Chapter III

The Depression and the New Deal

During the years of the Great Depression, there was a greatly increased involvement of Federal agencies in the Southern Appalachian highlands. Before the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, virtually the only Federal activities there were a forest resource survey, the purchase and management of lands for National Forests, and the searches by “revenuers” for illegal whiskey stills. The New Deal created the Tennessee Valley Authority, a program for purchase of submarginal farmlands and relocation of the farm operators, and greatly expanded public welfare and employment programs. At the same time, National Forests were enlarged and consolidated, and new National Parks developed. More people than ever before were directly affected by programs and policies of the Federal Government. The extensive social reform plans of the early New Deal years made dramatic changes in the mountains, but curtailment of these programs in 1935 and 1937 left the people of the mountains to slower and less orderly patterns of change. Some farm reforestation aid was offered by the Norris-Doxey Cooperative Farm Forestry Act of May 18, 1937 (which was superseded by the more comprehensive Cooperative Forestry Management Act of August 25, 1950), and by the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of July 22, 1937.1

Agriculture, textiles, and coal are all basic to the prosperity of the mountain people. These industries were in a period of decline and stagnation all during the 1920’s. Long before the rest of the Nation experienced the shock of the New York stock market crash in the fall of 1929, many mountain areas, especially the coal fields, like the Nation’s farmlands, had already entered the Great Depression. With the crash came further price declines and loss of markets for the products of the southern mountains. Coal production dropped drastically and in 1933 the number of miners employed dropped to its lowest point in 25 years.2

The peak of timber production had passed, and large-scale logging had begun to decline even before World War I. However, with the Depression, this decline was accelerated by a rapid drop in prices for lumber and related forest products.3 The major operator, Andrew Gennett, wrote in 1934:

At the present time the lumber business is so disrupted that none of us know where we stand, and we are making no engagements of any kind until we find out what is going to happen.4

Figure 42.—Loading logs onto a truck from a roadside skidway with a steam-powered rig on rails. Spot was along the Upper Tellico River, Monroe County, Tenn., south of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, on the Cherokee National Forest, in 1937. (National Archives: Record Group 95G-354360)
The market for what lumber remained in the mountains almost disappeared. In Georgia, lumber production reached its lowest point in the 20th century in 1932. Over 1,000 sawmills, most of them small, disappeared between 1929 and 1932. The picture was about the same in other southern States. Production of other forest products, acidwood, pulpwood, railroad ties, fenceposts, mine props, also dropped dramatically.

The value of the land itself declined rapidly as well. Some of this decline was due to the condition of the land. Cutover and not reforested, farmed to exhaustion, flooded by silted-up creeks and rivers, the land in many parts of the mountains was actually deteriorating. But most of the price decline was a result of the deflationary impact of the Depression. Land valued for tax purposes at $5 per acre in 1925-26 was worth $3 per acre or even less by 1934, and the possibility of finding a buyer was not likely even at the lower prices.

While large timber interests complained loudest about their losses in land value, the small landowner was also hard hit. In the mountains where the Pee Dee River rises west of Winston-Salem, N.C., over half of the farm property and a third of the forest land was tax delinquent at the height of the Depression. In some counties tax delinquency rose to 90 percent.

The slack in coal mining had put another burden on the already hard-pressed agricultural lands of the Appalachian highlands. In eastern Kentucky and adjacent Virginia and Tennessee, many mountain people had left the farms to go into the mines. As the coal slump deepened, some returned to worn-out farms and steep, cutover slopes and tried to get a living once again from the soil.
Later, when the Depression began to affect all parts of the Nation, more people joined the return to the land. For years the Southern Appalachian mountains had exported people as well as timber and minerals. Thousands of southern highlanders had found new homes in mill towns and industrial cities and were scattered over much of the east-central United States. Many of these people, finding themselves unemployed and destitute, returned to old family farms, abandoned or perhaps still inhabited by elderly cousins, and sought to resume the life of their forefathers. They rechinked the old log cabin, repaired the roof a bit, planted a cornfield and garden patch, and hoped for the best. Those less fortunate "squatted" in abandoned shacks, old chicken houses and smokehouses—anything with a roof and walls. They had neither seed nor tools and little knowledge of farming or gardening. They survived on relief or they starved.

In the counties where the Daniel Boone (originally Cumberland) National Forest is now located, the situation was especially acute. Assistant Regional Forester John H. Hatton, compiling a report on the "Social Aspects of National Forest Management" in 1934, described the area:

At the same time the population has increased in the last four or five years very rapidly, which increase depends entirely on local mountain farming . . . The conditions of the valley would not be noticed from the train but one has only to leave the highway and strike up one of the very small creeks and he finds whole sections and districts wherein not a person has sufficient supplies to support themselves above want and many are actually suffering from the need of food, clothing and medical attention. There was a time when the extremely poor had neighbors who could help them, but the neighbors' condition has become such that they can no longer render aid . . . The people are of good character, and have a certain amount of dignity and pride in the midst of direst poverty, unwilling to accept direct relief until they reach the point of actual suffering. They all prefer work rather than charity and especially the form of charity which is humiliating to them. For a good many years numbers of the small land owners and tenants after putting by their crops have sought work in factories of other States and some among settlements to work tobacco crops. They had to have this money to pay taxes and to buy articles for the winter, but the factories have been closed and other employment has practically ceased. On top of all this there has been a gradual influx from the cities and manufacturing centers of about 25% of the people who were unable to get employment and have returned to their relatives and friends in the country.9

Evidence that mountaineers who had earlier migrated to industrial areas returned to their former farm homes during the 1930's is abundant, though exact figures depend on the definition of Southern Appalachia used. In most of the mountain counties farm acreage remained quite stable from 1930 to 1940, but the number of farms rose significantly.10 This fact explains why mountain people were often reluctant to sell even very poor farms during the Depression years.

Because poverty, unemployment, and economic decline existed in the Southern Appalachian highlands to a degree unsurpassed in other regions of the Nation, the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the rapid development of "New Deal" programs designed to alleviate the symptoms of the Depression inevitably had a marked impact on the region. Even before FDR's inauguration the leadership of the Forest Service saw that National Forests would be called upon to play an important role in Federal plans for relief and recovery. Forest supervisors were willing and able to put large numbers of men to work. They began to plan as soon as Roosevelt was elected how they wanted to use additional manpower to carry out longrange plans for forest improvement.11
Figure 45.—Ramshackle barn used as dwelling in Estill County, Ky., under special-use permit from Daniel Boone (then Cumberland) National Forest, in late summer 1939. Upper Kentucky River watershed. This county, though forested, has very little National Forest land. (NA:95G-381247)

Figure 46.—A mountain family in front of their new log cabin on Balls Fork of Troublesome Creek, Knott County, Ky., in November 1930. (NA:95G-258896)
The role of the Forest Service as a forest resources manager was greatly enlarged by the New Deal. Roosevelt gave it large sums for land purchases, which aided economic recovery in several ways. The Government was virtually the only buyer of lands; its purchases often helped the selling individuals and companies out of financial difficulties. The new National Forest land also provided thousands of jobs, mainly through the Civilian Conservation Corps, in areas that were hard hit by the Depression.

It was an ideal time to expand the forests, since land prices were low, and opposition to Federal intervention had virtually disappeared. Many who might in other times have opposed the expansion of the National Forests were happy to unload their land onto the Federal Government and salvage what they could from the economic catastrophe.

The largest single beneficiary of the expanded purchases for National Forests in this period was the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. of Stearns, Ky. After it cut and removed all merchantable timber from its large holding in the vicinity, mostly for its own mine props, and drift-mining most of the coal, its president, Robert L. Stearns, Jr., appeared before the National Forest Purchase Commission in Washington in 1937 to strongly urge expansion of the new Cumberland National Forest Purchase Unit beyond the Cumberland River to the Tennessee State line. Thus the unit would encompass the extensive Stearns coal lands in McCreary County. Stearns offered a 47,000-acre piece just logged, for an attractive price; the National Forests in this period was the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. of Stearns, Ky. After it cut and removed all merchantable timber from its large holding in the vicinity, mostly for its own mine props, and drift-mining most of the coal, its president, Robert L. Stearns, Jr., appeared before the National Forest Reservation Commission in Washington in 1937 to strongly urge expansion of the new Cumberland National Forest Purchase Unit beyond the Cumberland River to the Tennessee State line. Thus the unit would encompass the extensive Stearns coal lands in McCreary County. Stearns offered a 47,000-acre piece just logged, for an attractive price; however he reserved mineral (coal) rights. The Commission endorsed the expansion of the Purchase Unit and accepted his offer of the lands. The deed was dated December 18, 1937. (The Cumberland unit had been established by the Forest Service in 1930, and the first land purchases had begun in 1933.) It seemed a good deal to both parties. The Forest Service secured a large addition at a good price—the country was still in a Depression, and the company had removed all resources that it profitably could yet still held the rights for the residual coal, subject to Forest Service regulations on land reclamation for surface disturbances.12

The Forest Service, because of its already established role in the Highlands, was to play a very important part in the New Deal, but other New Deal agencies and programs came into the area and left their mark on the land and people as well.

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) arrived in force in some mountain districts in 1934. The mountain people were most affected by the Land Policy Section, which sought to acquire “submarginal” farm lands and resettle the former owners or tenants on more productive farms. Much of the land being farmed in the mountains was clearly unable to produce an adequate living for its users, and thus could be labeled “submarginal.” The Land Program was shifted to the Resettlement Administration, then the Farm Security Administration and later the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, where limited funding reduced it to minor importance.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) with its sweeping powers to reconstruct the watershed of the Tennessee River also had considerable impact on its area. The mountains at the river’s source shared to some extent in TVA programs. Land was purchased, creeks dammed, lakes formed, and power plants built. Mountain communities were disrupted and rebuilt.

Two other New Deal programs—the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the concurrent development of Great Smoky Mountains National Park and the Blue Ridge Parkway—were so important that they are covered in separate chapters.

Submarginal Farm Relocation Projects: Stinking Creek

The early New Deal programs for economic recovery in agriculture were contained in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The act created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), charged with finding ways to raise the prices of staple agricultural commodities.

One method of raising prices was to curtail production by removing land from agricultural use. While some of this would be only temporary, the AAA provided an opportunity to remove poorer land permanently from agricultural use by purchasing it for other uses, such as park lands, forests, or wildlife preserves.

Land deemed unsuitable for productive farming was classified “submarginal.” This classification was based on (1) an estimate of the yield per acre that could be obtained from the most appropriate crop, and (2) whether capable farmers could expect to make an adequate living from the land. Since neither of these criteria was clearly defined, and both were subject to change, the definition was flexible.13

With the energy characteristic of the early days of the New Deal, the AAA’s Land Policy Division quickly began efforts to move people off eroded and unproductive mountain lands. The mountains, with their serious social and economic problems, seemed an ideal place to start purchasing land so that it would be removed permanently from agricultural use.

Because submarginal land purchase was shifted to various agencies during its life span, records are less complete than those of more permanent Federal activities. Efforts to trace the development of specific submarginal land purchase programs in the mountains are often unrewarding. However, in one location selected, the development of the program can be traced. In the spring of 1934 a University of Kentucky agriculture professor recommended four counties where most land being farmed was submarginal and where 80 to 90 percent of the families were on relief. He pointed out that the people of Knox, Clay, Leslie and Bell Counties were accustomed to cash income from employment off the farm which was no longer available.14 There was no way that they could make a decent living from their lands alone, even in more prosperous times.

Since local leaders in Knox County gave evidence of some support for Federal purchase of submarginal land in their county, plans for land acquisition in the county began in the spring of 1934. The Stinking Creek watershed in Knox County
was designated as part of a proposed Kentucky Ridge Forest Project which included purchase areas in Bell and Harlan Counties as well. Since there were no plans to establish State forests in Kentucky at that time, it was hoped that the land could be turned over to the Forest Service as part of the proposed Cumberland National Forest. The only drawback to this plan, from the viewpoint of local political leaders, was the fear of loss of county tax revenue if the land remained in Federal ownership.

The people of Stinking Creek accordingly began to receive visits from land acquisition agents in August 1934. Some of these agents had become familiar with the mountain country and its people while engaged in their previous jobs—locating and destroying moonshine whiskey stills during Prohibition. The identification of Federal agents as destroyers of one of the most profitable businesses in the mountains may have helped to intensify the suspicion with which the land purchase program was greeted. Some land purchase agents had to spend much time explaining the purpose of their new jobs.

The people were understandably cautious about the new program, wondering whether they would get a fair price for their land, and if they would be able to get a new farm near those of their friends and neighbors. The mountain man would agree that things were pretty bad where he was, but often concluded, "I am afraid I would not be satisfied to make a change." This caution, as one field supervisor pointed out, was not based on ignorance. They read their newspapers carefully and the men discussed Federal programs with considerable awareness. They knew that New Deal agencies had a lot of money to spend. As with most of the Southern Appalachian mountaineers, the Stinking Creek people were generally shrewd and careful traders, used to driving a hard bargain to get the most for what little they had to sell. In most cases their land was their most valuable possession. In the past it had been the basis of their economic security. They were in no hurry to sell; each waited to see what his neighbors would do.

The people were emotionally attached to their homes and anxious to remain close to their relatives and neighbors, but emotional attachment does not seem to have been the most important factor in their reluctance to sign options to purchase agreements. A 1934 survey of the 631 families in Knox County whose lands were included in the Kentucky Ridge Forest Project found that 157 families were unwilling to resettle, 93 were willing to move within the county and 381 were willing to move anywhere.

