Chapter VI
World War II Through the Fifties: From FDR to JFK

World War II marked the beginning of major economic and demographic changes in the Southern Appalachians. The wartime boom was temporary, and afterward the Depression returned. Many people left to find work elsewhere; rural farm population declined dramatically between 1940 and 1960. Meanwhile, Federal land acquisition nearly stopped as national priorities shifted. The Forest Service had to cope with a major increase in demand for outdoor recreation and balance that demand with other forest uses and needs. Although problems of National Forest management in the Southern Appalachians during the 1950's occurred in apparent calm, the region's poverty remained, and the potential conflicts among forest uses which were to receive national attention in the 1960's had already appeared.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, new and increasing demands were placed on the Nation's manpower and natural resources, demands that accelerated when this country entered the war in December 1941. Wartime production and mobilization revitalized the Depression-worn national economy. By 1944 half the country was engaged in war-related production, and full employment had returned. The Southern Appalachians experienced a good share of wartime changes as coal and timber prices began to rise. Old jobs in mining and lumbering reopened and new industries were established close to the mountains. Although emergency New Deal programs were gradually phased out, the popular and effective CCC lasted until war came to America, and the Tennessee Valley Authority continued to provide construction and related employment through the war years.

Heavy Demand for Timber

Demands on the Nation's timber resource were heavy. Wood was needed to build bridges, barracks, ships, aircraft, and above all packing crates for shipping supplies overseas. Vital wood products were cellulose for explosives, wood plastic, rosin, and glycerol. Wood was classified as a critical material by the War Production Board. Although the heaviest demand for wood fell on the Douglas-fir forests of the West and the coastal southern yellow pines, the hardwoods and conifers of the southern mountains were also needed.

The wartime demand for timber increased sales from National Forests throughout the South — from 94.2 billion board feet in 1939 to 245.3 billion in 1943. High war demands led to heavy cutting, especially of such desirable hardwoods as redgum and yellow- (tulip) poplar. There was a strong market even for previously unwanted "limby old field pines and inferior hardwoods." The total cut was still less than half of the estimated overall timber growth there, however. This was true because the forests all contained considerable second-growth timber which, although growing rapidly, was still not mature enough for harvesting.
Reflecting Forest Service policy, and the generally scattered and small volume available, about 90 percent of the timber was disposed of in sales of less than $500 each. The supervisor of the Cumberland (since renamed Daniel Boone) National Forest related in 1941:

... one mountain inhabitant purchased sufficient timber in small lots to make 1,200 railroad ties. He hired help to cut the timber; hewed the ties himself; skidded them to the roadside with his own mule; hired trucking of his product to the point of acceptance. He cleared about $600 on his operations. He has 14 children. This $600 was probably more money than the family had seen in the last eight years.5

Such sales were intended to take care of the little man, but they also made timber sale supervision and coordination harder. As the war went on, forest administration became more difficult. Many men had been drafted or had enlisted. Thus, timber stand improvement work, as well as cleanup and road repair work after timber sales, were not being done.6 An assessment of the situation in Region 8 in 1943 stated that "in general, standards of performance are poorer," largely because "many of our best men are in the armed forces and have had to be replaced with poorer ones."7

Figure 78.—Crew using peavies to roll a huge yellow-poplar log down to loading platform on Chattahoochee National Forest, July 1941. (Forest Service photo F-414105)

Figure 79.—Lumber crew rolling yellow-poplar logs from skidway platform to truck on Chattahoochee National Forest, July 1941. (Forest Service photo F-414107)
Even a large outfit that had been logging in the region since 1900 felt the pinch. When the supervisor of the Chattahoochee National Forest asked the Gennett Lumber Co. in September 1944 why it had left logs in an area, an agent responded:

... we had not intended to abandon any scaled logs that are on Cynth Creek ... we were forced to move over to Owl Creek so we could get men to operate. The labor situation got so critical on Cynth Creek that we could not keep things going. ...  

Since this forced the Forest Service to scale the area twice, a penalty was considered. The supervisor explained, “At a time when we are short of men and pushed to get the job done, the leaving of incompletely areas is costly to both you and us.”

As discussed earlier, land acquisition had been a major activity before the war. As late as 1937, it was felt that “the extension of government ownership in areas of low production and high watershed values as in the mountainous ... sections [of Region 8] is unquestionably desirable.” However, Weeks Act funds dropped dramatically, from $3 million or more per year to $354,210 in 1943, $100,000 in 1944, $75,000 in 1945, and nothing at all in fiscal year 1946.

However, land exchanges continued briskly through the war period. Desirable inholdings and adjacent lands were acquired in exchange for timber from Forest Service lands, with emphasis on facilitating sustained-yield management, experimental forests, and administrative economy.

One problem, which was to become of increasing significance later, first appears in reports from war years. This was the decline in personal contact between National Forest officers, especially district rangers, and the people living on or near the forests. A 1943 forest inspection report observed that, because of the volume work, “they (the rangers) know the bankers, members of service clubs, etc., but the lesser lights living on the forest are neglected.” Rangers already had less of what oldtimers on the Cherokee refer to as “spit-and-whittle time.” Mountain people prefer those who are not in a hurry to do business, but will “set a spell,” and visit. Fortunately, a reservoir of goodwill between the Forest Service and mountainneers had been built up during the Depression, chiefly through the CCC. Only after the war would a lessening of such personal contacts lead to friction.

**Coal Mining Revived**

In addition to demands for timber, the war brought huge orders for coal, giving the few mining companies that had survived the Depression a new lease on life. As demand grew, new companies were formed, and by 1942 it was boom time again in Southern Appalachian coal country. Miners returned to the delapidated company towns, and new housing was hastily constructed. Old men, youngsters below draft age, and those with serious health problems were accepted for mine work. The military had swept up the cream of mountain youth, fortunately for many of them. However, the development of heavy-duty trucks and the “duckbill” coal loader helped reduce the need for manpower, a trend that accelerated.

Depression-born attempts to diversify the economy of the coal-producing regions were wiped out by the demand of the wartime boom. As Caudill describes it:

The whole attention of the area’s population fastened again on coal. The blossoming farmers among whom County Agricultural Agents had worked so hard discarded seed sowers and lime spreaders for picks and shovels. The small but growing herds of pure-bred livestock were turned into pork and beef.

The same could be said for efforts to develop the timber resources of the coal counties. Early in the war the last stands of “virgin” hardwood forest in Kentucky were cut. Only in the cutover lands purchased for the new Cumberland National Forest was any thought given to creating a sustained-yield forest that could provide a continued wood-using industry in the area.

Figure 80.—Ranger Edgar F. Wolcott, Wythe District, Jefferson National Forest, Va., talking with a local farmer in July 1938. (Forest Service photo F-487235)
The benefits of the wartime boom, however, should not be exaggerated. As L. E. Perry, a former general ranger district assistant and fire control officer for the Forest Service on the forest, has written of the impact of the wartime economy on McCreary County, Ky.:

The coal and lumber industry was vigorous in McCreary County but there was an exodus of the working people, even teachers, to northern plants and to the armed services. Consequently, there were shortages—of materials; manpower; money. Food and fuel were rationed. There was not enough of anything to go around. Hoarding and the blackmarket flourished... When at last the war was over, recovery was slow.17

In some areas of the Southern Appalachians, stepped-up coal and timber production continued for several years after the war. For example, in Clear Fork Valley of Claiborne County, Tenn., between the Cumberland and the Cherokee National Forests, 10 underground mines producing 750,000 tons of coal a year and employing nearly 1,400 men were still actively operating in 1950—a holdover from war production years. However, like other Southern Appalachian counties almost entirely dependent on one or two extractive industries, Claiborne succumbed to a serious postwar depression, keenly felt by the mid-1950's.18

Helping to hold up the postwar demand for soft coal in the eastern Kentucky and Tennessee area was a new steam power plant constructed there by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. of Stearns, Ky., was alert to this new major consumer of its main product. Early in 1953 the company contacted the District Ranger at Stearns and the Supervisor of the Cumberland National Forest at Winchester. It was anxious to rework the coal seams in the 47,000 acres it had sold to the Government more than 15 years earlier. Many of the old seams still contained blocks of coal close to the surface of hillsides. This coal had not been removed during earlier deep mining because of the danger of collapse of the mine tunnels. Now, with higher prices and recently developed earth-moving equipment, this coal could be recovered by strip-mining. The soil and rock cover could be dug away with power shovels and bulldozers to expose the coal for loading directly into huge trucks. The debris would be mostly dumped down the hillsides, thus clogging streams.

The Forest Supervisor, H.L. Borden, told Stearns that he was opposed to permitting strip-mining on the tract. A clause in the 1937 deed of sale for the Stearns tract reserved authority for the Forest Service to require adequate reclamation of ground surfaces disturbed by mining. Borden retired in May. He was succeeded by Robert F. Collins, who met with company officials in August and received a formal request a week later. Collins sent a copy of the request to the Eastern Regional Forester, Charles L. Tebbe, with a memo of his own urging that the request be denied. Collins pointed out that serious erosion and stream pollution would result, if approval were granted, and the action would thus be in direct violation of the stated purposes of the Weeks Act, which authorized the National Forest land purchases. In addition, he noted that a dangerous precedent would be set for National Forests throughout the East where mineral rights had been reserved. It was estimated by the Forest Service that 2,000 linear miles of strip-mining in the old Stearns tract could result from approval of the request.

The Stearns request was reviewed by the Regional Office in Philadelphia and by the Washington Office and lawyers of the Department of Agriculture. A consensus was reached, and on January 29, 1954, Tebbe officially denied the request.

On July 1, 1954, the company renewed its request, pointing out that a new Kentucky strip mine law requiring surface reclamation had just become effective, and contending that this law should provide adequate protection to the affected areas. (See Chapters VII and VIII.) On July 30, Tebbe again denied the application. On August 29, Robert L. Stearns, Jr., president, appealed in person to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, in Washington. Benson referred the request to Richard E. McArdle, Chief of the Forest Service, who again conferred with his staff and with Department lawyers. Convinced that such mining would irremediably damage the land, streams, and wildlife of the Forest, McArdle denied the appeal, which was then taken to the Secretary for a final decision.

McArdle suggested that a special board be appointed by Benson to study the situation and give an advisory, but not binding, opinion. The board would be composed of a noted leader in the national resource field, a professional mining engineer, and a public member to be chosen by the other two. Benson and Stearns agreed. The men appointed were Samuel T. Dana, who had just retired as chairman of the Department of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan; Robert L. Wilhelm, a coal operator of St. Clairsville, Ohio; and Charles P. Taft, a prominent Cincinnati attorney who was son of former President William H. Taft and brother of the Republican Senator, Robert A. Taft. The board visited the area in January 1955 and examined the sites that would be strip-mined as well as other sites being strip-mined. The board also conducted a public hearing near Stearns, which attracted wide publicity. During the entire period of this controversy the Forest Service had received many letters from the public, mostly opposing the mining project.

On May 12, 1955, the board reported to Benson that a majority recommended denial of the Stearns request. On July 22, 1955, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Ervin L. Peterson publicly affirmed the Forest Service denial. The company decided not to appeal the decision in the courts.19

During the war the labor-short lumber and mining industries had tried hard, with varying success, to gain draft deferments for their skilled employees. The Gennett Oak Flooring Co. of North Carolina pleaded with the Asheville draft board to let it retain experienced workers to meet demands of the War Production Board for lumber and avert a shutdown.20
Wartime military service changed the outlook and lives of many. Young men often did not return permanently to the mountains. The "G.I. Bill of Rights" offered college education to those who might never have considered it. With new skills and confidence gained during military service, they worked to become teachers, engineers, pharmacists, doctors, lawyers, and football and basketball coaches. A few even studied forestry, a subject they had first come to know as teenagers in the CCC.21

The Tennessee Valley Authority
One New Deal program which continued to flourish during the war was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Increasing needs for electric power, especially for aluminum production, quieted the opposition of industry to increased TVA power-generating capacity. In 1942 and 1943, TVA had 42,000 employees working on 12 projects throughout the Southern Appalachian region, the highest employment figure ever recorded by the agency.22

Most impressive of all was Fontana Dam on the Little Tennessee River high in the mountains of Swain and Graham Counties, N.C., just south of Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Fontana, the highest dam east of the Rockies, built to generate electric power for industry, was claimed to be justified by the war effort; it was rushed with a sense of urgency and high purpose. Before work could begin a road had to be built to carry in heavy construction equipment. Fontana Village, with peak population of 6,000, was built nearby for workers and their families. Work on the dam began shortly after Pearl Harbor, and for nearly 3 years men worked in round-the-clock shifts, under floodlights at night. In November 1944 the dam was finally closed and Fontana Lake began to fill, only a few months before the end of the war.23

Jobs were plentiful everywhere during those years; therefore to keep workers at Fontana, a model community was developed, with library, schools, a small hospital, and recreational facilities. The project manager encouraged planting of gardens and flowers as an excellent way to reduce turnover in the work force. Those who planted gardens would want to stay and see them grow.24

Besides hydroelectric power, TVA plants produced fertilizers, chemicals for munitions, and synthetic rubber. The cartographic section of TVA, established to design maps of the region as an aid in planning and land purchases, was used by the Army to make maps for military planning. Supplying wartime needs helped TVA maintain political independence and continue many of its long-range social goals.

The uranium processing facilities for the atomic bomb, at Oak Ridge, Tenn., just west of Knoxville in Anderson County, require brief mention. The most notable aspect of the project that mattered to the local population was that they were forced permanently out of their ancestral homes and their community was destroyed. Today many East Tennesseens take pride in the scientific accomplishments of Oak Ridge; however, in 1941, their parents' and grandparents' prime concern was that the Army Corps of Engineers suddenly swooped in to condemn 59,000 acres of land, and abruptly evicted nearly 1,000 bewildered and resentful rural families from their homes and farms. No argument or protest was permitted; the need was considered too urgent.

Operating under the cover name of Manhattan Engineering District, Marshall (chief of the district) and his colleagues moved quickly — too quickly for many of the people in this affected area of Tennessee. After a September site inspection by Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, named in this month to head the entire Manhattan Project, a battery of Corps attorneys and surveyors entered the area and began mapping. In early October, condemnation proceedings got under way and a declaration of taking was filed in federal court at Knoxville. It called for immediate possession of the land, even though appraisals and transactions with individual owners had not yet begun.

By November, residents leaving the area were passing an incoming flood of construction workers.25

Partially because of the population dislocation and partially because of the influx of atomic energy employees from other regions, the Knoxville area swelled in population during the 1940's. When the Oak Ridge plants were phased down during the 1950's, Knoxville experienced a net migration loss.26

In sum, the wartime emergency brought a temporarily booming economy to the Southern Appalachians. The natural resources of the region—timber, coal, and water power in particular—were in high demand; the labor supply to marshall the resources was short. Prices and wages were high, as the area responded to wartime needs. With an emphasis on military materiel production, certain aspects of prewar forest management, such as land acquisition (except for Oak Ridge), recreation, and conservation, were momentarily de-emphasized. These concerns, however, returned to importance when the war mobilization wound down.

Heavy Migration to Cities
The Second World War not only affected national production and employment levels, it also brought large-scale shifts in population distribution. Between 1940 and 1950 about 1 million people migrated from farms to cities, and stayed there. The national rural-to-urban migration accelerated during the 1950's, as more than 5 million persons from nonmetropolitan areas moved to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). The Southern Appalachian region contributed many migrants to other regions during and after the war, as its farm population declined sharply, and manufacturing became increasingly important.
Figure 81.—Nantahala River in the Gorge above junction with Little Tennessee River and Fontana Lake, a Tennessee Valley Authority power and flood control reservoir on the border of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, Swain County, N.C., in July 1960. Nantahala National Forest. (Forest Service photo F-494664)
Population changes in the Southern Appalachians between 1940 and 1960 were particularly dramatic. Between 1940 and 1950, its rate of growth fell below 10 percent for the first time since the first census of 1790. Between 1950 and 1960, its population declined.27 Over the 189-country area defined by the 1960 Thomas Ford study, this loss was 2.8 percent, or about 160,000 persons. Net migration loss alone (in vs. out) was 19 percent.28 However, the change and the rate of change in population growth varied considerably. The Valley and Ridge subregion on the east side gained population, through urban-industrial growth in the broad river valleys. But the Appalachian Plateau subregion, particularly eastern Kentucky, had heavy losses, due primarily to the sharp postwar drop in coal industry employment as new technologies, and greater use of alternative fuels such as oil and gas, forced economies in the coal market. The population of the Blue Ridge subregion did not change markedly over the same period. Here, "the development of industry and tourism undoubtedly served to retard out-migration."29

As with the Nation as a whole, metropolitan areas of the Southern Appalachians grew more or lost population less between 1940 and 1960 than did the nonmetropolitan areas. Between 1940 and 1950, the nonmetropolitan counties gained by less than 15 percent, compared to 20 percent for the others. Between 1950 and 1960, nonmetropolitan population declined 6 percent; metropolitan population increased 7 percent. The region's metropolitan gains over the two decades were minor compared to those in most such areas of the United States. In fact, between 1950 and 1960, all SMSA's of the region defined by Ford except Roanoke, although gaining population overall, experienced a net migration loss. Asheville and Knoxville lost migrants at relatively high rates.30

Most of the region's migration during the postwar years was between adjacent counties or within the same State. Available data on destinations of migrants into and out of the region during 1940-50 show most movement was short, intracounty or to a contiguous county. In more than 80 percent of the region, less than 20 percent of the migrants went to another State. Of those who did, the patterns were fairly regular over the two decades. Most interstate migrants from the Appalachian Plateau subregion moved to Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. Most migrants from southwestern Virginia, if they left the state, traveled to the District of Columbia and Maryland,31 where Federal employment offered opportunities.

In general, as with most migrations, the majority were young—between 18 and 34. Most were white, male, and above average in education. Outmigrants, especially those moving longer distances, tended to be younger than inmigrants. Thus, in the postwar period, the population of the Southern Appalachian region defined by Ford became relatively older, with more persons 65 or over. Also, because women of child-bearing age were leaving in increasing numbers, a slowing down of the region's rate of natural increase for the following decades was assured.32

The demographic shifts that occurred in the region during and after the war are reflected in farm statistics. Between 1940 and 1950, its rural farm population declined sharply, so that in 1950, for the first time, the rural farm population was smaller than either the rural nonfarm or urban populations.33 During the 1940's, as many who had held onto their farms during the 1930's found employment elsewhere, the rural farm population experienced a net loss due to migration of 595,000 persons, a rate of over 28 percent. This loss was greatest in the Kentucky counties, followed by those of Tennessee.34

Demographic Changes Are Confirmed

For the smaller area of the Southern Appalachians on which this study focuses, the demographic changes between 1940 and 1960 were very nearly as dramatic as for the larger region defined in Ford's study. In both decades the coal counties of eastern Kentucky had the greatest outmigration losses and the greatest population shifts. Within the area with a high concentration of land in National Forests, most counties experienced a net migration loss. The greatest migration losses (40 percent or more) from 1940 to 1950 were in Kentucky: the Cumberland National Forest counties of Jackson and Wolfe; as well as in Hancock County, Tenn., a coal county, and Swain County, N.C., most of which is within the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Other counties suffering heavy net outmigration were Polk County, Tenn., and Rabun County, Ga., both of which had a large proportion of land in National Forest; and the Kentucky counties of Estill, Lee, Morgan, Menifee, Harlan, Letcher, Perry, and Clay.35 Between 1950 and 1960, the greatest losses from net out-migration were experienced in Lee County, Va.; Swain County, N.C.; and the eastern Kentucky counties of McCreary, Bell, Harlan, Letcher, Perry, and Leslie.36

In general, then, the heaviest net outmigration from the Southern Appalachians during the period from 1940 to 1960 was from coal-producing counties. That is, population loss appears chiefly correlated with changes in the mining industry, not with changes in Federal land acquisition or land policy. One exception stands out: Swain County, N.C. The heavy move from Swain County was forced by the closing of Great Smoky Mountains National Park to residents. Between 1940 and 1950, over 40 percent of them left, many to adjacent Sevier County, Tenn., where Gatlinburg is located. Sevier was one of the few counties to show a net migration gain.37

12 Counties Are Selected For Full Analysis

For a narrower focus on the demographic and economic changes that have occurred in the Southern Appalachians since World War II, we have selected a group of 12 mountain counties for further detailed analysis. This group consists of six counties with a high proportion of land in National Forests and six counties with little or no National Forest land. The former counties are considered representative of the core counties of the region. Each has a long (at least 40-year) history of Federal land acquisition and land management.
The latter group was selected as approximating many of the physical traits of the former group except for high Federal landownership. Each is mountainous (although not so much as the counties of the former group) and nonmetropolitan. Each is adjacent to or near the counties with a high proportion of National Forest. At least one county of each type was selected from all the five States of the study area. However, two of each type were selected from North Carolina, because of the presence of two National Forests there. The 12 counties are listed in table 4.

The population changes that occurred in the 12 study counties from the period 1940 to 1960 are representative of those that occurred across the greater Southern Appalachian region. These changes are shown in table 5. All 12 counties experienced net migration losses for both decades; however, from 1950 to 1960 the rate of natural increase was generally not great enough to offset the migration loss, and most counties experienced an absolute loss of population. All six counties with a high proportion of National Forest land suffered population losses during the decade 1950-60; whereas, only three of the counties with little or no National Forest did. And, in the latter counties that did experience population declines—Knox, Ashe, and Hancock—the losses were generally more severe than those experienced by the counties with a high percentage of National Forest land.

The population losses in the study counties between 1950 and 1960 can only marginally be attributed to an increase in National Forest acreage. Most of the counties in question gained no more than 4 percent in National Forest land ownership over the decade, but experienced more than a 20-percent net migration loss. As with the Southern Appalachian region as a whole, the counties of eastern Kentucky—McCreary and Knox—suffered the most severe population declines.

The population changes experienced by the 12 study counties between 1940 and 1960 are reflected strikingly in farm statistics for those years, as shown in table 6. For the six counties with a high percentage of National Forest land, the number of farms declined over the two decades by a weighted average of 45 percent. For the six non-National Forest counties, the average decline was 43 percent. That is, the decline in the number of farms does not appear to be related to Federal land-ownership. The counties that experienced the greatest decrease in number of farms over the period 1940 to 1960 were McCreary, (68 percent decline), Knox (53 percent), and Buchanan (57 percent), all predominantly coal counties in the Appalachian Plateau. This pattern confirms the finding of the Ford study over the whole Southern Appalachian region that from 1940 to 1960 the Cumberland coal counties lost the greatest farm population through migration.

| Table 4.—Twelve Southern Appalachian counties selected for comparison and detailed analysis: percentage of land in National Forests |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| County and State | Percentage of land in National Forest 1980-1981 |
|High proportion of National Forest | |
| Union County, Ga. | Chattahoochee 48 |
| Graham County, N.C. | Nantahala 58 |
| Macon County, N.C. | Nantahala 60 |
| Unicoi County, Tenn. | Cherokee 46 |
| McCreary County, Ky. | Daniel Boone (Cumberland) 45 |
| Bland County, Va. | Jefferson 30 |
|Little or no National Forest | |
| Habersham County, Ga. | Chattahoochee 22 |
| Ashe County, N.C. | Pisgah under 1 |
| Henderson County, N.C. | Pisgah 7 |
| Hancock County, Tenn. | None |
| Knox County, Ky. | Daniel Boone (Cumberland) under 1 |
| Buchanan County, Va. | None |

Source: Lands Staff, Southern Region, Forest Service, USDA, Atlanta, Ga.

| Table 5.—Population changes in 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1940-60 |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| County and State | Percentage change in total population | Percentage change in net migration |
| 1940-50 | 1950-60 | 1940-50 | 1950-60 |
|High proportion of National Forest | |
| Union County, Ga. | - 5.0 | - 11.0 | - 23.5 | - 25.0 |
| Graham County, N.C. | + 7.0 | - 6.6 | - 13.4 | - 25.0 |
| Macon County, N.C. | + 2.0 | - 7.7 | - 14.0 | - 22.0 |
| Unicoi County, Tenn. | + 12.0 | - 5.0 | - 2.5 | - 22.0 |
| McCreary County, Ky. | + 1.0 | - 25.0 | - 15.0 | - 43.0 |
| Bland County, Va. | - 4.4 | - 7.0 | - 15.6 | - 19.0 |
|Little or no National Forest | |
| Habersham County, Ga. | + 12.0 | + 9.0 | - 3.9 | - 8.0 |
| Ashe County, N.C. | - 3.5 | + 10.0 | - 18.2 | - 25.0 |
| Henderson County, N.C. | + 19.0 | + 17.0 | - 14.1 | + 2.8 |
| Hancock County, Tenn. | - 19.0 | - 15.0 | - 30.7 | - 30.0 |
| Knox County, Ky. | - 2.0 | - 17.0 | - 18.6 | - 32.0 |
| Buchanan County, Va. | + 13.6 | + 2.7 | - 10.3 | - 24.0 |

Throughout the southeastern mountains, farm acreage also declined markedly during and after the war. Again, no clear differences were evident between the counties with a high proportion of National Forest land and those with little or none. In fact, of the study group of 12, the two counties that experienced the heaviest declines in farm acreage from 1945 to 1959 were Knox (50 percent) and Buchanan (56 percent), neither of which contained any National Forest acreage.

Because migration destination questions were not asked on the 1940, 1950, or 1960 Censuses, it is not possible to know where the lost farm population of the 12 southeastern mountain counties relocated. It is likely, however, that the farm migrants followed the pattern exhibited throughout the region: most settled in urbanizing areas close by—in either the same or an adjacent county—and if not, probably within the same State.

The shift in farm acreage and farm employment is also reflected in statistics on the growth of the number of manufacturing establishments and of manufacturing employment in the study counties, as shown in the table in table 7. Between 1939 and 1947/1948, the number of manufacturing establishments in the heavily national forested counties swelled. This growth, which ranged from 55 percent in Unicoi County to 1300 percent in Union County, was probably a response to wartime demands on their timber resources. Growth in the number of manufacturing establishments in the non-National-Forest counties for the same time period was not quite so pronounced. However, this latter group had more manufacturing establishments to begin with.

In general, for both sets of counties, manufacturing continued to expand throughout the 1950's, although in some counties growth slowed after the wartime spurt. For most counties, the majority of the manufacturing units were small, employing fewer than 20 persons. Henderson County had the highest percentage of large establishments (in 1954, 43 percent had 20 or more employees and 10 percent had 100 or more). On the other hand, several counties in both groups — Union, McCreary, Hancock, and Buchanan — had only small manufacturers in 1958, with fewer than 20 employees.

In terms of total number of employees, the war brought a substantial marshalling of labor into industry. In both sets of counties the number of manufacturing employees approximately doubled between 1939 and 1947. As with the number of plants, this growth was not always sustained through the 1950’s. By 1958, Union, McCreary, and Unicoi Counties had fewer employees in manufacturing than they had had during wartime. The pattern of sustained growth was more clearly evident in the counties with little or no National Forests; but all Hancock and Buchanan Counties continued to grow in manufacturing employment throughout the postwar decade.

### Table 6.—Number of farms and total farm acreage in 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1940-59

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<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of farms</th>
<th>Farm Acreage (thousand acres)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>High proportion of National Forest</td>
<td>Little or no National Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>818</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>759</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>30</td>
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Table 7.—Changes in number of manufacturing establishments and employees in 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1939-58

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>High proportion of National Forest</th>
<th>Little or no National Forest</th>
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<td>Union. Ga.</td>
<td>Graham, N.C.</td>
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<td>Ashe, N.C.</td>
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<td>Hancock, Tenn.</td>
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<td>Buchanan, Va.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Proportion</th>
<th>Little or No National</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
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Number of manufacturing establishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Proportion</th>
<th>Little or No National</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1939</td>
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Number of employees in manufacturing

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D = Disclosure laws prohibit publication for one or two firms only.

Table 8.—Number of retail establishments in 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1939-58

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Proportion of National Forest</th>
<th>Little or no National Forest</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union. Ga.</td>
<td>Graham, N.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macon, N.C.</td>
<td>Unicoi, Tenn.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ashe, N.C.</td>
<td>Henderson, N.C.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hancock, Tenn.</td>
<td>Knox, Ky.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buchanan, Va.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Proportion</th>
<th>Little or No National</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
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Number of units

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Proportion</th>
<th>Little or No National</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1939</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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During the 1940's and 1950's, retail establishments did not contribute to the economic well-being of the Southern Appalachians as clearly as manufacturing did. In all 12 study counties except 3, the number of retail units actually declined between 1939 and 1958, as table 8 reveals. The decline appears to have been most severe between 1948 and 1954. These years probably represent the peak period of postwar economic stagnation in the Southern Appalachians, when the war's end most severely affected the region's agricultural and industrial base, and outmigration swelled. Two decades of public relief measures, private development, and local initiative were needed to reverse the depression conditions and slow evacuation of the Southern Highlands.

Land Exchanges Replace Purchases

Land acquisition for the National Forests virtually ceased during the war. There were no regular meetings of the National Forest Reservation Commission, although "recess approval" was given for several purchases on which work had begun before the war.

On February 7, 1947, the NFRC held its first postwar meeting. Congress appropriated $3,000,000 for forest purchases in 1947, and the prewar program of acquisition in existing purchase units was renewed. However, appropriations for land purchase steadily declined during the remaining years of the Truman administration. In 1948, appropriations were only $750,000; by 1951, they dropped to $300,000. The Commission did not resume the close supervision of land acquisition and the policymaking functions it had often assumed before the Second World War. Purchases were routinely approved by recess action and, when actual meetings were held, Cabinet members and other important figures were represented by deputies rather than attending in person, as had been customary before the war. The most important land purchase program was in the Superior National Forest of Minnesota for the Boundary Waters Canoe Area.

