Clar - Well, in the 1930's it wasn't much of an organization, if you measure against the dimensions of what it is at the present day. I went to work in 1927. I figure there were about 45 people. That was the total personnel all over the State, from Oregon and Mexico, and then a couple of years later it might have grown to 75, then up to 100. It was a poor organization and everything except one thing and that was the personal dedication of the field men.

Now the major work preformed by the Board was, of course, fire protection, and we use the word protection to include prevention and suppression. Matter of fact, there was relatively little prevention work. On Bird and Arbor Day most of the rangers went out and talked sometimes and most of them didn't like that. They were fire fighters. The State Forester, M. B. Pratt, who became Forester in the year 1921, I believe, was not a strong leader at all; and I would have to say not a good administrator. The Board of Forestry tried to establish a day-to-day policy or month-by-month policy as they were confronted with problems, and the State Forester rarely brought up many problems if he could avoid it.
I think I should first say that in the matter of fire protection it was almost mandatory as a part of law that there be a cooperator, someone to furnish part of the money. Counties were the great cooperators. There was some federal aid coming to the State through the Clarke-McNary Act and there were some funds from the Compulsory Patrol Act of 1923. But the point is, the relationship of the several counties and the State was of great importance. There was a very simple type of agreement which followed from the act of 1919 which provided for this cooperative fire protection, and there was no great system at arriving at agreements between the counties and the State.

About the only consistent thing about it was that the State would provide a ranger. He was a State employee. And he would take care of all the fire protection which might be wished in the area and for which the State and the county could put up money. Another aspect was .............

Fry- Was this staff limited to one ranger?

C - It was limited because there was no money. The next and most important helper was the ranger's wife. She was an unpaid assistant who did the dispatching and the State used to pay for a telephone in the home of the rangers. There were no offices. A few rangers might move in with the local Chamber of Commerce or something like that, or with the U. S. Forest Service if there happened to be a Forest Service office where the ranger was located, and that was generally in the county seat. As I say, the wives were the biggest helpers.

And then there was a little county money provided to buy a fire truck or build a lookout. There might not be
county money at all, it could just be an unofficial association--just a pass-the-hat situation, or possible a legally formed fire district. Then money might be provided to provide a patrolman or a fire truck driver for four or five months or a lookout for six months. That sort of thing.

This system of cooperation had one benefit I must admit. Even as crude as it was it allowed for flexibility to meet the various situations throughout the State. It had a couple of very great weaknesses. One was that it was fundamentally a matching concept. You see, the State of California earned Federal aid in competition with other States of the Union. In other words, there was so much on the dollar and if the State spent - or certified - that a dollar had been spent it might earn 15 cents or 20 cents a year. I hesitated there and said certified because the State Forester could certify that a lumber company or a Fire District or some other party had made an expenditure for fire protection (not including suppression incidentally, but for protection) that is, to build a lookout, buy a fire truck and that sort of thing. And these certified expenditures during a previous calendar year would earn a certain share of the Clarke-McNary money appropriated for the following year. And then it got even worse, you might say, because sometimes the counties, probably egged on by the local State ranger, would make deals for example, if they built a lookout would the State try to get money to man it. So it began to develop that the richer counties which had an interest in fire protection would put up more money.
And that might seem reasonable until you consider probably the greater need from a general public standpoint (as you consider general value watersheds and timber-bearing land) was, for the most part, in the poorer counties.

Up along the Mother Lode was probably the finest second growth pine area in the world, and the watershed areas where there was thin population and very little in economic development and generally poor counties struggling to provide schools and roads and that sort of thing. They couldn't match money to accomplish the need that you would get out of Southern California, where the people, and especially the people's government - the counties, cities and the districts, and so forth, had a much greater appreciation for fire protection because they had come to recognize the true value of the covered watersheds and also they saw the structural material, the industrial loss, caused by fire. So they had no objection to spending rather considerable sums of money from their county General Fund or district fund; whereas, throughout a great part of Northern California many people were positively against fire protection for a number of reasons. They were stock people, hunters, etc., and their grandfathers told them the land should be burned. So that many things were working against what you might call a consistent forest policy for the State.

F - I want to get one thing straight now. Do you mean the richer counties who could put more matching money would in turn get the Clarke-McNary fund expended on the ratio? So them who gave more, got more?
C - Yes. The Sanford Plan of 1932 or 1933 was born out of desperation in the depth of the depression when Roland Vandegrift, the Legislative Analyst, excuse me, he was the Auditor, he is now called the Legislative Analyst (the position which Allen Post now fills, at that time was Legislative Auditor). No, I am going to have to change that statement.

He, at that time was the Director of Finance in the cabinet of Governor Rolph. He was later Legislative Auditor.

F - You are talking about Vandegrift?

C - I am talking about Vandegrift who insisted that State money be spent carefully if at all, and here in forestry there was no very clean policy. There was no policy because the Board hadn't come to real serious grips with this and other problems and especially this distribution of money resource, and the State Forester hadn't certainly considered it very seriously. Now, this particular condition, I would like to point out, is quite important because what I had to do -- what I did do in rectifying that situation I can consider my one single worth-while contribution to the people of California -- wasn't easy for some other people to take, but the idea still perseveres and I think I can point to that as proof that it was worthwhile.

But at any rate, you can see that there was this county-against-county proposition and county against the State, because the ranger out there saw in the county funds and other local funds his opportunity to build the organization...
which he truly needed, there is no question about that.

F - You mean the county organization?
C - The whole organization the whole fire protection system needed tremendous building-up. And you figure here a million dollars may be spent along about 1927 as against the 30 million in fire protection now. Well, dollar values haven't changed that much. There was a great need then and there was no way of getting the money required until the population as a whole had been educated where until local people, who could prevail upon local government, took action to get the money that the Ranger obviously needed. He could point out where a lookout would help look into certain countries where there were many fires, or he could show by insurance reductions where a fire truck would pay in grain area and that sort of thing if counties would keep increasing money.

But the major point I started to make was that this State-paid Ranger was in a position to play the State against the county, and as a matter of fact, many of these men were selected from the local community by Civil Service, a rather crude type of Civil Service, but nonetheless they were formally selected to work for the State and in coming from local communities their loyalty was entirely to this local community. I have sat in meetings where our State Rangers were testifying and they would get up and introduce themselves as the County Firewarden of this or that county. You see that doesn't tend to make a unified organization especially when in response to some ranger asking for a fire truck or some tools for his area the State Forester would say, "See if you can't get it out of County money." He should have been going across the
street and buttonholing some legislators over there in the legislature.

F - It was Pratt's attitude of kind of "hands offishness" that actually encouraged this little....?

C - Yes, very much so. And the Chief Deputy State Forester, Rider, was a very conservative type of person and sort of abhorred spending public money for anything. He was a sort of a general manager, sort of a tight-fisted manager and I am sure they wanted to keep the organization small insofar as the expenditure of money was involved. In fact, I am quite sure that if I.....

F - What was the purpose of that?

C - I think just their philosophy. It could be controlled from one source by people who wanted to control the organization single handedly. And I think too, that neither one of them were--they were certainly not trained administrators, that's the first thing. The idea of thinking out a plan and then delegating the responsibility hadn't occurred to either of them. Of course, the responsibility was delegated and the man on the ground had to then, very much as now, had to make his own judgments. But the point is that then he was not given any guidelines at all. Now we try to develop these guidelines by providing the training. Of course, it is a very much more complex job now. These old-time rangers, as I say were very dedicated men. They would walk and work on a fire until they dropped, and say nothing about it. When they regained consciousness they would get some food and they would be ready to be on their way. It was part of the work.
But yet they couldn't hold their own against the foremen we hire now. They are just another class and they were working under different conditions, and they can't easily be compared.

F - Let me get tied in on your vantage point right here in the early 1930's. You were in what position?

C - Well, of course, I went to work in August of 1927 as a ranger, because there were no other positions. It was called a State Fire Ranger; and I was soon called Ranger-at-Large. I was supposed to be working out of the Sacramento Office. There were about half-a-dozen people there including clerks, the State Forester and his Deputy and one Inspector. I was immediately assigned to the California Forest Experiment Station which had been established on the year before in 1926. I spent about 3 1/2 years mapping the vegetation of this State.

F - Was this as a State employee?

C - Yes, a State employee, paid by the State, but I was wandering around. Now, sometimes I would enlist the assistance of state rangers. Most of the time I was working with some young fellow hired by the Forest Experiment Station. This was under the direction of A. E. Wieslander, who was director of this work. And incidentally, I went into the school, I guess it was still a division at this time, in the university, had a talk with Dean Mulford and he said that in all his experience he had never had a student who had such an opportunity in a post graduate course for administration in forestry work in California as I was getting in this type mapping; and I can certainly agree. I was out for months at a time, I didn't sleep in a
bed and cooked out and traveled continuously so I did develop a knowledge of the flora of California, the geography in general, the economics, the use of maps. And I stored it all in my head and also the people I met—which was a great value throughout my career.

Only of late years have I forgotten what California looks like (and sometimes I think it is just as well). I should say that from time to time I did have special assignments. In 1927 I went with a party and we cruised and mapped what is presently known as Latour State Forest. It was an exchange of State school land with U.S. Forest Service land and I also was called into the office to do some spot mapping of fires at the request of Doctor Pardee, who was Chairman of the Board of Forestry. And I suspect very strongly that this was the first time that anybody had ever spotted on maps the fire problem confronting the Division of Forestry.

F - Is that right?
C - Yes, and of course, I did a great deal of that later. In the year of 1931 I was pulled off this type mapping and was sent to Mendocino County as sort of an observer to work on the—what was called Agricultural Clearing, that is to say, the burning of brush and whatever timber got in the way. It was not a successful project.