However, they realized that resettlement plans were vague and that the money they would get for a poor mountain farm would not buy a better farm unless they were to receive Government help in obtaining the new land. Also, those who held the best land along the creek, and whose actions were most closely watched by their neighbors, soon realized that if the Government were to purchase most of the land, then the tracts remaining in private ownership would increase in value. No one wanted to sell first and see his neighbors get better prices for their land later.

The situation was further complicated by the Kentucky custom of separating ownership of the surface of the land from ownership of the minerals beneath the soil. Land acquisition agents were not sure whether they could buy land without acquiring the mineral rights, usually to coal, and the additional right to use a portion of the land and the timber on it for mining. Many mountain people had sold the mineral rights to their land years before and retained only rights to the surface. Usually even the surface rights were limited by the right of the subsurface owner to extract the minerals by any necessary means. In February 1935 it was finally decided that the Federal Government could take options for surface rights while allowing others to own the coal and timber needed to remove the coal.

The people of Knox County, moving with caution, missed their chance to sell their land to the Federal Government. Other mountain landowners in neighboring Bell County had been quicker to sign options to purchase agreements, and when funds for submarginal land purchase were cut, the available money went to those who had previously agreed to sell.

The land actually acquired was not contiguous to the Cumberland National Forest, as it was finally established, but the Federal Government retained the 14,000 acres of Bell County land as a demonstration area or "Land Utilization Project." The new Resettlement Administration, which acquired management of the AAA submarginal land program early in 1935, determined that the land could best be used for growing timber. The Forest Service was responsible for managing the land as a demonstration of good timber land management for the area. This Bell County forest land was later transferred to the State of Kentucky. It is now known as Kentucky Ridge State Forest. The Forest Service chose to concentrate its purchase efforts farther west in the Cumberland region.

Most of the originally proposed Kentucky Ridge forest area was never purchased. So little land had actually been optioned that the purchase of it was given a very low priority when land acquisition funds were reduced. It was considered more important to complete projects where larger consolidated areas could be acquired.

Several other land utilization projects involving watershed improvement and retirement of submarginal land were proposed but never undertaken in eastern Kentucky. The evidence is incomplete, but it is possible that political pressures resulted in the spending of limited funds in other areas of the State, where a few of the proposed projects were completed.

One long-term result of these abandoned land purchase plans, combined with the actual land purchases for the Cumberland National Forest, has been the persistent folk belief that during the New Deal the Federal Government had a secret plan to buy all the mountain land in eastern Kentucky.
The story surfaced in the summer of 1979 during a study of a proposed wilderness area in the Daniel Boone National Forest (now the name of the Cumberland). Oldtimers in the area still fear that the Forest Service is a partner in a "creeping federal land grab."11

The fate of the families who lived in the Bell County area actually purchased for the Kentucky Ridge Forest indicates that the mountain people on Stinking Creek may have been wise when they decided to hold onto their land. In September 1936, a resettlement report showed 115 families on the land purchased by the Federal Government. All but one of the families were tenants. Only 30 families qualified for rural resettlement. The report noted that the project area contained no farm land and that it was difficult to find good farm land in the area at a price the Government would pay. The people were right when they wondered where they would be able to find farms to replace those they were asked to sell.

Of the remaining families at Kentucky Ridge, 5 were judged mentally deficient, 15 physically unable to farm, and 25 were held to be "morally unfit" to receive help from the rural rehabilitation staff. The report concluded that:

the remaining heads of families (40) competent to assume obligations, are stranded industrial people, with no experience in the management of agricultural units . . . to be rehabilitated in industrial locations.12

The classification of mountain families as "stranded industrial people" illustrates the problem the Resettlement Administration had in dealing with them. Agriculture specialists did not see the mountain people as farmers. A corn patch and a garden scratched out of a mountain slope were not, in their eyes, a "real farm." Therefore, as rural rehabilitation, resettlement, and subsistence homestead schemes were shuffled from one agency to another during the middle period of the New Deal, it was easy to forget about the mountain people. By the end of 1936, agricultural resettlement projects in the Southern Appalachians were in limbo. Formal plans were largely abandoned. The Park Service and the Forest Service were left with the responsibility for the people who had been living on the lands they now owned.14 The Park Service moved everyone off its lands. The Forest Service allowed people to remain as tenants.

In the Kentucky Ridge purchase area, in 1938 the local project manager was required to move the remaining people off the Land Utilization Project lands. Finally, in April 1939, he was able to report that 116 families had moved themselves without any Government aid. One family had been moved "through the efforts and personal expense of the project manager." He considered all these families to be "in the direst need of assistance," but saw little hope of any Government help for them.15 Two additional families had moved onto the Government-owned land between 1936 and 1939.

The final result of submarginal land purchase and relocation programs in eastern Kentucky was the purchase of a few mountain farms and the eviction of the former owners and tenants. There was only one resettlement project in the area, called Sublimity, covered later in this section, and few of those whose lands were purchased by the Federal Government actually moved there.

In North Carolina the story was different because of the long established Pisgah and Nantahala Forests in that State's mountains. Both forests were expanded and consolidated during the 1930's. One important justification of these forest developments was the contribution made by the National Forests toward stabilizing the local economy. The Forest Service would provide part-time work for local farm and small community dwellers and would also make possible the continuation of employment in wood-using industries by regrowing forest on the cutover land.16

The AAA Land Policy Section in North Carolina tried to work closely with the Regional Forester to plan its land purchase programs. In 1934, under pressure to move quickly in the purchase of submarginal farm lands, land policy agents obtained information on the number of farms and acres of farm land within the forests and related purchase units. The Regional Forester stated that:

Under the Forest Service purchase policy no valuation is placed upon improvements such as houses, barns, and fences, since they are of no value in the future management of the National Forests. For this reason, ordinarily small tracts which contained cultivated lands and improvements could not be purchased even though the cultivated lands were submarginal because the Forest Service could not offer a high enough price. Furthermore, under the policy which has been in effect, it would probably have been unwise to purchase a large part of the farms listed because there were no provisions made to take care of the people living upon them and in many cases these men would not secure enough for their lands to allow them to purchase good farms elsewhere.17

He included a table showing 3,774 farms which could be added to the Pisgah and Nantahala National Forests and 2,255 which could be made part of the Cherokee National Forest in Tennessee. The Regional Forester offered the assistance of the Forest Service in locating farms and negotiating for their purchase, since the Forest Service was eager to acquire small farms within existing forests and purchase units.

Since the AAA Land Policy Division was not to keep the land it purchased, but had to find a State or Federal agency to administer and develop it, buying land for the National Forests simplified the job, both in locating land to be purchased and in disposing of the land after acquisition.

In spite of the obvious dovetailing of interests between the Forest Service and AAA Land Policy, negotiation of a working agreement between them took over a year. Decisions had to be reached about who would survey and value the farms and how
to determine which portions would be paid for by the Forest Service and which by the AAA. The development of the Blue Ridge Parkway also affected the land situation in the North Carolina mountains. An additional complication was provided by the desire of the Cherokee Indians to benefit from the Parkway and Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Since the Cherokee Indian Reservation is located between the Nantahala forest and Great Smoky Mountains National Park, the land interests of the Indians were affected by Federal purchases.

Not until May 1935 was a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Forest Service and the AAA Land Policy Section, by then under the new Resettlement Administration. The memorandum was too late to produce any results. In July 1935, the Land Policy Section Director for the region informed the Regional Forester that funds for land purchase had been greatly curtailed and the priorities of his organization had been changed. The Land Policy Section would therefore have to drop out of the land purchase plan just agreed upon. "We are reluctant," he wrote, "to break faith with the people who have optioned their land, but there appears to be little we can do about it." 28 Many of the farms were later acquired by the Forest Service through its regular land acquisition program.

In April 1935 the Resettlement Administration headed by "braintrust" Rexford Tugwell had been given control of the rural rehabilitation and land programs. Funding remained low. In all, only 4,441 families, nationwide, were actually resettled. Early in 1937 its successor with much of the same staff, the Farm Security Administration, took over. Again funding for the agency was low. The only project related to the Southern Appalachians was Sublimity, in Kentucky, discussed later. 29

Later in 1937 the work was transferred to the Land Utilization Division, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. It developed several land plans for the North Carolina mountain areas during the period 1937 to 1939. Since relocation programs were not being funded adequately by the Federal Government, the plans were developed on a different premise than the submarginal land program first set up by the AAA. After 1935 it was assumed that little or no money would be available for resettlement.

An important element of the plans was the part-time employment provided by the National Forests. A great effort was made to work out plans which would make it possible for the greatest number of mountain people to remain on their lands. This desire conflicted with sound economics and good farm management practices, but the land-use planners justified their approach by concluding that the people were there, most of them wanted to stay, and there was a real need to improve their economic lot where they were. Studies showed that in North Carolina, as in Kentucky, mountain people enjoyed a comfortable standard of living when they were able to combine subsistence farming with part-time employment off the farm. 30

Most of the studies remained in administrative file drawers. Funds were not available to carry out Federal development plans. The financial, political, and social problems they addressed were too complex for quick solution. The submarginal land and the relocation programs were curtailed before they were able to have much positive impact, but a few of their goals were achieved by the Forest Service as a byproduct of expanding the Southern Appalachian National Forests.

The Tennessee Valley Authority

The most famous and in many ways the most important of the New Deal development programs was the Tennessee Valley Authority. While the impact of TVA on eastern Tennessee as a whole was very great, most mountain people were on the fringes of the development during the 1930's. TVA made its presence felt most strongly in the mountain valleys that were flooded by its dams, including many small farms. The Tennessee River and its tributaries rise in the Appalachian Highlands, so mountain people in Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama encountered TVA as a land acquisition agency.

Unlike the Forest Service, TVA could not wait until people were ready to sell, since dams could not be completed until all of the land they would flood was acquired. To speed up the process of land acquisition, TVA developed its own procedure. As soon as the engineering staff had determined what land would be needed, the Land Acquisition Division sent out field appraisers to inspect the property. The recommendations of the field appraiser were reviewed by a committee of three, who decided upon a fair price. A TVA employee then submitted the price to the landowner. If the proposal was not acceptable to the landowner, condemnation procedures would be started immediately. This was called the "no-trading policy," since TVA would not negotiate over price with the landowner. 31 The method was efficient, and in most cases fair, but it gave the mountain people an impression of arbitrariness. They were allowed no scope for their customary bargaining.

More problems arose when the farmer attempted to find a new farm home. The owner of a small farm with a cabin and a few rough outbuildings would get little for it. If he wished to remain nearby, he would be competing with others who had also lost their homes the same way. For example, about 3,000 families were moved out of the Norris Reservoir area. Vacant farms were often almost nonexistent even before the TVA purchases. In many cases the displaced mountaineer soon used up the money he had received for his land in higher daily living expenses, and his family was without both land and money. 32

TVA land acquisitions also markedly decreased the limited amount of good farm land available in the mountains. As one wife put it, "Now the dam water will cover all the bottoms and leave just the hog ridges for farming. That dam will just about ruin this here country." 33
One major objective of TVA land acquisition was "to leave the people . . . at least as well off as they were before TVA entered the picture." This modest objective was met in some cases, but efforts to assist in the relocation of individuals and communities displaced by TVA activities were not always successful. Pressure to get the dams built limited the amount of time that could be spent in planning relocation projects, and funds for relocation assistance were limited.

Some TVA programs had positive effects on mountain people. TVA demonstration farms and reforestation projects helped to improve the use of the remaining land. Electricity generated at TVA power plants reached into some of the mountain communities, making possible a more modern way of life, including labor-saving equipment for both housewife and farmer. TVA encouraged and promoted many programs for the economic improvement of all parts of the Tennessee River watershed. However, the affected communities identified TVA most clearly with dam construction and the trauma of land acquisition.

In the long run many mountain people have reaped their share of the economic development brought about by TVA. Economic developments during the war years and continuing expansion of the potential of the Valley area first recognized by TVA have contributed further economic benefits to the region. However, these benefits have rarely affected mountain communities directly, since people had to move to urban industrial centers to participate in most economic opportunities. The social and political changes that New Deal planners hoped TVA would bring failed to happen on a significant scale. TVA remained chiefly a producer of cheap fertilizer and electric power.

The TVA lakes also contributed to the slow conversion of the mountains from a place to live to a vacation or recreation area. Today children and grandchildren of mountain people who live and work in Chattanooga or Knoxville are affluent enough to own a piece of land for a second home. They spend their weekends and vacations in the mountain area where their families may once have lived.
New Deal Expands National Forests

In June 1933 President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order providing $20 million to purchase more land for National Forests in the East. This was the beginning of extensive forest expansion during the New Deal. While much of this money was used to develop new National Forests in regions that had, at that time, few significant publicly owned forest areas, the older National Forests of the Appalachian region were consolidated and enlarged as well. Expansion of these forests provided employment for a small army of surveyors, timber experts, land purchase agents, and their attendant assistants, clerks, and secretaries. They rented or purchased locally everything from office space to mules, and were therefore welcome in the small towns where they made their headquarters.

Although the purchase process was time-consuming, the Federal Government paid for the land it optioned. Since the National Forest Reservation Commission (NFRC) had to approve land purchases for National Forests, there was an unavoidable delay of 6 to 8 months, and sometimes it was a year or more, before legal issues related to a land purchase could be settled and payment actually made. These problems remained as serious as they had been when the initial purchases were made 20 years earlier. For this reason, it was until 1935 and 1936 that the economic impact of payments for forest purchases was actually felt. Hundreds of small landowners received their payments, thus bringing some cash into the local economies. Timber, pulpwood, mining, and land investment companies also benefited from Federal purchase of lands for which there was otherwise no market.