Because funds were so limited and other regions had priority on forest purchases, land and timber exchanges played an increasingly important role in the consolidation of the Southern Appalachian National Forests and in efforts to add to the existing purchase units in the region.

Just after World War II many exchanges involved surplus military land. In 1949 the Forest Service gave 278 acres in the Chattahoochee National Forest, on which Camp Toccoa had been constructed during the war, to the War Assets Administration in exchange for 654 acres of surplus military land under its jurisdiction. The War Assets Administration later sold Camp Toccoa to the State of Georgia for conversion to a mental hospital.

The Forest Service also obtained some postwar National Forest acreage through the Surplus Property Act of 1944. Lands that had been acquired through bankruptcy or condemnation proceedings by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. could be purchased by the Forest Service. These lands were often bankrupt farms, abandoned and unproductive, or acreage owned by a bankrupt corporation. For example, in 1947 the Forest Service acquired 1,830.62 acres in the Jefferson National Forest that had been acquired by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. in condemnation proceedings against the bankrupt Triton Chemical Co. of Botetourt County, Va. The Forest Service paid $8,200.37, or about $4.50 per acre, for the tract.

In efforts to substitute exchanges for the almost nonexistent land purchase funds, the Forest Service worked out some complicated tripartite exchanges involving land and timber. One such deal involved 7,603.7 acres of land belonging to the Vestal Lumber and Manufacturing Co. in Greene, Washington, and Unicoi Counties, Tenn., within the Cherokee National Forest. The land, which was cutover and contained only some poor, second-growth timber, was exchanged for an equal value of National Forest timber. However, the Vestal Co. itself was not going to cut the timber; it would simply receive payment from third parties who contracted for the timber. The exchange was delayed and threatened because Vestal wanted funds from the timber sales by a specified date. This the Forest Service could not promise, but the exchange was finally consummated in September 1956.

In some cases, lands were purchased for the purpose of exchanging them for desired Forest Service acreage. For example, in 1953 the State of Georgia bought 239.15 acres of land in Union and Towns Counties. The land was described as "isolated, inaccessible, and of no known value to the state," but the State knew that it lay within the boundaries of the Chattahoochee National Forest and that the Forest Service wanted to acquire it. In 1956 Georgia exchanged this land for 105.10 acres in White County, which made possible the expansion of the White County Area State Park.

Figure 82.—The National Forests and Purchase Units, and the National Parks of the Southern Appalachian Mountains in 1948. Only changes from 1940 are the name of the Black Warrior National Forest in Alabama (not in the mountains) to William B. Bankhead, the spelling of Uharie to Uwharrie in North Carolina, and a new unit added to the Chattahoochee National Forest in Georgia. (Forest Service map and photo)
On rare occasions during this time, the Forest Service received land donations, generally small, of 50 or fewer acres. In 1948, Mrs. Cornelia Vanderbilt Cecil, daughter of George Vanderbilt, who lived in London, England, donated 2.6 acres within the Pisgah National Forest to the Forest Service. The Lincoln Investment Corp. donated two tracts totaling 47.2 acres in Smythe County, Va., valued at $127.45. One donation in the Jefferson National Forest reflected strong concern of local residents for conservation and ecology. The Virginia Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries planned to build a 65-acre lake in the Corder Bottom Area of theClinch Ranger District. Only 50 acres of the lake were within the National Forest; 15 were in private ownership. The local Izaak Walton League chapter and the Norton Chamber of Commerce purchased the 15 acres, as well as a protective strip and mineral rights. These they donated to the Forest Service in September 1956, and thus assured that access to the lake would be entirely within the National Forest boundaries.

Whether lands were purchased, exchanged, or even donated, the problem of extensive delays in the acquisition process continued. One striking example was in the Cumberland National Forest around 1950. After some negotiation, a widow, Mrs. Eva Kidd, agreed to sell 226.7 acres in McCreary County, Ky. She did not have clear title, so the land was acquired through condemnation proceedings. The Forest Service deposited payment, $680.70, with the court for disbursement, but for some reason Mrs. Kidd was not paid. Three years later, frustrated and annoyed, she visited the district ranger “once and sometimes twice a week insisting on settlement.” The Forest Supervisor wrote to ask the U.S. Attorney in Lexington to make sure Mrs. Kidd got her money. Finally, in September 1953, a check was mailed to her, but sadly, she had died on September 7 so the check was returned.

Another example of the frustrations involved in the land acquisition and exchange process is the case of Dr. Bernhard Edward Fernow, one of four sons of Bernhard Eduard Fernow, Chief of the Division of Forestry in the U.S. Department of Agriculture before Gifford Pinchot. Dr. Fernow, a mechanical engineer, purchased a summer cabin near Highlands, Macon County, N.C., in 1948. Slightly under an acre of the tract on which the cabin was situated encroached on Nantahala National Forest land; Fernow was asked to continue payment of $25 per year for a special-use permit to occupy the land.

A year later Fernow wished to purchase the acre. His request was denied by the Regional Forester, because Federal law forbade it. However exchange of land of equal value was permitted. So, Fernow then initiated requests to exchange other acreage for the desired 1 acre at his cabin site, but had considerable difficulty locating suitable land to exchange. The Forest Service valued the acre in question at $1,500 (the cost of a typical vacation site in the Highlands area in the early 1950’s). Fernow, on the other hand, referred to the tract as no more than an “acre of rock.”

After years of correspondence, negotiation, and finally the intercession of a South Carolina congressman and the Chief of the Forest Service, the matter was settled in 1957, 8 years after Fernow’s original request for exchange. Dr. Fernow exchanged several tracts he had purchased in neighboring Jackson County, N.C., totaling 112.8 acres, for the 0.9 acre he desired for his summer cabin.

After the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President in 1952, the Forest Service was uncertain what changes would accompany the end of 20 years of Democratic administration. The new (Republican) National Forest Reservation Commission met for the first time on June 17, 1954. Assistant Secretary of Agriculture J. Earl Coke explained that, “the department recommended to Congress that additional money for purchases under the Weeks Law not be provided, but Congress included some funds for this purpose so that the program will continue.” Some land funds were available through other programs, but Weeks Act purchases were limited to $75,000 for fiscal year 1954, the lowest since 1945. The major emphasis was on acquisition of Indian lands for the Chippewa National Forest in Minnesota.

The NFRC did not meet again until April 1956, though some purchases were approved by recess action in the interim. Major actions were taken at the 1956 meeting. Eight purchase units were abolished and the boundaries of a number of others were changed. In general, the changes made the units smaller, though there were some exceptions. Land in Madison and Haywood counties, N.C., was eliminated from the Pisgah National Forest Purchase Unit. The Chattahoochee

![Map of the National Forests and Purchase Units of the Southern Appalachian Mountains](image)

Figure 83.—The National Forests and Purchase Units of the Southern Appalachian Mountains in 1958-59. The Purchase Units in Ohio and Indiana had become the Wayne and Hoosier National Forests, respectively. The areas of the Chattahoochee and Pisgah forests were reduced. Yadkin and Uwharrie in North Carolina were still Purchase Units. Black triangles are Forest Experiment Station headquarters of the Forest Service. Black dots are National Forest headquarters. Atlanta is regional headquarters. (Forest Service map and photo)
National Forest lost prospective additions to territory in Dade, Walker, Catossa, Fannin, White, Banks, and Stephens Counties. A small addition was made in Habersham County to provide for better road access. Although tracts of land might still be acquired for consolidation, no real expansion of the units in the mountain forests was anticipated. Ironically, the recreation value of lands within or adjacent to the National Forests was now so high that the Forest Service could rarely afford to purchase such tracts. By improving its own lands, the Forest Service had enhanced the value of its neighbors' lands as well.

Thus, in the 15-year period that followed World War II, the impact of Federal land acquisition on the people of the Southern Appalachians was considerably less than it had been before the war. However adjacent landowners benefited from rapidly rising land values.

The number of Federal land purchases was far smaller than it had been during the New Deal, and exchanges were more likely to involve a land or lumber company, or a State or local government, than an individual. Further, the exchange program was slow and cumbersome. Nevertheless, the 1959 regional report recommended more use of "land for timber and tripartite procedures for acquisition of key holdings." These exchanges could be maddeningly difficult to set up, but they became the best way of adding land to improve forest administration.

Local attention to Federal land agencies during the postwar decades more often focused on the Tennessee Valley Authority, which became increasingly visible and controversial during the Eisenhower presidency than it previously had been.

Republicans generally did not favor public electric power development, and charges were made that industries had been "lured" to the Tennessee Valley by cheap subsidized power. Such charges were never substantiated, but TVA remained on the defensive.

In addition, TVA's practice of transferring its lands to other governmental agencies drew attention to the condemnaions of the 1930's and early 1940's. The Supreme Court had decided in 1946 that such transfer did not mean that TVA had illegally condemned unnecessary land. But large land transfers or sales still raised questions in local people's minds about the necessity for some of the earlier condemnations. Most of the TVA transfers involved land originally acquired for TVA forests or for recreational development. However, because there had been some success in encouraging private landowners to carry out reforestation, original plans for TVA forests had been abandoned, except for one experimental tract. TVA policy favored leaving recreation development to other agencies or to local or private enterprise. Several large reservoir lakeside areas were sold or turned over to other governmental agencies for recreation use. For example, between 1947 and 1951, TVA relinquished nearly 11,000 acres of land south of Fontana Dam to the Nantahala National Forest.

**Outdoor Recreation Use Skyrockets**

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, many Federal agencies had begun comprehensive studies to plan projects to provide work that would ease the expected strains on labor and the economy in the shift from military to civilian production. Great effort and time were expended in making detailed long-range plans. The Forest Service was much involved in this work. It was recognized that a tremendous backlog of maintenance and improvement had built up during the war, particularly for recreation. It was considered urgent to reverse destructive logging which the war had encouraged. Little came of these plans as the economy took care of itself, and the Forest Service gave up trying to regulate logging on non-Federal lands. It was also a decade before funds were again available to deal adequately with public recreation demands. In the Southern Appalachian forests, campgrounds and picnic areas built by the CCC, some of them already 10 or more years old, received increasingly heavy use after the end of the war. Families used accumulated savings to buy cars as soon as they became available. Gasoline was no longer rationed. More and more people took vacation trips into the mountains. Forest Service recreation development plans, shelved in 1941, were brought out again.

Even before World War II, recreational use of the National Forests had increased steadily. Between 1925 and 1940, visits to National Forests for recreational purposes rose from 5.6 million to 16 million.

After World War II, recreational visits increased far more dramatically, as the graph in figure 84 reveals.
Thus, for National Forests as a whole, recreational visits increased by 400 percent (five times) between 1945 and 1956, and by over 900 percent (10 times) between 1945 and 1960. Much of this increase was in National Forests of the West. Region 8 had only a 188 percent increase in recreational use between 1945 and 1956 (less than threefold). However, within the Southern Appalachians such use increased much faster; in North Carolina it rose 333 percent (more than four times).  

With the end of the World War II, the recreational potential of National Forest lands was recognized by resort developers and promoters as well as those within the Forest Service. The issues involved in resort development in or near the National Forests can be seen in connection with one proposed development on a peninsula in Lake Santeetlah in Graham County, N.C., in the Nantahala National Forest. The developer, a Miami realtor, wished to exchange over 2,000 acres of forest land in the county adjacent to the National Forest for this 136-acre tract. He intended to build a 25-room resort hotel. Because the case was potentially precedent-setting, it drew the attention of the Acting Chief of the Forest Service, who discussed some of the problems in a memo to the Regional Forester.

First, he explained that the Forest Service "has gone to considerable effort and expense to acquire control of shore lines on lakes having substantial recreational values," to insure that development was "appropriate."

Another consideration is that this apparently contemplates the installation of a high-priced and rather exclusive resort. By reference to the policy statement under the heading of Purpose on page NF-G-3(6) of the recreation section of the National Forest Manual, you will note that such installations require special justification. Our general policy is to favor more modest types, catering to persons of moderate means.

On the other hand, the memo pointed out, "the opportunity to acquire a substantial area of forest land in the trade is not lightly to be dismissed."

The decision was left to the Regional Forester. In order to gauge the value of the peninsula, he considered opening the land to vacation cottages. The Forest Service had been leasing sites for vacation homes since the 1920's. At first, demand was small; few families could afford second homes, and transportation was difficult. Although vacation home sites would appear to serve the needs of "persons of modest means" even less than would a resort hotel, they were a familiar form of recreation use in the forests. Study showed, however, that the Santeetlah peninsula was unsuitable for vacation homes. Furthermore, the hotel development had "the strong support of the leading citizens of Robbinsville who believe it will make a material contribution to the welfare of their community."

The Regional Forester supported the resort development, and by 1947 the land exchange was consummated.

Local political leaders, such as Governor Cherry of North Carolina, also recognized the potential of the National Forests for tourism and recreation. In an October 1947 speech before the Asheville Board of Conservation and Development, the Governor noted that the Forest Service had cooperated with the State in the development of roads to scenic areas in the mountains. Such roads, he believed, would contribute to the growth of tourism and bring money to the State's mountain people. Such cities as Asheville had long profited from tourism, and hoped to profit still more in the postwar years.

How Much Recreational Development?

One of the principal issues relating to postwar recreation was the degree to which the Forest Service should develop recreational facilities. A major advantage of development was that visitors could well become supporters of the National Forests and of conservation. Tourists and picnickers could learn the beauties of these forests, formerly reserved for hunters, fishermen, and a few hikers. A major disadvantage was cost. Even picnic areas and camping grounds required appropriations; elaborate facilities and paved roads were big investments. Should National Forests develop recreation areas or lease concessions for facilities? And, however financed, what types of recreational developments were most appropriate?

In 1947, 168 recreational developed areas had been built in the National Forests of the Southern Region. About half the developments were small — picnic areas and campgrounds. Forty-five of the areas were quite elaborate, some even including swimming pools. Selected recreational areas were considered of outstanding beauty, especially Cliffside on the Nantahala National Forest and North Mills Creek on the Pisgah. Equally well-planned areas in the southern-pine forests of the Piedmont and Coastal Plain were not so attractive or so heavily used. The natural scenic setting of the Southern Appalachian region contributed as much as the planned development to its attractiveness for recreation seekers, and the mountain forests thus had a distinct recreational advantage.

The attractiveness of the Southern Appalachians was demonstrated by recreation cost and use figures for the region. In 1947, less than a third of Region 8's investment in recreation development was devoted to the Appalachian forests, but they had two-thirds of the recreation use in the Region. Many of the recreation areas had been refurbished in 1946 with rehabilitation funds made available in that year to repair the consequences of wartime neglect.

Although the Forest Service developed numerous recreational facilities in the South, and although many questions were arising concerning basic policies, including the types and scale of new recreational development to be pursued, recreation as a form of land use was then not integrated with the resource management plans for either the individual forests or the Southern Region itself. The authors of the Region 8 General Integrating Inspection Reports (men from the Washington headquarters) commented on the development within the Region of master land-use priority plans organized
Figure 85.—Foot trail beside North Fork of Mills River, a recreation area on Pisgah National Forest between Hendersonville and Asheville, N.C., a short distance from the "Pink Beds," "Cradle of Forestry," and Blue Ridge Parkway, in August 1949. (Forest Service photo F-458635)

Figure 86.—Boy Scout camp site leased under Forest Service special-use permit at Lake Winfield Scott, a Tennessee Valley Authority power and flood control reservoir on Chattahoochee National Forest, North Georgia, in May 1949. (Forest Service photo F-458505)
Figure 87.—House trailer camping area in the “Pink Beds,” Pisgah National Forest, N.C., in August 1949. (Forest Service photo F-458631)

Figure 88.—Cherokee National Forest sign on Tellico River Road, Tellico Ranger District, Tenn., May 1957. (Forest Service photo F-486254)
by watersheds. These plans were intended to serve as benchmarks for the formation of resource management plans for the individual ranger districts within each forest. It was considered noteworthy that:

On some areas of the Pisgah District water and game were given priority over timber; in other words, customary cutting practices for the type were to be modified to favor the higher priority uses. We think this is a constructive approach, worthy of active expansion.66

Even putting water and game ahead of growing timber was a novel practice at the time, for heavily timbered forests. Policymakers in 1948 were preparing to plan for intensive recreational use in a large number of locations. Comprehensive recreation plans, however, were still in the future.

Thus, to a certain degree, as the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission noted in 1962:

It seems likely that the Forest Service was . . . pushed into recreational activities in self-defense. People discovered the recreational values of the forests and used them with the result that the Forest Service found itself attempting to "manage" recreation to minimize fire hazards, stream pollution, and hazards to the recreationists themselves. Once having become involved, Forest Service personnel apparently adapted themselves to the situation and tried to make the most of it.67

Figure 89.—Stand of mature white pine and hemlock trees in Laurels Recreation Area, Cherokee National Forest, on Stone Mountain, Unicoi-Carter County line, Unaka Ranger District, near Johnson City, Tenn., in June 1951. Dense tree canopy has provided a park-like atmosphere. Overnight shelters, picnic tables, and toilets are provided here. (Forest Service photo F-469300)

Figure 90.—Picnicking family at recreation area on Tellico River, Cherokee National Forest, Monroe County, Tenn., in May 1957. Cement tables and benches reduced maintenance and vandalism. (Forest Service photo F-486263)
In the late 1940's and during the 1950's, facility overuse became critical. As recreational visits to National Forests soared, more funds were provided but not enough for the policing and maintenance necessary. (In 1950, only $2 million were appropriated for all Forest Service recreation — maintenance, construction, and development.) Thus, the problems of roads and parking, litter and refuse, impure drinking water, and fires often became acute. In the Southern Appalachians, the recreation areas of Bent Creek, near Asheville, and Arrow Wood, outside Franklin, N.C., suffered particularly heavy use and required extra maintenance and patrolling. Throughout the Southern Region, vandalism was "widespread," in some locations "serious." The Forest Service considered night guards or appealing to "decent people in the neighborhood to handle the situation." Closely related to recreational overuse was the problem of defining who the forests should serve. As early as 1940, the demands of two different publics were noted in a Forest Service document:

Under some circumstances, as in the Talledega country in [northern] Alabama, [near Birmingham] costly recreational developments are primarily designed to serve residents of nearby cities and agricultural valleys, but are very poorly adapted to actual residents living in the "hollows" within the National Forest boundary. But in other instances, the development of simple

Figure 91.—Hikers camping overnight at one of 12 shelters on Appalachian Trail, Nantahala National Forest, N.C., between the Chattahoochee National Forest (Ga.) and Great Smoky Mountains National Park, in July 1960. (Forest Service photo F-494685)

picnic grounds is greatly appreciated by local residents who are high enough in the economic scale to own vehicles for transportation to such recreational grounds. These observations could well have been written about the forests of the Southern Appalachians.

In the 1950's, forest officers often accepted unquestioningly the idea that the National Forests were a national possession and belonged to "the people." However, increasingly there were two distinct groups, often with conflicting interests, who could claim to be "the people" to whom the forests belonged. When the needs and interests of recreation users from outside areas came into conflict with those of the local mountain residents, whose interests should come first? Recreation users from urban areas could point out that the National Forests belonged to all the people. Local citizens could argue that the needs of those who resided permanently in the area and made their living in or near the forests should have priority over occasional visitors whose only purpose was pleasure. Most forest officers hoped that the needs of both groups could continue to be met and that they would not have to face the unpopular task of assigning priorities.
Woods Burning Remains a Problem

In the Southern Appalachians during the 1950’s, management focused on balancing the multiple demands of an expanding public with the needs of the people living in and adjacent to the forests. Fire control, timber sales, and annual fee charges for special-use permits for those dwelling and farming on National Forest land brought the Forest Service and the mountaineer together most frequently.

During the 1930’s, as forest officers increasingly found themselves having to deal with people on the forests, they had turned to “people experts” and to occasional careful studies of the local population. Because they saw fire prevention as so vital to the forests in the South, they especially sought the reasons behind deliberate woods burning. Although the Forest Service had had an active program of involving the local population in fire control activities through the fire warden system, forest fires continued to plague forest officers throughout the South. The Forest Service hired a psychologist to study attitudes toward woods burning on one Southern forest, the Talladega in Alabama. He submitted his reports in 1939-40, but their real impact was delayed until wartime activities came to an end. His work was widely distributed and respected, though it was primarily based on study of the people of only one forest.11

The psychologist had concluded that the basic cause of fire setting was boredom and frustration among the local people. He noted the role of tradition in passing, as in the title of his article “Our Puppies Burned the Woods,” but his cure for fire setting was a plan to alleviate boredom. His principal recommendation was the creation of community centers for social, recreational, and educational purposes. Compared to other studies of the mountaineer personality, his work seems superficial and his policy recommendations were of doubtful value. There were certainly similarities between the people of the Alabama hills and those of the Southern Appalachian mountains, but there were as many differences. Even among the forests covered by this study, there were quite noticeable differences in the people and their attitudes, especially on the question of use and control of fire. There were differences between those who lived on the older forests and those in the new forest areas established in the 1930’s.

The psychologist stated his conclusions in broad terms:

The roots of the fire problem obviously go deep into the culture, the traditions and the customs of these people and their frustrated lives. It is well established in psychology that groups and individuals when frustrated express themselves by harmful acts, called aggression, either against other humans or against their environment . . . These intentional fires of the malicious type, however, are in the minority. Non-malicious woods-burning constitutes the major cause growing out of a survival of the pioneer agrarian culture originally based on economic grounds. With the closing in of the agrarian environment, it has become predominantly a recreational and emotional impulse . . . The sight and sound and odor of burning woods provide excitement for a people who dwell in an environment of low stimulation and who quite naturally crave excitement. Fire gives them distinct emotional satisfactions which they strive to explain away by pseudo-economic reasons that spring from defensive beliefs. Their explanations that woods fires kil off snakes, boll weevils and serve other economic ends are something more than mere ignorance. They are the defensive beliefs of a disadvantaged culture group.12

Noteworthy was the study’s refusal to accept the reasons for woods burning given by the people themselves, and the apparent assumption that woods burning was important to the people. The study was made because fire prevention was a major aim of the Forest Service in the South, but whether it was really important to the woods-burners was not clearly determined. Were the fires subsidiary results of brush clearing or hunting? Or were they considered a necessary part of life to southern rural people?
A more modest study carried out by a forest officer at about the same time covered three of the mountain forests, Cherokee, Chattahoochee, and Nantahala. Interviewing 39 heads of households whose lands were contiguous to, or surrounded by, Government-owned land, he asked a number of questions related to policies and management of the forests. Fire prevention was an important aspect, but he was concerned with more than woods burning. Trying to determine which Forest Service goals meant most to the people, he found:

Maintenance of timber resources and employment meant most to eighteen, or slightly more than half.

The wildlife . . . appealed most to eight, saving of land to six, and forest attractiveness to three. Many persons well acquainted with these people affirm that their interest in wildlife and hunting transcends everything else. The expressions here show, however, that aspects of the forest program promising more opportunities for employment have the stronger appeal.13

Figure 93.—A Forest Service crew clearing a fireline before setting light to a backfire to stop the Laurel Branch wildfire which was racing toward them. Campbell Creek, Watauga Ranger District, Cherokee National Forest, Tenn., November 1952. (Forest Service photo F-471193)
The investigation also showed the fire causes most familiar to them: farmers' burning brush or fields, campfires, smoking of "bee trees," and other "accidents." The purpose of starting a fire was not to burn the forest, but little was often done to keep the fire from spreading. They did not think people should be prosecuted for such accidents, but most of them agreed that intentional fire setters should be penalized.

One significant but not surprising finding was that each person tended to evaluate the National Forest and its programs by how he or she personally was affected. For the most part, respondents were satisfied with the forests in their localities, but:

The specific comments they made showed their appraisal to be in terms of grazing, prices paid for land, timber sales, and other matters in which they see themselves affected economically at present, and to no small extent, the likableness of forest officers they happen to know. The broader purposes of national forest management appeared to be unfamiliar lines of thought to most of these backhills people.74

A majority favored enlarging the National Forests in the mountains. Those who disagreed feared that families would be forced to leave and would have no way of getting along in new homes. The diversity of responses found in these interviews and the tendency of the mountain people to make judgments on a very personal basis seem most striking. The study made a number of recommendations for improving public relations, but proposed no overall plan or cure for problems with forest neighbors.

Figure 94.—Crewmen on the fireline using specially made triangular-toothed rakes to prevent their newly lit backfire from spreading across the line to unburned timber, Laurel Branch Fire, Watauga Ranger District, Cherokee National Forest, Tenn., November 1952. (Forest Service photo F-471196)

Figure 95.—A fire crewman keeps a close watch on a burning snag (dead tree), to prevent embers from spreading across fireline to untouched timber. Laurel Branch Fire, Watauga Ranger District, Cherokee National Forest, Tenn., November 1952. (Forest Service photo F-471197)

How widely these and other studies of the local people were read and believed by the forest officers is a question that cannot be answered, but the existence of these studies reflects official concern, beginning in the late 1930's, for developing insights into the behavior of rural Southerners. Although this concern persisted, it generally focused on the pine forests of the deep South, where burning could be beneficial if properly done. Man-caused fires were certainly not gone from the mountains, but the more severe problems often came from other areas.75

Timber Sales Favor Small Logger
Throughout the National Forests, but in the Southern Appalachians in particular, timber sale policy continued to favor the small logger. The Forest Service regarded such sales as a direct means of benefiting and influencing the local public. According to an internal document dated August 1940, "much emphasis is put on making sales to the little fellow who has only the meager equipment and can only raise a few dollars for advance payment."76
Indeed, the “little fellow” had come to dominate the lumber industry in the Southern Appalachians. Throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s small portable sawmills became more and more prevalent, and sawmilling in general became a seasonal or intermittent industry, employing only a few men. In 1954, about 90 percent of lumber operations throughout the region reported fewer than 20 employees. The largest commercial logging operations were concentrated in the coal-producing counties of eastern Kentucky, particularly Harlan, Leslie, and Perry.

Small sawmill operators on the Cumberland National Forest responded favorably to the agency’s timber sale policies. An interview conducted during the mid-1950’s of eastern Kentucky wood processors revealed a positive, even enthusiastic, attitude toward the Cumberland:

With few exceptions, the Cumberland National Forest received general acclaim, even among those wood processors who added that they didn’t buy there because too much of the lumber was fire scarred, or because “the system was too elaborate,” or, more generally, because the lumber was poor or to a “different measure.” Enthusiasm was greatest in the north, where the National Forest was said to be “a life saver to this area,” “wonderful,” “helping a lot.”

At the same time, attitudes toward private timber holders were unfavorable. They were criticized for carelessness concerning fires and a lack of initiative in reforestation. Ironically, however, most of those interviewed confessed to making no direct efforts themselves toward systematic reforestation.

Timber sales from the National Forests were important not just for the employment and profits they offered the local wood processors, but also for their contribution to National Forest revenues. Under the Weeks Act, 25 percent of such revenues (from the so-called 25-percent fund) were returned to the States for recommended distribution to the counties for schools and roads, proportional to the National Forest acreage in each county. Since timber sales were the principal component of National Forest revenues, their size and number influenced the fiscal wellbeing of whatever counties were involved.

The 25-Percent Fund

The writers evaluated the Forest Service’s recommended payments from the 25-percent fund, 1940-60, to the 12 Southern Appalachian counties selected in this study for detailed analysis. This showed considerable changes in timber sales and timber sale revenues, as well as increases in timber prices over this period. It also illustrated several of the problems with the Forest Service’s 25-percent payments as a source of county revenue.

Figure 96.—Hog Branch timber sale being discussed at portable mill site by Henry Parrott, right, of Bond, Ky., operator, and Berea District Assistant Ranger Paul Gilreath, in July 1955. (Forest Service photo F-478903)
Our analysis considered 25-percent payments and National Forest acreage per county for the nine counties of the group having such acreage. (Hancock and Buchanan Counties have no National Forest acreage; before 1972, Knox County had none.) For all nine counties, 25-percent payments and payments per acre increased from 1940 to 1960. Gross payments increased many times over—for example, from $1,658 in 1940 to $22,302 in 1960 for Union County. However, in 1960 even the highest paid county, Macon, received only $34,679 from the fund. As a supplemental payment for roads and schools, the 25-percent fund was still certainly not large.

On a per-acre basis, payments also increased over time. In 1940 all counties in the sample were paid only between $0.01 and $0.03 per National Forest acre; by 1960, this amount had increased to between $0.05 and $0.24 per acre. The most dramatic increases in payments per acre were for Union, Graham, Macon, and Habersham Counties, all but the last in the heart of the Chattahoochee and Nantahala forests. Much of the National Forest land in these forests had been purchased in earlier years; consequently, by the 1950's each had merchantable second-growth timber stands.

Figure 97.—Skidding hemlock logs to landing by tractor and winch on Reed Creek timber sale in Bear Hollow, Wythe Ranger District, Jefferson National Forest, southwestern Virginia, in July 1955. (Forest Service photo F-479067)
For all nine counties studied, World War II brought an increase in 25-percent-fund payments per acre, reflecting the wartime boom. Payments peaked during 1944. Graham and Macon counties experienced the greatest wartime increase in per acre payments—from $0.07 in 1943 to $0.16 in 1944—suggesting that timber cutting in these counties may have doubled.