F - That is an innocuous sounding task. I bet it was inflammatory in many ways.

C - Well, it put me in a nervous collapse I should say, a highly emotional thing, and that was incidentally the major reason for what I would call its failure. These people didn't have the slightest interest in learning anything about the value
of burning or not burning vegetation. They knew. Their ancestors had told them, and they had set enough fires to know that it would kill the rattlesnakes and did everything else. Of course, it produced sheep feed and it produced browse for deer. And it was generally thought to be a fine thing to do, and still is to a great extent in that part of the world.

F - What was your message to them--not to get them to burn at all --or to control the burning?

C - I really didn't go to give them a message, because they weren't interested in any gospel tidings. I was trying to make some records, you might say. This was a very much of a half-baked research project to make some records of the accomplishment on the areas they were burning. For their part, the people in general and their associations and the people who represented them, including the Board of Supervisors--they felt that government didn't want them to burn. And now I think I can be on solid ground. Many years ago the U.S. Forest Service hired a psychologist and sent him into the Southern States and he came up with the conclusion that many of their incendiary fires--and they had them by tens of thousands--were caused by people who were unhappy. Because of their economic situation they were getting even with somebody, and who is better to get even with somebody than the government? And you have a great deal of that; you did have it in California, as well as just a way of life. Now, in my childhood over in Sonoma County, if we saw a game warden driving down the road or coming in on the train it was our duty to pass the word...
that a game warden was in the country. It was a religious
duty. You see, these people had a duty to set fire to things,
and it was a joke that anybody wanted to put them out — until
the barn caught fire and then they wanted some help. So
that's where I was in 1931.

F - So did they consider you as a snoop in this, when you were
trying to find out the lands they were burning?

C - No, most of them knew why I was there. It is a little dif­
ficult to answer your question because it happened that some
of the oldtime personnel, local personnel, of our organization,
were quite sympathetic to the people and their policies, and
that made it uncomfortable. As a matter of fact, the person
most in that category was retired for "medical disabilities"
shortly after I made a report and a few other people made a
report of this particular case. So I wouldn't say that I was
regarded as a snoop. There was one part of Mendocino County
that was called the Tomki country where, it didn't happen to
me, but it was commonly said that the people would sic the
dogs on anybody that looked like a forest ranger. And whether
if game wardens went in there, I don't know about. But I
presume that it is much improved. But you see, many of these
rangers, they lived there with those people and many of them
believed quite as much in the burning as the people who owned
the land.

And of course, speaking of land ownership, you have
to remember that some of the most emotional advocates of burn­
ing don't own the land they want to burn. It might be public
domain or Federal Forest Service land or what not, you see.
But any time they had a flare-up of fires, I don't know how
it was in the Bay papers, but in the Sacramento Bee (where
they feature letters to the editor) you will see letters one after the other condemning the Forest Service. They say—how stupid can they get after all these years that they haven't found out that all you have to do is burn off the country and they won't have any more big fires. And you know, I've never seen anybody ever answer any of those letters. They are easy to answer, but there would be nothing accomplished because surely the people that write them don't own the land and in their general statements they are including a lot of land owned by timber companies who would shoot them if they ever caught them setting fire to the land, you see, so why get excited about it. It blows over.

F - Their concern is that although they don't own the land, they can get grazing permits?

C - Oh, excuse me, many people, stock men, sheep men, own great areas of land which is of a quality because of the water or the soil that grows brush more easily than browse plants. Now, many brush species produce pretty good browse, especially for sheep, and if you were a member of a deer hunting club, let's say, in Lake County or Mendocino County, or in the big Chamise fields you would like nothing better than about year old or two year old chamise sprouting after a fire because you would have open country where you could see the bucks and the bucks would be there because they would browse in the chamise, you see.

F - So it was primarily hunters, then for the hunting that.....?

C - No, I don't want to say that. There were many reasons for fires starting but we were talking about this land clearing.
Now fire can be used very legitimately for land clearing through the supervision of our organization. There have been many thousands of acres, possibly 100,000 in the last decade, but, the people have some professional advice on how to convert the brush to grass species. They often use bulldozers to bulldoze down part of the brush, or they may add chemical fertilizers or they may use chemicals to kill the brush before it is burned and they have a plan of reburning at certain times, you see.

Now, this sensible approach occurred after the Warren Administration came into office. This is one of the things that Swede Nelson, the State Forester, handled personally with the Board of Forestry and in getting the cooperation of responsible stockmen--and many stockmen were responsible, but you see heretofore there was just the butting of heads and little was accomplished. Some of the stockmen making outlandish claims and some of the foresters, non-owners, I suppose, were making claims almost as outlandish about the terrific soil erosion and the watershed loss, and that sort of thing. But just consider watershed. Suppose you did have a valuable brush watershed above a lake, let's say, or a reservoir, some 2,000 acres you wanted there. Who is paying you to keep that brush on there? You may want to burn it to persuade some deer to come there, or even have a little hunting lodge, or you might make money and have your friends there. Or you might be a perfectly legitimate sheep man. Just why should you think about the general public value of that watershed? There is a prime question and that isn't solved yet.
That is sort of a side issue in many Redwood Parks.

Just yesterday I read in the paper about somebody recommending that a certain area be purchased around the Rockefeller Grove Redwoods in order to keep it from being logged and in order to protect the watershed of that park. So, gradually I think the regulations on harvesting will squeeze in on the lumberman so that they must make more provisions to prevent erosion. It is quite normal that you would have accelerated soil erosion after you remove this high protective cover. But who is paying the lumberman for it? Eventually, if he is going to have to do it, he is going to get it in the profits that he gets from the lumber, or he may make some gesture just to keep the public off his back. Maybe the next fellow 40 miles away, over a bunch of hills where nobody sees him, can go ahead and log any way. People have been logging a long time.

This is an extremely complex area and anyone should be cautious about making very solid, firm, remarks about what does and doesn't happen. Beware of simplifying things. But of course, I believe that where you have an emotional situation, whether it is in the purchase of parks or in burning brush, the more emotional it becomes the less reason is displayed, and the more firm the parties on each side of the fence become as to what is right and wrong.

F - So you carried on the research project for how long?
C - Just the year of 1931. And then you see, we got into the labor camps of the winter of 1931.
F - Oh yes. Now you were working with labor camps while the Sanford Plan was just getting under way?
Actually I was put into Sacramento to be a sort of a little of everything. I took up the so-called Chapter Three-Thirteen of 1923, the collection duties under the Compulsory Patrol Act. That was sort of a miserable job because people didn't like the idea. And I made up the annual fire statistics and handled whatever problems there were in Clarke-McNary and then when Sanford came along he found my recent experience of nearly four years in type-mapping to be quite valuable. I am quite sure that he will acknowledge that any time. We worked together, as he needed me or as I could help him, and then with the labor camps he got out into those camps and was sort of diverted from his project, but that leads into the story of Black vs. Pratt.

I didn't spend a great deal of time in the labor camps. I was just sent out, Bill Rider sent everybody out. And there was no money, of course. It had been a pretty severe fire season and our people, the rangers didn't get any vacation. They weren't much for vacation anyway, these people. They generally went hunting for two or three days and considered they had a vacation. There were no working hours. This is a prime thing to remember now. In the field the work was there seven days a week.

In this type-mapping job, incidently, I was married in 1928 (my wife would be proud of me for remembering that) but it just happened that I was almost caught in the San Franciscuito Canyon when the dam broke there, and I was married shortly afterwards so I put those two dates together. Two calamities? Let's see--I lost my point---
Editorial Addendum: The point was about hours of work. On field assignments, other than fire suppression, an employee was expected to work six days a week from daylight until dark if necessary. We type-mappers commonly worked 13 consecutive days and took two off. Young brides sometimes considered themselves neglected. C.R.C.

F - I was sitting here wondering if this were the correct place to ask you if it wasn't a little unusual for an organization like CFPA [California Forest Protective Association] to be the one who received the Clarke-McNary funds and dispense them? Is that correct?

C - No, I think you are a little too generous with the federal aid money. What they did receive.....first, I would say that the very astute Mr. Black saw to it that lumber companies, a few of the big lumber companies, did get a return of federal aid that they had earned. Now do you understand this earning? You spend a dollar and then you split up the "pot" the next year.

F - Like matching?

C - No, hardly a matching. It depends on what the "pot" is as it gets to California and then it is broken up there. Even the U. S. Forest Service, you see, earned part of the Clarke-McNary money for protecting private land, but what Black said was this: the money received (prior to--I guess--the second time he and
Pratt got into a fuss) what he got was the earning on the Compulsory Patrol Collections. Now you see, this act of 1923 which was a typical Richardson Law (although as an individual I don't think he had anything to do with it) by that I mean that money didn't come out of the State Treasury and therefore it was all right with him [Richardson] and it went towards this State job of fire protection. But this law said that "if you can't furnish a fire patrol for lands bearing pine timber which you may own, the State Forester shall do it and he may collect a fee." And it made a maximum sum and it was generally 1 1/2 cents an acre that we collected.

The small people under this plan saw no value in the timber. And it had very little economic value, and sometimes there would be very little timber, but it would be just in the pay zone, and when they received this bill, some of them were unhappy and hostile and some refused to pay it, and even now, occasionally, we receive a small check which goes into the State Treasury to clear a lien on property owned up in the foothills, where people said, "No, by golly! We won't pay." They are now getting hundreds of dollars where the land was worth dollars before, so $2.82 doesn't bother them too much to clear a lien.

F - This was the money that Black.......?