New National Forest land meant increased employment for local mountain people, chiefly through the Civilian Conservation Corps. Emergency Conservation Work, the parent agency of the CCC, provided $10 million from its funds for forest purchases in the East in 1934. Robert Fechner, director of the program, had concluded that money spent for increased eastern forest purchases would spare CCC the
problems and costs of transporting men from the East to the sparsely populated Western States where most National Forest land was located. One major purpose of this purchase fund, then, was to create employment. 38

The total allotment for land purchase in 1935 was $15 million, but available funds dropped sharply in 1936. An average of $3 million per year was available nationwide from 1936 to 1941. The demands of wartime then brought about another drastic drop in forest purchase funds.

Since CCC labor was available to develop picnic areas and camp grounds, the Forest Service gave increased consideration to the acquisition of lands which would expand the recreation potential of the eastern forests. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior and a member of the NFRC, believed, like other Interior officials before him, that all Federal recreation areas should be managed and controlled by the National Park Service. The role of the Forest Service, he said, should be confined to growing trees. In spite of his determined opposition, many land purchases were made which added to the scenic beauty of the National Forests and improved their facilities for hiking, camping, hunting and fishing.

In most cases the recreation benefits were played down and timber and watershed management functions of the land to be purchased were emphasized, largely to avoid Ickes' opposition. For example, the highest-priced piece of land in the Nantahala was purchased from the Gennett Lumber Co. in 1936 and 1937. This tract, which became the Joyce Kilmer Memorial Forest, contained a magnificent stand of virgin timber. In justifying the high purchase price, the Forest Service carefully calculated the value of the timber, though there was no intention ever to cut this unique stand. 39 The value of the tract for scientific study was also pointed out.

Most of the lands acquired were cutover or heavily culled, and purchase prices of badly damaged land were sometimes less than $2 per acre. These purchases fit more closely with the older Forest Service practices of getting the most land for the money and of restoring land best suited to timber production to its natural use. The purchase of damaged lands also provided work for the CCC and would contribute in the long run to watershed management, another original National Forest purpose.

Benefits to Counties Vary Greatly

While owners of land were often glad to see the Forest Service in the market for major purchases, two issues were raised which led some to view major expansion of the National Forests with alarm. One group was led by Austin Cary, a pioneer in the development of sound forestry practices for southern forests, especially the coastal pinelands used for turpentine production. Cary had been employed by the Forest Service for many years, but had never accepted the idea of large-scale Federal ownership of land. He wanted only small experimental tracts in Government ownership and believed, like Carl Schenck before him, that private forest owners could be convinced to manage their lands responsibly. 40
Cary served as a focal point for those who feared a Government takeover of the forests. A delegation from the Society of American Foresters, which addressed NFRC at its January 22, 1936, meeting, recommended that the Forest Service be permitted to purchase lands only if they were not likely to be properly developed by private owners. The key to much of their argument was a desire for special credits to permit forest owners to survive their present economic problems without having to sell their land. A Forest Service representative pointed out in response that the purchase program planned by the Forest Service would leave 90 percent of the forest lands in the Eastern United States in private ownership. Federal domination of timber growing did not appear to be a serious threat.

Another issue raised at this meeting was far more important in its implication for the people of the Southern Appalachians. This was the problem of removal of land from the tax base of already hard-pressed counties. The Forest Service was well aware of the problem, especially in the areas of the mountains where it was acquiring new land. Forest Service payments to local governments in the past had been a percentage of revenue from the sale of timber. Much of the land now being acquired would take several generations to regrow, so the counties could expect no funds in the immediate future.

In response to the criticism that it was bankrupting the southern mountain counties, the Forest Service prepared a group of careful studies of the finances of representative counties. One of the counties studied was Macon County, N.C., a rural, mountainous area included in the Nantahala National Forest. In 1936, when the study was made, 43 percent of the area of the county was in Federal ownership and the rest, except an area of about 1,000 acres in the towns of Franklin and Highlands, was included in the area of proposed additions to that forest. It would require many years to restock the forest in Macon County, since its American chestnuts had suffered fatal damage from the Chinese blight and other species would have to be developed to replace them. The principal forest-related occupation in the county in 1936 was the salvage of dead chestnut stumpage.
Although the State of North Carolina had taken over the major portion of school and highway costs, the county was, in effect, virtually without funds. Services were minimal, and the rates of tax delinquency very high. The condition of county records was so poor that an exact picture of its financial situation was impossible, but the report concluded that the county had probably gained more than it had lost through the presence of the National Forest. Benefits included road construction and maintenance, development of recreation areas, free-use permits granted to county residents, use of Forest Service telephone lines, and employment on the forest. The report estimated that the county had received directly $12,500, chiefly in money spent for roads, and that it could have collected, at most, $8,000 in taxes from the Nantahala National Forest lands if they had remained in private ownership.42

Another representative mountain county was Johnson County, Tenn. It was also completely rural, but its farms were somewhat better than those of Macon County. However, tax defaults were common, and the county was also in debt. About 21 percent of the county had been purchased for the Unaka National Forest (now the northern Cherokee). Almost all of the rest was included within the planned future Forest boundaries, but in 1936 it did not seem likely that more land would be purchased soon. The report, which was less thorough than the study of Macon County, concluded that the county had lost about $3,300 in taxes and gained roads worth $8,250 per year in the years immediately preceding 1936. Other benefits such as recreation areas and employment of local residents were not estimated in this report.43

While Johnson County would undoubtedly have liked more tax money for operating expenses, the presence of the forest did tend to reduce many county expenses. The principal county expenditures were for law enforcement, roads, and schools. For the 21 percent of the county land already in the National Forest, no county funds were spent on roads, and the need for both schools and law enforcement was low because few people lived there.

In spite of the conclusion that local government had generally not lost much or even had gained by the presence of National Forests, the Forest Service and other Federal land agencies continued to work on a plan for reform of the method of payment to local government. The problem was that income from the 25 percent payment plan fluctuated too greatly for counties to use the money in their financial planning, and that some counties got no money because National Forest land was not yet productive.44 It proved impossible to come up with a new plan satisfactory to all concerned and it was to be many years before a basic change was made in the payment method.

While large tracts were purchased in the Southern Appalachians during the Depression, it was the purchase of smaller tracts to consolidate the Forests which had the most visible impact on the mountain people. The files of the NFRC
for 1935 and 1936 bulge with the records of hundreds of individual land purchases, some as small as 8 acres, many less than 200 acres. These acquisitions benefited the forests by improving fire control, game management, prevention of pollution and trash problems and in many other ways. Local governments benefited since they no longer had to worry about providing schools and roads in the areas. (They generally had made no provision for sanitation.) The more affluent small landowners benefited by acquiring cash to start over elsewhere on better farm land. Tenants and the poorer landowners were a serious problem. Many of them remained and became tenants on the forest.

Many Small Landholders Pose a Problem

The acquisition of these small parcels of land was often a complex process. First, as two decades before, few of the landowners had a clear idea of the location of the boundaries of their land. Even where boundaries were indicated by a creek or a road, the owner often had no idea of the exact number of acres he held. The Forest Service could not tell a mountain man how much money he would receive for his farm until it had been surveyed, since the purchase price would be determined by establishing the value per acre and multiplying by the number of acres. Many people felt cheated when the survey showed that they held fewer acres than they thought, and the payment for their property was therefore smaller than they had expected. On the other hand, nearly as many small landowners were pleasantly surprised to discover that they held title to more land than they realized. For example, an elderly farmer in Madison County, N.C., claimed 40 acres when he agreed to sell. Survey showed that he actually possessed 106 acres. 45

Figure 53.—Rocky Face Mountain, overlooking forested Mill Creek valley, near Dug Gap in Armuchee Ranger District, Chattahoochee National Forest, near Dalton, Ga., in 1941. (Forest Service photo F-411617)

Figure 54.—New Wild Acres Hotel near Mt. Mitchell, N.C., on Pisgah National Forest, operating under a special-use permit in March 1930. (NA:95G-238080)
A sample of 50 purchases made in 1935 for the Cumberland National Forest in Kentucky revealed only one case in which the amount of land claimed by the seller agreed with the amount a survey showed that he possessed. Many of the differences were large in proportion to the size of the tract being sold. The numbers of overestimates and underestimates were about equal. Purchases for the Unaka and Nantahala Forests in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia all showed similar discrepancies—occasionally quite large—between the number of acres claimed by the seller and the number of acres determined by survey.

These confusions over land boundaries were one facet of another complicating factor. Many of the mountain people did not have clear title to their lands. Inheritance, previous sale of a portion of the land, and inadequate local recordkeeping all contributed to this problem. A landowner often wished to sell land with title defects. Since the Government could not acquire the land unless the title could be cleared, this had to be done by “friendly” condemnation.

In contrast to the land acquisition policy of TVA, the Forest Service continued to follow its established rule of never condemning the land of an unwilling seller. Most of its condemnation cases were solely to clear title. The land was acquired at a price previously agreed on. Occasionally there was conflict over the amount to be paid for a piece of land, but land was never condemned when the owner did not want to sell at all.

Consider, for example, the case of Homer Frisbie, at times a guide to hikers in Bear Creek Cove, near Hangover Mountain, Graham County, N.C. Frisbie lived with his family in a two-room log cabin on his 3-acre “farm.” He had a 2-acre corn field, a garden including potatoes, beans, and rhubarb, and livestock—one cow, four calves, one pig and “about fifty chickens.” Frisbie supplemented his food by hunting and fishing.
Frisbie, however, did not exactly “own” his land. County records revealed that Frisbie and his wife held a 1/30 undivided interest in a 98-acre tract optioned by Sam Sparks and others. Since the owners of the other 29/30 interests wanted to sell, a “friendly” condemnation suit had been filed. Frisbie became alarmed and obtained the help of visitors who wrote letters on his behalf, including a Chicago attorney.

One solution was for Frisbie to remain on his 3 acres and farm it with a special-use permit, but losing title to the land. Frisbie refused, wanting either to retain ownership or to obtain title to some other suitable land. North Carolina law stated that a condemnation without Frisbie’s consent would be void, since he was using the tract as a home. The Forest Service might have agreed to allow Frisbie to retain title, but his plot was the last piece of a tract of nearly 30 square miles that the Forest Service had put together to establish a wildlife management area and to preserve its wildness. The tract contained the largest stand of virgin timber in the Nantahala forest. The Forest Supervisor was, naturally, eager to move Frisbie out.

Frisbie finally agreed to accept a 9.7-acre tract of federal land in exchange. Settlement of the case took about 9 months, extensive legal correspondence, and the consideration of diverse interests. The value of the Frisbie land so acquired was only $35.004.

One wonders what would have happened if Homer Frisbie had not received legal help. But in another case, stubbornness won out without legal help.

In 1934 Mrs. Hester Jane Truitt, a widow, signed an option to sell her land and cabin, in Swain and Macon counties, N.C., for $1.75 per acre. She was assured of help in finding a new home to buy when she received payment. Title to the 99.4-acre farm was clouded, requiring condemnation. There were delays, and payment was not ready until March 1937. By then Mrs. Truitt realized that she would not get relocation assistance, and she could not find a new farm to purchase with the money she was entitled to. So she simply refused to accept payment and remained where she was.

In November 1940, 44 months later, an attorney for the Justice Department Lands Division visited Mrs. Truitt to see why she had not accepted payment. A portion of his account of the visit follows.

Mrs. Truitt, whom I judge to be about 65 years of age, lives on the condemned property with her daughter, whom I judge to be about 35 years of age. Leaving my car at the nearest road approach to the premises, I climbed a rugged mountain trail about three-fourths of a mile up to Mrs. Truitt's cabin. The cabin is located in a small field, possibly three and one-half acres in total area, in which were a few scraggly fruit trees, a pig pen, and a crude cow-shelter, and apparently two acres of corn stubble. The ground indications were that the corn had been cultivated largely by use of the hoe. I saw three head of cattle and several chickens about the place. Every pound of supplies used in the house or on the land that comes from the outside has to be carried up the path by which I climbed. . . . The whole appearance from a physical appraisement looked about as hopeless to sustain human occupants as any I ever came in contact with; and my own origin was in the rugged Blue Ridge Mountains.

Figure 56.—Bent Creek Forest Camp, overnight public recreation site on Pisgah National Forest near Asheville, N.C., in March 1930. (NA: 95G-238168)
Mrs. Truitt said she had been waiting a long time for my visit and she wondered what kind of man would come there to tell her that she must leave her home that she had helped to clear out of the woods with her own hands and where she had reared a large family of children. She just wanted me to tell her what kind of government I was working for, which through its (forestry) representatives promised her and her neighbors if they would petition for the establishment of the Government Forest they would be paid enough for their lands to enable them to get better placed in the valleys; and that after she so petitioned, would send me around to offer her less than one hundred dollars after taxes for the home she had occupied for forty years. What kind of home would that amount buy for her and her daughter, who had many years to live after she, Mrs. Truitt, would be gone, she asked?

The conclusion of the matter was that she flatly declined to touch a cent of the award; and said that when she moved from those premises she would be carried feet foremost.49

It was finally decided to remove her tract from the condemnation and return the $173.95 to the U.S. Treasury.50 Lacking both an influential advocate and a legal leg to stand on, Mrs. Truitt nevertheless retained her land through sheer stubbornness.