In spite of the general increase in payments over the two decades, however, for any given county the amounts varied from year to year, giving support to Si Kahn's criticism that National Forest counties could not predict the amounts they would receive. As a case in point, Macon County per-acre payments from 1951 to 1956 varied as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>$0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>$0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>$0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>$0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>$0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>$0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although not all counties exhibited the same degree of variation, no pattern was steady.

Cross-county payment inequities were even more extreme and became increasingly so over the two decades. In 1940, all nine counties received between $0.01 and $0.03 per National Forest acre. By 1950, the payments ranged between $0.03 and $0.14. By 1960, the range was $0.05 to $0.24, primarily reflecting differences in timber sales from county to county. In general, these variations in per-acre payments had no relation to the proportion of National Forest land in a county.

Thus, not all mountaineers reacted so favorably to National Forest management as did the local wood processors. One group in particular, the tenants and squatters, proved a frequently difficult management problem. During the 1950's, when land acquisition faded, the chief friction with local residents was over special-use permits.
Tenants and squatters had often been permitted to remain on land sold to the Government during the 1930's. The Forest Service usually required them, however, to obtain special-use permits covering their cabins and fields. Although generally a small fee was charged, the principal purpose was to confirm Federal authority to regulate any activity carried out on the land.

One example shows what can happen in a classic case of mountain stubbornness. Cecil Cable, his wife, and seven children lived in a two-room cabin with lean-to on Nantahala National Forest land. Cable had repeatedly refused to obtain a permit for his home from the district ranger or to pay the user fee of $13.00 per year. The forest supervisor investigated, concluding that Cable, though poor, was well able to pay the fee, but "that he has simply made up his mind that he will not do so." Finally he recommended that Cable be evicted, but the Justice Department was reluctant to take such action.

The case eventually went to the office of the Chief, where a memorandum was prepared explaining that:

We have asked the Regional Forester to reconsider this case very carefully and to exhaust every possibility of solving the problem without resorting to eviction. We recognize that it is undesirable for the United States to be put into the role of "evicting landlord," especially when a family and small children are involved; however, in this case it seems inescapable...

It would be most difficult for us to administer the national forests if one person were allowed to defy the authority of the United States by refusing to pay a just and reasonable fee for the use of national forest land.

Eviction, recommended in October 1951, was carried out in early September 1953. Efforts were made to help Cable and his family find another home and move their household goods, but Cable refused all offers. Finally, the U.S. marshall physically evicted the man and his family from the cabin and piled all their possessions, including about 400 jars of home-canned fruit and vegetables, at the side of the road. A Forest Service crew immediately tore down the cabin and removed it.

In a similar situation on the same Forest, however, the Forest Service was lenient. A Mr. Posey was allowed to squat on Nantahala National Forest land for over 30 years without a permit. He had lived in poverty and obscurity along the Little Tennessee River on lands that were flooded by TVA when Fontana Dam was built in 1944. That year Mr. Posey, as well as the local Baptist Church, had been given deeds to small tracts on the lands of the Whiting Manufacturing Co., just south of the flooded area, in the Nantahala National Forest.

Mr. Posey, seizing a rare chance for profit, soon sold his deed and moved, as a squatter, deep into the Nantahala onto lands that TVA transferred in 1947 to the Forest Service. This squatting was "overlooked" by the Forest Service for over 30 years. However, in the late 1970's, when his son moved a trailer onto the site, the two were finally evicted.

Another permit problem on the Nantahala National Forest involved a mica mine on Government land. In 1952 the Supervisor informed the mine operator, S. W. Reid, of Franklin, N.C., that he was to stop mining until he had obtained the necessary permit from the Bureau of Land Management, the Government agency that regulates all mining and issues all mining permits and leases on Federal land. The Forest Service had no objection to Reid's operation, as long as he complied with regulations. Considering the large number of special-use permits issued on all of the region's forests, and the joint role of multiple Federal agencies managing the land, it is remarkable that there were not more conflicts.

A 1959 report defined the increasing pressures felt by forest officers in the mountains, as well as throughout the South, and foreshadowed the difficult management problems of the 1960's and 1970's. The Forest Service had been confronted with proposals to transfer National Forest lands to other jurisdictions for single-use for military use, for alienations for privately owned organization camps. The report concluded that, "although some such transfers may be justified, they indicated that the Forest Service had done an inadequate job of selling the principles of multiple-use management." The implication was that the National Forests, if properly managed, can be used for many things by many people:

Timber management should... be emphasized, but it must be fully coordinated with other uses. Allowable cut figures should make full allowance for scenic areas, soil stabilization, present and future recreation areas, roadside strips, etc. Ways and means must be developed to intensify programs in watershed management, public recreation, wildlife habitat management and grazing.

The difficulties of juggling the multiple purposes of the forests were to become increasingly apparent in the decades ahead. The Southern Appalachian forests had to continue to provide a steady supply of timber for small sawmill operators, local industries, and the population at large. Logging roads had to be maintained, opportunities for timber harvest continued, and timber sale profits assured. At the same time, wildlife and scenic areas had to be protected and recreational opportunities developed. In the eastern forests, scattered ownership patterns made administration for all purposes increasingly difficult. Poor marking of forest boundaries invited trespass and encroachment. Private land uses were increasingly incompatible with those of the Forest. There was still some hope for a future purchase program in the Southern Appalachians, but most of the consolidation of the Forests would have to be done by exchange. A long-time Forest Service employee summed up the problems tersely:

"People are so selfish. They all want whatever they use the forest for to come first."
Reference Notes

(In the following notes, the expression "NA, RG 95, FS" means National Archives, Record Group 95, Records of the Forest Service (USDA). Under this file designation, "OC" means Office of the Chief, "NFRC" means National Forest Reservation Commission, and "LA" means Land Acquisition, Region 8. "WNRC, FS" means Washington National Records Center. Records of the Forest Service. See Bibliography, IX.)


9. Gennett Papers, Box 21, Letter from Forest Supervisor, Chattahoochee National Forest, to N. W. Gennett, September 29, 1944.


13. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, GII Reports, Loveridge-Fitzwater, 1943, Region 8, p. 54.


16. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands, pp. 221, 222.

17. L. E. Perry, McCreary Conquest, A Narrative History. Whitley City, Ky.: L. E. Perry, 1979, p. 81.


21. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands, pp. 244-246.


23. Marguerite Owen, The Tennessee Valley Authority, pp. 84, 85.


40. NA, RG 95, FS, Office of the Chief (OC), National Forest Reservation Commission (NFRC), Final Report for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 1976, p. 4.
41. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, 1945-1953, "Recess approval" of a purchase required that proposals be mailed to each member of the NFRC. There was a specified time to reply yes or no. Recess approval had to be unanimous, but no response was assumed to be a yes vote.
42. NA, RG 95, FS, Land Acquisition (LA), Exchange, Purchase and Donation Cases, 1946-51, Chattahoochee Exchange, Camp Toccoa.
43. Surplus Property Act, 58 Stat. 765.
44. NA, RG 95, FS, Land Acquisition (LA), Exchange, Purchase, and Donation, Cases, 1946-1951, Jefferson Purchase.
45. WNRC, FS Accession No. 61A1087, Land Exchange; Purchase, Donation. (U-Recreation, Region 8.)
46. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 61A1087, Land Exchange, Purchase, Donation.
47. NA, RG 95, Land Acquisition (LA), Exchange, Purchase and Donation Cases, 1946-51, Pisgah Donation; Jefferson Donation.
49. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 61A1087, Land Exchange.
51. NA, RG 95, FS, NFRC, Minutes, June 17, 1954.
52. NA, RG 95, FS, NFRC, Minutes, April 17, 1956.
53. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 79001, General Integrating Inspection Reports, 1959, Comments.
55. Owen, TVA, p. 154, 155.
56. Lands Records, National Forest of North Carolina, Asheville, N.C. In addition to lands around Fontana Dam, TVA transferred another 21,640 acres around other area reservoirs to the Nantahala National Forest between 1940 and 1976.
60. NA, RG 95, FS, Region 8, Nantahala Exchange. Memorandum from L. F. Kneipp to Regional Forester, Atlanta, Ga., August 9, 1945.
61. NA, RG 95, FS, LA, Region 8, Nantahala, Exchange. L. F. Kneipp to Regional Forester, Atlanta, Ga., August 9, 1945.
62. NA, RG 95, FS, LA, Region 8, Nantahala, Exchange, Memorandum for Regional Forester to Chief, Forest Service, August 4, 1945.
63. Southern Historical Collection, Ramsey Papers, Folder 44, Speech of Governor Cherry, October 13, 1947, before Board of Conservation and Development, Asheville, N.C.
64. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, General Integrating Inspection Reports (GII), Marsh and Kramer, Region 8, 1948-49, pp. 38, 45.
65. NA, RG 95, OC, FS, GII, Marsh and Kramer, Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1948-49, p. 38.
66. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, GII, Marsh and Kramer Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1948-49, p. 45.
68. *Federal Agencies and Outdoor Recreation*, p. 22.
69. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, GII, Marsh and Kramer, Region 8, 1948-49, p. 38.
70. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 60A931, "A List of Different Kinds of Things the Forest Service and Forest Officers Do Which Influence Residents," August 12, 1940, p. 7.
72. Shea, p. 162.
75. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 79001, General Integrating Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1959, Comments.
76. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 60A931, "A List of Different Kinds of Things the Forest Service and Forest Officers Do Which Influence Residents." p. 4.


81. 36 Stat. 963.

82. Data on recommended county payments made to States were obtained from Fiscal and Accounting Management, Washington Office, Forest Service. It is important to note that county payments are only recommendations made to the States for roads and schools; the Forest Service has no jurisdiction over the actual payments a State chooses to make.


84. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 59A1753, Trespass files, Region 8, 1941-54.

85. WNRC, FS, Trespass files, Region 8, 1941-54.

86. The Mr. Posey anecdote was related in an interview with Frank Sharp, forester, National Forests of North Carolina, Asheville, May 11, 1979.


88. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 790001, General Integrating Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1959.

89. WNRC, FS, Acc. No. 790001, General Integrating Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1959, p. 25.

Chapter VII
Federal Development of the Southern Appalachians, 1960-81

Under the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the Appalachian region was recognized as seriously lagging behind the rest of the Nation, and concerted efforts were directed at revitalizing the area’s economy. A myriad of Federal programs were developed to combat poverty and unemployment, some aimed specifically at Appalachia. The Appalachian Regional Commission, created by Kennedy in 1963, and given expanded powers by Congress in 1965, funneled millions of dollars into the Southern Appalachians. In addition, Federal land acquisition in the area was given new impetus, and a new National Forest purchase unit was created in eastern Kentucky. The National Forests of the region were pressured to market their resources to help meet accelerating demands for timber nationwide. Although the region made gains in employment, health, and education, the Southern Appalachian mountaineer, in the early 1970’s, remained considerably poorer and less advantaged than the average American in spite of multiple Federal development efforts.

When John F. Kennedy campaigned in the West Virginia Democratic primary for the presidency in April and May 1960, the poverty and squalor he witnessed made a strong impression on him. One of his earliest concerns as President was to ease the depressed conditions he had seen and to restore the Appalachian region to economic health. Shortly after taking office, Kennedy appointed a Task Force on Area Redevelopment to deal with the problems of chronic unemployment, unused labor, and low income. The recommendations of the Task Force, published in early January 1961, echoed New Deal proposals of 30 years before: emergency public works programs in depressed areas of the Nation and development of these areas’ natural resources.

Appalachia Is Rediscovered
The year 1960 thus marked the beginning of a national rediscovery of Appalachia that directed billions of Federal dollars to improving the area. Specifically, the Kennedy Task Force identified nearly 100 Appalachian “depressed areas,” classified by the Department of Labor as having a “labor surplus, substantial and persistent,” and between 300 and 400 rural, low-income areas where Federal funds might be concentrated. The Task Force report recommended that a commission be established for the 11-State Appalachian region to tackle special area development problems. Although

Figure 99.—Local unemployed workers applying for forestry jobs under the Federal Accelerated Public Works (APW) Program in the Tusquitee Ranger District office, Nantahala National Forest, in Murphy, Cherokee County, N.C., in January 1963. APW ran for 2 years and led to the myriad programs of the Economic Opportunity Act. (Forest Service photo F-503999)
most of these recommendations were not translated into Federal action until the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, John F. Kennedy redirected national attention and concern to the region. He appointed an advisory commission in 1963. 

In 1960 the Appalachian region certainly deserved national attention. Since World War II, as its agriculture and coal industry failed to keep pace with national trends, its population was increasingly unemployed and poor. By 1960, the region’s employment, income, and educational levels were well below the national averages. Although the State of West Virginia represented one of the worst concentrations of regional poverty, Appalachian Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia also suffered severe underemployment and income inequities.

As discussed in some detail in chapter VI, the Southern Appalachian region had been experiencing heavy outmigration for two decades. At the same time, human fertility rates were declining, so that by 1960 the natural rate of increase (births minus deaths per 1,000 population) was not enough to offset the population losses from net outmigration. Not only was population declining, but relatively more was age 65 or older. Throughout the southern mountains, more and more people were leaving their farms for urban and suburban areas. However, retailing and manufacturing firms could not absorb the extra labor, and unemployment rose. In 1960, the unemployment rate of Appalachia was nearly twice the national average.  

By whatever statistic it was measured, the poverty of the region was glaring. In the counties of Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia defined by the Appalachian Regional Commission to be part of “Appalachia,” poverty was reflected in per capita income figures, poverty level statistics, infant mortality rates, and school enrollments. Four such measures are presented in table 9.

The table shows that, by all four measures, the people of the Southern Appalachians in 1960 were poorer, less healthy, and less well educated than the national average. This was especially true in Appalachian Kentucky where per capita income was only half the U.S. average, and nearly three times the national percentage of families were below poverty level. The infant mortality rate, as an indicator of general health conditions, was highest in Appalachian Virginia and Kentucky, which also had the most 16- and 17-year-olds not enrolled in school. Thus, the statistics confirm that, in general, conditions in the coal counties were the most severe, although throughout the region poverty was markedly worse than the national average.

These conditions were examined more closely for the 12 study counties selected for detailed analysis and introduced in chapter VI. Five poverty indicators available from 1960 Census data are presented for the 12 counties in table 10. On a county-by-county basis, the greatest discrepancies in the data appear between the Cumberland Plateau coal counties of

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Table 9.—Four poverty indicators in the Appalachian Mountain sections of five Southern States, circa 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per capita income as percentage of U.S. average—1965</th>
<th>Percentage of households below poverty level—1960</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate per 1,000—1960</th>
<th>Percentage of persons 16-17 not enrolled in school—1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian Kentucky</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian Virginia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian Tennessee</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian North Carolina</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian Georgia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Appalachia—A Reference Book (Appalachian Regional Commission, February 1979).
Table 10.—Five poverty indicators in 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, circa 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Indicator</th>
<th>High proportion of National Forest</th>
<th>Little or no National Forest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income—$</td>
<td>Union, Ga. 768</td>
<td>1,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graham, N.C. 770</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macon, N.C. 870</td>
<td>1,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unicoi, Tenn. 1,127</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blount, Six-County average*</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of families below poverty level</td>
<td>67.1 56.2 39.6 71.5 56.2 58.1</td>
<td>53.5 60.9 35.5 78.0 70.5 50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population receiving public assistance**</td>
<td>8.8 5.9 3.0 5.1 13.3 1.0 6.3</td>
<td>5.3 7.7 2.3 8.7 11.7 2.3 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of families with incomes of $10,000 or more</td>
<td>3.1 1.9 3.8 3.7 0.9 1.7 2.7</td>
<td>3.5 2.1 6.4 1.2 1.7 3.8 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population 65 years or older</td>
<td>10.2 7.6 10.7 9.1 9.0 8.8 9.4</td>
<td>8.3 10.2 11.8 8.7 9.7 4.0 8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For percent of families below poverty level, averages are unweighted.
**1964 recipients as a percent of 1960 population.

McCreary and Knox in Kentucky, and Hancock, in Tennessee, as a group, and the remaining mountain counties. In 1960, these three had by far the lowest income of the 12 and the most families below poverty level. Also, along with Union County, Ga., they had the most on public assistance and, along with Graham County, N.C., the fewest earning $10,000 a year or more.

L. E. Perry has painted a more explicit picture of conditions in 1960 in McCreary County, representative of the Cumberland Plateau in Kentucky, which has a high percentage of National Forest land:

> The county was not the best in economic stability (it never seems to be) nor was it the worst. But the general welfare of the people was disturbing... There were the same crucial and urgent problems. 49% of all homes had no running water; 65% of the homes had no bathrooms; 75% had no central heat; 33% of the homes were on dirt roads. Hundreds of unsightly, unsanitary and uncomfortable houses dotted the landscape. The problems of housing and what to do about it was one to stagger the imagination... [sic.]

> Surplus food distribution was not only a way of life it was life for much of the population, not unlike the never-to-be-forgotten days of the great depression.

> The slump in coal production in the 1950s persisted; the war-time factories no longer beckoned. Unemployment was at a high rate. Would poverty never perish in McCreary County?*

A comparison of the six study counties with a high proportion of National Forest land and those with little or no National Forest suggests that the former group fared worse in 1960—but only slightly so. The averages computed for each set of counties are generally close, with only several percentage points between them, except for a larger difference in the percent of population earning $10,000 or more. It is noteworthy that within each group of counties—and excluding the Cumberland coal counties—the differences are considerable. For example, Unicoi and Union Counties, with 43 and 47 percent, respectively, of their land in National Forests in 1960, showed a difference of 32 percent in per capita income. Similarly, Henderson and Ashe Counties, with only an 8 percent difference in National Forest land ownership in 1960, had a 44 percent difference in per capita income.

Thus, it appears that in 1960, although the six counties with a higher proportion of land in National Forests were generally poorer, had a higher percentage of people dependent on public assistance, and a higher percentage of people 65 or older than the six counties with a low percentage of National Forest ownership, these differences were relatively small. These differences were not so great as those within the two sets of counties studied and across the subregions of the Southern Appalachians. Thus, it cannot fairly be determined from this sample whether a high proportion of National Forest land depressed local social and economic conditions. Certainly, poverty conditions cannot be attributed to Federal landownership alone, if, indeed, to any degree at all.
The first emergency employment project for distressed areas to be implemented under President Kennedy was the Accelerated Public Works Program (APW) which operated nationwide during the 1962 and 1963 fiscal years under a $900-million authorization of the Clark-Blatnik Emergency Public Works Acceleration Act enacted September 14, 1962. Funds were allocated by the Area Redevelopment Administration in the Department of Commerce. During the 2 years, a peak force of 9,000 men worked on a multitude of projects on 100 National Forests, advanced with $60,800,000 of allotted funds, many in the Southern Appalachians. (See table 11.) Work included picnic and camp recreation and sanitary facilities, timber stand improvement, wildlife and fish habitat improvement, roads and trails, erosion control, and fire towers, ranger offices, warehouses, and other structures. Among the latter were a new office for the Morehead Ranger District, Daniel Boone National Forest, Ky., and construction of research facilities for water runoff measurement at the Cowee Hydrologic Laboratory near Franklin, N.C., in the Nantahala National Forest. The APW Program led to the numerous special work programs of the Johnson Administration which developed out of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

The Federal War on Appalachian Poverty

When Lyndon B. Johnson became President in 1963, he turned Kennedy’s concern with poverty and unemployment into a crusade: a “War on Poverty.” Over the next 5 years, a proliferation of governmental agencies and programs was created to combat the nation’s economic ills. The Southern Appalachians were “rediscovered,” and a substantial share of Federal program money was provided for the region’s development. As L. E. Perry put it:

Every big gun was pointed toward Appalachia and there were dozens of them in the armies of agencies recruited to fight poverty. There was an Accelerated Public Works Program and the Area Redevelopment Administration with numerous projects to disperse the federal benefits. Another division was called Manpower Development and Training Act. Only the bureaucrats knew the meaning of that. There was action in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the mighty Agriculture Department. The Appalachian Road Program was pushed forward and the Forest Service revived a nearly dead land acquisition program. Even the Kentucky Department of Economic Security was in the midst of this war. Every conceivable maneuver, it seemed, was anticipated, and covered by some sort of program or plan at the local, State or federal level.

But the top brass was that of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Here was the command post of such powerful agencies as Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, Vista, Unemployed Fathers (Happy Pappy) and others. If poverty could not be eliminated, this war would make it more enjoyable.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created many of the most visible programs throughout Appalachia, incorporating several antipoverty approaches. The Act established a series of unconnected programs under the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). These included: Community Action Programs, Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps, VISTA (Volunteers In Service To America), Summer Head Start, and the Work Experience and Training Program. In fiscal years 1967 and 1968 alone, OEO spent nearly $225 million in Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia.

Table 11.—Allocations of funds to National Forests in the Southern Appalachians under the Accelerated Public Works Program, 1962-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1962-63 allocations (dollars) total: 32,500,000</th>
<th>1963-64 allocations (dollars) total: 28,300,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All National Forests</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Appalachian Forests</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattahoochee and Oconee (Georgia)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee (Tennessee)</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boone (Kentucky)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson (Virginia)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgah, Nantahala, Uwharrie, and Croatan (North Carolina)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>485,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: NA = Not available
Total Funds, 1962-64, all National Forests: $60,800,000
Funds listed include amounts for States for tree planting
Source: Accelerated Public Works file, History Section, Forest Service
mostly on Community Action Programs, but much on Head Start and Job Corps also. VISTA, although more publicized, received only 2 percent of OEO funds for 1967 and 1968 in the five States.9

Another visible OEO program in Appalachia was President Johnson's Work Experience and Training Program, operated by the Department of Labor. It provided on-the-job training for unemployed fathers of dependent children who would otherwise receive AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) payments. Popularly known as the "Happy Pappy" program, it was very active in eastern Kentucky, where it at first inspired enthusiasm. In 1965 William McKinley Sizemore, mountain resident of Knox County, Ky., volunteered the following folk song about the Happy Pappy program:

Mr. Johnson put me to working  
When he signed that little bill  
Since I've become important  
It gives me a thrill  
The neighbors hushed their talking  
That I was no good  
Since I'm a happy pappy  
They treat me like they should.10

However, although for some mountaineers this program may have made Lyndon Johnson the favorite President since Roosevelt, it soon brought on widespread cynicism and disillusionment. By 1967, even before the Nixon administration, funds for the program were severely cut back.11 VISTA and most other OEO programs suffered similar fates. Basically, they were criticized for being naively and expensively staffed by people with grand ideas but little practical experience. OEO was repeatedly charged with spending dollars to "fatten middle-class staffs as assistant directors and executive secretaries proliferate."12 Part of the failure of VISTA, it was claimed, rested with Appalachian Volunteers, Inc., (AV) an organization of about 30 persons supported almost entirely by OEO grants, which managed VISTA initiatives. AV, it was charged, lacked management skill and was generally not cost-effective.13 (Of the 12 study counties, only Knox, McCreary, Hancock, and Macon received any VISTA funds.)14

Job Corps Proves Itself

One of the few OEO programs that survived the 1960's relatively uncriticized was Job Corps, which grew out of a recommendation of the 1961 Kennedy Task Force and was still going strong 20 years later. A supplemental appropriation to the Forest Service was recommended for timber stand improvement, control of erosion, and development of recreation facilities on National Forests in distressed areas, many of which were in the Southern Appalachians.15 One of the main aims, as with the CCC, was to create jobs to absorb the unused young labor of such areas.

This recommendation was translated into Job Corps during Lyndon Johnson's presidency by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, funded in the Department of Labor. Job Corps was intended to provide intensive educational and vocational training in group settings for disadvantaged youth so that they might become responsible and productive, and to do so in a way that contributed to national resource development.16 Certain Job Corps camps were to be operated by the Forest Service as Civilian Conservation Centers under an inter-agency agreement with the Department of Labor. As L. E. Perry said, "... Job Corps was the new baby the Forest Service had long wanted but could not afford until the OEO stork arrived."17

The first Job Corps center to be activated in the United States, Camp Arrow Wood, opened in the Nantahala National Forest near the town of Franklin, Macon County, N.C., early in 1965. (It was renamed Lyndon B. Johnson after his death.) Five other camps opened later that year throughout the Southern Appalachians. Most were old CCC camps, remodeled and made habitable by the Corpsmen themselves. The six Southern Appalachian Job Corps (Civilian Conservation) centers still active in 1982 are listed below.

The purpose of Job Corps was to transfer disadvantaged, primarily urban, youths to new environments where they would receive vocational training, education, and counseling. The Corpsmen who were sent to the Southern Appalachian centers were predominantly urban and black. When Job Corps began, the introduction of several hundred black youths into a previously all-white mountain community caused some problems. In some locations, it was difficult to integrate the Corpsmen into the surrounding communities as easily as had been hoped.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Forest</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Trainee Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal year 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nantahala, N. C.</td>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (formerly Arrow Wood)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgah, N. C.</td>
<td>Schenck</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee, Tenn.</td>
<td>Jacobs Creek</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson, Va.</td>
<td>Flatwoods</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boone, Ky.</td>
<td>Pine Knot</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Originally called Job Corps Centers
For example, a 1966 review of community attitudes toward the Schenck Job Corps Conservation Center located in the Pisgah National Forest showed some local reluctance to welcome the men. Although nearby Hendersonville had invited them to visit certain prearranged, select sites, the town would not send its representatives to the camp, “not wishing to have their presence [in general] or deal with their problems. This has been made formally clear.” The small town of Brevard, only a few miles from the camp, was felt to offer little for the urban youth. Asheville, where they were bussed regularly, seemed to know little about the camp. The Asheville police were said to “regard the influx [of Corpsmen] in a most informal manner, looking the other way when small disturbances occur.”

The worst Job Corps problems in the Southern Appalachians were at Arrow Wood. In 1965, after a busload of Corpsmen arrived in Franklin, N. C., for a summer evening, violence erupted between them and some local ruffians. According to the Camp’s first director, although local youths had caused disturbances with outsiders before, this evening’s melee was unprecedented. Police stopped the violence, and many local boys spent the night in jail. After that evening, policies changed; the number of Corpsmen bussed into Franklin was kept to a minimum. Fortunately, such racial disturbances were not widespread. Camps near towns larger than Franklin had less difficulty. For example, Jacobs Creek Center near Bristol, on the Tennessee-Virginia line, experienced no such problems. It seems that Bristol, a bi-State city of 55,000, with a black population of its own, was better able to absorb the Corpsmen.

The Pine Knot Job Corps Center, which opened in McCreary County in 1965, likewise experienced no racial difficulties. L. E. Perry wrote of its establishment:

At first the government officials were apprehensive about the possible racial consequences of establishing the training center in the area of McCreary County since it would recruit a majority of young blacks. After several local civic group meetings in the county, and with considerable preconditioning statements, it was generally implied that no more than 50% of the trainees would be of the minority class.

The local people for the most part have no preconceived ideas about racial discrimination and they refused to act violently. Within a few years the Center was almost 100% made up of black youths in training with a staff that was 100% white. The Forest Service hierarchy was pleased at the non-violent acceptance of the blacks by the citizens and privately and gleefully congratulated one another for integrating McCreary County without conflict.

Over the years, Job Corps has improved the National Forests of the Southern Appalachians in much the way the Civilian Conservation Corps did 30 years before—with road construction, construction of recreational facilities, soil erosion

Figure 100—New Stearns Ranger District office and modern sign, with Rangers Andrew Griffith and Herbert Staible by official car in front, on State route 27, Daniel Boone National Forest, Ky., in July 1966. Name of Forest had just been changed from Cumberland in April. (Forest Service photo F-515412)
control, reforestation, and timber stand improvement. For example, the ranger station and the visitor center of the Cradle of Forestry in Pisgah National Forest were built by the Schenck Job Corpsmen.23

Some of the Corps work has benefited local communities as well as the forests. In 1979, for example, the Pine Knot Job Corps unit rebuilt the McCreary County Little League baseball field, constructed a backstop and chain-link fence for the McCreary County Park, and supplied umpires for local Little League games.24 Job Corps centers have also provided employment for local residents, either through the construction of facilities for the centers or through staff positions. For example, in 1979 the Frenchburg Job Corps center in the Daniel Boone Forest employed between 30 and 40 persons from Powell, Montgomery, Menifee, and Bath counties on construction contracts, and employed 22 persons full time and 8 persons part time as center staff members, also from adjacent counties. The Center director estimated that 70 percent of Frenchburg’s nearly $1 million operating budget was spent in the five-county area surrounding the center.25

Other Programs Benefit Local Labor

The other Human Resource Programs administered by the Forest Service have had a more direct impact on the local labor market in the Southern Appalachians. The Youth Conservation Corps (YCC) and Senior Conservation Employment Program, both initiated in 1971, have provided employment in the National Forests for local youths and elders. YCC has operated summer camps for male and female youths 15 to 18, enrolling as many as 1,200 persons per year in the Southern Appalachians. Although YCC youths are not necessarily local, the locals who do enroll often are children of business and professional leaders in the community.26 YCC camps have built trails, planted trees, developed campgrounds, and surveyed land throughout the Appalachian forests. In 1981 YCC was reduced but continued on a revised basis.