C - He said: these are timber people and I represent the timber people. Now that was a pretty farfetched thing because those timber people didn't know then he represented the big lumbermen in the association. But he just made this sweeping claim and this money was allotted to the association. I can't say
how much money it was; I will say this......

F - You mean the money which these small owners gave on the Compulsory Patrol fee was used as a basis for earning more Clarke-McNary money?

C - Yes, the money itself came into the State Treasury, and it was put into the fund, and that fund was appropriated back to the organization, to the State Forester, and used for fire protection work. In looking at budgets of that time you have to be careful if you really wanted to see what came out of the General Fund, that you are not confused with Clarke-McNary earning, the Compulsory collection, or county money that might have been sent into the State Treasury by virtue of the cooperative agreement. It gets pretty complex there.

F - So there was a number of so-called certified sources then, which were used to earn Clark-McNary money?

C - Yes.

F - And this kitty that Rex Black talks about was just one.

C - Yes, that was one of them. But I do want to say sooner or later, that from the kitty he gave me an opportunity to start some legitimate planning of a fire protection organization. That I don't want to omit in any reference to Mr. Black.

F - So we got the Sanford Plan.....

C - Oh yes, that was right. We were talking about the Sanford Plan. Sanford left for another job before that was finished. Well, the essence of the Sanford Plan was, of course, to look at these sources of funds, to generally zone the areas of the State where the State of California should have some primary responsibility for fire protection, and there were a couple of
these zones. I really should say there were a great many more than that if you considered the weighting of the values. You see, there was mature timber and young timber and watersheds of different values, brush fields of relatively low values, State Park land for instance, was given high value. In other words, there was weighted land areas from a fire standpoint.

F - And these were largely arrived at by vegetation types, plus the elevation-terrain?

C - The flammable economic values—as affected by burning conditions—that is to say, you could have a very valuable chamise watershed in Riverside County or San Bernardino County, and if you transposed that same piece of land up into the center of Lake County, the ranger wouldn't even go out there and try to put out a fire, you see, it is hopeless, it has a negative value there you see. And as a matter of fact, in Southern California some of it had a negative value. For instance at the bottom edge of a National Forest the fringe of flammable brush was like a fuse to sweep fires up and into the National Forest. Even there, if you could afford to destroy it, it would have been more valuable than spending two or three or up to thirty dollars I guess, as they do now, to protect it.

That was the essence of the Sanford Plan. I had the job of doing the computing as to who got what. Most of the rangers were suspicious of the whole thing. I don't know exactly why. We would lay it out for them but I think it was
just too complicated. And one thing that we found out very promptly was that there wasn't enough money. It reminds me of one time I went to a party and heard some housewives talking, and one of them said "I just can't get along on a budget, just can't get along on a budget. I can't buy what I need. And the other woman said, "well why not?" And she said, "well there just isn't enough money to get along."

And that is just what we had there insofar as the poor counties were concerned. The first thing that was done was the pooling of money. After the Federal earning on the County money and the various other allotments that we had were allotted to the several county ranger units, then there was a pool left over, and this was to be divided up on the basis of this need as indicated by the weighted land areas. Well, when that happened in counties like Yuba, being a small county, it might not have enough money to hardly pay the State Ranger's salary. This took all the money.

There wasn't any money left over except possibly $200,000 or $100,000 used for a fire emergency fund, which was appropriated as an emergency fund, you see, and not to be used otherwise. And there is a point that I could go into further too, because Deputy State Forester Coupe as Fire Chief began to build up an organization by using this emergency fund but I think I had better go back into the Sanford Plan a moment.

So, in order to give these small counties even a minimum, there was a flat allotment taken out of the pool for every county and then the residue was divided according to the
weighted averages. And that in itself should have proved something. It could have proved that the small counties were too small to be efficiently run, although at that time the political consideration of a county, as such, was much more important than it is now.

We actually don't put too much weight on that in establishing the boundaries of a Ranger Unit. Now we carefully don't talk about county units in our organization, they are called Ranger Units, and we deliberately avoid the term "county".

As I say, I did the computing for the Sanford Plan and rangers were told what they would get and many of them didn't like it. They would come in and challenge me to prove that I wasn't cheating them. I was just a small boy in the back room all this time. Chief Deputy Rider pretty much ran the organization and this strong Fire Chief Coupe who had been a federal ranger and for most of his career and was a very able man. As a matter of fact, he listened to me when I explained to him that I thought I could lay out some firm plans indicating where lookouts should be and where assistant rangers, or crews and fire trucks and that sort of thing should be. This was in the year of 1934. Of course, the big depression following the 1929 crash brought about many other things than the Sanford Plan.

We spoke a little about the labor camps. These were unique to California. These camps were set up where transient men could come and work and get their food and no wages paid. This was during two winters--1931-32 and 1932-33.
The Civilian Conservation Corp Program under the ECW, Emergency Conservation Work, fund and program, began in the spring of 1933. Some people like to claim that this was patterned after the State Labor Camps, and possibly it was; this is a moot question. But, at any rate, here was a great wild land with a tremendous amount of work that could be done for the general good, and California was ready to accept their camps. Many of these CCC Camps were built in the National Forest and at the peak of the program there were 38 camps under the general supervision of the State Forester. He was termed a collaborator with the U. S. Forest Service. A special accounting office was set up and a great many projects were started, such as the big Ponderosa Way, which S.B. Show, the Regional Forester, no doubt dreamed up. This 800 mile firebreak ran along the base of the Sierra Nevada from Mariposa or Tulare County to Trinity. Many lookouts were built and residences and stations and barracks, and so forth. There had to be some planning for this. I remember when these camps were being built and our rangers were asked to lay out projects that were needed. It was most interesting to see how narrowly they planned—the low sights they set. We were a poverty stricken organization and before this time if a ranger wanted to build a telephone line badly enough he might go out and persuade a bunch of farmers to go in with him to build a farmer line; or someone would be tearing down an old line and he would go and salvage the wire, and it was just a hand-to-mouth proposition. So when they were asked to plan for putting really thousands of young men to work our sights
weren't high enough.

There were a few technicians engaged in the planning, there were a few architects hired in the central offices to design good buildings for lookouts, and ranger stations and that sort of thing, and there were some, sort of half qualified engineers--truck trail locators and that sort of thing in the camps and occasionally a good engineer. At any rate, there had to be some of this physical planning, you might say, or planning for physical works, in order to get along on this big CCC program. At the same time, of course, these boys were made available for fire protection, and that sort of raised the living standards, you might say, of this organization which had had practically nothing--just one man in the county who had a little emergency money so he could hire some pickup people if he had a fire. Now there was this backlog of crews.

I might say in passing, that this organization was paid from Federal funds. This pushed the State organization, 20 or 30 years beyond what could be anticipated, if it hadn't been inaugurated. It didn't make any special demands upon the Board of Forestry or the State Forester or the State of California to get its own house in order. What was asked was that all the States maintain these physical improvements that were established from Federal funds. Now that is an interesting point; and I heard Vandegrift declare that the State did not promise it. It was said that Governor Rolph had. I have a copy of a telegram in my possession which acknowledged that he had talked to the legislature about it; but Vandegrift said he would never let his Governor promise to do something like
that, to sort of, contract ahead and encumber the State with
a burden like that. But at any rate, the State has main­
tained them, of course.

At the forest experiment station, a few people did
some fundamental planning in such things as detection—the
location of lookouts. And they set up a school up at Mt.
Shasta, and I was permitted to go to that school for several
weeks and we tried to get down the scientific principles on
the location of lookouts; to study fire history of an area;
to map visible areas from potential lookout points; to es­
tablish relative mathematical values of potential lookout sites
based upon the anticipated number of fires that could be seen
from one point as against another. After a number of young
foresters had mapped and surveyed all the potential peaks in
the National Forests, I persuaded the Region, especially through
Jay Price who was the Assistant Regional Forester — the so­
called Clarke-McNary Inspector, and a very able man, admired
by everyone. He died here in Phoenix some five years ago.
But he was a quiet, strong person who had influence for good
over the State Forester. And many things were done which
should be done because Jay very quietly said "Merritt, I
think you should do this." I remember one time when I was in­
structed to take a man to the hospital in San Francisco with
a badly burned leg. The State Forester said, "You'd better
take care of that", but Jay said, "Merritt, I think he should
be taken to a hospital". And so the order was given and I
took him.

At any rate, my point was that these crews of
youngsters, boys that I knew and some I had gone to school with were then really turned over to me to give directions. Now I was just a technician yet, understand, I was just a boy in the back room. There was a Chief Deputy and the State Forester and there was a pretty strong, independent Fire Chief running things out on-the-ground. This was just a sample of the sort of dissension. The strong men were rising down in the ranks and there wasn't a strong man at the top to hold them down. I certainly wasn't one of those strong men, I was the technical force; that is how I happened to be where I was.

F - Now you talked to Jay Price....?

C - Well, I talked to him often about many problems but he was quite willing to do whatever was necessary to—I suppose—devote funds, from this emergency problem, which might have gone elsewhere, into a perfectly logical and entirely legitimate field, this particular thing. And Coupe and I, Coupe the Fire Chief, and Jay, worked to get these potential lookout peaks mapped. I don't know how many were mapped by us, but it was quite an interdependent thing. Before that project, we had about 30 lookouts, and then we would have conferences to which rangers were brought in. These peaks, the visible areas, would be overlaid, superimposed on one another, and the mathematical values were related. That is to say, you would have one high peak, I mean one high priority peak, if you say we will start here, like Mt. St. Helena, then the process was to slide others under that visible area from Mt. St. Helena. The other visible areas were then taken from what St. Helena saw, you see.
So by that method you could move best geographically and mathematically—schematically—from one peak to another and make a determination of the relative value. And through that method we determined that we at least needed to double our lookout system. And that came to pass, eventually, in accord with that plan.