While Mrs. Truitt actually retained title to her mountain farm, so that her daughter could also continue to live there after her death, some elderly residents sold the land to the Forest Service but reserved lifetime rights.

They continued to occupy their homes until they died, although the Government immediately acquired title to the land. The price paid for the land was reduced in such cases, and the occupants became subject to forest regulations on burning and trash disposal. Since the Government held title to the land, no State or local taxes would have to be paid. In some cases the Forest Service required that no change be made in the use of the land without the district ranger’s permission. A cash payment plus the right to remain in their homes gave some financial security for such older residents in their last years. Life interests were granted only to those over 65, thus ensuring that complete control of the land would pass to the Forest Service before long. Examples occurred in all of the Southern Appalachian forests, but the number was small.51

Forest Service as Landlord; Sublimity Project

As early as 1934, Forest Service administrators realized that their extensive program of forest land purchase would create problems for people, especially tenants and squatters, occupying the land. Many of these people were trying to make a living from unsuitable land only because they had no place else to go.

A policy established in September 1934 stated that all persons occupying land acquired for the National Forests could continue to live there by paying a “special-use fee.” This fee generally would be slightly less than the taxes payable on the land if it were in private ownership. Holders of special-use permits for residence and cultivation would be subject to land use requirements intended to minimize damage to the land, including restrictions on fires, trash disposal, timber cutting, and whatever else the district ranger thought necessary or enforceable.52

At that time it was hoped that rural resettlement programs might find new and better homes for many of these people. With the end of that hope, the Forest Service became a more permanent landlord. Even in 1934 provision was made for isolated pockets of good farm land within National Forests. Permanent authorization of special use for such areas was permitted, as long as this did not interfere with forest management.53

The mountain forest that had the greatest number of tenants was the newly created Cumberland National Forest in Kentucky, where purchases began in 1933. The one resettlement project, Sublimity, intended to provide better homes for those who had been displaced by the establishment of the forest, was a very limited success.54 The Sublimity Forest community was planned, constructed, and managed by the Forest Service with funds provided by the Resettlement Administration and later the Farm Security Administration.

Forest work needed by Sublimity residents to supplement their farm and garden income was never adequate. The high standards set for housing and social services made the cost per family prohibitive. Families carefully selected from a number of applications became disillusioned with the project and left. Between 1937 and 1945, 103 families lived in the project. The average period of occupancy was 18.8 months, and the average rate was 73 percent or 48 of the 66 homes in the community.

A 1947 Forest Service report on the project, written after it had been terminated, recommended that the “establishment of rehabilitation communities on or in connection with national forests be discouraged.” The author of the study concluded that Sublimity had been useful as an experiment, but that organized, managed communities were not workable either socially or economically. Socially, “improvements” in the peoples’ lives and attitudes were difficult to make and required constant supervision to maintain. Economically, the project closed with a net loss of $73,870, an unacceptable cost for a small project.55

One forest officer commented, “Sublimity to me was a nightmare, much more depressing from a psychological point of view than World War II.”56 No one wished to repeat the Sublimity experiment, including the local people who refused to apply for homes there or voted against it by simply moving out.

Lumber and shingles from dismantled CCC camps were used to improve some of the Sublimity homes. Longrange plans were made to improve homes, outbuildings, and the farmland itself, but funds for this work were always very limited. Forest
Service personnel felt a responsibility to the people, but they were uncomfortable in a "social work" role.

What type of structures should the Forest Service provide its tenants? What should our standards be? The TVA, so Richards told us, has spent from $400 to $1500 for each set of improvements owned and rented by the Government under similar conditions under the TVA. Forest Service expenditures on cases sampled during our trip were from $35 to $122 per case. These expenditures resulted in placing the properties in as habitable a condition as the general run of improvements occupied by the better tenants and the smaller owners in the same neighborhood. Should we attempt to raise these standards? Should we provide something besides bare board walls inside the house and floors as well as ceilings that the housewife will be especially proud of? Should we be so "extravagant" as to provide bright colored paints for the exterior of the dwellings? In addition, what kind and what use of incentives should be used to encourage these people to raise their standards? Such problems are over the head of the average forester but are quite probably everyday matters to the trained social worker. For this reason, we would join the Region in suggesting the assignment of a sufficient number of trained social workers to this field until a satisfactory plan and procedure for handling these cases has been developed.  

Dealing With Forest Residents

While Forest Service officers may have been uncomfortable in their roles as "landlord," they were more at home in dealing with local people in other ways. Technical personnel, clerical workers, and unskilled labor were usually local residents. The district ranger (or his staff, if any) was the "boss" for these workers, a role in which the forest officers were generally comfortable and quite successful.

Forest Service officers also dealt with people who requested special-use permits. The poor squatters and tenants mentioned earlier occupied their homes and land under special permits, sometimes free, sometimes paying a small fee. Similar permits were issued for a multitude of uses from resort hotels and industrial developments to cutting firewood or fenceposts. A Forest Service report in 1940 concluded that:

It is probable that all of this special use business is so much taken for granted that it has little influence on the attitudes of people except when they are refused some desired privilege. Such disapprovals result in more or less hostility and resentment.
Figure 58.—Successful hunters with their buck deer after a special Forest Service-regulated hunt on Pisgah National Forest, N.C., in fall 1939. (NA:95G-397085)

Figure 59.—Guide Bud Graves of Tellico Plains, Tenn., holding his dogs as he waited to be checked into hunting area for Forest Service-regulated wild boar hunt on Cherokee National Forest in fall 1941. (Forest Service photo F-414169)

Figure 60.—This 300-pound Prussian wild boar was the largest taken in the fall 1944 hunt regulated by the Forest Service in Tellico Wildlife Management Area, Cherokee National Forest, Tenn. Hunter was L. W. Galloway of Kingsport, Tenn. (Forest Service photo F-433225)
Some hostility and resentment also stemmed from the establishment of wildlife management areas where hunting was restricted, since local residents often were accustomed to hunting as a supplement to their food supply. Hunting has never been prohibited on National Forests, but the forest lands are subject to State laws regulating hunting and fishing. Limits on the hunting season and on the hunters' bag are often resented, as are hunting license requirements.

Active game management in the Appalachian highlands generally dates from the 1930's, so this was a new source of problems at the time. The purpose of the controls was to improve hunting and fishing in the forests and preserve the possibility of such sports for the future. Game animals had been shot out or starved out of much of the newly acquired land and restocking had to take place. However, there was good hunting in the better forested older areas. No Federal fee was charged for hunting and fishing in the National Forests, but about this time residents were required to obtain a State hunting or fishing license for the first time, which was an annoyance to many.

Fire control and land acquisition remained the two principal areas of activity where forest officers came in contact with local people. Fire prevention publicity, organization of fire crews, investigation of man-caused fires for prosecution—these tasks occupied much of the time of many forest officers.

Figure 61.—Blackened spots where boy is standing show how a farmer's land-clearing brush fire got away in a high wind in 1942 to burn 2,000 acres of the adjoining Cherokee National Forest, the margin of which is visible in foreground. (Forest Service photo F-419862)

Figure 62.—A local farmer serving as a fire warden for the USDA Forest Service on the Daniel Boone (then Cumberland) National Forest, Ky., in August 1940. The Forest Service furnished such wardens with a telephone in their homes, to report forest fires. (Forest Service photo F-400243)
Because of the extensive land acquisitions in the 1930's, related activities occupied relatively more time and led to more individual contacts with people than in recent years. It was a long, drawn-out process. As in the early years, after a purchase area was established, forest officers would interview landowners in the area regarding their interest in selling their land. Since prices offered were generally not high, much discussion would result. The forest officer would also have to
explain the Forest Service process of land acquisition and forewarn the seller of the possibility of delay in consummating the purchase. Once an option was obtained from a willing seller, a survey crew would retrace old survey lines, conferring with all adjacent landowners to help locate the corners and check the accuracy of the survey. A crew would then come in to inventory the timber and classify the soil to determine the value of the land for forest purposes. The relations of these crews with local people could be touchy.

In the early states of such work, forest officers are in danger of being mistaken for 'revenuers' and most take some pains to make their identity known to residents. Further negotiations often would result, sometimes over a considerable period of time. If the landowner decided to accept the final offer made to him, a final survey would be made to establish permanent corners and mark lines. The results of this final survey could lead to trouble if the lines were not where the owner thought they should be. As we have already seen, this was often the case. Still another source of trouble remained.

Final payment is made to a man for the land he has sold. Much ill will results from preposterous delays in making final payment because of highly technical legal demands from legal authorities regarding title, squatters on land, etc. Although Forest Service has fought for years for a more rational handling of title work, little real progress has been made until just recently.

One Week on the Job With a Ranger

A Memorandum of Inspection from the Cherokee National Forest shows how some of these interactions with people fit into the weekly routine of a district ranger. Hiwassee District Ranger J.W. Cooper, accompanied by the Assistant Forest Supervisor, E.W. Renshaw, toured his district in mid-April 1938, handling a variety of problems. The first stop on their tour was Hiwassee Beach, where the operator of the beach (a special-use permit holder) had requested that the Forest Service install a telephone. The ranger pointed out that the Forest Service could only install telephones needed for fire control purposes, but he suggested that the local residents might want to build their own telephone line. They could use the existing Forest Service telephone poles if they wished.

The two officers then checked the complaint of the man who had protested that Forest Service telephone line maintenance had destroyed trees and shrubs close to his summer cabin. Cooper concluded that the CCC had probably done a little more clearing than was necessary when they built the line in 1935, but nothing could be done about it.

The next day Cooper spent several hours with a junior forester who was conducting a "visible area study," to help plan lookout tower locations. Cooper and Renshaw then proceeded to the Tumbling Creek area to investigate a boundary dispute with a landowner who claimed that an Experimental Project crew had placed a weather observatory and a weir (for stream observation) on her property. Relations with this woman had become "rather strained." There was much difficulty in checking the boundary, as the line had never been painted and the corner marker had been destroyed.

Figure 65.—Tallulah (until 1931 called Clayton) Ranger Station, Clayton, Ga., in 1935. The District was then part of Nantahala National Forest. The Georgia portion of the old Nantahala was transferred to the new Chattahoochee National Forest on July 9, 1936. (NA:95G-310056)
Ranger Cooper and Assistant Supervisor Renshaw then returned to a nearby Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp where they found that a crew had been out fighting a forest fire. The next day they went to the site of the fire to investigate. They found stumps and logs still burning, so they called the crew back to put it out, and then checked the site for clues. Clear evidence remained that the fire had started from a campfire built by fox hunters. The ranger backtracked on the hunters and found the farmer’s yard where they had parked their car. The farmer identified it. Through the car’s license number the hunters were traced and eventually a conviction was secured.

A district ranger, dealing with land acquisition, timber sales, fire suppression, telephone lines, lookouts, information, special-use permit complaints, and a host of other issues, was the backbone of forest administration. He generally had the greatest influence on the image held by local people of the Forest Service. During the week described above, the ranger interacted with a recreation facility operator, two vacation home owners, a CCC camp, and a group of fox hunters—possibly not local since they had come by car and thus the neighboring farmer was willing to give evidence against them. This list raises questions as early as 1938, about the kind of people who lived near, or used, National Forest land. There is little interaction with a traditional mountain community; rather, the ranger was dealing with people who had a recreational interest in the forest. The farmer, who was the only fulltime resident, was extremely helpful in the investigation of the origins of the forest fire.

Conditions varied somewhat from forest to forest, and in parts of the same forest. Perhaps at another time of year the contacts would be different. A ranger in Kentucky, where the Cumberland National Forest had a large number of tenants, would probably have been interacting more with a community of mountain people at that period. The pressure on the land to provide the necessities of life was apparently greater in the Cumberland than in some of the longer-established forests along the crest of the Appalachians.13

Figure 66.—Blue Ridge Ranger Station office and warehouses near Blairsville, Ga., when new in 1938. Station was moved to Dahlonega in 1952 and name was changed to Chestatee. Chattahoochee National Forest. (NA:95G-386658)

Figure 67.—Ranger explaining use of anemometer (wind gauge) in forest fire control to businessmen from London and Berea, Ky., at Bald Rock fire tower, Sublimity Ranger District, Daniel Boone (then Cumberland) National Forest, in June 1938. (NA:95G-365420)

Figure 68.—Steel lookout tower secured by steel cables, topped with an 8- x 8-foot lookout house and walkway on all sides, on Chestnut Mountain, Armuchee Ranger District, Chattahoochee National Forest, south of Dalton, Whitfield County, Ga., completed in 1941. (Forest Service photo F-411612)
Reference Notes

(In the following notes, the expression “NA, RG 83” means National Archives, Record Group 83, Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (USDA); “NA, RG 95, OC, NFRC” means National Archives, Record Group 95, Records of the Forest Service (USDA), Office of the Chief, National Forest Reservation Commission; and “NA, RG 96” means National Archives, Record Group 96, Records of the Farm Security Administration (USDA). “WNRC, FSR” means Washington National Records Center, Forest Service records. See Bibliography, IX.)


3. National Archives, Record Group 83, Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), USDA, Forest Service, Soil Conservation Service, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics: “Preliminary Examination Reports,” Yellow Creek Watershed, 1939; Pee Dee River Watershed, 1938; New River Watershed, 1940; Roanoke River Watershed, 1941; Big Sandy River Watershed, 1940. These reports contain much useful economic information on the mountain areas where these rivers and their tributaries rise.