The Senior Conservation (older American) Employment Program has provided work at minimum wage for over 500 elderly folk in the National Forests of the southern mountains. They have been local men and women 55 or older, with no income except Social Security or small pensions, performing odd construction and repair jobs. The program has been considered highly successful in involving the local population in Forest Service activities, and in furthering rapport with the local community.27
The Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC), begun in 1977, is the most recent Human Resource Program. It has provided employment at minimum wage for a 1-year maximum to local men and women between 16 and 23 years old. Unlike Job Corps and YCC, persons in YACC lived at home; mostly on the fringes of the National Forests. In 1979, nearly 500 persons were employed in YACC in the Southern Appalachian National Forests—including 112 in the Daniel Boone alone. In 1981 this program was terminated by the new administration in Washington in an economy move.

The Appalachian Regional Commission

In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson secured passage of the Appalachian Regional Development Act, which created the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). A study commission, originally recommended by the Kennedy Task Force, had already been in operation for 2 years under presidential appointment. Under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., the President's Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) had conducted several analyses of the region, and had formulated the commission's essential approach to regional development.

The main problems of Appalachia were defined by PARC as a lack of access both to and within the region, a technological inability to use its natural resources fully, a lack of facilities to control and exploit its rainfall, and inadequate resources to train its youth. Thus, regional development was to focus on a new and improved highway network; public facilities; resource development programs for water, timber, and coal; and on human resource programs. Specifically in regard to the Appalachian timber resource, PARC viewed the region's timber as underutilized and undermarketed, and recommended that increased timber harvesting would not only provide local jobs, but would also improve conditions for recreation, wildlife, and water production.

The Appalachian Regional Commission, created in March 1965, consisted of the governors of 12 Southeastern and Northeastern States (the 13th State, non-Appalachian Mississippi, was added in 1967) and one presidential appointee. The Commission was to coordinate the administration of a great new Federal-State funding effort for Appalachian development. Although most supporting funds would be Federal, the burden of the responsibility for project initiation, decisionmaking, and program administration was delegated to the States. In this delegation, ARC represented a new approach to regional rehabilitation efforts.

The Commission defined "Appalachia" as a vast 195,000-square mile region of 397 counties, including all of
West Virginia and parts of 12 other States from New York to Mississippi. On the assumption that Appalachia, as "a region apart," lacked access to the Nation's economic system, and that correcting this defect was basic to the entire program, the main initial thrust of the commission's development effort was to improve the region's system of highways. In fact, more than 80 percent of the first ARC billion-dollar appropriation was for a Development Highway System, the money to be spent over 6 years. Among the improvements resulting were the Foothills Parkway along the Tennessee side of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, the Tennessee portion of the Tellieo Plains—Robbinsville Highway across the Smokies south of the Park, and the Bert T. Combs Mountain Parkway from Winchester to Salyersville, Ky., through the Red River Gorge. Other public works investments were planned, but human resource development was left to the poverty programs administered under OEO, and even natural resource development was regulated to low priority, as Robb Burlage described it:

The Act [Appalachian Regional Development Act] explicitly forbade use of public funds to purchase or support public power and ignored most direct agency resource development and administrative powers. Water resources were given to the Congressional (and private power company) favorite, the Army Corps of Engineers, to study and plan with the states for five years. Timber, livestock, and mineral development programs were whittled away. Environmental control over coal was narrowed to a few restoration and study efforts. ARC funds were to be concentrated in those areas of the region that had fared relatively well during times of economic distress and thus showed a potential for self-sustaining growth. The highway network would connect all such growth areas, and provide access to them from the surrounding labor fields. Jerald Ter Horst said there was "a hint of economic predestination" in ARC's development premise: "the belief that many economically weak towns and counties do not have the potential to become thriving, prosperous centers of population."

When eastern Kentucky newspaper editor Tom Gish saw an ARC development map in December 1964, showing only white space for his area, he labeled it "Eastern Kentucky's White Christmas."

Local Development Districts
For administrative purposes, the States divided their Appalachian regions into local development districts (LDD's), of which there were 69 in 1980. LDD's are multicounty planning and development agencies organized around urban growth centers. For example, the Southwest North Carolina LDD encompasses Cherokee, Clay, Macon, Graham, Swain, Jackson, and Haywood Counties. LDD's receive administrative support funding from ARC but operate differently from State to State. Projects are often initiated and administered LDD-wide, although others are restricted to one county or encompass several LDD's.

Figure 103.—Job Corpsman receiving instruction in operating heavy road-building equipment from officer of Pisgah National Froest, N.C., in August 1966. (Forest Service photo F-516209)
The programs funded through the Appalachian Regional Commission have been administered through a series of existing governmental agencies, often co-sponsored by them. ARC developed working relationships with a number of Federal agencies active in the region; for example, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Rural Development and Soil Conservation Services of the Department of Agriculture. Although ARC’s relationship with the Forest Service has been less formalized than those with other Federal agencies, there has been communication between the two on certain initiatives and policy issues. The commission has funded a series of resource and environmental programs, primarily in mine subsidence, land stabilization, and mine reclamation. There have been timber development programs as well, although very localized and small in scale; this is discussed further on. ARC has funded, through the Forest Service Regional Office in Atlanta, several associations of landowners for the purpose of private timber development. In 1980 one was operative in a five-county area around Catlettsburg, Ky.

Figure 104.—Cinder blocks for new office building of Stanton (formerly Red River) Ranger District being laid by Job Corps trainee in June 1967. The men on this project were from the Frenchburg Civilian Conservation Center, near the Red River Gorge and the confluence of Menifee, Powell, and Wolfe counties, on the Daniel Boone National Forest, Ky. (Forest Service photo F-519122)

ARC Is Criticized For Failing the Poor

Between 1966 and 1978, the Appalachian Regional Commission spent more than $3.5 billion for the region’s economic development. Although the Commission has cited numerous successful projects, critics—from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to local spokesmen, such as Robb Burlage and John Gaventa—have been vocal. In essence, they charged that ARC has failed to reach the region’s critically poor, and that “improvement” has benefited only the local elites or the already urbanized areas of Appalachia. Over 60 percent of ARC’s funds have gone into highway building or improvement. Of the remaining funds that have been dispensed, most have bypassed the hard-core, neediest Appalachian communities. Several have suggested that to be truly responsive, ARC should have recognized Appalachia’s status as an internal colony by taxing the coal and resource extraction industries, fostering the development of public power, and encouraging greater local citizen participation in the Commission’s expenditure decisions.
The General Accounting Office, in an April 1979 report to Congress, was more specific in its criticisms. In essence, the GAO found that, (1) the fundamental goals of ARC were not completely clear; (2) ARC State-planning efforts were politically oriented, fragmentary, and inadequate; (3) specific time frames for the accomplishment of the Commission's long-term goals had not been established; (4) often areas with the least severe poverty and employment problems had received the highest average ARC funds per capita; and (5) that funding and program status had frequently not been adequately monitored.44

The report specifically focused on the Kentucky River Area Development District of central eastern Kentucky, which includes Leslie, Perry, Knott, Owsley, Breathitt, Wolfe, and Lee counties—most of which are in the area of this study. The GAO concluded that, in spite of concentrated investments of nearly $23 million in the district, and in spite of the district's percentage increase in per-capita income greater than the national average, the incidence of poverty worsened for the district between 1960 and 1970. Thus, the GAO questioned "whether the goal of economic self-sufficiency is feasible or realistic in this and perhaps other parts of Central Appalachia."45

Out of the more than $3.5 billion in ARC funds expended between 1966 and 1980, slightly more than $230 million were spent for single counties over the 84-county area considered in this study.46 For four of the five States involved—Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia—ARC funds were spent fairly evenly on a per-county basis. The Virginia counties, however, received about twice the per-county ARC funds (over $4.6 million) as did the others.

Counties that received the most ARC funds individually (more than $6 million) over the 84-county area are listed below.

With the exception of Buncombe and Whitfield Counties, the above list is composed of coal counties, none of which has a high proportion of National Forest land. It is noteworthy that Buncombe County, where Asheville is located, received a relatively large share of ARC funds, an indication that development efforts were often concentrated in areas with an exhibited potential for growth.

For the 12 Southern Appalachian counties selected for detailed analysis in this report, a total of $23,438,631 in ARC funds were spent from the Commission's beginning through March 25, 1980. The breakdown of these expenditures and the expenditures per capita are shown in table 14. The difference in expenditures on county projects between the selected group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total ARC funds as of March 25, 1980</th>
<th>Population as of July 1, 1975</th>
<th>ARC funds per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wise County, Va.</td>
<td>13,029,646</td>
<td>68,554</td>
<td>$192.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitfield County, Ga.</td>
<td>10,530,783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buncombe County, N.C.</td>
<td>7,362,167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott County, Va.</td>
<td>6,859,172</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazewell County, Va.</td>
<td>6,816,041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell County, Ky.</td>
<td>6,766,902</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlan County, Ky.</td>
<td>6,722,624</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickenson County, Va.</td>
<td>6,420,717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARC Funds by County, Joe Cerniglia, Appalachian Regional Commission, Washington, D.C.

44 "No funds allotted, 1973-80

Table 14.—Total and per capita funds allotted by Appalachian Regional Commission to 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total ARC funds as of March 25, 1980</th>
<th>Population as of July 1, 1975</th>
<th>ARC funds per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High proportion of National Forest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union, Ga.</td>
<td>$ 633,163</td>
<td>8,110</td>
<td>$ 78.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham, N.C.</td>
<td>481,700*</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>72.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macon, N.C.</td>
<td>1,389,079</td>
<td>18,163</td>
<td>76.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicoi, Tenn.</td>
<td>725,756</td>
<td>15,702</td>
<td>46.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCready, Ky.</td>
<td>820,570</td>
<td>14,342</td>
<td>57.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bland, Va.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>5,596</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$ 4,050,268</td>
<td>68,554</td>
<td>$ 59.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Little or no National Forest |
| Habersham, Ga.          | $ 1,458,124                         | 23,128                       | $ 63.05             |
| Ashe, N.C.             | 1,653,312                           | 20,211                       | 91.70               |
| Henderson, N.C.        | 4,684,722                           | 48,647                       | 96.30               |
| Hancock, Tenn.         | 1,353,806                           | 6,486                        | 208.73              |
| Knox, Ky.              | 4,795,525                           | 26,713                       | 179.52              |
| Buchanan, Va.          | 5,242,874                           | 34,582                       | 151.61              |
| Total                 | $19,388,363                         | 159,767                      | $121.35             |

Source: Appalachian Regional Commission data sheets, "Financial Information for all Projects by County." Courtesy of Joe Cerniglia, ARC, Washington, D.C.
of counties with large areas of National Forests and the selected group with no National Forests is clear. The latter received more than four times as much ARC funds as the National-forest counties, although the group had only about twice the population. For example, Bland County got no funds at all, and Graham got less than $500,000, while Hancock County, with about the same small population, got $1.3 million. Thus, in terms of ARC funds per capita provided at the county level, the counties without National Forests fared about twice as well.

Of the 12 study counties, those that have received the most funds per capita are the predominantly coal counties—Hancock, Knox, and Buchanan. Here the funds have been spent diversely. The most costly ARC project in Hancock County was an access road between Morristown and Rogersville; Buchanan County received $2 million for construction of the Buchanan General Hospital; in Knox County, ARC funds were spent for an industrial park access road, the Union College Science Center building, and numerous smaller projects, ranging from an industrial park rail siding to an emergency radio communications network. Although such expenditures have probably contributed to the counties' wellbeing, they do not appear to have been aimed at the hard-cord victims of coal mining. (For all 12 study-area counties, about one-fifth of the total ARC funds were spent on roads and over one-quarter on vocational education.)

For the six counties with a high proportion of land in National Forests, McCreary and Graham are typical. Most of McCreary's $820,570 ARC funds went to the McCreary County High School vocational education department in 1974. In 1976, over $250,000 were spent on the McCreary County Park. Graham County's ARC funds also went largely for a vocational education facility, although a sewage treatment facility and solid waste disposal program were also funded. Graham County received no direct ARC funds between 1973 and 1980.

This assessment of the impact of both the ARC programs and the various anti-poverty programs initiated under OEO on the Southern Appalachians is neither clearcut nor exhaustive. However, an examination of changes in certain poverty indicators over time suggests that noticeable improvement has occurred. Table 15 presents changes from 1960 to 1970, 1975 or 1976 for the four poverty indicators shown earlier over the five Southern Appalachian States.

For all States, all indicators show an improvement over time, although in the 1970's the region still lagged behind much of the Nation. The most dramatic improvements in per capita income were for Appalachian Kentucky and Virginia—the poorest areas in 1960. Although they were still the poorest in 1976, per-capita income in those States was much closer to the regional average. Other noteworthy changes include an overall drop in the infant mortality rate closer to the national average (the Appalachian Tennessee rate was actually below national average), and a considerable decrease in the percent of families below poverty level. Although the number of persons 16-17 not enrolled in school decreased between 1960 and 1970, the percentage change was not as large as that for the Nation as a whole.

For the 12 study counties, changes in poverty indicators over the decade of the 1960's were typical of those across the Southern Appalachians, but appear greater for the counties with much area in National Forest than for those with little or no national forest land, as shown in table 16. In 1960, the six counties with a high proportion of national-forest land appeared to be poorer than their counterparts with little or no national-forest land; by 1970, there is a suggestion that the reverse was true.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Per capita income as percentage of U.S. average</th>
<th>Percentage of households below poverty level</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate: deaths per thousand</th>
<th>Percentage of persons aged 16-17 not enrolled in school</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100 100</td>
<td>22.1 13.7</td>
<td>26.0 16.1</td>
<td>19.1 10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>49 68</td>
<td>58.4 38.8</td>
<td>30.9 17.1</td>
<td>33.0 25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>55 75</td>
<td>24.4 0.4</td>
<td>31.0 21.6</td>
<td>33.1 17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>70 79</td>
<td>39.9 22.4</td>
<td>27.7 15.8</td>
<td>27.9 19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>75 84</td>
<td>37.2 18.8</td>
<td>26.8 19.1</td>
<td>25.6 17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appalachian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>70 77</td>
<td>38.5 16.9</td>
<td>29.1 16.4</td>
<td>28.0 25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Appalachia—A Reference Book, Appalachian Regional Commission, February 1979, pp. 56, 66, 74, and 77.
Although the six counties without National Forests had a higher average per capita income in 1974, the difference between the two groups of counties analyzed had closed from 6 percent to 4 percent since 1960. Furthermore, by the end of the 1960's, the counties with little or no National Forest had a greater percentage of families below poverty level (a reverse of the situation in 1960) and a higher percentage of people receiving public assistance. Indeed, in Buchanan County, with no National Forest, although the population dropped from 36,724 to 32,071 between 1960 and 1970, the number of people receiving AFDC payments increased between 1964 and 1972 from 837 to 2,009. Again, the predominantly coal counties appeared the poorest counties in both groups, in spite of signs of relative improvement. McCreary, Knox, and Hancock Counties, in particular—one of which has over half its land in National Forest, the other two having little or none—ranked low according to all the poverty indices. All 12 study counties experienced a uniform increase in the proportion aged 65 or older. Such a change suggests a continued trend in the outmigration of the younger population and, for some counties, an immigration of persons of retirement age.

Table 17 summarizes changes in net migration rates from the 12 study counties from 1960 to 1975. The data indicate that between 1960 and 1970, although the rate had slowed from the previous decade, net outmigration from most of the

Table 16—Changes in four poverty indicators for 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1960-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>766</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>844</td>
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<tr>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>3,256</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>2,278</td>
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</tr>
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<td>67.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>60.9</td>
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<td>78.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>50.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>&lt;1.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>&lt;1.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Per capita income—$%
Percentage of families below poverty level
Percentage of population receiving public assistance
Percentage of population 65 years or older

*For percentage of families below poverty level, averages are unweighted.


Table 17.—Changes in net migration for 12 selected Southern Appalachian counties, 1960-70 and 1970-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage change</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Graham</th>
<th>Macon</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>McCreary</th>
<th>Bland</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>McCreary</th>
<th>Bland</th>
<th>Mckinley</th>
<th>Bland</th>
<th>Hennderson</th>
<th>Hancock</th>
<th>Knox</th>
<th>Buchanan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-21.4</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>-30.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-75</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

counties was still considerable. The coal counties of Buchanan, Hancock, Knox, and McCreary continued to experience the greatest outmigration losses, with Bland and Graham Counties close behind.

Between 1970 and 1975, however, all 12 experienced a marked change. In several, net losses changed to net gains; at the very least, the rate of net outmigration dropped. Changes were most dramatic for the coal counties of Buchanan (29 points), Knox (22 points), and McCreary (23 points), although Union, Hancock, and Macon Counties improved by from 14 to 18 percentage points. The magnitude of the migration changes was apparently not related to the proportion of National Forest land. These population shifts will be discussed further in chapter VIII.

New Forest Is Created in Kentucky

One of the major concerns of the President's Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC), created by President Kennedy in 1963, was the development of the timber resource of the Appalachian region. "The timber resource," PARC reviewers felt, "should provide much of the foundation for the renewed economic vigor of the region." However, fragmented ownership proved to be one of the region's most serious timber problems, and "substantial acreages of forest land" in Appalachia were found so depleted as "not likely to be rehabilitated and adequately protected under private ownership." Thus, public ownership of such lands was recommended so that they could be returned to full productivity.

Following the recommendations of Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia and Governor Bert T. Combs of Kentucky, two mountain areas—one bordering the Monongahela National Forest, the other in eastern Kentucky—were studied for National Forest expansion in Appalachia. The area of eastern Kentucky was of about 4 million acres encompassing headwaters of the Cumberland, Kentucky, Licking, and Big Sandy Rivers. PARC recommended acquiring about 1.3 million acres over a 10-year period—not only to meet timber development recommendations but also to further general goals of the President's Commission.

Two years later, PARC's recommendations were realized. In February 1965, Congress created the Redbird Purchase Unit encompassing acreage in Leslie, Clay, Bell, Harlan, Owsley, Perry, and Knox Counties. Land acquisition began almost immediately. In April 1966, Congress renamed the Cumberland National Forest the Daniel Boone National Forest.

As in other parts of the Southern Appalachians before Forest Service acquisition, lands of the Redbird Purchase Unit had been held largely by absentee timber corporations, landholding companies, and mining interests since 1900 or earlier. As such, they had been extensively cut over and mined. Indeed, the Redbird contained some of the most abused land of the whole region. For the most part it was abandoned, and the few residents remaining, either small landholders or tenants, lived in the worst conditions of Appalachian poverty.

The Forest Service had considered this area several times as potential National Forest. Forest examiners had gone to eastern Kentucky in the first years after the passage of the Weeks Act. The area was reexamined during the 1920's, and again in the 1930's. By then, most of the lands had been heavily cut over, and could provide only the meager existence for the inhabitants. In 1933 Mary Breckenridge, founder of the Frontier Nursing Service in eastern Kentucky, went before the National Forest Reservation Commission to plead for a National Forest in the area. A National Forest, she felt, was the logical land-management choice for the region, not only to preserve and develop the timber resource and provide local employment, but also to prevent disastrous downstream flooding.

Although Mary Breckenridge was well received, and although Forest Service examiners visited the area and expressed strong interest in acquisition, no purchase unit was established. The major reason then, as it was in 1914, was that most of the land was held by timber coal companies whose owners either were unwilling to sell at all or refused to relinquish mining rights to the land until the coal was depleted.

In the 1960's, since much of the land had not only been logged but also mined, the Forest Service was more successful with acquisition. The first tract purchased in the Redbird Unit was of about 60,000 acres from the Red Bird Timber Co. The land, located in Clay, Leslie, Harlan, and Bell Counties, formed the nucleus of the almost 300,000-acre unit. Red Bird Timber had bought the tract from Fordson Coal Co., a Ford Motor Co. subsidiary, in the early 1960's; Fordson had held the land for almost 40 years after buying it from Peabody Coal in 1923.

Although some coal and timber companies were willing to sell to the Forest Service, the unit was not hailed enthusiastically by all of the local population. Indeed, for several weeks running, the Leslie County News lamented the Federal takeover and scorned the benefits that were assured the area. Although acknowledging that Government ownership could improve the land measurably, the paper said that Federal ownership is bad because it irrevocably takes the land away from private ownership. "It is a fact," stated The Politician of the paper, "that once the government does purchase property, it rarely sells it back."

A democracy does have many problems, but government ownership is not a cure all. Nor can it automatically make profitable a venture which has failed, in hands of individuals. The only real difference is that the government can afford to operate anything, anywhere, anytime, because it doesn't have to make a profit. It doesn't have anything invested, except the taxpayers' money.
Certainly, there was not much illusion that land acquisition for the Redbird would directly benefit the local population. As L. E. Perry of McCreary County wrote:

The land acquisition program was expanded into the Appalachia poverty areas, presumably to bring relief to the destitute people of Clay, Leslie and Bell Counties. In reality the drive was for more land area where the corporations and land holding companies needed to unload their cut-over timberlands at a good profit while retaining the rich mineral deposits. It is yet [in 1980] to be determined how the poverty stricken people of the area were helped by this land buying program.51

With the purchase of the Red Bird Timber Co. tract, the Forest Service assumed responsibility not only for the land, but also for 115 families who had been tenants of the company on a year-to-year basis. Most of these families lived in substandard housing on remote, unmaintained roads; about 30 percent were estimated to have been receiving welfare payments. The appearance of the mountaineers' homes was dismal; trash and refuse littered the yards; the exteriors of the homes were delapidated.52

When the families learned of Forest Service acquisition of their leased land, they raised many questions about the continuity or improvement of their lives. The policy was that, although no one would be forcibly removed from his home, the eventual goal was to relocate all the families. Special-use permits would be issued for continued tenancy and farming, but the Forest Service would not maintain the roads serving the homes and would require "that the permittees clean up the premises and keep them clean." So its policy differed little from that of the Red Bird Corp., except for cleanliness. Here, the Forest Service was "reluctant to condone or continue a practice [freely dumping trash in the yards and in the woods] which is perpetuating a situation which appears to be deplorable."53

Figure 105.— Severely cutover, farmed-out steep slope along dirt road at headwaters of Elk Creek, Clay County, typical of the Redbird Purchase Unit in eastern Kentucky in 1965. The Redbird, which comprises the headwaters of the Kentucky and Cumberland rivers in seven southeastern coal counties, is the Forest Service’s most recent Purchase Unit. Note dilapidated houses, abandoned auto. This scene was then typical of this area. Recent strong demand for coal has relieved the depression situation somewhat. (Forest Service photo F-512677)
Throughout the next decade, rangers on the Redbird Unit had continuous problems with some of the inhabitants, such as special-use permits, trash disposal, and incendiary fires. Maintaining a firm but friendly attitude was difficult, even for the most resourceful ranger.

For example, the first ranger on the Redbird Unit tells of his experiences with one particularly stubborn tenant family which had occupied several acres in the Redbird since the days of Fordson Coal Co. Although a tenant of Fordson, the family had consistently filed claims for the property they were occupying, but could never prove their case to obtain a “bona fide deed.”

When the Government acquired the lands the family was occupying, the second generation of tenants was not content with a special-use permit and continued the fight to own their small tract. They threatened the district ranger with bodily harm, and went so far as to begin construction of building foundations on the tract they occupied. In short, they “interfered with national forest management.” Ultimately, the case was settled in Federal court and the family was required to leave the National Forest. Several family members, however, continued for at least 10 years to assert their claim to the land.  

**Weeks Act Purchases Rise Steadily**

After the lean years of the Eisenhower Administration, appropriations for Weeks Act purchases increased almost steadily from 1961 until 1967, from $100,000 to $2,480,000. In 1966, more acres were approved for Weeks Act acquisition than had been approved for all the previous 11 years together. Throughout the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, acquisition in the Redbird Purchase Unit dominated the business of the National Forest Reservation Commission. According to NFRC minutes in 1972, “during the past six years, over one-half of the Weeks Law funds have been concentrated in the Redbird Purchase Unit.”

In 1972, the National Forest Reserve Commission approved a 96,061-acre extension to the Redbird Purchase Unit. The extension included land in Owsley and Perry Counties that was “forested although heavily cutover.” The Commission felt that Federal acquisition would help protect the area’s watersheds and improve the water quality of an existing reservoir in the region. It was projected that acquisition costs would range between $25 and $80 per acre, and that the purchase program would run for about 20 years. In 1975, the Redbird was still identified as the “major thrust area” for NFRC land purchase.

Most of the tracts purchased in the Redbird were small, ranging between 10 and 300 acres. Larger tracts were the exception, although in 1973 over 9,000 acres were acquired from the Mayne Land and Development Co. From its creation in 1965 until 1978, an average of about 7,500 acres was acquired in the Redbird each year. In 1977 the net acreage of the purchase unit was almost 135,000 acres. In 1981 it was just over 140,000. Prices for land in the Redbird have been far below those in the other Southern Appalachian National Forests. In fiscal year 1977, for example, tracts acquired in the Redbird averaged $85.97 per acre; those in the Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests averaged $441.27 per acre, and those in the Cherokee, $635.22 per acre.

**Serious Problem With Mineral Rights**

The problem of mineral rights on the lands of eastern Kentucky, which halted efforts to establish a National Forest there 60 years ago, has plagued the Forest Service since the Redbird was established in 1966. Much of the land in the Redbird is covered by the Kentucky broad form deed, which allows strip-mining and gives the deed holder wide freedom with the land. At first the National Forest Reservation Commission was reluctant to purchase lands that had mineral rights outstanding in a third party with a Broad Form Deed. Gradually, however, it was recognized that so much Redbird land was of this type, some would have to be acquired to create a manageable National Forest district.

Thus, many tracts in eastern Kentucky have been purchased with mineral rights held by third parties. The Commission consoled itself with the expectation that, because Kentucky had strengthened its 1954 strip-mining law, the mining would be acceptable. Mineral rights have been separately purchased, where possible, however, to facilitate Forest Service control. For example, in 1971 the National Forest Reservation Commission authorized $10 per acre to purchase the mineral rights to the Fordson Coal Co. lands. Ultimately, of course, the Commission could obtain the mineral rights with the Secretary’s condemnation, an option that was entertained more frequently in the 1970’s as recreation and wilderness forces collided with mining interests on the Daniel Boone.

**New Law Boosts Recreational Land Purchases**

Although land acquisition in the Southern Appalachians during the 1960’s and 1970’s was concentrated in the Redbird Unit, the other National Forests in the region also expanded because of a boost in acquisition monies provided by the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF). The Fund, established by the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of September 1964, was a direct outgrowth of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) study. The main purpose of the Act was to enhance the recreational resources of America through planning, acquisition of lands, and recreational development. A separate fund was established to provide money to individual State and local governments on a matching basis and to Federal agencies to carry out the purposes of the Act. Monies were available, through the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (later to become the Heritage, Conservation, and Recreation Service), for the Forest Service to acquire private inholdings in wilderness areas, lands for outdoor recreation purposes, or areas where any fish or wildlife species was threatened. The Act stipulated that no more than 15 percent of the acreage so acquired could be west of the 100th meridian.
Figure 106.—Hillsides scarred by strip and auger coal mining along Beech Fork, Leslie County, Ky., in 1965. A common sight then in Redbird Purchase Unit. Acid soil debris leached down to pollute streams and kill fish for many years. New highway and old road cut slope at lower levels. (Forest Service photo F-512684)

Figure 107.—Strip coal mine spoil banks, partly reforested by planting, along Little Goose Creek in Leslie County, Ky., in 1965. At that time, more than 1,500 acres of strip mine tailings in the area were still in need of rehabilitation and revegetation. (Forest Service photo F-512685)
After 1965, LWCF appropriations became by far the chief source of money for National Forest land acquisitions. Between 1965 and 1977 an average of over $25 million per year was provided for National Forest acquisition from the fund. By the end of 1973, 35 percent of the National Forest acres acquired through the LWCF were in Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee. In fiscal year 1976 conservation fund monies exceeded Weeks Act monies by a ratio of more than 25 to 1. Increasingly, the Fund was used to purchase lands on the older Southern Appalachian National Forests with high recreational value, while Weeks Act appropriations were devoted to the Redbird Unit. Table 18 summarizes the LWCF funds spent for land acquisitions in the Southern Appalachian National Forests during the first 14 years of the Fund, ending June 30, 1980.

Although land acquisition for National Forests in the Southern Appalachians continued throughout the 1960's and 1970's, large purchases were generally not made without a clear indication that they were approved by the local public. A case in point is a 46,000-acre tract largely in Bland County, Va., owned by Consolidation Coal Co., a subsidiary of Continental Oil Co. It was considered by the Commission in January 1972. Because the tract amounted to about one-fifth the land area of Bland County, the NFRC felt that evidence of public support for the purchase was necessary. The tract in question had been logged about 40 years before and contained only "a residual stand of poor quality timber." Manganese strip-mining had also occurred on the land, leaving behind a few small lakes. The tract was not being used for farming or grazing; it was mountain land with no ongoing commercial utility except some small-scale lumbering. However, its recreational potential was considered "great." Although the Virginia Commission for Outdoor Recreation favored Forest Service purchase, Bland County was divided on the issue. One-half of the letters to the Forest Service from local groups and individuals approved of the purchase, and the Bland County Board of Supervisors was split, two to two, on the acquisition. The opponents did not want to see the land removed from the tax rolls. The estimated loss of revenue from such removal was an annual $3,000, without considering timber harvesting. Although the tract contained poor second-growth timber, the Forest Service claimed it was suitable for immediate pulpwood harvesting, which would bring additional revenues. The NFRC recommended that the Bland County purchase be approved. The area actually so acquired was about 40,000 acres.