Well, I don't know whether I got the idea that fire station sites should be established the same way. I think these things sort of grow up in the same way in different places. It could have been that other people were using the method, but I can't remember anybody telling me about it. But I got an idea that if you knew how far you can travel from one of these points at a given time you could get a comparison of various places, cross roads and that sort of thing. So I got one of the old-timers from the Mother Lode Country in the office and I said to him "How far can you go up this road in 15 minutes, half hour, an hour; how far could you go up that road." We made these things [travel areas] like spider webs, you know, and asked Coupe to come in and look at them. He was rather impressed. Here we had a picture of the relative value from the time standpoint and, of course, proper forest fire control is related to elapsed time just as city fire protection is so related.

F - Was the Forest Service cooperative in some of this too at the same time? Since it was Statewide?

C - Well, they had their own show. They were doing things, you see, we sort of trailed along behind. We were a very small brother to the Forest Service. We sort of waited until they
did what they wished and then we pretty much could get the crumbs. However, there was always a close working relationship. Once in a while some jealousies, but nothing very serious. They were a rich organization. I might say that later the publication of our book "Principles of Forest Fire Management" had a tremendous morale boasting factor within our organization. It is still felt, I think. This was in 1954. Because it was recognized as a valuable production in its own line and it did not come from the U.S. Forest Service. It wasn't borrowed. Some of our local boys had made good, and it was highly appreciated. Well, I am off the subject of the planning.

But at any rate, I explained this idea for planning crew sites to Coupe one time. He was going up to a Board meeting to be held in Oroville, and he went up there and tried to explain it to the Board, they didn't have time to listen. He came back and told me that the State Forester wasn't interested in it, and that Black had said that he would like to hear about it. I believe that it was the next day that Black came into my little back room office and said "What is it that you want to do?" Now Black was Chairman of the Board, I believe at that time, I am quite sure he was. So I showed him, layed it out, and he said, "How many men do you want?" And I said, "Well, three or four; I don't want some of these politicians that you have been putting in the conservation camps on some of these special jobs". And he said, "Good enough."

So I am quite sure that he set aside enough money
from this kitty to pay for a couple of men and sort of made a deal with the Board of Forestry I think, in regular session; it's in the minutes. I wasn't there at the time but he said the Board should see that the State Forester gets two more men beside, to help Clar to do this planning. And then we set up what was then the technical office and we just had the whole world in front of us, a bunch of young fellows with more work than a great crew could do in a century, and we just didn't know what way to start. We were ambitious. This was the first time we had a chance to get loose. I should say that by this time there were, in number, maybe 20 technically trained men including the present State Forester and some of our Deputies and the present Chief Deputy State Forester. They were sort of all my boys. The first thing that we found out when we went out into the field to make a study where things were quite needed, I am quite sure it was Yuba County, the boys came in and said, "This is a good idea, but we can't do anything about it because we need a map to work on. It just takes too much time to make our own maps as we go along." So that led us into the map making business, and we are still in it. It required the making of well projected maps and we therefore have had to make our own administrative maps.

So that is how this master fire plan, as we called it, got started. The strange thing is that Coupe never did like what we were doing because it cut into his independence in establishing crews as he wished them. And Black opposed the various supplemental budget plans which were based upon
this same planning; a rather paradoxical situation. I don't quite yet understand how Black, who was a very straightforward thinker and a doer, did in fact allow me (I think I was called a Forest Examiner then or I might have been a Technician, I don't know) to get going with this.

Of course, I did other things on the side. I hadn't dropped all of the other routine jobs, fire statistics and so forth. However, now there was a chance to get people paid from the Emergency Conservation Works Program and also at that time there was a program for youths. I believe that was NIRA, National Industrial Rehabilitation Association [?]; we got some boys out of that. I think we did not ever get any out of the SERA programs, the State Relief Administration. This business of administering relief to the unemployed by employing them was a pretty chaotic thing in itself. But really not insofar as the CCC program went.

One of these youngsters that I got in the youth program and who I didn't think too much of at the time, he was sort of a dreamer, but he is now the head of the Art Department of the Division of Highways involving these jobs of building models of bridges and over-passes and that sort of thing.

So we went on with our planning for roads, fire crews, and for more assistant rangers. We had a pretty good background of things needed but there was no use, practical use--made of this because, as I say, the State Forester didn't want to be placed in the position of trying to get more funds, or of
agitating anyone else. Fire Chief Coupe thought that he could handle his end of the work very well by himself, and he was a very able man. He just didn't think in these terms. It was all right to do the planning but no need to pay any attention to it after it was done.

I think I am correct in saying that Wendell Robie, a member of the Board of Forestry, probably took a first interest in it because I do know that I was not surprised when Mr. Pratt called me into his office, from way back in my back room. This was in April of 1938, after the Board had met at Bakersfield. He told me that the Board passed a resolution and they wanted a fire plan. I looked up that resolution and it said that the State Forester is requested to have his technical staff prepare a plan of fire protection and suppression, step-by-step, and place-by-place.

I must admit I can't remember implanting the idea in anybody's mind, but I was not shocked when I heard that. I was not even surprised when the State Forester said, "I would like to have you handle this, and I think you should write to the rangers and ask them what they need." And I said, "Mr. Pratt, I think that would not satisfy the Board." And he said, "What do they want?" And I said, "We have been planning for about four years and I think they would ask us to show them how that could work to improve fire protection, and what would really be needed." He said, "Well, go ahead."

So we had a crash program. In one months time we got out what was called a Projected Fire Protection Budget. This was 30 mimeographed pages. I suppose at that time the
organization spent in a year about one-half million dollars of the State's money, and you could add some federal aid, 130 or 140 thousand dollars, and these other small incomes, such as the Compulsory Patrol fee that we spoke about, and then, of course, in addition to that, whatever the counties put up. From that half million State expenditure we were suggesting that we would need about four and one-third million dollars. This was to buy vehicles and establish stations and that sort of thing. Rather a shocking request, but it indicates that there was a vital need. If you could compare that plan with what is being done now you could see that we weren't wild at all. In fact, some of the things are amusing when you read now what we asked for then.

F - Now they would seem so inadequate.....

C - Yes. And then, of course, the wages being paid were about 35 dollars a month for a firefighter or foreman. I think it was 25 dollars for a firefighter and 35 dollars for a foreman or something like that.

F - These were standby crews?

C - These were...yes. You said it, standby; 24-hours, 7 days a week; no fringe benefits. Well, the next two meetings of the Board of Forestry brought up this mimeographed plan that was handed to them and there were different ideas as to what was needed, and what wasn't needed. I remember Robie was a very strong-minded man, very conservative in politics if there ever was one. He is the owner and manager of the Auburn Lumber Company; institution over 100 years old. He was the recent Campaign Manager for Barry Goldwater up there, and I
think that in itself will bear out my statement that he was a conservative.

I will say this, though, early in his career on the Board of Forestry he became convinced that a great deal more was needed for the good of the general public as well as lumbermen and water companies. A great deal more was needed in wildland fire protection and he never varied from that opinion, and he worked hard at it and even when the State Chamber of Commerce, of which I am sure he was a member, and the Forest Protection Association opposed the bills that he drew up, he never varied from that opinion. I think he was the one who had most to do with getting a bill introduced for a proposed budget supplement. I think I should mention that after the two Board meetings following the April meeting. I was asked to come to Monterey in August of 1938. There in the San Carlos Hotel I presented the latest version of the plan after it had been shaken down here and there. This plan was now called a supplemental budget to the regular budget, and the sum of money that I determined was needed was a little over two million dollars and that would have been a request for the first biennium. Remember appropriations were made for two years. Robie was there; he was not Chairman of the Board, but he made the statement that he thought this was a fine plan, and then he tried to get George Nordenholt, the Director of the Department who was there, to admit that it was a good plan. I can remember quite vividly that Nordenholt was behind his newspaper and he grunted. He didn't like the idea of somebody else doing something--especially spending money.
But at any rate, Gordon Garland who was Speaker of the Assembly at the time—I am certain he was a couple of years later when I made my own appearance in the assembly chambers before the Legislature as a Committee of the Whole. Gordon Garland and seven other assemblymen with him introduced a bill in January, 1939, for a supplement to the regular biennial budget for the Division of Forestry. This sum that he asked for in the supplemental budget was exactly what this plan had shaken down to; a little over two million dollars, but I have forgotten the exact figures.

I think it is important to remember that we still were in the great depression here in 1939. When the bill was introduced the General Fund deficit was $37 million dollars and it was to go a lot higher, but that was pretty bad. I believe I was receiving part of my pay in a warrant that wasn't cashed until later. Things were pretty bad. The Chamber of Commerce opposed this bill and a lot of other people did. The strange thing is that the bill passed the Assembly, possibly through Garland's persuasion. Strange things happen over there. But the bill was killed in the Senate.

The Senate, I think it can be said, was a conservative body, and I am certain if you thought of bills related to forestry back into the earliest days of California State Government you will find that the Senate generally killed them. I guess the thing that interests me here is that the Senate was weighted in representation from the counties which this bill would benefit.
C - Yes, definitely, very much so. It is rarely the so-called cow counties, the timber counties, that produce the leaders in what you might call wildland conservation. If you go back you will find that it generally is city men who have some independent means or some other type of work, men who are not directly interested in forestry or water conservation who were the champions. Pinchot was a rich man's son. Millionaire Assemblyman Coleman really wrote and introduced the bill which created the Board of Forestry in 1885. And Dr. Pardee was, of course, was a physician and got into politics and was Mayor of Oakland; and why should he have been the great leader, in my opinion the patron saint of forest conservation of California?