4. Duke University, Perkins Library, Gennett Lumber Company, Papers, Box 24, Andrew Gennett to C. W. Savage, Murphy, N.C., October 15, 1934.

5. Ignatz Pikl, Jr., A History of Georgia Forestry, p. 25. See also note 3, “Preliminary Examination Reports.”


7. NA, RG 83 (BAE), “Preliminary Examination Reports,” Pee Dee River Watershed 1938. Although counties did not make adjustments readily to the lower land values of the Depression, in most cases land was taxed at a fairly low rate.

8. Harry Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands, Chapter 13.


11. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, Supervision, 1929-35, General, Memo, E. A. Sherman, Associate Forester, to Regional Foresters, December 9, 1932.


14. National Archives, Record Group 96, Records of the Farm Security Administration, Correspondence, Records of Regional Director, Region 4, 1935-40. AAA Land Policy Section, Division of Program Planning, W. D. Nicholls, University of Kentucky College of Agriculture, to L. C. Gray, Division of Land Economics, Land Policy, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, April 14, 1934.

15. NA, RG 96, Farm Security Administration (FSA), W. D. Nicholls to L. C. Gray April 6, 1934; L. C. Gray to W. D. Nicholls April 12, 1934. See note 14.


20. NA, RG 83, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), Appalachian Regional Office Records, 1935, Kentucky 184.


22. Interview with Dr. Billie DeWalt, Winchester, Ky., July 27, 1979. Dr. DeWalt was employed by the Forest Service to do a community study in the Red River Gorge area.


25. NA, RG 96, FSA, Correspondence 1935-40, Land Utilization Projects, Region 4, File of letters dealing with the need to move people off all Land Utilization Project lands by May 31, 1938. W. P. Mayhew, Project Manager, Pineville, Ky., to Howard H. Gordon, Regional Director, FSA, Kentucky Ridge Forest Project.


27. NA, RG 96, FSA, Correspondence of the Regional Director, Region 4, AAA, Joseph C. Kircher, Regional Forester, to Dr. Carl C. Taylor, Regional Director, Division of Program Planning, AAA, Lands, October 27, 1934.


32. Arthur E. Morgan, *The Making of the TVA* (Buffalo, N.Y., 1974), pp. 75-79. Morgan and others had many ideas about social and political development of the region through TVA. Most of their ideas were never carried out. See also Clarence L. Hodge, *The Tennessee Valley Authority: A National Experiment in Regionalism* (Washington: American University Press, 1938), for efforts made to cooperate with and assist local communities and interest groups.


37. NA, RG 95, Records of the Forest Service, Office of the Chief, National Forest Reservation Commission (NFRC), Minutes, June 9, 1933. The information in the following section is chiefly derived from NFRC minutes. Specific citations will be provided where appropriate.

38. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, NFRC, Minutes, November 21, 1934.


41. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, NFRC, Minutes, January 22, 1936.

42. WNRC, Forest Service Records, Accession No. 60A851, Report on Macon County, North Carolina, 1936.

43. WNRC, FSR, Acc. No. 60A851, Report on Johnson County, Tenn., 1936.

44. WNRC, FSR, Acc. No. 58-A64, Memo from R. C. Hall, Director, Forest Taxation Inquiry, to R. E. Marsh, Assistant Chief, "Department Contributions Policy" June 18, 1943.

45. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, NFRC, Minutes, July 30, 1935, Unaka Forest Purchase Records.

46. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, NFRC, Minutes, July 30, 1935, Cumberland Forest Purchase Records.

47. NA, RG 95, OC, NFRC, Minutes, July 30, 1935, Unaka and Nantahala Forests Purchase Records.

48. NA, RG 95, Land Acquisition (LA), Condemnation Cases, 1939-46, Region 8, John A. Massen to Hon. Mastin G. White, Office of the Solicitor, USDA, May 31, 1940; L. L. Bishop, Assistant Forester to John A. Massen, June 1, 1940; L. F. Kneipp, Assistant Chief, F.S. to J. Kircher, Regional Forester, August 7, 1940; J. Kircher, Regional Forester, to Chief, September 10, 1940; John E. Burch, Acting Chief, Land Acquisition, to Regional Forester, September 30, 1940; Memorandum for Mr. Kneipp, Acquisition, Nantahala, September 27, 1940; Memorandum for Supervisor, Nantahala, August 13, 1940.

49. NA, RG 95, Land Acquisition (LA), Condemnation Cases, 1939-46, Region 8, Nere A. Day, Special Attorney, Department of Justice, to Attorney General, Lands Division, Condemnation Section, Department of Justice, December 13, 1940.
50. NA, RG 95, Land Acquisition (LA), Condemnation Cases, 1939-46, Region 8, John E. Burch, Acting Chief, Forest Service, to Solicitor, Department of Agriculture, Acquisition, Nantahala, May 26, 1941.

51. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, National Forest Reservation Commission, Minutes, Cherokee Forest Purchase Records, July 30, 1935; Pisgah Forest Purchase Records, April 2, 1936; Nantahala Forest Purchase Records, June 30, 1941; Chattahoochee Forest Purchase Records, June 4, 1940.

52. Washington National Records Center, Accession No. 72A3386, Forest Service Records, L. F. Kneipp, Assistant Forester, to John E. Burch, Secretary, NFRC, October 17, 1934.


54. Forest Service Regional Office Records, Atlanta, Ga., Lands Division, "History of the Sublimity Forest Community Situated in Laurel County, Kentucky," prepared by W. E. Hedges, 1947, pp. 5-8, 34, 80, 81.


57. NA, RG 95, Office of the Chief, General Integrating Inspection Reports, Region 8, 1937, by E. W. Loveridge and J. A. Fitzwater. The southern lowland forests such as the Talledega and Kisatchie had more serious tenant problems than the mountain forests.

58. Washington National Records Center, Accession No. 60A931, "A List of Different Kinds of Things the Forest Service and Forest Officers Do Which Influence Residents," August 12, 1940.

59. WNRC, Acc. No. 60A931, "A List of Different Things"

60. WNRC, "A List of Different Things"

61. WNRC, "A List of Different Things"

62. NA, RG 95, CCC Camp Records, Memorandum of Inspection, Hiwassee District, Cherokee National Forest, April 18, 1938, E. W. Renshaw, Assistant Forest Supervisor, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.

63. Forest Service Regional Office Records, Atlanta, Ga., Lands Division, "History of the Sublimity Forest Community," p. 73. In 1938, 80 free permits were issued to destitute families living in the Cumberland Forest. Several hundred additional holders of residence permits paid a small fee.
Chapter IV

The Civilian Conservation Corps

In 1933, shortly after his inauguration as President, Franklin D. Roosevelt sent to Congress an urgent request for legislation to put unemployed young men to work in conservation jobs. FDR and others had been considering such a program for several months and when Congress passed the Emergency Conservation Work Act on March 31, 1933, they moved swiftly to get the program started. Just 5 days later Robert Fechner was appointed Director of Emergency Conservation Work to head the program. The first Civilian Conservation Corps camp was occupied in less than 2 weeks. By July, 300,000 men were in CCC camps all over the United States.

At first, the Forest Service was the sole CCC employer; later it employed at least half of the men. Its camps were the first established and often the last closed down, some of them existing from 1933 to the end of the CCC in 1942. In contrast, other camps were usually dismantled and moved when they completed a project, often in less than a year. The Forest Service, which for years had been short of funds and manpower for tree planting, timber stand improvement, recreation development, building telephone lines, firefighting, road and trail building, and scores of related jobs on the Forests, had responded eagerly to the opportunity. Forest supervisors promised to put young men to work as soon as they could be recruited and brought to the forests.

Other agencies supervised significant numbers of CCC camps in the Southern Appalachian Highlands. One was the new Soil Erosion Service of the Department of the Interior, headed by Hugh H. Bennett, also created in 1933. Enrollees planted trees and shrubs to help hold the soil in place and built small dams to help lessen floods, mostly on private lands. These camps are difficult to trace, as they were often temporary, and moved to a new location when their work was completed. At the strong urging of a coalition of agricultural and forestry groups, Roosevelt transferred SES to the Department of Agriculture in March 1935 and had it renamed Soil Conservation Service.

The National Park Service had many CCC camps in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park (16 in 1934 and 1935) and along the Blue Ridge Parkway. Other CCC camps worked on new State parks. The tasks performed by these camps were similar to those of the National Forest camps with the exception of timber stand improvement. The Tennessee Valley Authority provided work for men in about 20 camps in Tennessee and Kentucky building check dams and planting trees. TVA camps did their work both on TVA-owned lands and adjacent private land.

The Army, experienced in handling recruits, was given the job of processing the young men and operating and maintaining the camps. There was no drill or military training, but Army Reserve officers at first had to maintain discipline, arrange leisure-time activities, and provide suitable food, clothing, and shelter.

The CCC had an especially strong impact on the southern mountains and their people, so it is appropriate that the first CCC camp was located in an Appalachian National Forest. As we have already seen, the CCC was indirectly responsible for the enlargement of the Southern Appalachian National Forests. The desire to find more places for the CCC to work in the East accelerated the process of acquiring more land for the forests, and $10 million in additional forest purchase funds came directly from the budget for CCC, Emergency Conservation Work. The CCC program was so successful and met so much approval nationwide that when emergency authorization for the program expired in March 1937, Congress passed new legislation continuing the program and giving it a more permanent status. Many hoped that CCC would continue after the Depression was over. As it turned out, CCC lasted only for a little over 9 years. Enlistment declined in 1941 as war industries attracted young workers. The CCC was disbanded starting in 1942, soon after the United States went to war.

Many Camps in Appalachia

CCC camps, usually with 150 to 220 enrollees each, were clustered thickly in the National Forests of Southern Appalachia. The arrival of so many young men in the rural mountain counties created tensions, especially since the first CCC recruits were chiefly unemployed youth from the larger towns and cities of the States in which the camps were located. Accustomed to different standards of behavior and a different way of life, they were considered "foreigners" in the mountains, though many of them were still in their native State. Later this picture changed as the CCC recruited more young men from the neighboring farms and small towns. However, in lightly populated counties with lots of forest, local boys were often outnumbered in the camps. In the middle and late 1930s many boys came from heavily populated and urbanized New Jersey and New York, States with more unemployed youth than their forests could keep busy. These boys, many from tough big-city neighborhoods, found the southern mountains and people as strange as the natives found them.

Initially, CCC enrollees were unmarried, 17 to 21, unemployed members of families on relief or eligible for public assistance, not enrolled in school (the CCC was not a "summer job"), in good physical condition and of good character. The few World War I veterans accepted later usually had separate task-oriented camps. Both blacks and whites were enrolled, but were rarely in the same camp. The mountains had no black camps, because CCC administrators concluded large groups of young black males, would not be welcome. It was also more convenient to locate black CCC camps where there were lots of prospective enrollees.

Each camp had one to three reserve Army officers and technical personnel responsible for work supervision, including foresters, engineers, and experienced foremen. There were also a few local experienced men (L.E.M.), usually men who previously had worked for the Forest Service.
Hiring of technical personnel was at first under political control. The Project Supervisor for each camp was selected from a list of men approved by the local congressman. These jobs were much sought after since they paid quite well for the time, $1,200 to $1,800 per year. At first some project supervisors made more money than the local district ranger to whom they reported, but salaries were evened out later on. Eventually many supervisory personnel became Forest Service employees subject to Civil Service regulations. Even in 1933 and 1934 political approval for project superintendents did not cause serious difficulties. A former Forest Supervisor on the Nantahala recalled that because so many well-qualified men were unemployed, it was not difficult to select them from the congressmen's lists. This particular Forest Supervisor also remembers little difficulty in getting political approval for his own candidates for CCC jobs if there was no one suitable on the approved list.

Many of the early enrollees did not work out because of the nature of most CCC work. An early inspection report from a camp on the Pisgah National Forest reported 41 "elopeemnts" (unauthorized departures) from the camp during the late summer and early fall of 1933. The reasons given were the isolation of the camp and the hard outdoor work, unfamiliar to the former cotton mill hands sent in the camp's first allotment of young men.

By 1936 there had been a shift to enrollees more familiar with outdoor labor. A recent inspection report from a camp on the Pisgah National Forest reported 41 "elopeemnts" (unauthorized departures) from the camp during the late summer and early fall of 1933. The reasons given were the isolation of the camp and the hard outdoor work, unfamiliar to the former cotton mill hands sent in the camp's first allotment of young men.

By 1939 the CCC camp was receiving a different type of young man.

The majority of present day "Rookies" might be called products of the depression. From 16 to 22 years old, most of them quit school before completing the grammar grades, except for a few who attended vocational school from 1 to 3 years. Many admit they have loafed from 1 to 7 years and don't really know how to do anything.

The effects of the Depression on school budgets and on the morale of young people had been devastating. For many enrollees, developing the physical strength and mental concentration necessary to do a full day's work was the most important part of their training in the CCC.

Many Enrollees Were Illiterate

For other enrollees the CCC provided an opportunity to acquire education. CCC education reports reflect serious efforts, usually successful, to teach illiterates the fundamentals of reading and arithmetic. For mountain boys especially, basic education filled a real need. One camp in Kentucky reported in 1940:

Due to the fact that practically all men enrolled in the company from seven local surrounding counties where educational facilities are limited, a major emphasis must be placed on Literacy Education. Twenty-five men enrolled in the company during the past year had never previously attended school. Sixty others were illiterate.