Forest Commission Dissolved

Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, the National Forest Reservation Commission was finding it nearly impossible to assemble the various cabinet members, senators, and congressmen, or even a quorum of their deputies, at the same time to consider National Forest land acquisitions. Approval was usually granted in "unassembled" meetings. Finally, in October 1976, the NFRC was dissolved. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 transferred its functions to the Secretary of Agriculture, granting him authority to approve small, routine acquisitions, but requiring those of $25,000 or more to be submitted to the House Agriculture Committee and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry for a 30-day review.

The demise of NFRC marked a symbolic end of National Forest creation under the Weeks Act. After the Redbird Purchase Unit was added to Daniel Boone National Forest, acquisition of large cutover tracts at major stream headwaters virtually stopped. By 1975 most such lands in eastern watersheds not in Federal ownership were too expensive to buy or not for sale. Additions to eastern National Forests were thus increasingly based on other legal authority, and primarily for recreation—as will be discussed in chapter VIII.

Recent National Forest Timber Management

Although the demand for timber slackened in the immediate postwar years, the 1950's saw a steady rise in timber harvesting across the Nation as housing construction and timber exports increased. In 1952 the Forest Service, in cooperation with other Federal, State, and private agencies, began a new inventory and assessment of the country's timber resource known as the Timber Resource Review (TRR). The TRR report, published in final revised form in 1958, found that in 1952 growth of sawtimber was almost equal to the cut, and in the South and East, exceeded the cut. However, the report expressed serious concern over the ability of the nation's forests to meet future timber demands, which were projected to rise rapidly. Although the TRR report fell short of recommending regulation of harvesting procedures on private timberlands, it emphasized the need for increased National Forest production and more intensive timber management on lands of all ownerships.

Table 18.—Total lands acquired with Land and Water Conservation Act funds in National Forests of the Southern Appalachians, 1966-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>LWCF acquisition funds*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chattahoochee</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7,898,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boone</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1,622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nantahala</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>10,139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgah</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>4,923,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>4,046,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>16,106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$44,734,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rounded to nearest thousand. Fiscal year data.

At the same time, as discussed in chapter VI, pressures on the National Forests had been building for expanded outdoor recreational opportunities. In June 1958, shortly after the publication of the TRR report, President Eisenhower established the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) to inventory the nation's recreational resources. (ORRRC is discussed further in chapter VIII.) Meanwhile, the Forest Service was handling a multitude of problems connected with livestock grazing in the Western National Forests and was receiving increasing numbers of requests for special uses of Federal land, including the reservation of more wilderness. The combined pressures on the National Forests throughout the 1950's led to the drafting and eventual passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, which defined the purposes for which National Forests were established and administered, mostly reaffirming long-standing Forest Service policies and practices. It was the organization's feeling that the Forest Service "had better get its national forest house in order" that prompted the legislation.

The Multiple Use Act of 1960

The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, enacted on June 12, 1960, stated five renewable resources or uses of the National Forests in alphabetical order: outdoor recreation, range (grazing of domestic livestock), timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish. (Mining was not mentioned; it is not a renewable use, and was not at the time felt to be in need of express encouragement.) In essence, the Act declared that National Forests do not exist for any single purpose and implied that no one resource should be overemphasized at the expense of others. The Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act articulated the management ideals that the Forest Service had espoused for years: the National Forests are to be managed for a variety of purposes, with an effort to sustain the benefits of each purpose for the longest possible period of time. Although conflicts between purposes (uses) are possible, they are to be resolved in favor of the long-term public interest—in Pinchot's paraphrase, "The greatest good of the greatest number in the long run."
Much has been written about the ambiguities inherent in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. First, the Act states that the five purposes are “supplemental to but not in derogation of” the purposes stated in the so-called Organic Administration Act of 1897 that provided for management of the forest reserves. Those purposes were forest improvement and protection, securing favorable water flows, and a continuous timber supply. The Act also specifically protected prospecting and mining rights. There is some overlap between the two acts, and whether the more limited purposes stated in the 1897 Act should take precedence over those of the 1960 Act was publicly discussed after the latter’s enactment. Resolution of competing claims remained difficult. The more recent laws of the 1970’s have clarified the situation substantially.

In addition, the 1960 Act’s definition of multiple use was vague and simplistic. The criteria of flexibility in uses over time and continuous resource productivity can give “the unwary or ill-informed . . . the comforting illusion that if the uses are multiple enough there will be sufficient for everyone.” Moreover, the Act gives little specific direction as to how National Forests are actually to be managed, much less just how conflicts among purposes are to be resolved. Thus, some critics have charged that the multiple-use concept is a “facade behind which the Forest Service can operate to make decisions according to the relative strengths of clientele groups in a given area at a given time,” or that it is a “blank check” to manage the National Forests as it sees fit.

Certainly, the legislation was not so much a management tool as it was a statement allowing the Forest Service management flexibility while placating the multiple forest users. As Edward C. Crafts, Assistant Chief of the Forest Service during the 1950’s, wrote:

... there was a chance the various pressure groups might tend to offset each other to some degree. For example, the grazing people might like the bill because their interests would be equated with timber and recreation. Recreation and wilderness users should like it because it would raise them to a status equal to commercial users. The timber industry which had enjoyed preferential treatment would not like losing this preference, but on the other hand would be protected against being overridden roughshod by the recreation and wilderness enthusiasts. The bill contained a little something for everyone.

Nevertheless, in spite of its ambiguity and openness to conflicting interpretation, the Act did express the fundamental approach of Congress and the Forest Service to managing lands under pressure from multiple interest groups and fast-growing U.S. population: a recognition of all the uses to which forests can be put (except mining), and an attempt to diversify land use—or prevent single use—wherever possible. As Richard E. McArdle, then Forest Service Chief, stated at the Fifth World Forestry Congress in August 1960, “in most instances forest land is not fully serving the people if used exclusively for a purpose which could also be achieved in combination with several other uses.” McArdle conceded that multiple use is not “a panacea,” but he pointed out that because it helps considerably to overcome problems of scarcity and resolve conflicts of interest, it is the “best management for most of the publicly owned forest lands of the United States.”

Difficult to Promote Private Forestry
Against the background of potentially conflicting management directives inherent in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, Forest Service management of the Southern Appalachian forests became increasingly complex through the 1960’s. The complexity was compounded by the development initiatives encouraged by the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission. In 1963 PARC recommended that a timber resource development program for the whole Appalachian region be launched “on a scale far greater than ever before.” This program would involve an accelerated effort on both National Forests and on State and private lands. Specifically recommended initiatives were reforestation, timber stand improvement, construction of access roads, and the location and marking of property boundaries, as well as firebreak construction and erosion control. PARC estimated that more than 37,000 man-years of employment would be involved in the initial 5 year effort, and that more than $240 million should be spent.

The Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965 creating the new Commission with expanded powers made a specific provision for technical assistance to be given for the organization and operation of private “timber development organizations.” Timber development organizations were conceived as nonprofit corporations that would manage the timber resources of participating private landowners. One of the first research reports prepared for ARC was an evaluation of such organizations as a source of regional economic benefits.

The report concluded that, because sawmilling dominated the timbering industry of Appalachia—not pulpwood, plywood, or the like—and because of “restrictions imposed by timber availability, timber procurement economics, and requirements for timber quality,” the industry was not expected to grow. Furthermore, private forest lands were found to be in “multiple thousands of small size holdings,” and many of the region’s timber owners unmotivated to improve their long-term productivity. “Feelings of disinterest and mistrust” often characterized sales transactions, as well as “a propensity toward overengagement in dickering and negotiation.” For these reasons, consolidating private timber holdings and turning their management over to second parties did not seem feasible, and timber development organizations were proclaimed “not . . . viable in sufficient numbers to yield substantial economic benefits to Appalachia.”
This finding serves to emphasize the stabilizing role of Federal land managed for a variety of uses in the development of the Appalachian timber resource. Clearly, the National Forests did not exhibit the fragmented ownership, lack of owner motivation, and poor resource quality that characterized the private timber industry. Nevertheless, because of their timber composition, Southern Appalachian forests could not then be managed in the same way that Pacific forests and Southern coastal forests were. Appalachian forests did not at that time contain nearly the proportion of commercial timber acreage that the Western and the Southern piedmont and coastal forests did. Much was low-quality, second-growth hardwood, the product of a history of repeated "selective" cuttings, actually destructive "high-grading" in most cases, that left behind the undesirable and damaged individuals and species. Further, the quality hardwood that was present had a fairly long rotation cycle: between 40 and 80 years for sawtimber-sized trees.*

Figure 109.—Tractor-mounted power loader dropping a big white pine sawlog onto a truck at a Forest Service timber sale in Hurricane Gap section of Nolichucky Ranger District, Cherokee National Forest on the Tennessee-North Carolina State line adjoining Hot Springs Ranger District of Pisgah National Forest, in May 1962. (Forest Service photo F-502185)

Nevertheless, the Appalachian National Forests continued to provide resources for the small local wood processors. Small sales, of less than $2,000 in value, generally exceeded the larger sales in value by a factor of four to one, although there was considerable variation from forest to forest. For example, in fiscal year 1960, the only year for which comparable data were readily available, there were no sales of greater than $2,000 in value on the Daniel Boone or Cherokee National Forests, and on the Chattahoochee, only a handful; whereas, on the Nantahala and Pisgah, the value of "large" sales was nearly equal to that of small ones. It is interesting to note that large timber sales in the western North Carolina and northern Georgia forests were dominated by one company, the Ritter Lumber Co., which had been operating in the area since 1900.
For both small and large lumber firms, logging in the National Forests could not be described as a lucrative business, in part because the process of sealed bidding often elevated timber prices; in part because of the restrictions placed on the logger. As George Hicks wrote in *Appalachian Valley* about logging in North Carolina:

Work in timber continues to provide a living for some local men, but it is seasonal and sporadic employment . . . When a local man, for example, won timber rights to a large tract of national forest land in 1965 by submitting a bid far above all others, it was generally agreed by those who make their living in cutting timber that he “might just come out even” and perhaps make a slim profit only because he and his five adult sons would work together. If he were to hire labor, he would surely lose money.  

Moreover, as it did nationwide, the Forest Service placed restrictions on the size and type of logging roads, requiring piling and burning of slash, and specified the methods of timber extraction—to protect the environment, reduce danger of fire, and assure reproduction—all of which increased the cost of logging. This is even more true today.

**Even-Aged Management Becomes Standard**

In the early 1960’s—under policy directives to increase National Forest timber production, with the support of long-awaited new silvicultural research findings, a more stringent need for economy and efficiency in harvesting, and with demand increasing from the region’s pulpwood industry—clearcutting in patches (called even-aged management by foresters) became a more prominent practice of timber management in the Southern Appalachian forests, where mild climate, heavy rainfall, and generally good soils help insure rapid regrowth. Indeed, by the middle of the decade, it was the chief method of timber harvesting nationwide on National Forests, as it had nearly always been on private forests, and by 1969 accounted for about 50 percent of the harvested timber volume on eastern National Forests.  

However, it was over such cutting in an Appalachian forest—the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia, along with others in Montana and Wyoming—that the practice actually became a national controversy. The debate over clearcutting or patch cutting, which persisted through the 1960’s and into the 1970’s, illustrates the kind of difficulty that multiple-use management could bring, and points to the special qualities of Southern Appalachian forests that help explain why they would increasingly become the focus of management controversy.

Scientific clearcutting in patches, or even-age management, is a silvicultural technique that has been in practice for centuries. All the trees within a given area of limited extent are cut, regardless of age, species, or size, so that the stand that replaces them will be even-aged and will mature at the same time. Forest regrowth is assured by natural or artificial seeding, or by planting. The advantages of the technique over true selective cutting, shelterwood, or seed-tree methods are: improved regulation of stands, encouragement of growth for valuable sun-loving shade-intolerant timber species—such as yellow-poplar in the East and Douglas-fir in the West, control of disease, and economy of cutting.  

With this cutting system accounting for about half the harvest, timber sales increased markedly in the Southern Appalachians during the 1960’s. Data on the volume and value of timber sold from fiscal years 1960 to 1969 in the Jefferson and Daniel Boone National Forests, for example, show a steady increase over the decade. The volume of timber sold in the Jeffeson nearly tripled from 13,070 million board feet in 1960 to 38,752 million board feet in 1969. On the Daniel Boone the increase in volume was from 18,726 million board feet to 41,384. (The value of the timber sold similarly tripled and doubled respectively.) Thus, although the total acres cut in the Southern Appalachian National Forests were but a small percent of the region’s total forest, the increase in timber harvesting made this system more visible.  

Public reaction to patch clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest began with the objections of squirrel and turkey hunters to losing some of their favorite densely forested habitats, which years of Forest Service protection had fostered. The objections reached the West Virginia legislature, which passed a resolution in 1964 calling for a study of timber management practices on the Monongahela. Over the next 7 years, despite several such resolutions and studies, and numerous requests to change the system, the Forest Service continued to practice even-aged management there, with some modifications. The issue broadened its scope and base, as national interest groups became involved there and in the West. The press and other media provided extensive and usually highly critical coverage. Eventually the clearcutting controversy resulted in heated and extensive Congressional hearings and litigation.
Lawsuit Forces New Forestry Act

In 1974 a Federal District Court judge in West Virginia ruled the Forest Service in violation of the Organic Act of 1897 (which permitted the harvesting of dead, mature, or large trees); its ruling was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975, which noted that if changes in the law were needed it was up to Congress to make them. The appeal ruling forced Congress to act, prompting passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976. The Act repealed the restrictions on timber harvesting declared in the 79-year-old Organic Administration Act, set more specific requirements for management planning, thereby amending the 1974 Resources Planning Act, and established guidelines for timber harvesting. Patch clearcutting on National Forests was not forbidden, but was permitted only when determined optimal and under environmental constraints.

By the last half of the 1970's, because of harvesting delays caused by litigation and new rules, timber harvesting in the Southern Appalachian National Forests was reduced below the annual levels of the previous 10 years. On the Daniel Boone and Jefferson National Forests, for example, the volume of timber sold dropped to pre-1964 levels in fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 1979. (On the Jefferson, less timber was sold in 1979 than had been sold in 1960.) Integrated planning on an increased scale to give more concern to wildlife, esthetics, and watershed protection, and changes in road design and harvesting practices to assure minimum environmental impact, plus many studies for new wilderness proposals and increased public participation in decision-making caused a slow down timber sales.

Throughout the 1960's and until the mid-1970's, the Forest Service's required 25-percent payments to counties continued to reflect timber sales and, as such, fluctuated with the rise and subsequent fall in timbercutting.** In only two of the six study counties with a high percentage of National Forests (Graham and Macon) did 25-percent payments per-acre increase overall from 1961 and 1975. In the other four, per-acre payments rose to a peak in the years between 1965 and 1970, and then fell close to their 1961 level. In Union County, for example, per-acre payments rose from $0.26 in 1961 to a peak of $0.38 in 1967; in 1975 the payment was $0.18 per acre. Similar fluctuations applied to counties with little or no National Forest acreage. In 1975 none of the study counties received more than $0.29 per acre in 25-percent payments.**

The Appalachian counties' dissatisfaction with the fluctuating and often paltry compensation for Federal landsownership drew national attention in the 1970's. The Public Land Law Review Commission report, One Third of the Nation's Land, issued in 1970, summarized the inequity of the reimbursement system:

The study made for this commission confirms the contention of state and county government officials that shared revenues amount to less than the revenues they would collect if the lands were in private ownership and subject to taxation.**

Nevertheless, the PLLRC report concluded, it does not follow that these payments should be equal to full tax equivalency. Although they are difficult to calculate, direct and indirect benefits go to counties with Federal land—such as special land use permits, fire protection, and road construction and maintenance. The Commission considered that fair payment for Federal land in lieu of taxes should equal 60 to 90 percent of the amount necessary to provide full tax equivalency.77

In 1974, Si Kahn, who learned of the 25-percent payment through VISTA volunteers in northern Georgia, published The Forest Service and Appalachia, a tract railing against the unfairness of the Federal payment to National Forest counties.88 Although Kahn challenged several Forest Service acquisition and management policies, his basic charge was that the tax-exempt status of vast National Forest lands had weakened the counties' tax bases, increased the burden on local landowners, and threatened the ability of the counties to govern themselves.99

Congress Raises Payments to Counties

Two years after Kahn's publication was released, Congress passed the Payments In Lieu of Taxes Act.100 Under this Act, counties would receive the higher of $0.75 per acre of entitled Federal land minus certain payments received under 10 specified laws, or $0.10 per acre without those deductions, both subject to a ceiling based on county population. One of the specified laws was the original Act of 1908 first authorizing Forest Service payments to States from receipts of National Forest land, as amended.

Thus, for Southern Appalachian timber-harvest-poor counties that had been receiving less than $0.30 per acre from Forest Service payments prior to 1976, the In-Lieu Act qualified them for the difference between that previous allotment and $0.75 per National Forest acre. The Bureau of Land Management would be the actual disbursing agent of In-Lieu funds; the States would continue to provide to the counties the recommended Forest Service 25 percent-of-receipts payments, which would literally be subtracted from the $0.75-per-acre amount due.

Table 19 illustrates the difference in such revenues between 1975 and post-In-Lieu years for five of the 12 selected study counties. For most, the new total payments represent a 400- or 500-percent increase from pre-1976 revenues. The importance of the In-Lieu additional payment can be seen in the example of Graham County, where 25-percent payments ranged between $4,885 and $36,296 over only 4 years. The In-Lieu payment gave Graham County an assured, steady revenue.

However, whether an assured, steady revenue of $0.75 per acre from Federal lands is necessarily fair is open to question. One problem is that, in spite of the increased revenue, timber-poor counties are still penalized. That is, counties with vast timber sales (for example, in the Pacific Northwest) can elect...
to receive $0.10 from the Bureau of Land Management and still receive the 25-percent Forest Service payment, yielding well above $0.75 per acre. In addition, the issue of whether even the $0.75 per acre adequately compensates a county for lost property taxes remains unclear.  

A recent study sponsored by the Appalachian Regional Commission, which includes several county case studies, states that Swain and Clay Counties, N.C., which are 80 percent and nearly 50 percent Federally owned, respectively, would receive an average of $1.22 per acre from out-of-State private owners if Federal lands were in their hands. However, the counties receive only $0.75 for their National Forest land. The study claims that $98,182 per year is being denied the two counties even if the Federal Government would pay the low out-of-state corporate tax rate instead of the $0.75 per acre.  

Similarly, the report states that, "if the 70,000 acres owned by the Forest Service in Bland County were taxed at the same rate as land owned by county residents, the county would realize an additional $16,000, a substantial increase for a county of 6,000." In 1980, Bland County, which is 30 percent federally owned, received $451,487 revenue from property taxes versus $47,122 from the In-Lieu and 25-percent payments combined. In Union County, Ga., the tax assessor asserted that property taxes yield about $800,000 in annual revenues; whereas, In-Lieu payments for National Forest land—which account for nearly half the total county acreage—yield only about $55,000 (He failed to mention the 25-percent payment to Union County, although for the last few years it has been small.)  

While In-Lieu payments in the Southern Appalachian National Forest counties generally have not equaled property tax revenues for private lands, less tangible benefits must also be considered. These include increased revenues from tourism (which will be addressed in the next chapter), the value of wildlife and hunting, the value of forest products, and watershed control. Furthermore, such adverse effects as may be traced to Federal landownership must be compared with the effects of any absentee ownership, whether corporate or individual. As this chapter has suggested, and chapter VIII will further consider, the economic and social problems that many Southern Appalachian counties have faced may be more, or as, attributable to private absentee landownership, and the resource exploitation that accompanies it, than they are to Federal ownership of land.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980 National Forest acreage</th>
<th>Union County Georgia</th>
<th>Graham County North Carolina</th>
<th>McCrory County Kentucky</th>
<th>Habersham County Georgia</th>
<th>Henderson County North Carolina</th>
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<tr>
<td>Payments in 1976: 25% fund from 1975 receipts</td>
<td>17,374</td>
<td>32,774</td>
<td>24,554</td>
<td>7,194</td>
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<td>Payments in 1977: 25% fund from 1976 receipts</td>
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<td>18,755</td>
<td>25,995</td>
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<td>In-Lieu fund</td>
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<td>64,975</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>83,730</td>
<td>129,420</td>
<td>29,684</td>
<td>13,157</td>
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<td>Payments in 1978: 25% fund from 1977 receipts</td>
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<td>4,885</td>
<td>9,545</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>116,678</td>
<td>29,684</td>
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<td>Payments in 1979: 25% fund from 1978 receipts</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>83,894</td>
<td>116,678</td>
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<td>13,157</td>
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<td>123,899</td>
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<td>13,157</td>
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Source: Fiscal and Accounting Management Staff, Forest Service, USDA, Washington, D.C. Fiscal year data.
Reference Notes

(In the following notes, the expression “NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC” means National Archives, Record Group 95, Forest Service, Office of the Chief, National Forest Reservation Commission. “WNRC, FS” means Washington National Records Center, Records of the Forest Service. See Bibliography, IX.)


5. Accelerated Public Works Program File, History Section, Forest Service.


7. Perry, McCreary Conquest, pp. 87, 88.


17. Perry, McCreary Conquest, p. 227.


25. Letter to Forest Supervisor from James E. Morphew, July 25, 1979, Frenchburg Civilian Conservation Center, Mariba, Ky.


27. Interview with Harold Debord, Human Resource Programs, USDA Forest Service, Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., July 10, 1979. The success of the SCEP program was confirmed by staff officers on the Chattahoochee, Cherokee, and Daniel Boone forests.


38. "Fact Sheet on ARC."


42. Data for the analysis of ARC funds that follow were obtained from computer printouts on total ARC funds spent by county and state, and for selected counties, by project. Provided by Joe Cerniglia, Appalachian Regional Commission, Washington, D.C.


47. Breckenridge, Wide Neighborhoods, Chapter 35. Also quoted in Thomas R. Frazier, Project Leader, Redbird Purchase Unit, "Redbird Roundups," Forest Service public relations publication, 1966. See also, Robert F. Collins, A History of the Daniel Boone National Forest (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1975), pp. 259-262. Collins notes that Ms. Breckenridge tried unsuccessfully in 1936 to help the Kentucky State Garden Club save a tract of "virgin" timber then being logged on Lynn Fork of Leatherwood Creek in southern Perry County by having it included in the new Cumberland National Forest Purchase Unit.


56. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, March 15, 1972.

57. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, January 26, 1972, p. 7.

58. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, January 17, 1975.


60. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Final Report, pp. 6, 7.

61. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, January 15, 1969.

62. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, July 8, 1971.


64. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Final Report, p. 4.


67. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, March 15, 1972.

68. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, January 26, 1972.

69. NA, RG 95, FS, OC, NFRC, Minutes, January 26, 1972, 3, 4.

70. Si Kahn wrote about this tract in The Forest Service and Appalachia, pp. 60-65. Kahn quotes several residents who were opposed to the federal purchase, which, Kahn says, the Forest Service "pushed through" in spite of the opposition.


73. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, 74 Stat. 215.


77. *Federal Agencies and Outdoor Recreation*, p. 28.

78. *Federal Agencies and Outdoor Recreation*, p. 28.


83. Program Highlights, viii-xi.


86. Shands and Healy, *The Lands Nobody Wanted*, pp. 27-31; Clawson, *Forests For Whom and For What?*, p. 49. It was not selective cutting in the proper, professional, silvicultural sense.


95. Data on 25-percent payments: Fiscal and Accounting Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.


97. PLLRC, *One Third of the Nation’s Land*, p. 238.

98. Si Kahn, *The Forest Service and Appalachia*. (See note 70.)


100. 90 Stat. 2662. The 1908 Act was 35 Stat. 260; it was modified by the Weeks Act (36 Stat. 963).


104. Letter to authors from Dorothy M. Wright, Treasurer, Bland County, Va., January 27, 1981.

105. Telephone interview with Office of Tax Commissioner, Union County, Blairsville, Ga., January, 1981.

Chapter VIII
Recreational Development of the Southern Appalachians: 1960-81

The recreational development of the Southern Appalachian Mountains during the 1960’s and 1970’s was extensive. It brought widespread changes in landownership patterns, greater visitation and use of the region’s forests, and a vocal, organized, and critical response from the Southern Appalachian mountaineer. After 1965 the Federal Government provided millions of dollars from the Land and Water Conservation Fund to acquire private lands. Then a series of Federal laws established National Recreation Areas, Wild and Scenic Rivers, a National Trail, and finally confirmed and extended wilderness areas in the region’s National Forests. At the same time, second-home builders and resort developers helped increase the pattern of absentee landownership already typical of the region. In response to the accelerating loss of private and locally held land and local land-use control, residents throughout the mountains organized to protest. The people of the Southern Appalachians now seemed much more determined to resist giving up ownership of land than they had been in the past.

As discussed in chapter VI, outdoor recreation became more and more a national pursuit and a national concern after World War II, as the spendable income, leisure time, and mobility of Americans increased rapidly. Concern with the Nation’s ability to satisfy recreational demands was expressed in Federal legislation in June 1958, when President Eisenhower created the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC). The Commission’s task was to inventory and evaluate America’s outdoor recreational resources, both current and future, and to provide comprehensive information and recommendations so that the necessary quality and quantity of resources could be assured to all. It was composed of four senators, four congressmen, and seven private citizens.

The Commission’s immense report was issued in 1961, in 27 volumes. In essence, it found that America’s recreational needs were not being effectively met, and that since future demands would accelerate, money and further study were needed at the Federal, State, and local levels. The Commission provided more than 50 specific recommendations, which can be grouped into five general categories. These were: (1) the establishment of a national outdoor recreation policy, (2) guidelines for the management of outdoor recreation, (3) increased acquisition of recreational lands and development of recreational facilities, (4) a grants-in-aid program to the States for recreational development, and (5) the establishment of a (Federal) Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Is Created

During the next 10 years, virtually all the ORRRC recommendations were enacted. In April 1962 the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) was established in the Department of the Interior. Edward C. Crafts, former Assistant Chief of the Forest Service, became its first Director. The Bureau’s purpose was to coordinate the recreational activities of the Federal Government under a multitude of agencies and to provide guidance to the States in planning and funding recreational development. At the same time a policymaking Recreational Advisory Council was established by executive order. It was composed of the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Defense, and Health, Education and Welfare, and the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The Outdoor Recreation Act of 1963 was passed to expedite coordination of recreational planning by Federal agencies and initiate a comprehensive national recreation plan. A year later, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act was passed to provide funds for Federal and State recreational development.

This heavy Federal legislative and administrative emphasis on outdoor recreation was to have a decided impact on the Southern Appalachians during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Many of the Federal recreation programs and dollars spent on recreation were channeled into the region. The number of annual visitors to the southern mountain forests rose substantially, as increased recreational development—both public and private—increased tourist attractions and investment possibilities. In addition, the renewal of Federal funding for recreation made land acquisition appear much more urgent than it had previously been for general National Forest purposes. Consequently, the Forest Service decided to exercise its condemnation power as a final option, if needed, to acquire especially worthy sites from owners unwilling to sell. Such condemnation aroused residents in several areas, many of whom organized for the first time in often bitter protest of Federal land acquisition policies.

Since the early 1900’s, with the genesis of the movements for National Parks in the Great Smoky and Blue Ridge Mountains and for the Blue Ridge Parkway, the recreational potential of the region’s natural resources had been well recognized. By 1960, decades of Federal land acquisition throughout the region had put together very large tracts close to the Eastern Seaboard that appeared ripe for recreational development.

Studies conducted for the Appalachian Regional Commission were somewhat contradictory. One made for ARC by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in 1966-67 declared the Southern Appalachian region had great potential to provide for rapidly rising demands for public recreation. The study, in estimating demand for outdoor recreation from 373 counties and parts of 53 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas within 125 miles of Appalachia, calculated that to meet 1967 needs, at least 600,000 more acres were required for boating, 20,000 acres for camping, and 30,000 for picnicking. By the year 2000, it predicted, the recreational demands placed on the region would be "staggering"; thus, an intensive effort was believed necessary to provide recreational supplies to meet the demands. However, another study, made jointly by two private firms less than a year earlier for ARC, had warned against major public investment.
The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), established in September 1964, was the principal Federal step taken to meet these perceived recreational demands. The Fund, administered by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, could be used for Federal acquisition of lands and waters—or interests in lands and waters such as scenic easements. The properties would be used to create National Recreation Areas in the National Parks and in the National Forests and to purchase private inholdings in the National Forests “primarily of value for outdoor recreation purposes” including wilderness. The ORRRC report had stressed the need to rectify the imbalance between the abundance of Federal recreation lands in the West and their scarcity in the East. The Land and Water Conservation Fund was to address the need. Within the Southern Appalachian forests, LWCF monies were used in the Mount Rogers National Recreation Area in southwestern Virginia, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and the Appalachian Trail. The Mount Rogers NRA was perhaps the most visible and controversial use of LWCF funds in the region.

National Recreation Areas (NRA’s) were first conceived and established by the President’s Recreation Advisory Council. The first NRA’s created in 1963, were administered by the National Park Service, and were principally based on a large reservoir, such as Lake Mead above Hoover (Boulder) Dam on the lower Colorado River. NAR’s were defined to be spacious areas of not less than 20,000 acres, designed to achieve a high recreational carrying capacity, located within 250 miles of urban population centers. Each was to be established by an individual act of Congress. The first National Recreation Area in the Appalachians was the Spruce Knob-Seneca Rocks NRA, established in September 1965 in the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia. The Mount Rogers NRA, centered on Whitetop Mountain and Mount Rogers—the highest point in Virginia—was established in the Jefferson National Forest on May 31, 1966.