F - At this point, was that compulsory patrol fee still being collected?

C - Yes, that wasn't repealed until 1941.

F - I see. So the land owners still had to pay that. And I guess they opposed this bill then because they didn't want taxes. In addition to that.....

C - I doubt if that made too much difference. You see, the patrol fee was a direct tax out of their pocket, even hit them a little closer than a county tax, whereas, when the State government pays out money or the Federal government, most people don't get excited too much about it.

I made a little side study of that in respect to the so-called separation of taxes in the 1911 constitutional amendment which pretty much established ad valorem property taxes alone as a source of revenue for cities and counties. I
think that a public utility tax was the principle State tax at that time. (This incidently arose from Pardee's clear understanding of taxation in 1903) I wanted to see what happened if the taxes, which were immediately visible to people out in the hinterlands as an advalorem tax, which had been the principle source of revenue for the State--if that Statewide use now disappeared, and they could see their taxes just going to roads and schools, the local things--if there was a change in the attitude of the legislature, as it was moved to act by the people in respect to appropriating money for such things as general fire protection. I could not observe that there was a ripple. It didn't make the slightest difference. But I don't know a great deal about taxes.

F - So at any rate, you don't think then, that these taxes would have made much difference in their attitudes?

C - No, I think the big general fund deficit, and of course it was not only a State deficit, but the sad plight of the counties--you see, some of the counties could not really meet the standards that they had set in our cooperative agreements in fire protection.

F - Oh, I see.

C - Low as the costs were, they were poverty stricken. You see, the so-called Okies were coming into the State and burdening the county hospitals and schools and law enforcement officers and all that. This was a pretty tragic situation. So there wasn't a lot of money to throw around like another two million dollars for fire protection; this wasn't a happy time to get these ideas. I still maintain that the money was necessary
but this was a hard time to get it. But, as I said, the bill did pass the Assembly, but was killed in the Senate. This was in January.....

F - Just a minute....Do you think the Governor would have signed it? This was Olson?

C - I believe he would have. Yes this was Olson. But now you see Robie went out as a Board member with the end of the Merriam Administration. Merriam, of course, was an extremely conservative individual. I doubt that he would have signed it at all. I think that....well, that's why George Nordenholt stayed behind his paper and said, "Ugh." You see, he was a Merriam man, and this two million dollars didn't look good to him. So that is why Robie carried it, and pushed it, and advertised it and the rest of us did too.

1939 was a very bad fire season, a lot of cost, and then that winter there were great floods and that reacted on the legislature and on us, and a lot of other people. You may remember that a fellow named Hitler sent some armies into Poland and that kind of stirred things up. And also, for some strange unhappy reason, somebody back in Washington decided that the CCC boys should not be used for the first suppression attack on fires. They could be called in after the fire was going but they were no longer to be used as a primary fire suppression force. I can't tell why that was done but it had an effect on our organization. It would be quite obvious that it would have an effect. Here was the first time that we really had an adequate fire force that
we could call on and it was being pulled away all of a sudden. And as you say, Culbert Olson took office, and unhappily, so far as the fiscal situation was concerned, he moved into about as bad a condition as anyone could imagine.

The legislature was primarily Republican and conservative, and it's my opinion that they were snapping at him all through his regime. I think he certainly made what I would call political administrative mistakes. Yet I do wish to hasten to add that the men he appointed in the Department of Natural Resources, that is, the Director and Deputy Director, were very congenial and able. Their whole effort was in the direction of improving our organization and I was happy to have worked with them. And I did work with them because they sort of picked me up out of the back room and placed a pretty heavy burden on me. One I didn't pick up entirely willingly, believe me.

F - As what?

C - Well, I had some plans--and the man who was selected as Deputy Director of the Department--a new position--Warner Marsh, had come from Los Angeles. He is still in Sacramento. He is a landscape architect and is a member of the local Planning Commission. I don't know what it is called, they deal especially in State buildings. Warner, as I say, was an idea man. He'd come up from Southern California and he got hold of me first, by accident. I went out to the desk to answer a few questions of a woman visitor. She wanted to know "everything about forestry." I explained that that would be pretty difficult. About the time she had finished asking me questions
and I had just about exhausted my knowledge she told me that someone would call on me and she left her husband's card. She was the wife of a newly elected Assemblyman from Los Angeles. He was a member of this "Olson family" which sort of took over.

And the man did call on me. He was to be the new Deputy Director (but at that time was the first new Board member). He was quite interested in these plans I had and then a very.....

F - This was Mr. Marsh?
C - Yes, Marsh. And then a very vivacious youngster named Carl Sugar was made Chairman of the Board of Forestry. He had had a little experience working in the fire crew in San Bernardino County and has been running fast ever since. He has made a lot of money in land development and pretty nearly every thing that he got into but he never shows the slightest interest in money. He's doing things. And right now he is one of the faculty over in the University of Nevada under the big Fleishman-grant, teaching a little bit of everything about conservation. He should be retired but he never will be. He is in these things all the time.

He came in as a rather brash young Chairman of the Board of Forestry and he was going to clean things up. I remember the first meeting of the Board and I was called in and he said, "Well, am I really working around here now?" and I said, "I guess you are. You took the Oath of office." And he said, "I want a bed roll, I am going out to see the boys". That shocked me a little bit. But he was definitely not what we used to call at that time a "red light and siren boy".
You know in fire business you have people who just have to have a red light and a siren. They don't want to go to fires but they need this for prestige purposes. But he was not that type at all. He later left his position in order to do some investigating of personnel in the organization; and he preferred charges against some of them but he didn't get too far because it was a sort of wound-up...that I must say, was an indication of the unhappy personnel situation, the low morale, the....I would like to say, in my opinion, the lack of leadership on the part of the State Forester.

But the Olson Administration tried rather desperately to get the organization going in the right direction. I personally felt that some ideas put forth by some of the members were a bit wild. They were certainly trying. I think I can say honestly that they were harrassed unnecessarily at times by opposition. You see, anybody of a conservative nature wouldn't like what they were doing. The lumbering industry, State Chamber of Commerce, and so forth. Although the State Chamber of Commerce was persuaded to get into the act pretty heavily later on, and that leads me into the Fire Plan of 1940 which the Board of Forestry later called the Clar Plan.

It was the interest of Marsh and Sugar especially in bringing these ideas for technical steps--in establishing fire protection facilities and units of various sorts--it was their interest that permitted me to extend these studies. The Board in October 1939, at a meeting which I did not attend, actually named a committee. They made me chairman.

F - This was after that bad fire season then?
C - Yes, but it wasn't particularly that fire season that brought it about. It was just that we had a very chaotic organization. You might be interested in names of the committee. There was Jess Graves, who was an old-time ranger. He had been Sugar's boss years before when he worked for Los Angeles County. And there was Earl Barron who was an old-time fire stomper who was at this time Assistant Fire Chief; there was Cecil Metcalf who was Ranger of Tulare County at that time and later was District Deputy--good thinker, good, solid man. And myself as Chairman. Later Ed Miller, Ranger of San Diego County took Graves place when Graves was moved to another ranger district.

We were active for a couple of years. We went out and set up regional meetings. I think we had about eight regional meetings, and we invited the rangers to come in with a plan of what they needed. They put up maps on the wall and an outline of crews, assistant rangers, lookouts and what not. Of course, we had the so-called detection plan pretty well worked out by then, and we were following it. But these fellows had to get up before their neighbors, and their neighbors were pretty darned critical, as we were. We knew something about what should go in and we sort of beat out a consistent plan. We had maps of fire history, that is a spotting of history of past fires, and some of these travel studies from different points. So we had, you might say, a technical study, plus a great deal of field experience put together here in these conferences.

So we beat out this plan and we got their ideas. For instance, assistant rangers were an important position.
I remember when we went into the Lenhart Hotel in Sacramento and borrowed their mezzanine floor. There was a big table which salesman, I guess, used for display. We laid out a map of the State on a quarter-inch scale. That made a map twelve feet long. We used erasers of pencils, little red pencil erasers, and set them up on this map, clear down the State--oh, 150 or so, of desired assistant rangers locations, geographically. That was done largely on the basis of experience.

So, we did arrive at this Fire Plan of 1940, or the Clar Plan, and it was explained to the Board when it was about half through. I remember going in there, and the Board was very pleased with what we had. The Director at that time was Richard Sachse, a specialist in transportation. He was later on the State Railroad Commission. A Bavarian, a very able man, and a fine engineer. He was there and saw that the Board approved of this Plan and he asked the State Forester very pointedly if he approved of it. The State Forester said he approved of it in principle.

F - In principle....

C - That was all he got out of Mr. Pratt. Then Sachse told about how he talked to the Governor and that there would be an Extraordinary Session called because of the flood damage situation. The state of the General Fund was terrible at this time; about $68,000,000 in deficit. Nevertheless, Director Sachse did write a letter to the Governor on April 24, 1940, and requested that inasmuch as the Governor was planning the special session he urged him to enter another item in the session, a special supplemental bill for fire control. He asked
that $883,608 for one year, that is ending in June 1941, be asked for.