Teachers for those in need of basic education were sometimes provided by Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds; sometimes other enrollees served as instructors. The use of enrollees as teachers was possible because there was a wide variation in educational background among the young men. In 1939 a camp near Morehead, Ky., reported sending eight young men to Morehead State College. Four enrollees were attending the local high school.

The education the boys needed was not always available. The educational advisor from another camp in Kentucky reported that 76 men in his company had completed the 8th grade but no high school instruction was available. He was tutoring 11 men whom he classed as "semi-literates." Academic classes were not the most important part of the CCC educational effort. A nationwide education report for 1937 stated that about 60 percent of the classes in CCC camps were vocational because "... job training and vocational courses were the most popular in the camps ... and had the strongest holding power." Only 33 percent of enrollees nationwide attended academic classes.

Work Projects Under Forest Service

The Forest Service was responsible for job training related to the work projects. The camp Project Superintendent was responsible for training in each camp. Forest Service staff, especially district rangers, were instructed to help camp supervisory personnel learn to use the education method recommended by the Forest Service. This method, generally, was to break each job into a number of simple steps and then coach the enrollees through the task step by step until they understood how to do it.

A carefully prepared little pamphlet, "Woodmanship for the CCC," was printed by the Forest Service and usually issued to each enrollee. It went through a number of printings and was always in demand. "Woodsmanship" explained clearly, with
many illustrations, how to use an axe or crosscut saw safely, and how to recognize potential hazards such as poison ivy. Other materials were developed to teach enrollees the basics of firefighting. Always the emphasis was on safety. CCC boys were given some training and valuable experience as truck drivers, rough construction workers, operators of road and trail-building machines, cooks, and tool clerks. Some received special training as truck mechanics. Young men also developed leadership skills as leaders and assistant leaders of work groups. In the later years of the CCC many of the Forest Service technical personnel supervising CCC enrollees were former enrollees themselves.

A 1939 report from a camp in Tennessee listed the jobs that former enrollees reported that they had obtained as a result of training acquired in the CCC. These included filling station operator, skilled foundry worker, laborer, many truck drivers, mechanic, grocery store helper, railroad worker, sawmill hand, auto assemblyline worker, rock crusher operator, clerk in a laundry. In some cases references from project supervisors helped former "Three C-ers" get jobs by assuring prospective employers that they were honest and hard working. Job placement was important since CCC enrollees could remain in the Corps for a limited time only, 6 months to 2 years.

Pay for CCC enrollees seems very low by present-day standards—$30 per month. This limited amount would buy many necessities in the 1930's, when a loaf of bread cost 5 cents and a quarter would often buy 10 pounds of potatoes. For these young men $30 plus food, clothing, and shelter seemed a reasonable wage. Regular enrollees were given $5 per month for spending money; the remaining $25 was sent home to their families. In this way many became breadwinners for parents and younger brothers and sisters. Regular CCC enrollees at first signed up for a period of 6 months, after which they were allowed another term. Later, they were permitted to continue in the Corps for 2 years.

In addition to their wages, CCC enrollees received food, clothing and shelter at the camp. Records of weekly menus indicate that the CCC boys ate well. Certainly the quantities of food were planned to satisfy appetites developed by hard outdoor labor. The quality presumably was affected by the skill of the camp cook, but since fresh fruits and vegetables, milk, and meats were purchased from local merchants and farmers, quality and variety were available. Staples such as flour and lard came from Army Quartermaster Corps.

The camps themselves were usually roughly built collections
of wooden buildings, often unpainted. One building, or sometimes a series of small cabins, provided quarters for the officers in charge of the camp, for the project supervisors in charge of work, and the camp educational advisor. The largest building in a camp would be the kitchen and dining hall, with a recreation room either in the same building or nearby. The boys were housed at first in tents, then in rough wooden barracks, sometimes with bathroom facilities attached. Some camps had separate bath houses. There would usually be several sheds for trucks, road machinery, and storage. The buildings were heated in winter by wood- or coal-burning stoves. Buildings at these camps hastily constructed of green lumber in 1933 were in bad repair by 1940, but other camps were more solidly constructed, especially later buildings built by the CCC boys for their own use. Some of the more permanent camps had classroom buildings and athletic fields for leisure time activities.

Weekly Recreation Visits to Town
Most of the camps were close enough to towns to permit weekly recreation visits. Such visits were welcomed by the boys and by local merchants as well. Theater owners could count on a good audience for the motion picture when the CCC came to town. Some camps were actually located on the outskirts of small towns like Hot Springs, N.C. Other camps in the most rugged mountain districts were almost inaccessible. In 1939 an inspector noted that one camp near Laurel Springs, N.C., was 18 miles from the nearest telephone. The camp was also without telegraph or radio communication. Consequently, he recommended the construction of a telephone line to be used for fire control and to obtain assistance in emergencies. 17

A rough idea of how many boys were affected by the CCC can be obtained from table 3, which gives some enrollment figures for 3 years and indicates as well the size of the CCC at its beginning (1934), peak enrollments at the height of the program (1937), and declining enrollments (1941). Declines were not so great for the Southern Appalachian States, especially Georgia and Kentucky, as they were in some areas of the country, but by the end of 1940 there were fewer camps and the remaining ones were below strength. 18

| Table 3.—Civilian Conservation Corps: Numbers of Residents and Nonresidents Enrolled in Camps in Each of Five Southern Appalachian States; Residents of These States Enrolled in Other Regions, 1934, 1937, 1941 |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| State                                         | 1934           | 1937           | 1941           |
| Kentucky                                      |                |                |                |
| Total residents enrolled in CCC camps (nationwide) | 4,495          | 5,571          | 5,414          |
| In Far West (beyond Great Plains)             | 1,068          | 669            | 587            |
| In Appalachians                               | 820            | 1,224          | 660            |
| In other regions                              | 2,607          | 3,698          | 4,167          |
| Out-of-State residents in Kentucky Appalachian camps | 0              | 725            | 740            |
| Tennessee                                     |                |                |                |
| Total residents enrolled in CCC camps (nationwide) | 5,779          | 7,649          | 6,831          |
| In Far West (beyond Great Plains)             | 0              | 43             | 827            |
| In Appalachians                               | 1,086          | 2,282          | 1,994          |
| In other regions                              | 4,691          | 5,324          | 4,010          |
| Out-of-State residents in Tennessee Appalachian camps | 3,248          | 126            | 143            |
| North Carolina                                |                |                |                |
| Total residents enrolled in CCC camps (nationwide) | 6,820          | 8,542          | 6,219          |
| In Far West (beyond Great Plains)             | 0              | 116            | 118            |
| In Appalachians                               | 3,839          | 1,355          | 684            |
| In other regions                              | 2,981          | 7,071          | 5,417          |
| Out-of-State residents in North Carolina Appalachian camps | 448            | 1,306          | 561            |
| South Carolina                                |                |                |                |
| Total residents enrolled in CCC camps (nationwide) | 3,802          | 6,258          | 4,466          |
| In Far West (beyond Great Plains)             | 0              | 192            | 185            |
| In Appalachians                               | 588            | 603            | 452            |
| In other regions                              | 3,214          | 5,463          | 3,829          |
| Out-of-State residents in South Carolina Appalachian camps | 0              | 241            | 158            |
| Georgia                                       |                |                |                |
| Total residents enrolled in CCC camps (nationwide) | 6,899          | 6,654          | 6,556          |
| In Far West (beyond Great Plains)             | 0              | 381            | 1,143          |
| In Appalachians                               | 2,359          | 776            | 565            |
| In other regions                              | 4,540          | 5,742          | 4,848          |
| Out-of-State residents in Georgia Appalachian camps | 184            | 96             | 124            |

Source: National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 35, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Station and Strength Reports.
Two examples serve to illustrate further the impact of the CCC on the young enrollees. In 1934 a young Tennessean, B. W. Chumney, enrolled. He intended to go to college later, but needed a job to earn expenses. However, his temporary job became a career. He remained on the Cherokee National Forest until his retirement in 1977. For the first 7 years he was employed by the CCC, though his duties in timber management and fire control remained similar when he was shifted to regular Forest Service employment in 1941.

Chumney participated as a fire dispatcher in the application of many new firefighting techniques, from the use of radio dispatching in the 1930's to helicopters and flying water tankers in the late 1960's and early 1970's. During his career he saw the Cherokee National Forest grow from a patchwork of eroded, cutover slopes to the magnificent and valuable stands of timber that comprise much of the forest today. The Cherokee became Chumney's hobby as well as his job. He is a recognized expert on the history of the forest and has devoted much effort to collecting information about it. A staunch believer in Forest Service management practices, Chumney has preached fire control, timber stand improvement, and careful timber cutting to his neighbors and acquaintances for more than 40 years. Practicing what he preached, he used his savings to buy timber land which he managed carefully according to the practices he learned in the Forest Service.¹⁹

For other young men, the CCC provided only a few months' employment in the outdoors, but often with much benefit. One case history from the "Summary of Social Values 1933-1934" tells the story of Johnny S., a North Carolina tenant farmer's son who spent 6 months in the CCC. Johnny's family lived in an isolated area. The children (Johnny was the oldest of 10) had little schooling and almost no contact with the world outside their family. Johnny learned to read and write a little at the CCC camp and developed enough skill in the woods to get a job near home when he returned.

The county welfare director concluded his report:

Johnny has been home for some time now and all reports from him are that he "is holding his head high." He helped his father make a crop this year and received a share of it for his own. He made a great deal of money and bought a secondhand car. The neighbors say that he takes the family to church every Sunday and is now helping them to see beyond the little road that stretches in the front of their door.²⁰

Johnny returned to his native area and even to his father's occupation, tenant farming, but for him, as well as for those who found new careers through the CCC, the experience provided a widening of outlook and opportunity for new skills. Johnny's brief experience away from home, according to the County Welfare director, marked the change from boy to man.

These two examples illustrate the wide variety of young men who found employment in the CCC. Anyone, from a semi-literate squatter to the Forest Supervisor himself, may have been a "Three C-er." And, most important, this shared experience helped the Forest Service for many years to build trust and friendships in the mountains. As the generation that served in the CCC retires and dies, this nostalgic common bond is being lost.

Large Camps Close to Towns Cause Some Friction

Most CCC camps sent truckloads of young men into the nearest town once or twice a week for recreation, often a visit to the local movie theatre. The boys were usually free to wander about town and spend their limited pocket money in the stores. Sometimes they attended services at local churches, though often neighboring clergymen were invited to conduct services at the camps and there were official chaplains assigned to groups of camps. After 1937, when the CCC became a more permanent organization and increased its emphasis on education, some boys attended local high schools and, in a few cases, colleges. CCC boys were also taken on recreation trips to see local landmarks, and to other camps or nearby towns to play baseball games.

The degree of social impact a camp had varied greatly from place to place. Smaller, more isolated camps might go almost unnoticed except by those who were employed there or who did business with the camp. Larger camps, and those very close to towns, made their presence felt continually, sometimes with unfavorable results for all concerned.

The most notorious case was Camp Cordell Hull, Tennessee F-5, Unicoi County.¹ This camp illustrates most of what could go wrong. In spite of the many problems, however, the camp remained in use throughout the life of the CCC, since there was much work to be done in the area. The camp also had an unlimited supply of pure drinking water (often a problem at other camps) since it was located on the site of the Johnson City waterworks. Because of its convenient location, much of the time the camp housed two companies of CCC—about 400 young men.

During the period of most serious trouble, 30 to 100 of the regularly enrolled young men were local, from Unicoi or neighboring counties. Thirteen local skilled men were employed by the Forest Service as supervisors for various projects.

A routine inspection of the camp in January 1934 reported all was well and that relations with the surrounding community were "very favorable," but as the weather improved in the spring, conditions deteriorated rapidly.

According to the military men assigned to run the camp, the locals used it as a ready-made lucrative market for prostitutes and moonshiners. The camp commander blamed lax local law enforcement for the situation and refused to cooperate with the local sheriff when he came to arrest CCC enrollees at the camp.
Local people did not want drunkenness in the camp, but at the same time turning in moonshiners was against their custom. As a former county sheriff put it:

There is some in the [CCC] camp that sells liquor. I can throw a rock from my barn and hit one of them . . . I am personally acquainted with him, and it would hurt his feelings if I said anything about it.22

It would appear that the situation was also exacerbated by factionalism within the camp, for when a formal complaint was filed against the Army officers in charge, one of the complainants was the educational advisor. The complaint alleged misbehavior of the enrollees and failure of the officers to cooperate with local law enforcement officials. Other complainants were four neighboring residents and the county sheriff.

When the Army investigator from Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga., came to sort out the situation in July 1934, evidence indicated that the Army officers and the sheriff were all to blame. Testimony he collected showed that the four local residents had been enraged by the remarks yelled at local women and girls by CCC boys driving past in trucks. They also complained that CCC boys had disrupted two church services.

The county sheriff reported two serious incidents. The first resulted from a fist fight at a "wiener roast" in Unicoi. A CCC boy pulled a knife, seriously wounding a local boy. The knife-wielder was arrested, but escaped from jail and was hidden by his friends at the camp for several nights until he could arrange to get away. The local boy was believed to have started the fight.

The other was a "highway robbery" incident. A Johnson City man had picked up three CCC boys who were hitchhiking. He had a jug of whiskey which he offered to share and apparently all four had quite a bit to drink. The complaint contended that the boys then knocked him out (they said the whiskey did it) and took his car, which was hidden near the CCC camp. The CCC boys claimed that the incident, while regrettable, was really far less serious. Feeling against the sheriff was running high in the camp at that time and the camp commander refused to let him search the camp for suspects.