Mount Rogers National Recreation Area

The Mount Rogers NRA was originally conceived as an intensely developed recreational complex of 150,000 acres with a 63-mile scenic highway, campgrounds, and nearby reservoirs. (Two of these reservoirs were part of the proposed Blue Ridge Project on the New River, to be discussed later.) Mount Rogers was expected not only to help satisfy future regional demands for outdoor recreation, but also to provide an economic boost to the economy of southwestern Virginia. As the Secretary of Agriculture stated in congressional testimony on the NRA:

- To fully develop and assure maximum public use and enjoyment of all the resources of this area, there will need to be some consolidation of landownership. The present ownership pattern, particularly in the immediate vicinity of Mount Rogers, precludes effective development for public use. Acquisition of intermingled private forest and meadowlands and of needed access and rights-of-way is essential to fully develop the outdoor recreation potential by protecting the outstanding scenic, botanical, and recreational qualities of the area...

However, the scope and intensity of development originally planned for Mount Rogers were not realized. The Forest Service finally shifted its priorities away from encouraging more motorized recreation such as those activities enabled by reservoirs and scenic highways, to more active, “dispersed” recreation, such as canoeing and backpacking. This shift is reflected in recreational use data by type of activity for two representative Southern Appalachian forests, the Cherokee in eastern Tennessee and the Chattahoochee in northern Georgia. For both forests between 1968 and 1980, automobile travel declined somewhat, not in volume but as a percentage of all recreational activities. In the Cherokee, the decline was from 18 percent to 15 percent; in the Chattahoochee, it was from 22 to 19 percent. On the other hand, hiking more than doubled as a percentage of all recreational activities: in the Cherokee from 2.4 to 8 percent, in the Chattahoochee, from 4 to 8.9 percent.

The legislation establishing the Mount Rogers NRA provided for acquisition of such lands, waters, or interests in them, by purchase, donation, exchange, transfer, or condemnation, as the Secretary of Agriculture deemed “needed or desirable.” The Land and Water Conservation Fund was to be used as the source of acquisition monies. The final Forest Service-developed plan for the NRA called for Federal ownership of 123,500 acres within the approximately 154,000-acre NRA boundary. By 1966 much of the desired acreage had already been acquired; some 58,000 acres were deemed “needed or desirable” to complete the future NRA.

The defined “need” was based on the premise of protection, as the Secretary of Agriculture explained to Congress:

Of the approximately 58,000 desired acres remaining in private lands, the Forest Service estimated acquiring about 32,000 “during the next several years.” Of the other 26,000, it was hoped that scenic easements could be used for a good portion, although the exact amount of land to be acquired or easements obtained could not be estimated. However, no scenic easements were obtained during the next 15 years. At the end of 1981 the first easement was acquired, 20 acres along a road in the Brushy Creek area, and another easement on a similar small tract was in the process of being acquired. The new plan for the NRA places strong emphasis upon scenic easements.

The counties involved [in the NRA] are in areas of continued and substantial unemployment and a relatively low rate of economic activity. A national recreation area will benefit this situation both immediately and in the long run through the inflow of funds and accelerated development and intensified administration and the upbuilding of a permanent economic base oriented to full utilization of all the national forest resources.
Between 1967 and early 1981, approximately 25,000 more acres in 312 separate transactions were acquired for the Mount Rogers NRA. The lands selected for acquisition were generally in stream and river valleys where developed recreation facilities (campgrounds, roads, trails, parking, and picnic areas) could be located, and where the Forest Service generally had not previously acquired land. The acquisition process proceeded gradually over a 15-year period, dependent upon the funds available for purchase (mostly from the Land and Water Conservation Fund) and the operational plans of the Forest Service staff, and influenced by the local peoples' reactions to such acquisition.19

Of the 312 tracts, 51, totaling about 7,100 acres, were taken for the NRA through condemnation. Of these 51 tracts, 20 had full-time residents, 15 of whom did not want to sell at all. (Five agreed to sell, but wanted more money than the Forest Service offered.) The majority of the condemnation cases were filed between 1972 and 1975, in preparation for specific development projects. Most tracts were in western Grayson County, in the area of Pine Mountain, where a ski resort was planned under special use permit, and Fairwood Valley, where resort accommodations and camping facilities were planned.

Figure 111.—Hereford cattle grazing in mountain pasture adjoining Jefferson National Forest near Taylors Valley, Washington County, Va., between Damascus and Konnarock, close to the Tennessee State line and the present Mt. Rogers National Recreation Area administered by the Forest Service. In November 1966, White pine and northern hardwoods are visible on nearby slopes and ridges. (Forest Service photo F-515652)
The Forest Service acquired the Pine Mountain lands to keep the area free from extraneous commercial development and thus maintain a natural camp setting. Resort to condemnation was minimized by Public Law 91-646 (1970) which liberalized relocation assistance benefits to displaced landowners who were living on their properties. However, some still resisted. Many residents of the Mount Rogers area were angry and puzzled by the rationale for the taking of land. A newsletter of a local protest group declared:

Nowhere has the Forest Service lost more credibility and generated more ill will than in its land condemnation and acquisition practices. Everyone in the affected area has either lost land or had friends or relatives who did. These are people who ancestral homes are here, whose parents, grandparents, great- and great-great-grandparents have lived here, and until recently were coerced into selling their land at a fraction of its worth.

The Forest Service has been condemning land for years, making sweeps through the area taking thousands of acres at a time while assuring residents “that’s all the land we’re going to buy.” A few months later they sweep through again enlarging their borders. As a result of their disgruntlement, local citizens organized to combat the tentative Forest Service development plans. The Citizens for Southwest Virginia, which formed shortly after the Forest Service issued the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the NRA in spring 1978, was composed of citizens from the five-county area affected. They formed a Board of Directors of prominent citizens whose families had been in the area for generations. The organization claimed in 1978 that almost 10 percent of the five-county population had signed their petition of protest against further NRA development. Largely as a result of local citizen protest, supplemented by that of environmental groups nationwide, the Forest Service modified some of its initial development plans for Mount Rogers. The proposals for a scenic highway and for a ski resort were dropped completely. Projections that reservoirs would be constructed, that an excursion rail line would be built, that local investment capital would supplement Federal development proved too optimistic. The regional reservoirs and rail line were never built; the Mount Rogers Citizens Development Corporation, created to raise capital for local development use, failed to achieve its funding-raising goals. Regional economic conditions, however, began to improve without such massive development efforts.

The popular mandate, the Forest Service concluded, was clearly for dispersed recreation at Mount Rogers, with emphasis on hiking, camping, canoeing, and the like.

In 1981 some members of the Citizens for Southwest Virginia were still active. Although in general they were satisfied with the modified development plans for the NRA, they were skeptical about a Forest Service “access road” being built between Troutdale and Damascus on the path of the supposedly defunct Scenic Highway. Citizens were still uneasy about Forest Service acquisition techniques, convinced that local landholders were sometimes intimidated through harassment and a lack of knowledge of their rights. By 1981, the Citizens for Southwest Virginia had joined the National Inholders Association, a California-based organization created in early 1979 to change Federal land acquisition policies nationwide.

The Big South Fork NRA
Another National Recreation Area in the Southern Appalachians that was still in the preliminary development stage in early 1981 was the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area in McCreary County, Ky., and Scott County, Tenn. The Big South Fork basin of the Cumberland River, although rich in coal deposits, had not been extensively mined or developed, because of the high sulfur content of the coal as well as the physical limitations imposed by the narrow shoreline, high cliffs, and generally rugged terrain of the river basin. The area was largely uninhabited, most of its acreage owned by the big Stearns Coal and Lumber Co., which had bought the land around 1900. Since the end of World War II, the Corps of Engineers had tried unsuccessfully to win Congressional approval of an almost 500-foot dam on the Big South Fork near Devil’s Jump for hydroelectric power and flood control. The dam was generally supported by local legislators and was strongly sponsored by the Kentucky Senator, John Sherman Cooper; it was opposed by private power companies: the Kentucky Utilities Co., the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., as well as the Associated Industries of Kentucky.

In 1967 Howard Baker was elected Senator from Tennessee. During the 1950's and early 1960's, Baker had represented the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. in litigation and in efforts to persuade the Forest Service to allow strip mining under Stearns' reserved mineral rights. Between 1962 and 1966, he served on Stearns' Board of Directors. Shortly after his election to the Senate in 1967, the fate of the Big South Fork was decided. Baker called various government officials together to determine the best development strategy for the area; the plan to develop an NRA was an administrative and legislative compromise.

Authorized under the Water Resources Act of March 7, 1974, the NRA was to encompass approximately 123,000 acres. Of these, 3,000 belonged to the State of Tennessee, 1,000 to the Corps of Engineers, and about 16,000 lay in the Daniel Boone National Forest. All public lands were to be transferred to the National Park Service—the designated managing Federal agency—when sufficient private land had been acquired. The Federal land acquisition agency, as well as planner, designer, and construction agent of the NRA, was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Corps’ land acquisition program began in August 1979, when Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. sold 43,000 acres of surface rights, and 53,000 acres of mineral rights, in the Big South Fork area, for $16.5 million. (Although the authorizing legislation did not require that subsurface rights be acquired for the NRA, it did prohibit prospecting and mining. Thus, the Corps of Engineers felt obligated to acquire mineral rights as well as land.) During 1980 several smaller tracts were acquired, including those of over half the 38 families living in the area. By March 1981 about half the privately owned land remained to be acquired, but the timetable for that acquisition was uncertain, depending as it did upon congressional appropriation.  

Local reaction to the development of the National Recreation Area was mixed. Although at first McCreary County citizens, having long supported the Corps dam, were generally opposed to the NRA, by 1978 many were beginning to regard the development favorably. There was some feeling that the area might prove a major tourist attraction, even to the point of tacky overdevelopment, characteristic of Gatlinburg. 

However, in spite of the promises of local economic boom assured by NRA promoters, the former Forest Service employee of McCreary County, L. E. Perry, was scornful:

Some local leaders have been brainwashed to the point they believe the National Recreation Area . . . is holy salvation, placidly accepting the fact that not one major highway leading from Interstate 75 to anywhere near the Big South Fork is in the foreseeable future, which is further proof that the people of the region have been had.

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and the National Trails Systems Act, which also guided recreational development in the Southern Appalachians, were passed in 1968. The former established a system of rivers judged to possess “outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreation, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values” to be preserved in a free-flowing state.  

Rivers of the system were classified as “wild,” “scenic,” or “recreational,” depending on the degree of access, development, or impoundment they possessed; each class was to be managed according to a different set of guidelines. The Act designated 8 rivers, all west of the Mississippi, as the first components of the system, and named 27 others to be considered for wild and scenic designation. By 1980, only two Southern Appalachian rivers had been designated part of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System—the Chattooga River, forming the border between northeastern Georgia and northwestern South Carolina, and a portion of the New River near the western North Carolina-Virginia border.
The Scenic New River Controversy

A 26.5-mile segment of the New River in Ashe and Alleghany Counties, N.C., was designated a "scenic river" in March 1976 by the Secretary of the Interior. This designation was a deliberate obstruction to a development proposed in 1965 by the Appalachian Power Co. called the Blue Ridge Project, designed to provide peak-demand power to seven States in the Ohio River Valley. The project would have created two reservoirs—one in Grayson County, Va., the other in Ashe and Alleghany Counties, N.C.—totalling over 37,000 surface acres. The reservoirs would have displaced nearly 1,200 people and over 400 buildings. Nevertheless, the project promoters promised the local population construction jobs and revenues from reservoir recreational visitation.

Citizens of the North Carolina counties affected by the Blue Ridge Project organized a protest against it. A National Committee for the New River, based in Winston-Salem, N.C., mounted a well-financed publicity campaign with letters, brochures, and reports. By 1973, the commissioners of Ashe and Alleghany Counties, and the two candidates for governor of North Carolina, denounced the Blue Ridge Project and endorsed the preservation of the river. In 1974, the North Carolina legislature designated 4.5 miles of the New River a State Scenic River. Public pressure was applied at the Federal level through the Federal Court of the District of Columbia, which was responsible for the Federal Power Commission license, through the Congress, and through the Department of Interior. Although the FPC license was upheld in March 1976, the Secretary of the Interior designated the 26.5-mile portion of the New River as part of the national Wild and Scenic River System 3 weeks later, in effect revoking the FPC license.

The Final Environmental Statement prepared by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, although conceding that the scenic river designation resulted in the projected loss of some 1,500 temporary construction jobs, and a certain loss in projected increased land values adjacent to the reservoirs, emphasized the benefits of the scenic designation. These were principally intangible—the preservation of a unique, free-flowing river, the preservation of wildlife and of archeological and geological assets, and the preservation of a way of life in an Appalachian river valley. The direct recreational benefits from the scenic designation to the local communities were estimated to be low. The activity areas to be established along the river were expected to accommodate annually 50,000 canoeists, hikers, and picnickers. Private entrepreneurs were anticipated to have little opportunity for riverside development, due to the existence of easements and floodway zoning.

Incorporation of the New River segment into the Wild and Scenic River System provoked little local protest. In general, the scenic designation brought only minor changes to life along the river. Nearly 5 years after the designation of the New River segment, the County Manager of Ashe County summed up its impact as "very little." The State of North Carolina, which has managed the 26.5-mile, 1,900 acre river segment, established a State park along a portion of its banks; a few canoe rental firms and river outfitters receive seasonal revenues from recreationists. Overall, however, inclusion of the New River in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System has had only a small local impact.

The Wild Chattooga River

The designation of the Chattooga River had larger repercussions. Public reaction was more outspoken, largely because most of the nearly 57-mile segment of the river, which included over 16,400 acres of adjacent land, was designated "wild" and was therefore slated for more restrictive management, and because the Forest Service sought to acquire land along the river to establish a protected corridor.

The Chattooga River portion of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System was so designated by legislation of May 10, 1974. The designated river segment lay within the Nanahala National Forest and on the border between the Chattahoochee and Sumter National Forests. A corridor up to 1 mile wide was outlined for acquisition along the designated river. In 1974, 47 tracts consisting of nearly 6,200 acres had to be acquired for the river corridor. By early 1981, 85 percent of the desired corridor acreage had been acquired, mostly through exchange, and all from willing sellers.

In general, acquisition along the Chattooga River proceeded smoothly; land management of the area, however, met with considerable local protest. Because some 40 miles of the 57-mile corridor were designated "wild," river access was deliberately restricted in keeping with the guidelines established by BOR. These guidelines stipulated that administration of a wild river required restricted motorized travel, removal of homes, relocation of campgrounds, and the prohibition of structural improvements. Consequently, upon land acquisition, the Forest Service closed several of the jeep trails that had provided river access. Not all the river jeep trails were closed, just those the Forest Service judged were allowing excessive and inappropriate use of the Chattooga that was not in keeping with its wild and scenic designation.

The rationale for restricting access, however, was not strongly supported or well understood by the local population. As an Atlanta newspaper reported:

When the Forest Service attempted to keep the jeeps away from the protected Chattooga River, the mountain dwellers torched vast tracts of National Forest land; if they couldn't use the land as they wished, they wanted no one else to use it at all.
Over the years, as the Chattooga River became increasingly popular with urban recreationists for white-water canoeing, rafting, and camping, local resentment mounted. In 1980, nearly 130,000 visitor-days were spent in watercraft recreation along the 57-mile river segment; 70,000 were spent in swimming, and 60,000 in hiking. Altogether, the Chattooga Wild and Scenic River received nearly a half-million visitor-days of use in 1980. With a high frequency of visitors, it appeared to some local people that the Forest Service was catering to outsiders who came to the Chattooga to canoe, raft, and camp. Those who lived in the area often resented the restriction on using four-wheel drive vehicles. As one Clayton, Ga., resident wrote to the Forest Service in 1978:

Special interest & minority groups, plus environmentalists got the Government to close off the Chattooga River, in Rabun County. Look at the river now & it is more filthy and more trashy, from no one but people who ride the river, & if any, very few local people ride the river. Local people of Rabun County don't destroy beauty, it's our home. [sic]
The Appalachian Trail

Another piece of post-ORRRC recreational legislation was for the full development and protection of the Appalachian Trail. The Trail, running for over 2,000 miles from Georgia to Maine, mostly along the high ridges of the Appalachians, was actually originally cleared and built between 1925 and 1937 by the Appalachian Trail Conference, a group of Trail enthusiasts composed of outdoorsmen, parks and planning staff, foresters, and governmental officials, in cooperation with State and Federal agencies. Most of the Trail was constructed by volunteers, on private lands, whose owners gave permission. Nearly a third of the Trail was built by the Forest Service and National Park Service on their lands. Both agencies have helped promote and maintain the Trail. In the Southern Appalachian forests, 441.4 miles out of a total 592, or 75 percent, were "protected" before 1969 with an acquired right-of-way or scenic easement.

The same was not true, however, of those portions of the Trail not under Forest Service or Park Service jurisdiction. Over the years, as the Appalachian Trail received increasing public use, concern for the Trail's protection and uniform management mounted, resulting in the National Trails System Act of October 2, 1968. The Act established a national system of recreation and scenic trails, with the Pacific Crest Trail and Appalachian Trail as the major components of the system. The former was to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, the latter by the Secretary of the Interior, although specific stretches of either trail were to be managed directly by the agency whose land the trail traversed.

Specifically, the National Trails System Act charged the Secretary of the Interior with establishing the right-of-way for the Appalachian Trail, provided that, "insofar as practicable," it coincided with the right-of-way already established. The required dimensions of the right-of-way were not specified in the 1968 Act; thus, the adequacy of Trail protection at a given location was open to interpretation. Right-of-way purchases could include entire tracts, strips of tracts, or even easements, so long as the adjacent land uses were compatible with the Trail's scenic qualities.

The authority to condemn lands of an unwilling seller for the Trail right-of-way was clearly provided in Section 7(g) of the Act but was to be utilized "only in cases where . . . all reasonable efforts to acquire such lands or interests therein by negotiation have failed." Further, a limitation was placed on the amount of land that could be taken—no more than 25 acres per mile of Trail. Most condemnation cases simply involved clearing title to the land. An example of a tract that in 1980 appeared likely for such condemnation was the Blankenship tract along the Tennessee-North Carolina border, owned by more than 50 heirs. Condemnation would clear title, but all 50 owners had to be contacted before the suit could begin, and the proceedings were obviously complicated.

Until 1978, unprotected stretches of the Appalachian Trail were acquired by the various jurisdictions with acquisition authority, but generally—except for the Forest Service—at a desultory pace. The slowness was due largely to the multiplicity of agencies and States responsible for right-of-way acquisition and management. This was compounded by the fact that the two principal Federal agencies—the Park Service and Forest Service—were unable to develop a uniform approach to Trail policy, which, in part, was due to differing interpretations of the 1968 Act. The Park Service maintained that a mile-wide strip on either side of the Trail, that was free of parallel roads, which had been established in a 1938 Forest Service-Park Service agreement, was the appropriate right-of-way. The Forest Service stressed that the Trail right-of-way could not exceed 25 acres per mile.

In addition, the two agencies disagreed over the funding and timing of Trail purchases. The National Trails System Act established a $5-million fund for Trail purchases that the Forest Service felt it could draw upon. The Park Service considered this fund to be for State purchases only. Further, the Park Service imposed acquisition deadlines on the Forest Service that were impossible to meet, given the time-consuming nature of surveys, title searches, and buyer-seller negotiations. Several deadlines were established and subsequently extended. Nevertheless, between 1969 and mid-1977, 110

Figure 114.—Hiker passing new Forest Service sign on Appalachian Trail at Rock Gap, Nantahala Mountains, in Standing Indian Wildlife Management Area of Nantahala National Forest southwest of Franklin, N.C., near Georgia State line, which is much closer as the crow flies than sign indicates. Photo was taken in July 1960. (Forest Service photo F-494584)
miles of the Appalachian Trail in the National Forests of the Southern Appalachians were acquired. Of the 61 tracts involved in this acquisition, 4 were obtained through condemnation: one in the Nantahala, 2 in the Pisgah, and one in the Cherokee. By mid-1981, only 14.3 miles (2.1 percent) of the 677.0 miles for which the Forest Service has responsibility in the mountains of four States were unprotected. Of the 263.5 miles dedicated to the National Park Service, 42.8 miles (16.2 percent) were still unprotected. A summary of the status of Appalachian Trail protection in the Southern Appalachians in October 1981 is shown in table 20.

Amendments to the National Trails System Act passed in 1978 substantially improved the administration of the Trail acquisition process and clarified most of the management problems. Substantial additional funds were provided for acquisition, and condemnation authority was extended to allow acquisition from unwilling sellers of up to 125 acres per mile of Trail. In addition, the amendments stipulated that the acquisition program was to be "substantially complete" by the end of fiscal year 1981 (September 30).

Under the 1978 amendments, the acquisition process proceeded with available funding. By January 1981, all but 14 miles of Trail strips in the Southern Appalachian National Forests had either been acquired or were in the final stages of acquisition. Most of the remaining private tracts involved appeared to be obtainable only through condemnation. Some were held by implacable owners who simply refused to sell. John Lukacs, as resident of Florida, was one. Lukacs owned about 1,500 acres in the Cherokee National Forest, near Johnson City, Tenn., which he planned to develop someday. The Appalachian Trail cut diagonally across one small corner of his property. The Forest Service wanted to purchase a strip of land along the Trail as well as the 11.6-acre "uneconomic remnant"—the corner cut off by the Trail. Lukacs refused to sell, citing as his reason a spring in the corner remnant. In 1978 the Forest Service referred the case to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Late in 1981 Justice agreed to press ahead with the suit.

Another long-resistant owner was the Duke Power Co., which had several large tracts along both sides of the Trail on the Tennessee-North Carolina State line in the Cherokee and Nantahala National Forests. Duke Power finally exchanged its Nantahala tract for equivalently valued National Forest acreage. Although the Forest Service needed only a narrow strip nearly 5 miles long, Duke insisted on selling the whole Cherokee tract intact, about 1,705 acres. The Forest Service made an offer which was refused by Duke, but after another potential buyer dropped out, further negotiations produced an agreement on the sale price for the whole tract and the Forest Service set aside funds for it. Completion of the purchase was expected by early 1982. This would reduce the agency’s remaining Trail strip to be acquired to less than 10 miles out of its total Trail responsibility of 677 miles in the four affected States, less than 1.5 percent.

**Kentucky Red River Gorge**

Aside from Mount Rogers and the Appalachian Trail, the only other location in the Southern Appalachians where the Forest Service has taken lands from unwilling owners by condemnation for recreational purposes was the Red River Gorge of the Daniel Boone National Forest. Named a geological area in 1974, the Gorge covers 25,663 acres along the north and middle forks of the Red River, in Powell, Menifee, and Wolfe counties, Ky. Once part of an ancient sea and the product of centuries of weathering and erosion, the area is unusually scenic, with natural arches, caves, bridges, and rocky outcrops along the cliffs of the gorge. It has been managed as a special forest unit, both for recreation and to protect and preserve a unique environment. Lumbering is prohibited in the Gorge.

Condemnation in the Red River Gorge has been used to acquire summer-house lots held by absentee owners along Tunnel Ridge Road, a high-use portion of the area. Altogether five tracts involving 45 acres have been condemned, although several owners have sold under threat of condemnation. In 1973, when the Forest Service’s draft plan for the Red River

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Table 20.—Protection status of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail in the Southern Appalachians, October 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Trail</th>
<th>USDA Forest Service Still to be Protected</th>
<th>National Park Service, USDI Still to be Protected</th>
<th>State-owned Land Still to be Protected</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>miles</td>
<td>Protected</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>303.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>152.0</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>662.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Land Acquisition Field Office, Appalachian National Scenic Trail, U.S. Department of the Interior, Martinsburg, W. Va. Tennessee and North Carolina mileage is combined because much of the trail follows the State line. Virginia data includes stretches not included in the study area of this publication.
The static mountain community of Nada, Powell County, Ky., on old State route 77 which tunnels through the mountain close by and forms part of the Red River Gorge Loop Drive on the Daniel Boone National Forest. The modern Mountain Parkway also now passes near the town, and the Frenchburg Civilian Conservation Center, established 3 years before the photo was taken in September 1968, is just a short distance away. A scene still common today throughout the Southern Appalachians. (Forest Service photo F-519027)

The opposition appears to have been inflamed by the RARE II proposals to designate nearly one-half of the Red River Gorge (Clifty area) as wilderness (to be discussed later); however, the concern developed out of general experience with Forest Service acquisition policies and procedures. As in the cases of Mount Rogers, Chattooga River, and the Appalachian Trail, legislative development and Forest Service management plans appeared to threaten, with little warning, the pattern of local landownership. In the Red River Gorge area many people believed that, although the Forest Service usually aired its land-management alternatives in public, it often did not adequately inform them of final land-use decisions. Because people sometimes felt uncertain of their options, the threat of Federal acquisition was not entirely removed. As long as the Federal Government was a neighbor, the mountaineer felt he could never be certain that his land would remain his own.
Private Recreation Business Is a Major Force

One conclusion of the ORRRC report was that the "most important single force in outdoor recreation is private endeavor—individual initiative, voluntary groups . . . , and commercial enterprises." Indeed, the heightened Federal attention to outdoor recreational resources and and Federal legislation passed following the report apparently triggered a substantial private recreational development, particularly in the Southern Appalachians. The natural beauty of the region and its proximity to the population centers of the East were recognized as assets that had not been fully exploited. National corporations opened new resorts in the mountains; vacation home communities spread in clusters outside the National Forests; the number of retail establishments catering to tourists increased, and speculators bought numerous tracts of mountain land, throughout the region, hoping to turn a profit by subdividing. The impact of these actions was considerable, not only on the local population but also on the managers of Federal land.

In its first years, the Appalachian Regional Commission funded a series of studies to ascertain the potential role of the recreation industry in the region's economic development. The benefits of tourism to the local population had long been acclaimed by recreational developers seeking to gain support for their programs. Promoters of the Blue Ridge Parkway and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park had both predicted a regional tourist boom. Nevertheless, although recreational visitation and tourism in the Southern Appalachians increased dramatically over the years, by 1960 no such boom had developed.

The first ARC study in 1966 concluded that the economic impact of recreational development on local areas is "marginal" and should be justified principally because it gives open-space recreation to people living in metropolitan areas. It cautioned that recreational employment is seasonal, low-paying, and undemanding, and that the indirect benefits of tourism are small. Thus, the 1966 ARC report pointedly advised, "major public investment in non-metropolitan recreation resources would rarely be justified solely or even primarily, for the sake of the economic impact on the local area." So the recreation industry, like the timber industry, was not the solution to Appalachia's economic ills. Nevertheless, seemingly ignoring the prudent findings of its first study, and favoring the rosy BOR report of 1967, ARC continued to encourage heavy recreational development. In 1967 the Commission began an inventory and analysis of selected multicounty sites, 23 of which were labeled of greatest potential. Twelve such sites were in the Southern Appalachians, and seven of these, all relatively undeveloped, were selected for further analysis. All seven were near, or enclosed, National Forests, National Parks, or TVA reservoirs. Thus, the large Federal landownership in the region was recognized as a major recreational asset. Private investment, it was felt, could "piggy-back" on the existing recreational attraction of public sites.

For example, the Upper Hiwassee River Interstate complex, a seven-county highland area of northern Georgia, southeastern Tennessee, and southwestern North Carolina, just south of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, was credited with enormous potential because of the Chattahoochee, Cherokee, and Nantahala National Forests and four TVA reservoir lakes. However, the area lacked road access, accommodations, and camping spaces. Although it was implied that Federal or State funds would be required for roads and other public services, ARC said private developers could profitably build hotels, motels, and second homes.

Similarly, the Boone-Linville-Roan Mountain complex in the Pisgah National Forest section of North Carolina, just east of the park, was seen to exhibit "great potential" for attracting vacationers, especially skiers. Overall, the ARC study concluded, if the 14 recreation sites were fully developed, by 1985 there would be a $1.7-billion "total economic impact." Even in the smallest counties where a lower level of expenditure could be assumed, "a sizable amount of private business development and/or expansion could be expected, and services would probably be considerably expanded."" In 1960, private recreational development was not spread evenly over the Southern Appalachians; rather, it was concentrated in distinct county clusters. The principal clusters were near Great Smoky Mountains National Park—Sevier and Swain; in the Nantahala National Forest—Graham, Jackson, and Macon; the northern Georgia counties in the Chattahoochee National Forest—Towns, Union, Fannin, and principally, Rabun; and Watauga and Avery counties, in the upper Pisgah National Forest, near Boone, N.C., and the Blue Ridge Parkway. Clearly, the National Forests, parkway, and National Park of the region were integral to the development of the private tourist-recreation industry.

Nevertheless, physical recreational resources alone do not explain the locational pattern of the recreation industry. Hancock County, Tenn., for example, one of the 12 study counties we chose for more detailed analysis, located north of Knoxville near Cumberland Gap, had "a mountain environment, clean air and streams, an uncommercialized and unspoiled countryside, and a unique county culture group . . . . Tourists, however, have not visited the county in large numbers." Major factors in recreational development were relative ease of access and a resort history. That is, the counties with the greatest recreational growth in this period were those that had a history of tourism and that seemed unable to attract other economic activities, because of their remoteness. Southern Appalachian counties with the most lodgings and tourist-related jobs were relatively inaccessible, lacked a diverse economic base, but had been frequented for many years by vacationers.
The Federal lands that provided the regional recreation base attracted vacationers throughout the 1960's and 1970's, most of them at an increasing rate. Statistics for the fiscal years 1972-80 reveal the general trend, as shown in figure 116. The Chattahoochee and Jefferson National Forests did not show substantial visitor growth over the 8-year period, and the Cherokee did so only in 1980, when visitation increased 150 percent over 1979. In the four North Carolina forests, it increased steadily by 240 percent over the period. In the Daniel Boone, including the Redbird unit, the peak was reached in 1976. Notably, compared to all National Forests in the United States, the Daniel Boone and North Carolina forests rose dramatically as ranked by number of recreation "visitor-days" reported. By 1980, the Daniel Boone ranked 26th out of 122 National Forest units; the North Carolina forests jointly ranked eighth.