I can't remember if it was before or after that letter that I was taken over to the Governor's Office by Warner Marsh, Deputy Director, and gave a small talk to Governor Olson. He was very busy, and very harrassed. We caught him in an anti-room outside his main office. We came through a side door, an unmarked door. If you walked into the west entrance of the Capitol, into the corridor where the statue is, just immediately to the right of the main door, you will see an unmarked door and that used to be how the Governor sneaked off when things got too hot, I guess. But at any rate, I had a few maps there and I was talking as fast as I could about what we intended to do, why we needed the money, and how much it would cost and the Governor, I guess, was listening. But most of the time it seemed like his bodyguard was putting his overcoat on; and out the door he went. I got a much better shot at His Excellency a little later, though. But at any rate---

F - And you will tell us about that later on?
C - Well, I think so. Yes, I should indeed. There was considerable opposition towards this augmented plan. Some of it came out of Southern California. George Cecil, who had been the Forest Supervisor of the Angeles, and at this time he sort of was a public relations man, secretary of some association. I am sorry I can't remember the name of it; it was a pressure organization for more protection in the watersheds down there--especially in Los Angeles County. Cecil was a very powerful
citizen. And even Herbert Gilman, who had been on the Board of Forestry, these two didn't like the idea of such an expenditure with the budget in the state that it was in. And also, they felt, and wrongly, that they weren't getting their share of the money.

I think what they saw in front of them was an end to the days when they could get matching money from the State or from Clarke-McNary. This distribution of quite a considerable amount of money up in the timber counties where it was really needed—they didn't like. Actually, the need for fire protection in Southern California was recognized by the Committee in a perfectly fair way, and the southern people weren't loosing anything. Actually then were gaining.

Well, before I mention what happened to that bill, let me see, this was in 1940—that particular request to the Governor to have a bill for $883,600 introduced, I believe got no place in any special session. But a number of things did happen in the session. I don't want to go into it too deeply--there was $300,000 appropriated to make up for some other losses we had, and there was some $48,000 plus, to take care of flood losses and damaged roads and that sort of thing.

I would like to go back to this Fire Plan of 1940 and emphasize the fact that there were two prime elements in this plan. Most people who think about it now, or know anything about it, think it was merely making a determination of where these fire protection units should be established in order to equalize adequate or basic fire protection, the establishment in crews, lookouts and that sort of thing.
that was actually done, and it was done without any regard for the source of money to accomplish it. In other words, we did not say, well, Amador County puts up $2,000 and therefore it would be nice to have three crews there but you can only afford one. Money was utterly disregarded. We were trying to make a consistent fire protection scheme of units on the ground in accordance with need, and need was fundamentally a matter of the flammable values and fire conditions--fire risk and hazard. Risk means the potentiality of fires starting, and hazard means the difficulty of controlling the fire after it has started.

I say there were two prime factors. This designation of protection units was one, and the other was a positive segregation of land areas by political responsibility.

The idea consisted of establishing a part of the State, geographically, regardless of land ownership, where the State of California could be said to have a primary interest in forest and watershed fire protection. Or let's just say, an interest in fire protection. What is the interest? Well, it is the protection of State Parks, the protection of general watersheds, of timber, especially young timber. In what areas should the general tax payer's money be spent as against the areas where local interest should take care of the burden? The grain field is pretty much an individual farmer's own interest. It is pretty much like his house. Communities, fire districts, and cities have fire departments because they are efficient, not because the city owes you the protection of your house. You simply pay taxes and the city government
uses that money to hire some professionals because you can't stick around all day and all night to protect your house and your neighbor's house.

But in a case of the forest--let the people as a whole have an interest in the forest. If that were not true the State would have no business at all in having regulations in respect to harvesting, reforestation, and that sort of thing. Nor would the federal government or the State government have any right to use the general tax base to give fire protection, and insect control and such. And so it is with the watersheds.

Now, heretofore there had been this mixing of money. They put a ranger in a county and he got whatever he could and he'd put out fires generally where the people wanted and wherever they occurred. I set up this idea of having the State delineate where it would protect. We had incorporated cities. We could say they would have their responsibility. The federal government in the National Forest, and the National Parks would have their own responsibility. And then I said, if some other agency, government or private, wants the State Forester to protect any area that is not a State area, or if he wants to extend the forest protection, or if the agency wants to extend the protection into the winter months when there are no forest fires, then let that agency contract with and the State, specifying what it wants/pay the actual cost. That is what is done and has been done since about 1942 or 1943.

It seems very very simple. You would be amazed at the difficulty we had in explaining that to people. I taught my own rangers, excuse me, I shouldn't say my own rangers;
that is a term I developed when I became Chief Deputy. At this time I think I was called a Technician and I was tolerated by some of the rangers and generally liked by most of them. I thought they were laughing at me when I tried to explain this; it seemed so utterly simple. I don't know to this day if they were or not. I think they didn't understand; it was just too simple. And the reason that I think that, is that Mr. C.R. Tillotson, who succeeded Jay Price as the Clarke-McNary Inspector, was with us during the sessions. He heard this over and over again--our plan--he lived with it. He was one of the boys. He probably knew more State people than I did.

After we had made these tours I was in our office explaining this idea to Coupe or someone--about this segregation of responsibilities, and that we could never know what the State was supposed to do unless we knew what land the State was supposed to protect, and who had responsibility elsewhere. And the people I talked to looked kind of dumb or prejudiced or sarcastic or something. But Tillotson was a very serious able fellow--an old-timer in the Forest Service. He finally looked up and he said, "By God, Ray, that is a good idea and you stay with it".

Well, I was flabbergasted. He had heard this story over and over again throughout the entire State, in hotel rooms through the nights when these debates were going on, and it had just registered on him. I think it was so simple that these people who were used to matching State against county--matching funds wherever they could get it, catch as
can, didn't want to be interfered with too much in that system. Either they didn't understand it or they didn't want too. I suspect it was too simple for them to understand. If you tried to change it now I am sure there would be a revolution. I think that is because of the fact that that idea was put over and entered into the statutes in 1945--because it was a fact by then--the statute followed the fact.

This is the one outstanding thing I claim to have done for my organization, and I think for the people of California. Maybe, in a sense, it cost them a lot of money, but in my opinion, it was the keystone of an orderly organization in place of chaos.

Well, when the requests for appropriations were entered in that special session of the winter of 1940, nothing came of it. The Fire Plan hadn't been developed and Warner Marsh then conceived the idea of launching a publicity campaign. This was started in the fall of 1940. And this is where he brought in the State Chamber of Commerce. He persuaded them to sponsor dinner meetings. I want to be very clear--they did not sponsor the Plan. They sponsored the dinner meetings. And we had about fifteen such meetings from Yreka to San Diego, mostly county seats. The last one was in the Leamington Hotel in Oakland.

They started out where everybody made a speech of some kind but it wasn't very long before they all said something and then introduced me. I was sort of the party of the first part. We had a great number of maps showing the fire history and the way we planned lookouts. It got to be just a
show. We had flood lights and we set up this map rack and everybody would tell the wonderful things that I was going to tell them, and it got to just a regular show. I must say that it was some of the hardest work I ever did. In these darn meetings, where I would get awful tired of ham and peas, we would have to make this talk and then try to get enough sleep so we could get going the next day to get set up in some other town where the ranger generally had gathered in all his friends.

What really lent spice to the whole thing, and I didn't realize until after I was through—was that I enjoyed the general heckling. Every place we went they had things they didn't like about the organization. And we had enough sins so that when they were laid out in public some of them didn't look very good—just because of this lack of an orderly organization. But I, of course, knew enough about the organization and the particular area that I could anticipate their problems and lay back and wait for the slings and arrows to descend. I generally had all my answers all cooked up. So it got to be quite a game.

At any rate, we went on with this publicity campaign and in January of 1941 we persuaded Assemblyman Mike Burns, with the thick brogue, of Humboldt County, to introduce a bill for $1,171,505, again as a support bill. See, we had the bill of 1938 and then this request later of 1940, and now in 1941 in the regular session—$1,171,505, which was to be, we said, a third of what we really needed. This was in addition to the budget that we had of some million and a half for the biennium. Los Angeles wasn't getting much out of this
money and it wasn't very long before they got into the Assembly and amended our bill. This change said that whatever else we did we could only have 85% of the money to spend on the counties within the Division of Forestry. I can remember.......

F - Spent on the counties in the Division?
C - Yes, you see these were "outside counties"--these older counties - Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Ventura, Marin - had their own organizations and we sort of neglected to include them, at least they thought. And I think they were right. It wasn't good politics. We should have cut them in. We should have cut in Los Angeles for 10% of the whole thing--whether they needed it or not.

I just remembered another thing--there was a committee Assembly meeting on this bill and Mr. Fulton--Kenneth Fulton, the Director, went by my office and said, "I notice there is a hearing, come over and tell me what I am supposed to say". So I briefed him on the way over to the Capitol. He was a good listener and had a good mind and picked it up. I remember walking into this hearing room in the Capitol. They hadn't been called together by the Chairman. Mr. Cain of Sacramento, an Assemblyman, who was I guess pretty much of the Olson family saw Fulton; at any rate, they were good friends, and he came over and Fulton introduced me, and Cain said, "Why are you here Ken?" and Ken said, "We are over here to boost our bill." Cain put out his hand and said "Let me be the first to offer by sympathies."

There was that much chance of getting this by, and even old Mike Burns said later there is not a chance. He
said profanely but nevertheless to the point, "Boys, if Jesus Christ himself was ladin' the parade you'd never get that money." And we didn't.

F - What about this man, the Lieutenant Governor, what was his name, Patterson? At that time, I understand that he had a lot of pull and power.

C - I never observed that. I can simply tell you that he was much respected by parties in the Senate of all political faiths. He conducted a very business-like Senate. I cannot remember that he entered into anything that I had anything to do with. I used to hear more gossip about that administration because I was sort of hauled into it, you know. I was practically forced into the Chief Deputy's job by Marsh and by the Governor's campaign manager of the north coast area. And there was a great deal of opposition to my taking over the job. But I was sort of one of the boys. And I just can't tell you about Ellis Patterson, I think that is his name. I can remember him sitting in the Senate. I don't know, he may have had other interests, and that is why I didn't run across him.