The CCC enrollees and their commander were angered by what they perceived as the sheriff's "double standard"—arresting them for drunkenness, but ignoring the illegal whiskey sales which caused it. The sheriff blamed moonshining on "bad times" and said wherever men congregate they will manage to get liquor; to him it was a normal occurrence.23 The citizens also testified that there had been some troubles with local girls who hung around the camp. As one neighboring resident put it:

It seems that all hours of the night they are out, and if I understand it right there has been quite a few girls that has happened with bad luck. That is a misfortune to our community.24

The people of Unicoi County seem to have been reluctant to assume responsibility for the behavior of their own citizens toward the CCC camp, expecting the Army to prevent serious trouble by disciplining the enrollees. The Army officers, on the other hand, had to try to control about 400 vigorous young men without using military discipline. It was a difficult task, certainly not made easier by the ready availability of moonshine whiskey and other distractions. It is not clear how the camp commander was to control their behavior when on leave.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the whole acrimonious affair was that no one wanted the camp removed. All the complainants agreed that it was "a good thing for the county." The sheriff even protested that the camp commander had tried to get him in trouble with the local merchants by refusing to let the boys go into Erwin, the county seat. (The commander did later let local enrollees take a truck to Erwin to vote against the sheriff.) The camp was considered beneficial because of its contribution to the local economy.

Testimony also was unanimous that the Forest Service had nothing to do with the enrollees' misbehavior and was not responsible for the trouble. The complaint was entirely against the Army. The Army investigator concluded that nothing further needed to be done, since the camp commander had already been replaced, and he hoped for better relations with local citizens. No further serious disturbances were reported from Camp Cordell Hull. The personnel changes and increased efforts to keep the boys busy after working hours helped to improve community relations.

Although the Forest Service was not held responsible for the CCC's drinking problem in this case, it appears certain that a few temporary local employees who could not resist the chance for easy money in the bad times were often directly involved in moonshine distribution. In many camps the whiskey was covertly brought in by local experienced men (L.E.M.) or technicians. District rangers tried to eliminate men who were habitually drunk or who sold liquor to the enrollees. As the Supervisor of the Cherokee pointed out to a trail building foreman he had been forced to fire:

Regardless of the excellent caliber of an employee's services, the Forest Service cannot condone drinking by its employees on the job and at CCC camps. Instructions have been repeatedly issued to all employees cautioning him in this respect.25

Even firing a local foreman who peddled moonshine on the side was not as simple an issue as it might seem. The Forest Service was committed to doing its best to relieve unemployment in the mountain counties. Forest supervisors and district rangers were very anxious not to have "outside" CCC enrollees push local men and boys out of the available jobs on the forests. If a man was fired, often he could not find a job. Many local men had been employed by the Forest Service before CCC was established and firing them gave the impression that they were being pushed out of work by the CCC.26
Though for obvious reasons documentation of the practice does not exist, conversations with former district rangers and indirect evidence suggest that illegal stills were frequently overlooked as long as they did not cause fires and the owner did not harvest timber illegally to fuel his still. Such tolerance would maintain local goodwill and prevent trouble. Moonshiners may have been surprised by the ban on sales to CCC men.

Enrolling and employing local men contributed directly to the drinking problem. The more local men there were in a CCC company, the more connections they had to obtain moonshine. One company commander in Kentucky noted in 1935 that some men had to be discharged and others disciplined for over-indulgence.37

Both drinkers and sellers became angry about efforts to control the use of liquor. Moonshiners saw the CCC camps as one of the best places to get hard cash for their product, though both the Army and the Forest Service tried to discourage them. According to one report, when a camp first opened at Pine Ridge, Ky.:

... the Moonshiners used to come on pay day and ask the camp commander to collect their booze bills for them. When they were ordered off the grounds they got sore on everybody.28

While the liquor problem never disappeared entirely, it did become less serious in the later years of the CCC.

In the early years of the CCC, the Forest Service was troubled by the requirement that they release even the most satisfactory of the local experienced men after only 6 to 12 months of employment. Supervisory personnel were not subject to these time limitations, and this caused resentment. In 1935 the Forest Service secured the approval of the Director of Emergency Conservation Work to keep the L.E.M.'s employed indefinitely where they were needed. It had been pointed out that many of the L.E.M.'s were former part-time Forest Service employees who had depended for work on the forest for years.29

Best Enrolees Get Forest Service Jobs

The Forest Service was able to arrange regular jobs for outstanding enrollees as well. A 1937 report on jobs for former CCC enrollees stated that the largest number had found jobs as machine operators or truck drivers; the second largest category of regular employment was with the Forest Service. In January 1937 the Forest Service reported that a Civil Service position, that of junior assistant to technician, had been created just for the CCC boys. Those who placed highest in the exam filled the available positions.9 The agency was able to reward the most competent and interested CCC boys with permanent good jobs. The promise of more permanent jobs for their young men greatly helped to build local support as well as high morale in the camps.

Another way in which the CCC sought to create good feelings among its neighbors was by various kinds of festivities held to celebrate the "birthday" of the CCC in April of each year. There was even competition to see which camp could hold the most original party. They often included a picnic, open house, tours of work projects, and entertainment by enrollees. Some camps used these parties to preach the message of fire control, since the CCC camps were heavily involved in firefighting. Other camps used the parties as recruiting devices, seeking to convince young men visiting the camp to join the CCC. The parties were well publicized locally.

At one such party, the "CCC Fox Chase and Barbecue" at the 200-man Camp Old Hickory, near Benton, Tenn., on April 5, 1938, 1,500 people from Reliance, Archville, Greasy Creek Caney Creek, Etowah, and Cleveland joined the families of Cherokee National Forest personnel to feast on barbecued beef and pork, with trimmings. A foxhound show judged by a prominent citizen drew 68 mixed entrants, but a planned fox chase was cancelled for lack of a fox.31

In 1938 Camp Old Hickory had been in existence for 5 years and local residents were thinking of it as a permanent fixture. They were certainly familiar with the work it had done. If a family from a neighboring town decided to picnic in the Forest, they would drive on a stretch of road built by the CCC, and use the rest rooms and picnic tables built by the CCC as well. The caretaker at the picnic ground would be a trained CCC enrollee. If a farmer adjacent to the Forest started a fire to burn brush, it would be reported by a CCC youth manning a fire tower. If the fire threatened to spread into the Forest, it would be extinguished by a CCC crew trained in fighting forest fires. And if the farmer had misjudged the wind, and the fire began moving toward his house or barn, he could call for help from the CCC fire crew.32

Major Work Is in Fire Control, Road, Trails, Campgrounds

Much of the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps was related, directly or indirectly, to the control of forest fires in the mountains.33 Ever since the first land acquisition in 1912, the Forest Service had been convinced that control of fires was essential to the improvement of the forests. This was contrary to local practices of burning to remove debris, encourage forage growth or kill insects and snakes. Though much of this deliberate burning had been stopped as a result of Forest Service educational efforts, mountain people were often careless with fire when they burned brush on their own land. Hunters, fishermen, and campers sometimes failed to put out their fires. Finally, arson as a form of malicious mischief or to get work was popular in some mountain areas.34

The existence of the CCC gave the Forest Service a pool of manpower that could be trained to fight fires and was quickly available when fire broke out. The final report prepared when the CCC was disbanded concluded that "During the nine and one quarter years of the Corps, CCC enrollees became the first line of fire defense."

All were given basic firefighting instructions and indoctrinated in the Forest Service dictum that fires should be prevented.
CCC youths built fire observation towers and manned them during the months of high fire danger. The towers, located high in the mountains in carefully chosen locations, made it possible to spot fires quickly and send in a fire suppression crew before they became large enough to cause serious destruction. Such towers were used until the mid-1960s when most of them were replaced by light patrol planes.

Fire towers had telephone and, later, radio connections to district ranger offices to report fires. The construction of telephone lines was another important CCC task. The telephone lines not only made reporting fires quicker, they also made possible the rapid assembly of firefighting crews where needed. Forest Service telephones were also available for use by local people in emergencies. This was much appreciated in areas where few people had private telephones. In some areas lines for private telephones were installed on the telephone poles put up by the CCC for Forest Service lines.

One of the biggest jobs undertaken by the CCC in the Southern Appalachian forests was road and trail construction. The enrollees built high-quality roads in some areas to open up the forest for timber harvesting or recreation, but many of the roads they built were of the type known as truck trails or "fire roads." These single-lane dirt roads could serve as firebreaks, but more important, they made it possible to bring truckloads of men and equipment quickly to the site of a forest fire. With the modern advent of new fire-control techniques, many of the old "fire roads" have been abandoned and others have not been maintained for lack of funds, but for 40 years the truck trails built by the CCC were a vital element in forest fire protection.

Because funds for road building had always been scarce in the mountain counties, the CCC roads were often an important benefit to small local communities and to isolated farmers. In Harlan County, Ky.:

The CCC built the road from Putney to the Pine Mountain Settlement School, primarily, of course, for fire protection. Its construction has resulted in rather heavy traffic consisting mostly of forest products finding their way to market. Before this road was built there was no means of getting out to the railroad. The School has been considerably enlarged and improved.38

By this time, 1941, the market for timber had recovered, and local residents in areas newly opened up by transportation improvement could get a good price for forest products.

Many Recreation Facilities Built

Although it was not their original purpose, the "fire roads" did much to open up the forests to recreational use by hunters and hikers who still gratefully use them today. The development, especially after World War II, of four-wheel-drive vehicles such as jeeps made these trails even more popular. CCC men also built trails for hiking, especially short ones to spots of particular natural beauty of interest, often providing bridges and steps for visitors also.

Valuable work was done by the CCC on the famous Appalachian Trail, the Maine-to-Georgia trail which follows the crest of the Appalachian Range. In the Pisgah National Forest about 60 miles of the trail were maintained by the CCC from 1933 to 1942. One section, from Hot Springs to Waterville, N.C., was relocated and 26.2 miles of new trail built. In the Chattahoochee National Forest about 100 miles of the trail were maintained, a new shelter was built, and a spring was improved. The CCC maintained 93.4 miles of Appalachian Trail in the Cherokee National Forest and constructed several new shelters for camping along the Trail.39

Since road building and automobile ownership were making the forests more accessible for recreation, the Forest Service put some of the CCC boys to work building campgrounds. A campground might include shelters, toilet facilities, picnic tables, fireplaces, parking lots, and water supply systems. The CCC also built and erected signs to direct visitors to the facilities and to points of interest. Bathhouses were built at
The CCC was often referred to by the press as "Roosevelt's Tree Army." Tree planting was a much-publicized CCC activity. In the Southern Appalachian most of the tree planting was done by the TVA camps to control erosion and to beautify the margins of the lakes created by damming the rivers. The CCC planted seedling trees raised in TVA nurseries on private land if the owner promised to maintain and protect the infant forest. As woodlands planted by the CCC began to grow successfully, they gave needed encouragement to the TVA forestry program by showing that reforestation could work.  

There was no extensive planting of young trees in the National Forests of the Southern Appalachians. In most cases natural reproduction encouraged by the heavy rainfall could be relied upon to restock cutover lands within forests. CCC crews did much timber stand improvement work, removing diseased or damaged trees and less valuable species to give more room for the development of desirable timber. Such work often greatly enhanced the value of a stand of trees, increasing the quantity and improving the quality of saleable timber. CCC boys helped combat deadly tree diseases, notably white pine blister rust. The crews learned to recognize and destroy the currant and gooseberry bushes which serve as an alternate host for the blister rust fungus. They also helped fight the bark beetle infestations which often severely damaged timber in the forests.

Federal administrators who placed emphasis on the educational role of the CCC sometimes argued that too much time was spent working. Would it not be better for illiterates to spend more time learning to read? Why should classes be confined to evening hours when the boys were often tired and ready to relax? The CCC position varied but work generally was considered by most important part of education for the CCC enrollee. "Book learning" definitely took second place.

In the newly purchased areas of the forests another CCC task was razing "undesirable structures," the cabins and outbuildings left behind by former owners or occupants, to prevent their use by squatters. In some cases windows and roofs were removed and the uninhabitable cabin was left to decay slowly. In later years only a few foundation stones and the base of a chimney remained to mark the site of a former mountain home.

some good swimming areas. The first caretakers and lifeguards for the facilities came from the CCC ranks.

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Benefits to Local Areas

Throughout the life of the CCC, there was continual debate about the quantity and quality of work accomplished. Since CCC enrollees had to be trained for the work they performed, they naturally accomplished less than would a crew of already skilled laborers. Some Forest Service employees, especially project superintendents, argued that it would have been better to use the money spent on the CCC to employ local skilled workers to do the jobs performed by the CCC on the forests. In spite of efforts to employ as many local people as possible through the CCC, there was always some feeling that the CCC took jobs away from them. In truth, there is some doubt whether the Forest Service, Park Service, TVA, SCS, or State agencies that employed the CCC would have been able to get funds to have the same work performed by ordinary wage labor. CCC labor was cheap, even though the boys might not accomplish as much as skilled workmen.

The quality of work done by the CCC naturally varied from site to site; much depended on the vigilance and skill of the project superintendent. There were cases of loafing and of slovenly work performance, but these were balanced by examples of hard work resulting in well-built trails and buildings. The Forest Service and other "employing agencies" tried to encourage the enrollment of young men who would make good workers. They sometimes accused the local welfare and employment offices of enrolling the "worst first," because these young men appeared to be more in need of help. Many young men who enrolled in the CCC required job training and had little or no work experience. However, most of them learned the skills they needed and became good workers. Others left. Efforts were made to reward those who worked well with promotion to crew leader or to skilled jobs. Where there were large numbers of repeat enrollments, work output tended to improve because less training was required.