Private Development Varies Greatly
The extent of private recreational development that occurred during the 1960's and 1970's varied considerably from county to county across the Southern Appalachian region. Some became the focus for heavy second-home development; others grew in commercial facilities; others, although remaining relatively important as recreational concentrations, developed very little. One area that achieved wide publicity for its heavy, uncontrolled commercial development is Gatlinburg, Sevier County, Tenn.—western entrance to Great Smoky Mountains National Park.

During the 1980's changes in landownership began to occur suddenly in the Gatlinburg area where for years land had been closely held by a few families. After 1960 "outsiders with no apparent intention of establishing residency . . . increased their holdings." Most of these "outsiders" were northern corporations, such as Rapoca Resources Coal Co. of Cincinnati, or national chains, such as Holiday Inn. A very high number of franchise or chain ownerships located there.

Investments were made not only in resort attractions (resort hotels, restaurants, and shops), but in residential land as well. Individuals and corporations bought acreage all around Gatlinburg, so that by 1972 almost half the landowners were outsiders. Many of them bought land for summer or retirement homes but some, with no intention of settling, bought for pure speculation. Although in the mid-1970's sizable tracts outside Gatlinburg were still in the hands of local inhabitants, the slightly more distant tracts, upon which higher capital gains could be realized, were largely in the hands of outsiders.

Although the town was unusual in the Southern Appalachians in that it had been an established resort area for several decades, its pattern of land development by outside investors was repeated throughout the region. Watauga and Avery Counties, N.C., were heavily developed in the 1960's, first by local entrepreneurs. For example, Hugh Morton transformed Grandfather Mountain into a recreational complex that included condominiums, a subdivision of Scottish manor houses called Invershiel, a lake, and the Grandfather Mountain Golf and Country Club, with a professional golf course. His family had owned some 16,000 acres of mountain land since the end of the 19th century; when his father died, Morton inherited the mountain as a parcel of land no one else in the family wanted. Although a movement was started to purchase Grandfather Mountain for the National Park Service, Morton finally decided to develop the land. With the aid of professionals, he built one feature after another. By 1978, Grandfather Mountain boasted, in addition to traditional resort facilities, a bear habitat, a nature museum, and a mile-high swinging bridge.

Later, corporate developments, such as Sugar Mountain and Beech Mountain, owned by Carolina-Caribbean Corp. of Miami, followed. Some Winston-Salem businessmen and the L.A. Reynolds Construction Co. built Seven Devils nearby. All included golf courses, lakes, tennis courts, and ski slopes, as well as second homes spread in subdivision fashion across the hills.

Northern Georgia has also attracted heavy recreational investment, particularly in vacation-home communities. As of 1974, approximately 210 second-home subdivisions were being

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**Figure 116.—Volume of Recreational Visitation in Southern Appalachian National Forests, 1972–80.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visitor-days—millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Forests¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattahoochee²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Includes the small Croatan and Uwharrie National Forests of the Piedmont and coast.
²Includes the small Oconee National Forest of the Piedmont.

Source: "Relative Standings of the National Forests According to Amount of Visitor-days of Use," Recreation Management Staff, Forest Service, Washington, D.C. A visitor-day is any aggregate of 12 person-hours, ranging from one person for 12 hours to 12 persons for one hour each.
"actively developed" in 12 counties, some as large as 5,000 to 9,000 acres. On a smaller scale, the Highlands area of Macon County, N.C., became the site of many second homes whose owners had permanent residences in Atlanta, Savannah, Jacksonville, and other southern urban areas. However, recreational subdivisions per se did not become a common feature of the southwestern North Carolina landscape. In the 11-county "Southern Highlands" region of North Carolina, including Buncombe, Henderson, Graham, Macon, and Swain Counties, there were only 12 second-home development firms that controlled 30 or more homes or sites each in 1973. Macon County, had the most, with four.

The increase in second-home development throughout the Southern Appalachians was part of the general reversal of the heavy outmigration the region experienced in the two decades after World War II. As discussed in chapter VII, between 1970 and 1975 a distinct change in migration patterns occurred in all study counties; either net outmigration slowed dramatically or net immigration took place. This shift appears to have applied across the whole region, and must be seen as part of a national change. In general, over the United States as a whole, after 1970, nonmetropolitan areas attracted increasing numbers of people while Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas lost population. In particular, nonmetropolitan places of a recreation or retirement character attracted heavy numbers of immigrants. Although the Sunbelt States were the chief recipients of immigrants, parts of the Southern Appalachians previously identified as areas of recreational development were also among the migration-destination targets.

No Economic Boom Results

However, in spite of the isolated clusters of resorts, the localized proliferation of second homes, and the reversal in migration trends, recreational development in the Southern Appalachians in the 1960's and 1970's did not create an economic boom. Development was initiated largely by individual or corporate outside investors, and secondary growth was often limited. Ten years after the initial ARC recreational study of 1966, reports and statistics of actual results generally confirmed this study's conclusion that the net economic impact of recreational development on the Southern Appalachian region would be "marginal."

For example, over the 11-county area of southwestern North Carolina, almost no growth occurred in the local recreation industry between 1966 and 1972. Specifically, the North Carolina Outdoor Recreation Areas Inventory discovered an actual decline in the number of resorts offering camping and recreation/amusement facilities between 1966 and 1972. This decline was most extreme for commercial resorts, which dropped in number by 25 percent; whereas resorts on government land actually increased by 60 percent.

Employment in recreation-related businesses over the 11-county area generally increased between 1960 and 1970; however, as a percentage of total employment, recreation business employment showed little gain. Only employment in construction and in hotels, lodging places, and amusement services increased, both absolutely and relatively. Employment in eating and drinking places, gas stations, and real estate experienced relative declines. The only real recreation-related growth shown was in the actual number of firms servicing the recreation, tourist, and second-home market. This growth, however, may more accurately reflect exogenous investment than it does local capital development.

Over the Southern Appalachian region as a whole, as represented by the 12 study counties, growth from recreational development can be partially gauged from the increase in the number of, and sales from, eating and drinking places. Table 21 shows these increases over the years for which data are available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of eating and drinking places</th>
<th>Percentage of total retail sales from eating and drinking places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High proportion of National Forest</td>
<td>Little or no National Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D' = Disclosure laws prohibit publication for only one or two firms.
Although the number of eating and drinking places increased in both the counties with a high proportion of National Forest land and those with little or none, the percentage increase was greater for the former group. For two-thirds of the former, the number of eating and drinking places at least doubled, an increase that suggests the rise in tourism those areas experienced. Similarly, that group of counties showed a gain in the relative importance of sales from eating and drinking places between 1967 and 1972; whereas, over the same period, the relative importance of such sales generally decreased in the latter group. This differential probably reflects the failure of the heavily national-forested counties to build a broad economic base as those counties without much such land, as well as their increase in recreational development.  

**Pace of Recreational Development Slows**

Although the recreation industry of the heavily national-forested counties experienced a period of relative growth in the 1960's and 1970's, the extent of neighboring Federal landownership was no assurance of a successful recreation investment. The pace of development has slowed. For example, the privately owned Bear Paw Resort on Lake Hiwassee in the extreme southwestern corner of the Nantahala National Forest—one of the areas identified by ARC as showing substantial recreation development potential—suffered major financial losses during most of the 1970's. The resort, a 99-acre complex with 40 rental cottages, built by TVA when the Hiwassee Dam was constructed, included tennis courts, a swimming pool, an ice-skating rink, marina, stables, and restaurants. In 1979 the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development negotiated to buy the property for a State park. But, as one of the owners lamented, "the thing is a loser. There's no way for us to make money or even for the state to . . . . The property isn't worth $200,000, so far as a going concern . . . ." The purchase did not take place.  

Furthermore, whatever growth may have occurred in the recreation industry in selected counties during the 1960's and 1970's, the employment in the industry was repeatedly acknowledged to be small, sporadic and low-paying. In 1975, in 12 mountain counties of North Carolina, where recreational development was a feature of the landscape, only 6.6 percent of the labor force worked in the recreation industry, and then only seasonally, for low wages. As Lewis Green of Asheville has written, in spite of the promises developers make for the local economy:

> . . . all that one can see for the little man is maintenance and custodial jobs. Maids and waitresses. At the end of the season, the big money goes to Florida—to return here again to buy up some more old homesplaces.  

Even more significant, some feel, is the fact that such employment introduces "a job orientation no longer directly associated with the land." Although in itself such orientation may not be bad, it "serves to undermine the spirit of independence so long characteristic of the mountain people, and places them in a position of almost perpetual subordination to the outside-dominated financial manipulators."  

During the 1960's, commercial and individual private land acquisition began to alter the mountaineer's perception of his land. Land became "significant as property," and valued for financial investment. On the whole, private investment in the Southern Appalachians during the 1960's and 1970's substantially inflated the price of land. In southwestern North Carolina, "hilly woodland that sold for $50 to $100 [per acre] in 1955 could have easily been sold ten years later for $450 and more." Such inflation consequently raised property valuations, causing increased property taxes, and thus a higher property tax base. Whether such changes were ultimately beneficial or detrimental is open to some controversy. Edgar Bingham has described the circumstances that have led to the inflation of land values:

> Buyers from . . . large corporations . . . offer prices for land which unsuspecting natives find difficult to refuse. The prices offered are in truth inflated relative to the value of the land in its traditional subsistence or semi-subsistence farm use . . . . Many sell, assuming that they will buy other property within the general area, but they find that land values overall have gone up radicoly, so they either must give up their former way of life and become menials for the developer, or, as is often the case, they leave the community altogether. Even those who are determined to retain their land find that its value has become so inflated that it is no longer practical to use it for farming, so either they become developers themselves or they sell to the developer.  

This process has been clearly documented in Ashe, Avery, and Watauga Counties, N.C., where the number of out-of-State landowners and the amount of land they owned increased dramatically between 1960 and 1980. A study by the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group found that outside speculators increased their landownership by 164 percent in Watauga County and 47 percent in Avery County between 1970 and 1975. One result of such increase is that, as land values inflated, farmers found it more and more difficult to pay taxes. By the mid-1970's, approximately half the farmers in Watauga and Avery Counties worked at least 100 days per year off their farms to supplement their incomes. The long-range predicament is that, as farmland prices escalate, a farming career ceases to be viable.
Net Benefits Are Questionable

Although second-home developments and investments in mountain land increased the property tax base of many Southern Appalachian counties, the cost of services also increased considerably. Due to a lack of substantive documentation, it is not certain whether revenues kept up with costs. The 1966 ARC study found that resorts and vacation homes generally strengthen the property tax base. Also, because the highest single item of public expenditure—education—is usually not increased as a result of recreational development, the study claimed that vacation homes and establishments do “yield a profit on the municipal balance sheet.”

However, a mid-1970's study of the Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina State agencies responsible for recreation suggested that the cost of providing services to second-home developments can be more than the increased taxes they generate, particularly if the developments are not adjacent to existing population concentrations. Specifically, Avery and Watauga Counties, with very limited road-maintenance budgets, allowed ski roads in demand for tourist developments to be maintained, while farm roads suffered. Hospitals, fire departments, and police all were found understaffed and underfinanced to handle the temporary vacationing population. Similarly, in Sevier County, Tenn., three resort developments studied by the State Planning Office in 1977 were found to have cost the county at least $23,000 more in services than they generated in tax revenues.

In addition, many have claimed that resort and recreational home development in the Southern Appalachians has brought environmental degradation similar to that resulting from the exploitation of timber and coal resources decades earlier. Problems of erosion, inadequate water supplies, and sewage treatment facilities have been cited. Some of the degradation has been clearly visible, as the description of a Rabun County, Ga., development, named Screamer Mountain, testifies:

Such visual blight has occurred largely because most counties in the region have not had appropriate zoning or land use controls. In North Carolina, although most county governments have zoning ordinances, they are generally of poor quality, and are often set aside or lightly administered under economic pressures. In addition, development has often taken place in the unincorporated areas of a county, where land-use controls have been even more lax.

Big Influx of Temporary Residents

Finally, recreational development has brought to the mountains a new group of temporary residents, most of whom have a value system and attitude toward the land that are alien to the mountaineer. Writing of the suburban newcomers, Bingham has explained:

The effect on the human population [of recreational development] over recent years has been to replace the natives with “new” mountaineers. Mountaineers without a real attachment to the land and whose demands or expectations have tended to be in conflict with rather than in harmony with the mountain habitat. His automobiles, motorcycles, and the service vehicles meeting his more elaborate demands clog the mountain roads and disturb the rural quiet with the roar of their engines. His ski slopes have cut huge slashes in the natural cover of the most attractive mountains, and the most appealing trails and associated vistas suddenly become off-limits to the people who have always lived here.

Perhaps the greatest misunderstanding between the old and new mountaineer is in the matter of trespass. The southern mountaineer has his own sense of landownership rights. Holding title to the land is but one type of possession; long residence in an area entitles one to certain rights as well—for example, free access for hunting, wood gathering, and berry picking. This attitude toward the land is based on historical precedent; in the past, each farmer had his own bottomland acreage but regarded the forested ridges as common ground.

Thus, although over 4 million acres in the region were in Federal ownership, local residents still felt free to use much of that land in the traditional way. As George Hicks has written:

Timber is recognized as private property and one must buy trees before cutting them. Scavenging for fallen tree limbs to use as firewood, however, falls into the same category as galax: it belongs to the gatherer. The same is true for wild fruits—huckleberries, blueberries, blackberries, and so on.

Although permits were required for some activities—tree cutting, gathering evergreens, or hunting—the Forest Service at times overlooked violations. As Hicks wrote of local use of the North Carolina National Forests, “evergreen collectors take it as a game to evade the forest rangers and Federal officers, and they declare that the officials have a similar playful attitude.” A similar “game” has been observed between
local hunters and Forest Service personnel along the Appalachian Trail:

"Foot Travel Only" trails . . . [are] being (hopefully, at least) protected by Forest Service signs designed to exclude two-wheeled and four-wheeled vehicles. During hunting season, it seems that the signs are taken down and hidden; and vehicles enter. Violators profess innocence . . . claiming they saw no signs excluding vehicles. To combat this, the Forest Service erects heavy wooden posts. The posts are cut down with chain saws, and vehicles obtain entrance. The Forest Service retaliates with more wooden posts, and this time drives one-inch thick steel rods diagonally through the posts and into the ground. And so the battle goes on . . . each side thinking of new ways to outwit the other.110

Figure 117.—Prominent wilderness leaders who accompanied Forest Service officials on a 4-day "show-me" trip through National Forests in the Southern Appalachian Mountains, were here looking over the new Shining Rock Wild Area, later called Wilderness, from the crest of Shining Rock on the Pisgah National Forest, N.C., in September 1962, 2 years before passage of the Wilderness Act. The spot is near the "Pink Beds," "Cradle of Forestry," and Blue Ridge Parkway, southwest of Asheville and not far from Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Standing, left to right, were: North Carolina National Forests Supervisor Peter J. Hanlon; Southern Regional Forester James K. Vessey; Harvey Broome, a lawyer and co-founder in 1934 of the Wilderness Society, a leader in the Great Smoky Mountains Hiking Club; William W. Huber, Southern Regional Information chief; Pisgah District Ranger Ted S. Seeley; and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, a hiking and wilderness enthusiast. Seated: Ernest M. Dickerman, then director of field services, eastern region, Wilderness Society, later also Washington representative of Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning, and (1982) vice-president of Conservation Council of Virginia; and Charles Rickerhauser. (Forest Service photo F-504012)
When the new group of vacation homeowners and resort developers came, they established the boundaries of their newly acquired property with fences and often “No Trespassing” or “No Hunting” signs. This exclusion became a source of misunderstanding and antagonism. Why, the mountaineer reasoned, was he prohibited from woodgathering or hunting on lands his family had used for years? Incidences of arson were traced to such resentment. In Macon County in 1976, an outbreak of fires struck a sawmill, several patches of woods, and a tourist attraction called Gold Mountain. A man was later quoted as saying, “The posted signs burned right off early. They didn’t last no time.”

Because the mountaineers, the newcomers, and the Forest Service staff live in close proximity throughout the mountains, a triangular relationship developed in which the Forest Service was often perceived by the mountaineers to be catering to the ways of the newcomers. There was a “conflict—real or perceived—between the expectations and desires of forest users distant from the forest scene and local economic aspirations.” The forest officers, following administrative directives from Washington, felt caught in the middle. In no case was this situation more dramatic than in the battles that were staged during the late 1970’s over wilderness.

Wilderness Act Sparks Much Conflict

The Wilderness Act of September 3, 1964 gave Federal statutory recognition to wilderness designation through the establishment of a national system of wilderness areas. The Act was the culmination of 8 or 9 years of intensive legislative debate and lengthy testimony. The first wilderness bill had been introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey in 1956 following the opposition to and defeat of the proposed Echo Park Dam on the Green River in Dinosaur National Monument, northern Utah and Colorado. That preservation-versus-development controversy illustrated both the political power of militant conservationist groups and the substantial base of their popular support.

Debate over the Wilderness Act focused on three issues: the amount of land to be included in the wilderness system; the addition of lands to the system; and the status of logging and mining in wilderness areas. Most timber, mining, petroleum, agriculture, and grazing interests opposed the legislation; the Forest Service, although a pioneer in establishing wilderness areas, also was strongly against the bill at first, largely because its administrative and land-management prerogatives would be restricted. The statement in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 that “the establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes and provisions of . . . multiple use,” anticipated to some extent the wilderness legislation to come. Support for a separate wilderness act was strong, however, and the Forest Service ultimately acceded to the popular movement, lending its expertise to the long bill-drafting and modification process.

The Wilderness Act defined wilderness areas as places “where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” Wilderness areas were to be preserved in a roadless, forested, undeveloped condition. Specifically prohibited in the wilderness system were motor vehicles (land or water), motorized equipment, and the landing of aircraft, except where already established, as well as permanent buildings and lumbering. In general, hunting, fishing, and grazing (but not crop farming) were allowed. Where rights had been previously established, mining and prospecting could continue until January 1, 1984.

The wilderness system defined by the Act incorporated over 14 million acres of areas that were already being administered by the Forest Service as wilderness. In 1924 its Southwestern Region had established the Gila Wilderness Area in New Mexico. In 1929 the Forest Service had set aside large primitive areas in the West and upper Great Lakes region for protection under Regulation “L-20.” In 1939 the “U” Regulations formally established a system of wilderness, wild, and primitive areas. (Later the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota, much of which had been pledged by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1926 to remain roadless, was added as a distinct administrative entity.) Lumbering, roads, commercial establishments, motor boats, and resorts were all prohibited in the system. Except for size, Forest Service wilderness and wild areas were the same; wilderness areas were larger than 100,000 acres, wild areas were between 5,000 and 100,000 acres. Primitive areas were tracts set aside for further study, although they were administered as wilderness. Altogether, in 1964, the system encompassed over 14,600,000 acres.

The Wilderness Act included the Forest Service’s 54 previously designated wilderness and wild areas as the sole initial components of the national wilderness system. Its 34 primitive areas, which accounted for over a third of the 14,600,000-acre system, were to be reviewed over a 10-year period for possible inclusion. Each area could be added to the system only by an act of Congress; prior to congressional action, each area had to be the subject of a public hearing where testimony from Governmental officials and private citizens would be taken.

By 1973, only three areas in the East, formerly designated wild areas, had been included in the wilderness system: Great Gulf, in the White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire, and Linville Gorge and Shining Rock, both in the Pisgah National Forest. In designating wilderness, the Forest Service had maintained a strict interpretation of its own guidelines. In the East, where most lands had been occupied, logged, or burned, only a few select areas of more than 5,000 acres qualified for wilderness consideration. However, the 7,655-acre Linville Gorge and 13,400-acre Shining Rock tracts were not altogether free from the imprint of man; parts of both areas had been logged and burned about 1900.
 However, the national movement for wilderness was strong. Local conservationists expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusion by definition of all but a few eastern lands from the wilderness system. Furthermore, the eastern areas that had been designated wilderness were experiencing a phenomenal increase in public visitation. Linville Gorge and Shining Rock had a recreational use of 5,300 and 5,200 visitor-days respectively in 1968; by 1974, the figures were 21,800 and 12,400 visitor-days. Recognizing the pressure for designating more areas as eastern wilderness, the Forest Service in 1972 asked conservation organizations and natural resource associations for recommendations on ways to classify and preserve wilderness in the East, taking into consideration the special problems posed by the fragmented landownership pattern, the fact that most mineral rights were privately held, and the fact that most rivers and bodies of water within National Forests were not federally owned.

Beginning in 1972, bills were introduced in Congress to establish a special wilderness system; the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 resulted. The bill did not attempt to define wilderness as such, but catalogued the value of wilderness as, "solitude, physical and mental challenge, scientific study, inspiration and primitive recreation." Altogether, the Act designated 16 eastern National Forest areas totaling over 207,000 acres as the initial components of the system. Five of the areas were in the Southern Appalachians, as listed in table 22.

In addition, the Act named 17 study areas for consideration for inclusion in the wilderness system. They were to be administered as wilderness until a final determination on their status was made, which was to be no later than 1980. Three were in the Southern Appalachian forests: the 1,100-acre Craggy Mountain area in Pisgah National Forest, and Big Frog and Citico Creek in the Cherokee, totaling 18,500 acres.

### The Roadless Areas Reviews (RARE)

Before the Eastern Wilderness Act was passed, efforts had been underway to expand the national wilderness system. In 1971, the Forest Service initiated a review process called RARE (Roadless Area Review and Evaluation) in which National Forest roadless areas not included in the previously named Primitive Areas were identified and rated for possible wilderness designation. The result of the RARE process was a list of 274 study areas, published in late 1973. Very few, however, lay east of the 100th meridian.

Although the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 established an eastern wilderness system, public pressure for more wilderness, and Federal dissatisfaction with the slow process of study and evaluation before public land use could be allocated, precipitated another review of potential wilderness sites. Another Roadless Area Review and Evaluation was begun in 1977, which immediately came to be known as RARE II.

RARE II was proposed as a national town meeting wherein the public would help select potential wilderness sites and then evaluate them. The RARE II process thus built upon and extended the requisite for public involvement in Forest Service planning that had been expressed in legislation since 1964. The evaluation demanded a quick decision: within a year and a half, each site was to be designated either "wilderness," "nonwilderness," or "need further planning"—subject to congressional approval or modification. During the summer of 1977, workshops were held throughout the country to review a preliminary list of Forest Service-proposed wilderness sites and to suggest designation of others. On August 6, 1977, a public workshop was held in Dahlonega, Ga., to comment on wildernesses proposed in the Chattahoochee National Forest. At this meeting, the public literally drew boundaries on maps around areas they favored for wilderness.

After considering the public comments, the Forest Service selected 2,688 areas nationwide for possible wildernesses. The criteria for eastern wildernesses were different from those of western areas; for example, they could contain one-half mile of improved road for every 1,000 acres. Nevertheless, relatively few areas were named in the eastern forests, and not even 3 percent were in the forests of the Southern Appalachians.

In June 1978 the Forest Service published its Draft Environmental Statement announcing the potential wildernesses, and during the summer and early fall, solicited public response. Town meetings were held to explain the RARE II process, to outline the possible wilderness areas, to clarify wilderness management, and to receive public questions and comments. Largely through announcements in local newspapers and other media, the agency openly sought letters, written comments on pre-printed forms, and visits from the public.

The size and intensity of the public reaction surprised some in the Forest Service. Altogether, 264,093 separate responses (with 359,414 signatures) were received nationwide, "the largest number of comments the agency had ever received on a Draft Environmental Statement—or on anything else for that matter."
Mountaineers Protest Strongly

The response of southern mountaineers, although part of the national reaction, was particularly strong, one-sided, and widespread. In one sense, the emotions expressed went beyond their typical and long-standing mistrust of government, frequently noted by Appalachian scholars; in another, they were no more than a release of pent-up frustrations and dissatisfactions with the Federal Government.\(^\text{141}\)

From the beginning of the land acquisition program the Forest Service had filled many roles in relation to the local population: Buyer, patron, employer, persuader, educator, disciplinarian, incendiary, and forester. In most of these roles the agency activated some respect of the relationship and guided it toward a predefined goal. For example, from earliest days it chose to crusade against man-caused forest fires. This effort led to interactions with the local population that varied according to the personalities of the ranger and careless burner or incendiary involved.\(^\text{142}\) The mountaineer's resistance, although not always passive, had been generally silent. His frustrations became increasingly pronounced during the 1960's, however. The relationship between Forest Service managers and both the recently arrived and long-settled local populations became more and more strained by complexity and distance.

One factor that contributed to the strain was the change in the defined role of the district ranger. Because of the growing public demands on the National Forests and the increased complexity of land management, the ranger was drawn more and more into an administrative role. He was expected to be the "whole man," handling all aspects of land management and public relations.\(^\text{143}\) To ensure that the ranger performed his job well, much of the time he had formerly spent training forest technicians and work crews was transferred to his district staff. As paperwork multiplied, he had to spend more time in his office and less in the forest.\(^\text{144}\)

During the 1960's, throughout the region, the ranger's office was moved from the forest into nearby towns. Such relocation was done primarily to give the towns an economic boost and to enhance public access to the ranger, but it proved generally detrimental to his relationships with the people in his district. As a Chattahoochee forester explained the problem, rural folk traditionally came to town only once a week — Saturday. Thus, if the ranger was based in town and tied to his desk, people would see him at most only one day out of seven.\(^\text{145}\)

This distance between the ranger and the rural residents was even more pronounced in the case of the forest supervisor. The former ranger assistant, L. E. Perry of McCreary County, writes with some acidity and apparent disgruntlement on the remoteness he perceived in the Daniel Boone forest managers:

\begin{quote}
The office of the forest supervisor of the Daniel Boone forest was located as far from the national forest as politely possible, at Winchester, Kentucky, in the heart of Bluegrass country, amidst horse farms, stately homes and country clubs. From this comfortable position the supervisor with a large staff of subalterns has directed the activities of his district rangers. As the forest supervisor he belongs to an elite group of minisupervisors because he holds one of about 150 such positions in the United States. On rare occasions a forest supervisor makes a brief tour of the ranger stations on the forest but keeps a discreet distance from the general public, taking great pains to shun all politicians below the level of the Governor or a U.S. Congressman, and aloof from most corporation executives or professional people unless circumstances dictate otherwise.\(^\text{146}\)
\end{quote}

Perry's description of the role and attitude of the forest supervisor, if strongly biased and inaccurate, nonetheless reflects the estrangement the mountaineer sometimes felt between himself and the Forest Service.

Another factor that contributed to this estrangement was the replacement in the mid-1960's of the fire warden system. Under this system, which had been in existence for decades in the eastern forests, a fire warden — a local man selected by the ranger for his leadership and reliability — headed a team of about 10 citizens who could be summoned immediately on notice of a fire. Fires were reported to the warden, who in turn reported to the district ranger.\(^\text{147}\) Over the years, however, the type of person suitable to serve as warden had become harder to find. Increasingly, such citizens commuted to work in nearby towns or cities; they were not at home to respond to fire emergencies or to activate a fire crew.\(^\text{148}\)

In the 1960's, aerial detection and special fire crews became the chief means of fire control, and the need for fire towers, crews to man them, and local labor declined. Although the new fire protection system was more efficient and helped substantially to reduce the size and number of fires, a chain of communication between the ranger and local community was broken. "Gone was much of the direct contact with the local folks and their appreciation of the Forest Service attitudes, interests and personnel."\(^\text{149}\) The same was true of local involvement with timber stand improvement and tree planting, as during the 1960's much of this work was contracted out to professionals.\(^\text{150}\)

Thus, it is apparent that during the 1960's and 1970's, as the size of the Forest Service administrative staff increased, and as mountaineers were contacted less often about its activities, local resentments towards Federal land managers in the Southern Appalachians increased. At the same time, throughout the region, public land acquisition intensified: the Federal Government had pressed for recreational land even to the point of taking it by condemnation, and more and more outsiders had arrived to buy whatever was left. In the eyes of many mountaineers, its proposal to designate local land as wilderness was an intolerable last straw.
The Forest Service, however, was sensitive to local feelings. It was specifically asking the people to voice opinions on a major land-management issue. Such a request was part of a recently increased Servicewide effort to involve the public in the National Forest planning process; however, it was not only new to the mountain people, but also alien to their usual method of handling community problems:

[It] may be that the methods used by the Forest Service to elicit public input are not those that fit with the social and cultural ways of local Western North Carolina people. Natives of this area have generally been reluctant to speak in public meetings, write letters to public officials, or organize to put political pressure on national government organizations, especially if there is any division of opinion within their own communities on an issue.$^{151}$

Reluctance notwithstanding, RARE II sparked an historically atypical response in the region that often surprised forest officers.