At any rate, that bill introduced by Mike Burns for the $1,171,000 was killed in an Assembly committee. And it could have been in that very committee that Fulton and I attended was the death of it--very probably was, if it was killed in the first committee.

This was now in 1941 and we were talking up our need for money. We had mimeographed bulletins on this Fire Plan that we wanted to put out. In the meantime, there was a big war in Europe. The legislature created a Council of Defense
in 1941. The Attorney General, Mr. Warren, was made head of it. I have forgotten that title. And also Kenneth Fulton was an important member of some aspect of that committee; even while he was Director of Natural Resources. He had been the Governor's personal secretary and wrote a great majority of Olson's speeches. A very able, erudite man, and very well liked by all of us.

This year we did get an appropriation of over $105,000 because of the extra fire hazards caused by trailer camps and the influx of people around defense industries. And I suppose they had army camps booming then in 1941. But at any rate, we had this $105,000 to get some more men and fire trucks here and there. Also this year the Compulsory Patrol Act was killed and the Legislature appropriated $100,000 to offset that loss. I guess that would have been for the two years—$50,000 annually. And as I said before, we had a flood damage appropriation of $48,000.

It seemed like the legislature would immediately balk at anything in your budget, or anything new. They kept cutting and cutting the budget and then they would turn around and make these special appropriations because they pretty near had too. They were kind of going crazy.

In this Council of Defense the Division of Forestry was pretty heavily involved because we had a good fire department even without the several millions we said we needed. We certainly had a dispatching system and I think, most of all, our men had the confidence of everybody through-out the State. Our dedicated employees were known. And the people depended
on them. So they set up a system of general fire protection, especially coordination and dispatching, and we had a part to play.

We had a scheme for manning lookouts in the event of war reaching California. I used to attend these meetings with sheriffs and the FBI and other people on some of these plans. Of course, they were very much hush-hush classified. I don't think anybody used the term classified then. But they were quite confidential. Even among our own people we had difficulty. Some men would go to some of these meetings and be sworn to absolute secrecy and yet they are supposed to accomplish something by going back to their superiors and tell them what they wanted done. Sometimes that was a little odd. But then such things happen at times like that. Then, of course, came Pearl Harbor, December 11, no, December 7, 1941. We did put the lookouts on the hills. Some of them thought they saw enemy airplanes. We did pull trucks down from the mountains and put them around some of the cities. I can tell you quite positively, excuse me, don't let me be too positive because I wasn't there--I'm sure that the Army expected an attack to come and especially to hit San Francisco. Most Californians didn't know it, and there was no reason why they should have. I certainly was asked to get trucks down around the cities, and there was a reason for it.

Now, we had gone through a summer, you see. This was December. We had spent our money but as I said, I called some men back to work to man the lookouts, and lo and behold, I looked around and somebody told me I spent $38,000 that we didn't have. You know the Sovereign can do no wrong; only the Servants can do wrong, and I apparently was in the middle.
Somehow or other the State Forester didn't get involved in these things. Especially after Pearl Harbor he pretty much sat aside and let me handle anything that needed to be handled with the Legislature. I was very busy with Richard Graves who later ran for Governor. Graves at that time was appointed as kind of a civil defense chief. He didn't keep the job very long. Vandegrift was pretty potent as a legislative auditor at that time and we three spent a number of evenings at that time, excuse me, well into the night, after midnight up in the dome of the Capitol discussing budgets and what needed to be done. And also with legislative committees I spent a great deal of time.

I want to go back to the $38,000 I was speaking of and the legislative committees. The Senate Committee, I don't know whether it was Governmental Efficiency, or Finance, it doesn't really matter, they did generally the same thing. The old men of the Senate who were the undertakers for most of the legislation which cost some money. But I was called before them to explain by what authority I had ordered the expenditure of this money when it wasn't in the budget.

F - You mean this was during Pearl Harbor?

C - This was after Pearl Harbor, yes, and we had carried out the plan which the military knew about--and the Council of Defense knew about it. That, of course, is no excuse for practically embezzling State money. The constitution says you can't take money out of the Treasury except in due form after it's been duly appropriated for a purpose. And I guess that is what I did. I found it a little hard to answer; in fact,
there wasn't any answer. Even after I was told by the Chairman, I think it was Jerry Sewell of Placer County—This was "a friendly committee—just give a good explanation why this money was spent." I can say that I was embarrassed and I apparently looked dumb because one of the Senators said, "Mr. Warren, the Attorney General and head of Civil Defense is in the audience and perhaps he could tell the committee what he thinks of this." But what they didn't say is that if I was to be prosecuted for misapplication or misappropriation of State funds, he was the man to do it.

Mr. Warren stood up and said "Gentlemen, I think this young man did the right thing under the circumstances, and this was a very unusual circumstance." He sat down and the committee smiled and I was dismissed. I suppose Mr. Warren forgot the incident but people don't let him forget that he also was faced with an unusual condition when he had the Japanese transported to the camps. Well, so much for that little thing.

I had the burden of meeting with these legislative committees. The National Board of Fire Underwriters became pretty potent at this time. They brought over an English London fireman who gave some talks about what was happening in Europe on account of the bombing. And I was in these things as I say, in and out....

F - They presented this as part of their lobbying activities?
C - I think you could say that. I don't want to positively say it on my own. He was there. I heard his talks. I practically lived with him, and we were in and out of these committees
here to there. He did ask that it not be publicized. The meetings were open. The newspaper men didn't publish it, I don't know whether it was a matter of war secrecy so far as the English were concerned. But at that time the London firemen were trying to get out of the fire service by enlisting in the English army. It was infinitely more hazardous than the lines.

Well, Mr. Fulton, our Director, was aware that the iron was getting hot and we should strike. The legislature knew it had to do something to be prepared for troubles.... war troubles. The military, especially the navy, didn't want beacons off the coast which would be caused by forest fires; they didn't want smoke drifting out to sea and mixing with fog and making visibility barriers. And, of course, they had enough experience in the First World War, and I suppose by seeing things in Europe, that they were afraid of fire sabotage. And it wouldn't be difficult to burn up California if you knew how to do it at the right time. So, our fire protection was pretty much in demand. Instead of urging them to get on with the Fire Plan they were now ready to buy it. We extended ourselves a little further at Mr. Fulton's encouragement. He said, "You'll never see a time like this again."

We built up a budget of $7,871,017.

F - You mean a budget request?

C - A budget request, an emergency request for the remainder of the biennium and we went over there with it. The Director of Finance, Mr. Killian, a most honorable man, and his staff didn't want anything like that. They said we could get along on a quarter million, and I thought that that was a pretty hefty thing.
I remember very vividly going to a night session on the budget over on the floor of the Senate Chamber and sitting in the double seats with Mr. Fulton.

Seth Millington, Assemblyman from Butte County, who was sort of master of the budget at that time, was up in the President's chair and he was hearing from the various agencies that wanted to do things. And there was a great number of them you know. The war time pressures put on them—this was definitely an emergency thing. I suppose you can imagine we were getting a small taste of what must have been going on in Washington. As a matter of fact, I saw what was going on in Washington, as I hope I don't forget to mention here in just a moment. But at any rate, I was sitting there with Fulton, and the Director of Finance came over and said, "Ken I hear you are going to ask for something over seven million?" Mr. Fulton said, "Yes." "You can't do that, Ken, we are going to give you a quarter million." "Nope, George, I'm asking for the whole thing."

And George turned around and walked away. And later it came time for Mr. Fulton to testify and he got up and asked for this sum.

Apparently Mr. Killian had talked to the Governor and persuaded him that he should not go along with this. I was going up to a committee hearing in the Capitol elevator and met the Assistant Director of Finance, I think Claude Barker, if I remember the name correctly. We were alone in the elevator and he said, "Do you know the Governor wants to see you?" and I said "No."...it wasn't every day that a Governor asked to see me. "But he does." So I went down the elevator and
immediately went to the Director's Office, told Mr. Fulton, and he said, "Well let's go see him." Fulton said, "I spent a couple of hours on the phone last night trying to persuade him that he should go for this seven million plus. I couldn't persuade him."

We walked over to the Governor's Office and eventually we got in and Mr. Fulton again went through the list of reasons why this money should be appropriated and it was the only time I ever really saw him down-hearted. The Governor didn't budge. Incidentally, he was interrupted during this conversation by a telephone call; it was from Mayor Rossi of San Francisco. Of course, I heard only one end of it. Mayor Rossi seemed unhappy because Fiorello La Guardia had come out as emissary for President Roosevelt and if you look back you will see the headlines in the papers on that particular day, where the Little Flower had lambasted Mayor Rossi for the poor showing they were making in civilian defense. Governor Olson said, "Well, a lot of people just have to complain—and cheer up," and that sort of thing.

And then he came back and sat down and Fulton finished his speech, and there was silence. As I say, it was the only time I ever saw Mr. Fulton dejected. Then I said, "Apparently the Governor doesn't understand our plan." And he said "Probably he doesn't" and I said, "May I speak to the Governor?" And he said, "Yes, go ahead." I talked for twenty minutes. I think I can say that I had my speech down pat after working all fall at these dinner meetings.

F - It was just like pushing a button.
C - Yes, and, by golly, at the end of twenty minutes Mr. Olson said, "All right, I will go along."