On the whole, the mountain people opposed more wilderness, especially in the Cherokee and Chattahoochee forests. Even in North Carolina, where out-of-State interest in RARE II was strongest, about 62 percent of respondents opposed more wilderness, 32 percent supported more.$^{152}$

Opposition to wilderness was directed at the Federal Government in general. A citizen of Elizabethton, Tenn., for example, said simply, “Upper East Tennesseans do not want anyone in Congress to tell us what is Wilderness. I am opposed to it.”$^{153}$ More often, however, people responding to RARE II focused on specific sites. Certain areas drew particular interest—like Blood Mountain in the Chattahoochee, Clifty area of the Red River Gorge in the Daniel Boone, Southern Nantahala in the Nantahala and Chattahoochee forests, Cheoah Bald in the Nantahala, and Citico Creek in the Cherokee forest. Many people wanted some of the areas to be wilderness; other areas were almost universally favored for nonwilderness, and some drew a mixed response.$^{144}$

Restrictions, Outsiders Seen as Threats

Opposition to more wilderness in the region was based on several issues: (1) the ban on logging in wilderness; (2) the threat of losing county tax revenue; (3) the exclusion of motorized vehicles from wilderness; (4) the “invasion” of the area’s National Forests by “outsiders”; (5) the threat to private holdings within and adjacent to wilderness areas, and (6) the rights of the Federal Government versus those of the private citizen.

These issues were not always clearly understood or articulated. In spite of the town meetings and press releases, misinformation circled widely, even through the local newspapers. The Watauga Democrat of Boone, N.C., stated in August 1978 that under RARE II, “There will be no hunting, fishing, or other recreational use of the [wilderness] lands.”$^{155}$ Two newspapers in Towns, Ga., implied that the wilderness nearby was being established for blacks and the unemployed.

(There were no blacks in Towns County.) Thus, as one pro-wilderness resident of Hiwassee, Ga., wrote, “fear and bigotry was the reason” for RARE II opposition.$^{156}$

Lumbermen throughout the Southern Appalachians strongly opposed wilderness proposals. As Opel Smallwood of Frenchburg, Ky., expressed it, “There’s a world of timber in there . . . just falling down and will go to waste.”$^{157}$ Areas where the lumber industry was predominant were particularly opposed. The Shady Valley community of Carter County, Tenn., for example, had two sawmills employing about 30 men, heavily dependent on Cherokee forest timber. The timber operators feared that designating the nearby Beaver Dam Creek area as a wilderness would force them to close their mills. The Forest Service’s internal assessments concurred that one or both mills might close if Beaver Dam Creek was declared a wilderness.$^{158}$

Similarly, in remote Graham County, N.C., on the southern border of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, where 75 percent of the labor force was employed in timber-related jobs, antagonism toward RARE II was strong. Six of the roadless areas under study, including Cheoah Bald, were in the county—which is 60 percent in National Forest. In 1977 the Doyle Brock Bemis Lumber Co. of Robbinsville began petitioning the forest supervisor’s office in Asheville, and several citizens’ groups were organized in the area.$^{159}$

The timber interests expressed opposition to RARE II primarily through lobbying and newspaper campaigns. Long accustomed to supporting and protecting their interests, they were familiar with methods of political persuasion. In addition to writing letters to their district rangers, timber groups visited their city councils and congressmen, or wrote letters to local newspapers. The Appalachian Hardwood Council, which represents many of the South’s largest timber companies, sent officials to Washington in the summer of 1978 to protest further wilderness in the southern mountains.$^{160}$

\[\text{Figure 118.—Homemade sign on plywood made by opponents of expanded wilderness areas in North Georgia during the Forest Service's second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II) hearings in the late 1970's. (Photo by Chattahoochee National Forest)}\]
Numerous letters to district rangers expressed fear of counties losing incoming because of wilderness. RARE II gave many people the chance to express their belief that the Federal Government had been shortchanging their local governments for years. Although the Payment-In Lieu-of-Taxes Act had substantially increased payments to Southern Appalachian counties with National Forests, some either were unaware of the increase, or considered 75 cents per acre still inadequate compensation.\textsuperscript{161}

Probably the most widely expressed opposition to the proposed wilderness in the Southern Appalachians was based on the exclusion of roads and motorized vehicles. Although hunting and fishing were to be permitted in wildernesses, access was limited to horseback or foot travel. Hunters and fishermen, accustomed to entering the woods in a pickup or 4-wheel drive vehicle, loudly attacked the restriction. Protests came from sportsmen’s clubs, such as the Carter County Hunting and Fishing Club in Tennessee, as well as from individual sportsmen. As a resident of Lakemont, Ga., wrote, “I like to hunt and fish, but would like to drive within easy walking distance.”\textsuperscript{182} The letters of protest also came from mountaineers who use the woods for berrying and gathering firewood. Quite a few complained that the roadless designation was discriminatory. A Rabun County citizen wrote:

If roads are closed, only the young, hale and hearty will be able to use the inner-regions of the wilderness while the elderly, handicapped and those who are not well-in-body will have to nibble around the edges. It’s not right . . . it’s not American.\textsuperscript{165}

Some of the protest against wilderness designation focused on the outsiders who visit the National Forests. A Marble, N.C., man, interviewed by CBS News, wondered, “People in Raleigh and Washington, D.C., they don’t have to make their living here. They don’t have to heat with wood. Where we gonna’ get heater wood? Where’s these men gonna’ work over here?”\textsuperscript{164} Although many expressed concern about the general overuse of wildernesses, some spoke disparagingly of the type of people attracted to them. Throughout the region, the mountaineers made a clear distinction between themselves and the weekenders who hiked the Appalachian Trail, rode the Chattooga River, or backpacked near the Red River Gorge of the Daniel Boone. A Georgia resident wrote, “I used to be able to drive with my family down on the Chattooga and camp out. Now it is only open to river riding hippies.”\textsuperscript{165} Another Georgia resident wrote, “I like to be able to get out and ride Dune Buggies and 4 Wheel. I don’t like these city slickers and Hippies taking over.”\textsuperscript{166}
Private Inholdings Are Protected

Emotions sparked by RARE II also ran high over the question of private inholdings within designated wildernesses. The Eastern Wilderness Act provided for acquisition of inholdings, but put no specific restrictions on the use of private land within or adjacent to wilderness. The Act authorized condemnation or exchange when the use of an inholding was incompatible with wilderness, but it did not define incompatibility. Since some of the proposed wildernesses contained several inholdings, the ambiguity created some alarm. For example, the 11,115-acre Clifty area in the Red River Gorge contained 2,145 acres in private ownership. Most was in summer-home lots and vacation cabins, but there was one permanent resident, the elderly Mrs. Ernie Tyra. Mrs. Tyra, who had optioned 115 of her 250 acres for sale to the Government, seemed less concerned about the wilderness designation than the second-home owners in the area, many of whom sent written comments to the forest supervisor.167 Although the Clifty area was finally selected for wilderness, it was determined that the inholdings, if their present use continued, were not incompatible with wilderness, and that nothing in the area would change, “except that it [the designation] will never be changed.”168

In the Chattahoochee National Forest, the proposed Blood Mountain and Broad Camp roadless areas stirred inholders’ reactions. When their perimeters were originally drawn, several summer homes in the vicinity of Lake Winfield Scott, and private lands with farms, chicken houses, and commercial enterprises were included. Clearly, some of these would be incompatible with wilderness. People asked what would become of these settlements—would their land-use options be restricted? Would the Forest Service take their land? The Forest Service, however, was unable to give a precise, definitive answer.

A public meeting was called in April 1978, in Suches, Union County, Ga., to which the Chattahoochee supervisor was called to explain the agency’s intentions. Suches is a hamlet of only a few families cradled in the hills, but over 200 people were gathered in the local Woody Gap School. The crowd was visibly hostile; the supervisor was grateful to have had an assistant and two local ministers, Baptist and Methodist, acting as moderators and protectors.169

The meeting passed without violence. Primarily as a result of the meeting, the supervisor acted to insure that the boundaries of the areas recommended for wilderness were redrawn to eliminate all private lands. He published a letter to the citizens of northern Georgia acknowledging a Forest Service error, and the validity of local concern.170

How Much Wilderness?

Finally, some of the opposition to RARE II was based on the general issue of Federal rights and the particular issue of how much land and land-use control the Federal Government should have. “Must the Forest Service be so greedy?” a Young Harris, Ga., woman asked.171 A Blairsville, Ga., dentist wrote, “Although I’m an avid environmentalist, I feel that the current proposed legislation imposes too much upon the citizens’ rights under our Constitution.”172

Throughout the Southern Appalachians, citizens were not content simply to write protest letters to their district rangers. Many of them organized protest groups. Jack Brettler, of Franklin, N.C., started the Save America Club; Jimmy Rogers, a Baptist minister with interests in timber, organized the Stop RARE II Coalition in western North Carolina and northern Georgia. The Coalition issued “Stop RARE II” bumper stickers, which were popular on the mountain roads.173 By far the largest and most effective local organization was SORE—Save Our Recreational Environment. SORE was formed in September 1977, in Tellico Plains, Monroe County, Tenn., and was led by the mayor, Charles Hall. SORE boasted about 2,500 members, but it sponsored many times that number of protest letters. SORE inundated the Cherokee forest office with written comments on RARE II. Indeed, Tennessee ranked fifth nationally in the number of responses received, more than half of them sponsored by SORE.174

The intense, instant opposition to RARE II in the Tellico Plains area can be explained largely by the concern already present over the halting of the Tellico Dam and Tellico-Robbinsville Scenic Highway. Both of these projects had been stopped by environmentalist protest but were favored by the local population because they would boost the area’s marginal economy.175 The Tellico Dam, a proposed TVA project on the Little Tennessee River, was halted by a court ruling based on the threat to the smali darter, an endangered fish species.176 The Scenic Highway, which had been approved in 1964, was opposed from the beginning by environmentalists because its path traversed a portion of the Joyce Kilmer Memorial Forest, a remote and pristine area of the Nantahala National Forest.177

The original route was shifted, and one-third of the highway had been completed through the Cherokee National Forest on the Tennessee side when it was halted by environmental opposition.

SORE thus represented a convergence of issues. Moreover, the success of SORE was partly attributable to the ease with which local residents and vacation homeowners could work together. In contrast to the situation in northern Georgia and southwestern North Carolina, many second-home owners in the East Tennessee mountains had roots there. Although they lived in Chattanooga or Knoxville, their families had come from the mountains, and they felt at home there. They drove the same cars, and looked and talked the same, as the full-time local residents. Thus, the two groups worked easily together for a common goal: no more mountain wilderness.178

Considering the high level of emotion, concern, and involvement generated by RARE II, it is not surprising that antiwilderness protest threatened at times to become violent. The level of hostility at RARE II meetings was often high. In Franklin, N.C., in early August 1978, the Forest Service presented an “information meeting,” which brought “a
caravan of cars and pickups, heavy log-loaders and tractor-trailer rigs" to town.\footnote{179} Citizens had previously agreed to refrain from verbal comment at the meeting. However, when one unidentified man yelled, "We don't want no more damned wilderness," the mayor of Franklin, claiming to be a protestor himself, led a walkout.\footnote{180} The most widespread threat expressed was burning the forests, should they be designated wilderness. For example, in the Chattahoochee National Forest in the summer of 1978, a plywood roadside sign was posted that read, "You put it in 'wilderness' and we'll put it in ashes."\footnote{11} Such threats were verbal as well as written, and became a popular subject of local newspaper editorials and analyses. April 1978 was a month of unusually numerous fires across the Southeast, attributable in part to unseasonably dry weather. Some of the fires, however, were called deliberate.\footnote{12} That month, the Asheville Citizen-Times in an editorial discussed reasons for deliberate forest burning. Acknowledging the Southern tradition of burning the woods for the purpose of clearing land and eliminating rodents, snakes, and insects, the article also cited revenge and 'misguidance' as motivations. "Big government,'... an unresponsive society... foresters," all were cited as targets of vengeful burning.\footnote{13} (Ironically, that very month, in McCreary County, Ky., the Forest Service was embarrassed when a debris-burning fire it had set to clear a 100-acre plot flattened by a tornado spread out of control, aided by very dry brush and gusting winds, until it had covered 1,400 acres in the Daniel Boone National Forest.\footnote{14}

However, although there were threats and hints of violence, there were almost no violent acts documented. Rangers on the Cherokee observed that, even at the height of the RARE II conflict, the number of incendiary fires remained about the same as for the previous 10 years.\footnote{15} In both the Pisgah and Nantahala forests, although the total number of man-caused fires (accidental or deliberate) in 1978 was greater than in 1977, it differed little from that of 1976.\footnote{16} In general, mountain people were striving to control the forests for the uses most important to them—hunting, fishing, gathering, fuel, and timber. In spite of the threats, there was no hostile intent toward the forests themselves.\footnote{17}

By the end of 1978, the wilderness recommendations were announced—only 89,000 acres in the Southern Appalachians, a large portion of which was the Southern Nantahala area of the Nantahala and the Chattahoochee National Forests. Other sizeable designations were the Brasstown Bald area of northern Georgia and the Clifty area of Kentucky. In Tennessee, only one roadless area, the Bald River Gorge east of Knoxville, was recommended for wilderness—less than 4,000 acres. Considerably more land was slated for nonwilderness status than was put into the further planning category. In the Cherokee forest, only 38,100 acres were assigned to further planning; in the Chattahoochee, more than 93,000. Further planning areas are to be managed as wilderness until their status is finally decided.\footnote{18}

With the announcement in early January 1979 of the outcome of the RARE II process, the public furor subsided. However, the issues raised during RARE II remained alive, and only partially resolved. The RARE II outcome obviously could not please everyone, and, as expected, some of the groups that contributed heavily to the public response were not pleased with the results. In Tennessee, where only Bald River Gorge was committed to wilderness, environmentalists were outspoken in their disappointment. In Tennessee and North Carolina, the Wilderness Coalition, the Sierra Club, and other prowilderness groups vowed to exert strong pressure for the areas under "further planning" to be designated wilderness.\footnote{18}

In some mountain areas, people continued to protest any land being designated wilderness; and some felt that too few areas were designated nonwilderness. Jack Brettler, of the Save America Club in North Carolina, expressed disappointment that the Harper Creek tract, which contains uranium deposits, was recommended for further study.\footnote{19} Antiwilderness forces of Robbinsville, N.C. were upset that three out of the six sites in Graham County were designated wilderness, and vowed to get the other three assigned to multiple use. "We're going to fight just as hard for those areas as if there were six. We're going to fight full steam."\footnote{20} In northern Georgia, many mountain communities expressed concern about the acres set aside for further planning. As the Towns County school superintendent said, "People are afraid that the federal bureaucracy will take a little more each year, and you lose more and more."\footnote{21}

**Mining Issue Is Unresolved**

A potentially more explosive issue was not addressed by the RARE II process and remained unresolved: mining in National Forest wilderness areas. Shortly after the Wilderness Act was passed, the Chief of the Forest Service expressed concern that this issue could cause "some of our most difficult administrative problems."\footnote{112} Under the Wilderness Act and Eastern Wilderness Act, mining was permitted in designated wilderness areas, according to terms of preexisting leases and permits, until December 31, 1983.\footnote{144} (In the eastern National Forests, mineral rights under one-third of the land are not owned by the Government; either they were reserved by the seller when Federal acquisition occurred or they were already outstanding in third parties. In the Daniel Boone and Jefferson forests, where coal deposits are known to exist, even more of the subsurface mineral rights are held by private interests. For example, of 85,000 acres on the Clinch Ranger District of the Jefferson, $5,000—or 65 percent—have privately held mineral rights.)

Although the Forest Service has been unable to dictate the extent of mining in parts of the Southern Appalachian forests, mineral extraction prior to 1975 was limited, and most was through deep mining, which generally did not jeopardize other forest uses.\footnote{193} However, as strip-mining of marginal lands became more economically feasible, the threat of major land-use controversies grew. In the late 1970's, such a controversy erupted over strip-mining in the Beaver Creek wilderness of the Daniel Boone National Forest.
In 1975, the Greenwood Land and Mining Co., which operated four deep mines in the Daniel Boone forest, purchased rights to 5,000 acres of coal under the Beaver Creek wilderness in McCrory County—rights that had been reserved when the land was sold to the Government in 1937. Greenwood applied for a permit to prospect for coal at 27 sites, 22 of which were in the wilderness. The prospecting would have involved the use of motorized equipment and excavation. Ultimate recovery of the coal would require some contour stripping.¹⁹⁴

The Forest Service denied the permit, on the basis that the prospecting was not compatible with wilderness management. Greenwood filed suit in U.S. District Court in November 1976; the court ruled in favor of Greenwood, but, commenting on an issue beyond the immediate suit, added that strip-mining could not occur on public property.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the Forest Service began planning to acquire Greenwood's interests in the Beaver Creek area, as the mining company appealed its case. Neither initiative had been settled by early 1982.¹⁹⁶

A similar case in the same county had a different outcome. In 1976 the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. applied for a permit to strip-mine 15 acres of National Forest land on White Oak Creek. The Forest Service denied the application, citing the Secretary of Agriculture's Rules and Regulations of 1911 with which Stearns' reserved rights had to comply.¹⁹⁷ Stearns "wholly rejected" the premises of the Forest Service denial, and took the case to court for resolution.¹⁹⁸ In 1978, the Kentucky State Supreme Court upheld the Kentucky tradition that, in the case of a broad form deed, mining rights take precedence over surface rights, even if the surface owner is the United States Government and the surface is "public property."

The case went to Federal court, and in early 1982 was still unsettled. The outcome of the case will have repercussions not only in McCrory County, where Greenwood Land and Mining Co. is seeking to traverse and possibly strip within the Beaver Creek wilderness, but throughout the Daniel Boone and other eastern National Forests. The most decisive recourse for the Forest Service would be acquisition of or exchanging other land for the mining rights to such land—either a very expensive solution.

By early 1982, Congress had not yet acted to establish the recommended new wilderness areas in the Southern Appalachians. In the meantime, public use of most of the areas that had been previously designated wilderness was increasing substantially. In only 3 years, between 1977 and 1980, the estimated recreational use of the eight wildernesses of the Southern Appalachians increased by over 13 percent.²⁰¹ The pressures on the forests of the region, from backpackers, Federal recreation developers, and the mountaineers, seemed focused on wilderness areas. Yet the issues surrounding wilderness—particularly strip mining and the acquisition of inholdings—remained unresolved.

Reference Notes

1. 72 Stat. 238.
3. The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) was created April 2, 1962, by Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950. Foss, Conservation in the United States, p. 595. See also Fitch and Shanklin, The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. BOR was deactivated January 25, 1978 by Secretary Cecil D. Andrus, and its functions shifted to the new Heritage Recreation and Conservation Service, which was abolished February 19, 1981 by Secretary James Watt and most functions shifted to the Park Service.
7. 78 Stat. 897. See Chapter VII for discussion of LWCF acquisition in the Southern Appalachian forests.
8. LWCF Act, Section 6 (a) (1).
11. 80 Stat. 190.
14. Recreation-Use Information, computerized data on microfiche, Recreation Management Staff, USDA, Forest Service, Washington, D.C.
15. Act to Establish Mount Rogers, Section 3 (a).


17. Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture in Establishment of the Mount Rogers National Recreation Area in Virginia, 5.


An example of a Mount Rogers condemnation case based on a dispute over the price of land is that of John Kabler. Kabler, a bankr from Delray Beach, Fla., purchased a 106-acre tract in the Fairwood Valley area of Smythe County in June 1972 for $22,000. According to the Forest Service correspondence file on the Kabler case, Kabler had been informed before purchasing the property that the Forest Service needed it for the NRA. Almost immediately after acquisition, he began improvements to the property, including a vacation cabin, septic field, roads, and clearing. The Forest Service began efforts to acquire the tract but Kabler, although continually informing the Forest Service of his improvements, professed a complete unwillingness to sell. He wrote letters and visited politicians to protest both the acquisition itself and the approximately $40,000 appraised value the Forest Service offered. The case was finally settled in court in June 1974 when Mr. Kabler was awarded $75,000, nearly three and a half times the value of the tract two years before.


25. Interview with Charles Cushman, President, National Inholders Association, Sonoma, Calif., March 6, 1981.


32. Perry, McCreary Conquest, p. 164.

33. 82 Stat. 906.

34. Some confusion over the Federal designation of a Wild River versus a State designation is apparent in the case of the Big South Fork of the Cumberland River in the Daniel Boone National Forest. L. E. Perry, in his book McCreary Conquest, stated that the Big South Fork had been designated under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968; in fact, the river became a Kentucky Wild River under the Wild Rivers Act of 1972, and is administered by the Kentucky Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. “Wild Rivers of Kentucky,” publication of Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Frankfort, Ky., n.d.

35. This designation was legislatively confirmed by PL 94-407, September 11, 1976.


37. A glossy folded brochure entitled, “The New River, A Heritage Endangered,” with colored photographs, was distributed by the National Committee for the New River. Reports were regularly printed in Committee letterhead.


41. Interview with County Manager, Ashe County, N.C., February 19, 1981.

42. P.L. 93-279.

43. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February 1981.


45. Interview with Pat Thomas, Supervisor, Chattahoochee National Forest, Gainesville, Ga., July 11, 1979; supplemented with interview with Charles Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.


47. Recreation-Use Information, Recreation Management Staff, USDA-Forest Service, Washington, D.C.


51. 82 Stat. 919.

52. 82 Stat. 919; Section 5 (a).

53. 82 Stat. 919; Section 7 (g).


56. Fairfax, p. 137.

57. Fairfax, pp. 138, 139.

58. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February 17, 1981.


60. 92 Stat. 159.

61. 92 Stat. 159; Section 5 (a) (1).

62. In fiscal year 1980, no funds were appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund for Appalachian Trail right-of-way acquisition. However, other LWCF funds from the West were utilized for Trail purposes. Acquisition was slowed, but did not stop. Some funds also became available late in FY 1981. Information provided by Lands, Staff, USDA Forest Service, Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February and October, 1981.

63. Forest Service Lands Staff, Atlanta, Ga., February, 1981.

64. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February and October, 1981.


68. Interview with Dr. Billie DeWalt, University of Kentucky anthropologist employed by the Forest Service to study Red River Gorge community, Winchester, Ky., July 27, 1979.

69. Fitch and Shanklin, The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, p. 73. (See notes 2, 3, and 9.)


75. Walp, p. 31.

76. Walp, p. 30.


78. Neff, 30.

79. Neff, Chapter II.

80. Recreational use statistics are not comparable for the years before and after 1965; in that year the Forest Service shifted from reporting "visits" to "visitor-days." One visitor-day is equal to recreational use of national forest land or water that aggregates 12 visitor-hours. This may entail one person for 12 hours, 12 persons for one hour or any equivalent combination of use, continuous or intermittent. Recreation Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.

81. Recreation-Use data on the North Carolina forests include the Pisgah, Nantahala, Uwharrie, and Croatan National Forests; the data on the Chattahoochee include the Oconee.

82. Gatlinburg was cited in the *Response* of Citizens for Southwest Virginia as an example of what they hoped Mount Rogers would never become, pp. 40-42.


89. Shands and Healy, in *The Lands Nobody Wanted*, cited Highlands, along with Massanutten Mountain in the George Washington National Forest, as an example of the "blightings developments" that exist "in almost every eastern national forest," p. 157 (See note 13.)

90. Data on Recreation-Tourism-Second Home Development Firms, Table 1, in *Southern Highlands Mountain Resources Management Plan*, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, North Carolina Department of Administration, South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, June 1974.


92. Roseman, Table 2.

93. Roseman, Table 5.

94. Roseman, Table 3.

95. These data support for findings of Neff, "A Geographic Analysis of the Characteristics and Development Trends of the Non-Metropolitan Tourist-Recreation Industry."


103. Hicks, pp. 51, 52.

104. Hicks, p. 62.


112. The analogy between recreational development and coal and timber exploitation appears, for example, in Bingham, "The Impact of Recreational Development on Pioneer Life-Styles in Southern Appalachia;" O'Neill, "Greatest Menace Yet to the Southern Mountains;" and Parlow, "The Land Development Rag."


118. Hicks, *Appalachian Valley*, p. 52.

119. Hicks, p. 53.

120. Garvey, *Appalachian Hiker II*, p. 167. (See note 49.)


124. 78 Stat. 890.


127. 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. 529; (Section 2); Cooley and Wandesforde-Smith, *Congress and the Environment*, p. 54; *Federal Agencies and Outdoor Recreation, ORRRC Report* 13, p. 27.


131. Frome, *Battle For the Wilderness*, pp. 170-175.

132. Recreation-Use Information, on microfiche, Recreation Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.


134. 88 Stat. 2096.


139. For example, the Greenville, Tenn., Sun. on August 16, 1978, published a Forest Service invitation for groups interested in a program on RARE II proposals to contact their local ranger station for scheduling. The July 2, 1978 Lexington, Ky., Herald Leader presented the RARE II proposals for the Daniel Boone and explained where copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement could be obtained.


144. Implementing the Organization Study, p. I-IV.


146. Perry, McCreary Conquest, p. 223.


149. Sidney Weitzman, Lessons From the Monongahela Experience, An In-Service Analysis Based on Interviews with Forest Service Personnel, December 1977, p. 8.

150. Weitzman, Lessons From Monongahela, 8.

151. Margaret J. Boland, Public Involvement in Forest Planning, Community Research Center, Mars Hill College (N.C.), January 15, 1979, pp. 12, 13.


156. Letter No. 08-00-002746-30546-1-1 to USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., from resident of Hiwassee. See also Steve Oney, "The Wilderness Campaign," p. 27 (note 46).


158. Based on analysis of questionnaires sent to district rangers as part of RARE II Individual Area Social Analysis, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.

159. Analysis of RARE II questionnaires, Atlanta, Ga.


161. See, for example, Lee Vance, "For the Record," Erwin Record, Erwin, Tenn., September 6, 1978.


163. Letter No. 08-03-01137-30525-1-1 to Forest Service, Tallulah Ranger District, Clayton, Ga., from resident of Clayton, Ga.


165. RARE II Oral Comment dated June 24, 1978. See also Boland, Public Involvement in Forest Planning, p. 15.

166. RARE II Oral Comment dated June 30, 1978, received by Chattahoochee National Forest headquarters, Gainesville, Georgia. The aspersions cast by some mountaineers on the urban recreationists were sometimes matched and exceeded by outsiders' comments on the protestors. A man from Pocatello, Idaho, enraged by a national news story citing Georgia residents threatening to burn the wilderness, wrote to the regional forester in Atlanta, "I'd like to see those stupid mountain YA HOOS try to burn them down. The national forests belong to everyone, not just some fat-bellied and round-assed Georgia locals." Letter 08-00-002377-83201-1-1.


169. The information on the Suches meeting is based on an interview with Pat Thomas, Supervisor of the Chattahoochee National Forest, Roger Frantz, and Steve Briggs, Gainesville, Ga., July 11, 1979. The incident described is very similar to the experience of citizens of Bristol, Vermont over the designation in 1975 of the Bristol Cliffs wilderness area in the Green Mountain National Forest. Inholders learned of the wilderness only after it had already been created; they formed the Bristol Cliffs Wilderness Area Landowners Association and eventually succeeded in having all private inholdings removed from the wilderness area. Shands and Healy, *The Land Nobody Wanted*, pp. 166, 167.


172. letter No. 08-03-00489-30512-1-1 to Forest Service, Brasstown District, Blairsville, Ga., from resident of Blairsville, July 31, 1978.


177. Frome, *Battle For the Wilderness*, p. 175. It is now a wilderness.


179, 180. “Ah, Wilderness ... When is Enough Enough?”

181. From a photograph in the possession of Pat Thomas, Forest Supervisor, Chattahoochee National Forest, Gainesville, Ga.

182. “Clip Sheet, Southern Region, Southeastern Area,” Collection of newspaper articles pertaining to fires in Region 8 national forests, April 1978, from USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.


185. Interview with Russell Griffith, Bruce Jewell, and John Moser, Cherokee National Forest, Cleveland, Tenn.

186. “Summary—Statistical Data, Forest-District-By Years,” computer printout, National Forests of North Carolina, Asheville, N.C.


194. The Wilderness Act, Section 4(d)(3); The Eastern Wilderness Act, Section 6(a).


201. Recreation-Use, Wilderness Use data, on microfiche, Recreation Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.
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Herald Leader, Lexington, Ky.
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July 9, 10, 1979
Russell M. Daley, Jr.
George H. (Pat) Cook
Harold E. DeBord
Thomas R. Frazier
Jack S. Kelley
Vincent H. McCormack
Elwyn F. Peffer
James A. Rothschild

National Forests of North Carolina, Asheville, N.C. 28802
May 10, 11, 1979
Richard C. Moore
Walter W. Rule
Frank Sharp

Headquarters, Cherokee National Forest, Cleveland, Tenn. 37311
July 17, 18, 1979
B. W. Chumney
Russell F. Griffith
Bruce Jewell
John W. Moser

Headquarters, Daniel Boone National Forest, Winchester, Ky. 40391
July 27, 1979
Charles Crail
Billie De Walt, anthropologist
Clarence Moore

Headquarters, Chattahoochee National Forest, Gainesville, Ga. 30501
July 11, 12, 1979
Charles (Steve) Briggs
Roger Frantz
Howard R. Orr
W. Pat Thomas

Clyne and Walter Woody, Suches, Ga., July 12, 1979
Taped Interview with J. Herbert Stone, Forest Service, Southern Region, History Program, November 22, 1978
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Charles Cushman, National Inholders Association, Sonoma, Calif., March 6, 1981.

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Lawrence Pierce, Citizens for Southwest Virginia, Troutdale, Va., February 25, 1981.


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