I think the legislature had its own mind made up and instead of passing a bill appropriating money for the entire biennium they appropriated enough for the calendar year. This was something over four million dollars. In other words, it was at exactly the rate requested. The State For­ester was in San Diego at this time; I had been at all these meetings. I should say that before this matter came to a vote, both houses of the Legislature had been convened as a Committee of the Whole. Mr. Gordon Garland was the Speaker. Vandegrift and I and Jim Mace and Ralph Williams addressed them. Mace had been called in from one of the ranger units, made a Deputy and assigned to liaison with the military. Williams was the retired Fire Chief of Fresno City, a very able man. He was made Fire Chief of the Council of Defense. Ralph and I were later sent to Washington. But at any rate, in this Committee of the Whole, where the Senate came over and sat in the Assembly Chamber, the four of us spoke.

Vandegrift got up as the Fiscal representative of the legislature and said that he endorsed this and it should be done and he answered a few questions. I remember he sat down next to me and I said, "Van, I am surprised that you know as much about our organization as you do." Of course, then he knew about everything anyway, but nevertheless he said, "Boy, don't stop any questions here; roll them back. They are too hot to handle, give them an answer."

So I did talk last, and when I yielded the floor I got a number of nasty questions from the group, some of them
relating way back on "what did you do with the $50,000 we gave you in 1932 to buy fire trucks?" and that sort of thing. It was quite an experience. It was almost the peak moment of my career.

But at any rate, after that they did pass the bill. They cut the time period as I said, and they tripled our budget. So, as I said, the State Forester was in San Diego, and he wanted me to keep him up on how things were going. He was quite a ways from Sacramento, you will observe. So I remember along in the middle of night I got hold of the teletype operator in the Division of Criminal Identification or Highways Communication system we used. My message to Mr. Pratt said, "The Legislature appropriated this sum of money for the rest of the calendar year and I am tired." And the girl at the other end of the phone said, "I am tired too."

This appropriation meant tripling our organization; trying to keep 2,000 men working. We had to set up a central dispatch system for the entire State. We had a big mobile pool of trucks and men. We stationed groups of trucks here and there. We had to get supervisors. We had to purchase the equipment and we had a difficult time purchasing it. I was sent back to Washington, with Ralph Williams. It was Easter Sunday, 1942, I remember and it was very stormy. There we met Jay Stevens, State Fire Marshal, who was a representative of the Board of Underwriters, I think.

We immediately went to Senator Sheridan Downey's Office. I think I was in Washington a week. It happened that my brother was working there and he was ordered back to California.
so I came back with him. But I can recommend securing the services of a U.S. Senator if you want to get around Washington. We went to see Dean Landis who was the new Czar of all kinds of operations. We went to see General Hershey of Selective Service. I had a very interesting talk with him. I was trying to save some of these truck drivers. We actually were reduced to hiring women truck drivers at one time, just a few. We went to the War Office and had a most interesting session and I was allowed to explain our plan of protection to Assistant Secretary McCloy, John McCloy, you remember he was later U.S. Commissioner in Germany. To me a fascinating character. I was never before in the presence of a man who just seemed to scintillate power and knowledge—sort of a dynamic personality.

The President and General Marshall were in Casa Blanca or someplace so I didn't bother them. But I did spend a lot of time in rooms where they were making allocations of equipment.

One funny little incident was where we had a request in for chasis for some trucks. I don't know what kind they were, and we also had a request in for some sheet metal to make water tanks for them. Well, the people said, "There's no use giving you these truck chasis because they will be just sitting there and wasting. You don't have the metal from the metal people." And the other office said, "You don't have any trucks so why give you metal?" We took all these piles of paper and got them together and got them signed so we could get our trucks and sheet metal together. That was one of the things. Otherwise, I was pretty much bewildered in my short
F - Did you have a Senator helping you?

C - Senator Sheridan Downey, yes. He went to every meeting. I don't know whether I should tell stories on the Senator but James Byrnes, of course, had been the powerful man, the "Assistant President of the United States". At this time he was on the Supreme Court. Downey and I were standing on a corner waiting for a taxi and the Senator was sort of talking to himself about how we could accomplish something for us and he said, "Maybe I could go and talk to Jimmie Byrnes." He kind of forgot I was there, and I said "Senator, I recognize the importance of what I am trying to get here, but I hadn't thought it would get to the Supreme Court so soon." He laughed and said, "Well, Mr. Clar, we have ways of doing things in Washington." Well, we have ways of doing things in Sacramento too, so I wasn't shocked.

We did have this terrific War job. I seemed to have lived through it. Walter Winters, now retired, was the Fire Chief, and as I say Deputy Mace--they were my main helpers. Everybody pitched in and we came through quite successfully. One of the things we did was to form administrative districts--half a dozen districts. Mr. Pratt didn't like these districts. I think the reason was that we had had them and one of the deputies went especially sour--speculations and so forth, and embarrassed Mr. Pratt, and besides, the individual rangers were a little more potent influence when political help was needed for him to keep his job.

But I had the burden of running the organization
and I think I can say....I was Chief Deputy State Forester, of course, as I had been since April, 1941. So I tried to get districts formed by setting out inspectors under the title of Assistant Fire Chiefs. The State Forester went along with that reluctantly. The Personnel Board turned me down when I went over there in September and tried to get that done. They were very cold about it.

After the Warren Administration came in, the new Director obtained these proper districts set up under deputies. It just happened that I didn't go back to the Board on a day in May, 1943, when they were created, but I noted in the minutes of the Personnel Board that the State Forester and the Director went over there and did it and the State Forester, I guess, made a speech that this was necessary and good.

We had a lot of nasty personnel problems. We had the Japanese ballons coming across and they were a kind of a nuisance and most people didn't know about them--just plain administrative problems. Then people came back from the war and Swede Nelson came in as Deputy Director and then State Forester. DeWitt Nelson, Swede, was persuaded to come from the Forest Service. Mr. Pratt was getting ready to retire. I was acting State Forester for--it seems to be about ten months. At that time the Chief Deputy was sort of a man in the slot. What is commonly called a dog in an organization, sort of a central plant manager. That is really why the administrative districts were so necessary. It was impossible to administer this big organization from one source reaching thirty rangers. So we wanted to get an administrator closer to the individual
rangers and make it a half a dozen people to deal with instead of almost independent rangers.

Well, Nelson arrived in the later part of the time of the war, 1944, I have forgotten the date. He found a pretty sad organization. General Hannum became Director and he also found a pretty sad organization. I worked most congenially with both of them. I had no great ambition to be State Forester, and as far as I know nobody had any ambition to make me State Forester.

The problem of placing returning veterans back in their jobs was pretty much left to me. As a matter of fact, Nelson and I, when he became State Forester, pretty soon settled down to a Division of Labor. I was the inside man shuffling paper and he was the front man and worked with the Board and the Legislature, and more than that, new attacks on old programs--old proposals--could now be undertaken and basic policy problems considered. And he had enough to do in that respect. For example, in the matter of burning brush--getting that under some kind of control legally--so he worked with the farm groups and stockmen and legislators. And there was the acquisition of State Forests which came about through the Biggar Senate Committee. There was the matter of trying to develop better relations with some of the county supervisors, especially some of the so-called outside counties. Because, you see, the situation had just been upset by Bill Moore, the recent Director, and I think very properly so.

Nelson was a sort of a coordinator and collaborator and a general salesman, as was Mr. Rosecrans, but I am not so sure but that the violent upheaval wasn't necessary before
you could start smoothing ruffled feelings and settling things down into a good sensible method of operation.

I was the "pointer" for Director Moore in the business of establishing the principal of the Clar Plan, which is to say, the State would take what money it had and protect the State interest principally, and we said to other people who wanted something done, "you tell us what you wish and we will do it." Now when I proposed that in 1940, it was still theoretical because the State just didn't have the money to do anything like that. We were depending on this county money and other money. And even after we got the appropriation at Pearl Harbor, the boys across the street at Department of Finance who had a major purpose in life of keeping from spending the money that is appropriated, (after they haven't kept it from being appropriated) they shook their finger at me and said, "Now don't forget this is a war time thing, don't think you are going to get this all the time." And we said just as strongly, "Don't you fool yourself, this has been needed and we are going to keep it." And we have. It never quite reached up to the full plan, I think even yet. But of course, the plan has been revised upwards.

We departed from the Sanford system of taking what money we had and dividing it up to what you might call the Clar Plan system. Here we made a determination of what the State could spend, from the sums it had of State money—spreading it as far as it could go in initiating the plan—70%, 80% --and treating all areas alike, you see.

The counties had been used to being persuaded by the
ranger to just put up some money. It was my duty to go out and educate the various supervisors. I think some of them just frankly didn't believe what I told them. Others wanted to believe it if they could understand it. Some, very few, were downright discourteous, and a few, like the poor county of Mariposa, I am sure was most suspicious when we said we didn't want anything from them. They had been putting up a thousand dollars or so, and we said, "No, this county deserves practically full protection at State expense. We will protect it." It must have been quite a shock. It was so different from the earlier days when the ranger went around begging for some old baling wire and whatever they had to give away. So I had that job. It was enervating at times. At other times it was interesting. But at any rate....

F - Well this, coupled with the fact that you reorganized, which had taken a lot of the power away from the county rangers--it must have left you sort of....

C - Yes, a pigeon. You could use other terms. I am quite sure that is true. That, of course, didn't bother me. I think it didn't bother me. I did suffer a lot from nervous tension. It was a job requested of me, for a pretty tough person. I spoke to Mr. Nelson yesterday. We were discussing this, and I said, "I am sorry I didn't have a tough enough nervous system to take that abuse much longer." And he laughed and said, "Well, you were pretty tough."

So I guess that ends my story.