One advantage that the CCC had over many New Deal "make-work" projects was the the work was "real." Good project superintendents and district rangers made sure that the enrollees were told why the project they were working on was necessary. For example, they were shown how their particular truck trail or telephone line fitted into the plan for fire control in the district.

Although the CCC presence in the Southern Appalachians was sometimes disruptive, on the whole the program brought the mountains multiple benefits. The CCC employed thousands of local men, providing wages, education, and a sense of accomplishment. Thus, perhaps more than any other New Deal program, the CCC contributed much to human dignity in a time of dire economic need.

In addition, the CCC altered the landscape of the Southern Appalachian forests and parks. The fire towers, trails, roads, and campgrounds it built and the trees it planted, thinned, and protected were improvements that controlled fire, enhanced the forests' beauty, and made the mountains more accessible.

The overall impact of CCC camps on local communities, society, and culture can best be evaluated by a comparison. Even before the turn of the century mountain communities had been influenced by the temporary presence of logging or construction camps. Thus, adaptation to the presence of camps similar to those established by the CCC was not new. Railroad building, logging, and mining all brought large groups of "foreigners," chiefly young males, into the mountains. The impact of these groups on mountain culture and society was chiefly economic and often temporary. These is no evidence that the impact of CCC camps was any greater, or more lasting, but the program did ease conditions at a very critical time.

Figure 73—A 26-year-old white pine plantation thinned and pruned the previous summer by Civilian Conservation Corps enrollees to encourage fast quality timber growth. Nantahala National Forest, N.C., in 1940. (NA:95G-396044)
Reference Notes

(In the following notes, the expression "NA, RG 35" means National Archives, Record Group 35, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps; "NA, RG 95, CCC" means National Archives, Record Group 95, Records of the Forest Service (USDA) Records Relating to Civilian Conservation Corps Work, 1933-42. See Bibliography, IX.)


2. NA, RG 95, CCC, General Correspondence, Information, Emergency Conservation Work, What About the C.C.C.? 1937, 1933-42, Information, Records of CCC Work. The CCC newspaper Happy Days is another source of stories about CCC, though few of these pertain to the region under discussion here.

3. Camp Roosevelt, near Luray, Va., in the George Washington National Forest, 120 miles from Washington, D.C.

4. The following account of the CCC is based on information in Record Group 35, National Archives. Investigation Reports and Education Reports for camps in the National Forests were used, and specific citations are given where necessary. John Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-42: A New Deal Case Study (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), Chapter 5, "The Selection of Negroes." Black camps were not welcome in most areas of the country and were limited in number, mostly in the Deep South.

5. Interview with B.W. Chumney, July 18, 1979, Cleveland, Tenn.; Interview with J. Herbert Stone.


13. NA, RG 95, CCC, CCC Personnel (Training).


15. NA, RG 95, CCC, CCC Personnel (Training), Monthly Education Reports 1939, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.

16. Menu and building descriptions are taken from Inspection Reports cited earlier.


18. NA, RG 35, CCC Station and Strength Reports 1933-42. The records of the following CCC camps were examined for this study: Kentucky: Camp Lochege, F-4, Morehead, Rowan County; Camp Woodpecker, F-9, Stanton, Powell County; (No name), F-13, McKee, Jackson County; Camp Bell Farm, F-14, Bell Farm, McCreary County; and Camp Bald Rock, F-15, London, Laurel County, all in Cumberland (now called Daniel Boone) National Forest; Camp Elkhorn, S-82, Hellier, Letcher County (Flat Woods area), and (No name), S-84, Crummiess (Harlan County Game Refuge), both State camps; also several Tennessee Valley Authority camps.

Tennessee: Camp Old Hickory, F-3, Archville (Benton), Polk County; Camp Cordell Hull, F-5, Unicoi, Unicoi County; Camp Evan Shelby, F-11, Bristol, Sullivan County; and Camp Turkey Creek, F-17, Tellico Plains, Monroe County, all in Cherokee National Forest; also several TVA camps.

North Carolina: Camp Grandfather Mountain, F-5, Mortimer (Edgemont), Avery-Caldwell County; Camp Alex Jones, F-7, Hot Springs, Madison County; and Camp John Rock, F-28, Brevard, Transylvania County, all in Pisgah National Forest; Camp Coweeta, F-23, Otto, Macon County; and Camp Santeetlah, F-24, Robbinsville, Graham County, both in Nantahala National Forest; and Camp Meadow Fork, NP-21, Laurel Springs, Alleghany-Ashe County, Blue Ridge Parkway.

Georgia: Camp Woody, F-1, Suches, Union County; Camp Crawford W. Long, F-7, Chatsworth, Murray County; Camp Lake Rabun, F-9, Lakemont, Rabun County; and Camp Pocket Bowl, F-16, La Fayette, Walker County, all now in Chattahoochee National Forest. (At the time, F-9 was in Nantahala, and F-1 and F-7 were in Cherokee National Forest.)

South Carolina: Camp Ellison D. Smith, F-1, Mounain Rest, Oconee County, then in Nantahala National Forest, now in Sumter National Forest.

(In this list, F stands for National Forest, NP stands for National Park, and S for State-operated camps.)


25. NA, RG 95, CCC, Donald E. Clark, Forest Supervisor, to W.M. Felker, November 24, 1934, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.

26. NA, RG 95, CCC, General Integrating Inspection Report, Region 8, 1937.


29. NA, RG 95, CCC, Memorandum for Hiwasee Project Superintendents from J.W. Cooper, Sept. 14, 1935, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.


31. NA, RG 95, CCC. This account of the "Fox Chase and Barbecue," April 5, 1938, is taken from local newspaper accounts found in the CCC Personnel Training file, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.

32. NA, RG 95, CCC, Memo to District Rangers from Forest Supervisor, Cherokee National Forest, June 9, 1938, National Forest Development and Protection; Fire Reports to Forest Supervisor, Cherokee N.F., 1935; CCC Inspection Reports, 1933-42, Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.

33. The following account of work performed by the CCC is derived from records cited in notes 4 and 32.

34. John Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps 1933-1942, pp. 121-125; Michael Frome, The Forest Service, p. 20; Ignatz Pikl, Jr., History of Georgia Forestry, pp. 19, 28, 33. Summaries of work performed in the individual camps are found in the Inspection Reports cited earlier.

35. NA, RG 35, "CCC in Emergencies."


39. NA, RG 95, CCC, Personnel (Training), P.F.W. Prater—Forest Supervisor, Cherokee National Forest, Memo on ECW Education (Conservation), April 27, 1937, CCC Camp Old Hickory, Tenn.


41. The following discussion of the CCC's accomplishments is based on the surviving records of the camps listed in table 3.
The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), established in September 1964, was the principal Federal step taken to meet these perceived recreational demands. The Fund, administered by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, could be used for Federal acquisition of lands and waters—or interests in lands and waters such as scenic easements. The properties would be used to create National Recreation Areas in the National Parks and in the National Forests and to purchase private inholdings in the National Forests “primarily of value for outdoor recreation purposes” including wilderness. The ORRRC report had stressed the need to rectify the imbalance between the abundance of Federal recreation lands in the West and their scarcity in the East. The Land and Water Conservation Fund was to address the need.

Within the Southern Appalachian forests, LWCF monies were used in the Mount Rogers National Recreation Area in southwestern Virginia, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and the Appalachian Trail. The Mount Rogers NRA was perhaps the most visible and most controversial use of LWCF funds in the region.

National Recreation Areas (NRA’s) were first conceived and established by the President’s Recreation Advisory Council. The first NRA’s created in 1963, were administered by the National Park Service, and were principally based on a large reservoir, such as Lake Mead above Hoover (Boulder) Dam on the lower Colorado River. NAR’s were defined to be spacious areas of not less than 20,000 acres, designed to achieve a high recreational carrying capacity, located within 250 miles of urban population centers. Each was to be established by an individual act of Congress.

The Land and Water Conservation Fund was to be used as the source of acquisition monies. The first National Recreation Area in the Appalachians was the Spruce Knob-Seneca Rocks NRA, established in September 1965 in the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia. The Mount Rogers NRA, centered on Whitetop Mountain and Mount Rogers—the highest point in Virginia—was established in the Jefferson National Forest on May 31, 1966.

Mount Rogers National Recreation Area
The Mount Rogers NRA was originally conceived as an intensely developed recreational complex of 150,000 acres with a 63-mile scenic highway, campgrounds, and nearby reservoirs. (Two of these reservoirs were part of the proposed Blue Ridge Project on the New River, to be discussed later.) Mount Rogers was expected not only to help satisfy future regional demands for outdoor recreation, but also to provide an economic boost to the economy of southwestern Virginia. As the Secretary of Agriculture stated in congressional testimony on the NRA:

However, the scope and intensity of development originally planned for Mount Rogers were not realized. The Forest Service finally shifted its priorities away from encouraging more motorized recreation such as those activities enabled by reservoirs and scenic highways, to more active, “dispersed” recreation, such as canoeing and backpacking. This shift is reflected in recreational use data by type of activity for two representative Southern Appalachian forests, the Cherokee in eastern Tennessee and the Chattahoochee in northern Georgia. For both forests between 1968 and 1980, automobile traveling declined somewhat, not in volume but as a percentage of all recreational activities. In the Cherokee, the decline was from 18 percent to 15 percent; in the Chattahoochee, it was from 22 to 19 percent. On the other hand, hiking more than doubled as a percentage of all recreational activities: in the Cherokee from 2.4 to 8 percent, in the Chattahoochee, from 4 to 8.9 percent.

The legislation establishing the Mount Rogers NRA provided for acquisition of such lands, waters, or interests in them, by purchase, donation, exchange, transfer, or condemnation, as the Secretary of Agriculture deemed “needed or desirable.” The Land and Water Conservation Fund was to be used as the source of acquisition monies. The final Forest Service-developed plan for the NRA called for Federal ownership of 123,500 acres within the approximately 154,000-acre NRA boundary. By 1966 much of the desired acreage had already been acquired; some 58,000 acres were deemed “needed or desirable” to complete the future NRA.

The defined “need” was based on the premise of protection, as the Secretary of Agriculture explained to Congress:

To fully develop and assure maximum public use and enjoyment of all the resources of this area, there will need to be some consolidation of landownership. The present ownership pattern, particularly in the immediate vicinity of Mount Rogers, precludes effective development for public use. Acquisition of intermingled private forest and meadowlands and of needed access and rights-of-way is essential to fully develop the outdoor recreation potential by protecting the outstanding scenic, botanical, and recreational qualities of the area...

Of the approximately 58,000 desired acres remaining in private lands, the Forest Service estimated acquiring about 32,000 during the next several years. Of the other 26,000, it was hoped that scenic easements could be used for a good portion, although the exact amount of land to be acquired or easements obtained could not be estimated. However, no scenic easements were obtained during the next 15 years. At the end of 1981 the first easement was acquired, 20 acres along a road in the Brushy Creek area, and another easement on a similar small tract was in the process of being acquired. The new plan for the NRA places strong emphasis upon scenic easements.
Between 1967 and early 1981, approximately 25,000 more acres in 312 separate transactions were acquired for the Mount Rogers NRA. The lands selected for acquisition were generally in stream and river valleys where developed recreation facilities (campgrounds, roads, trails, parking, and picnic areas) could be located, and where the Forest Service generally had not previously acquired land. The acquisition process proceeded gradually over a 15-year period, dependent upon the funds available for purchase (mostly from the Land and Water Conservation Fund) and the operational plans of the Forest Service staff, and influenced by the local peoples’ reactions to such acquisition.¹⁹

Of the 312 tracts, 51, totaling about 7,100 acres, were taken for the NRA through condemnation. Of these 51 tracts, 20 had full-time residents, 15 of whom did not want to sell at all. (Five agreed to sell, but wanted more money than the Forest Service offered.) The majority of the condemnation cases were filed between 1972 and 1975, in preparation for specific development projects. Most tracts were in western Grayson County, in the area of Pine Mountain, where a ski resort was planned under special use permit, and Fairwood Valley, where resort accommodations and camping facilities were planned.

Figure 111.—Hereford cattle grazing in mountain pasture adjoining Jefferson National Forest near Taylors Valley, Washington County, Va., between Damascus and Konnarock, close to the Tennessee State line and the present Mt. Rogers National Recreation Area administered by the Forest Service, in November 1966. White pine and northern hardwoods are visible on nearby slopes and ridges. (Forest Service photo F-515652)
The Forest Service acquired the Pine Mountain lands to keep the area free from extraneous commercial development and thus maintain a natural camp setting. Resort to condemnation was minimized by Public Law 91-646 (1970) which liberalized relocation assistance benefits to displaced landowners who were living on their properties. However, some still resisted. Many residents of the Mount Rogers area were angry and puzzled by the rationale for the taking of land. A newsletter of a local protest group declared:

Nowhere has the Forest Service lost more credibility and generated more ill will than in its land condemnation and acquisition practices. Everyone in the affected area has either lost land or had friends or relatives who did. These are people who ancestral homes are here, whose parents, grandparents, great- and great-great-grandparents have lived here, and until recently were coerced into selling their land at a fraction of its worth.

The Forest Service has been condemning land for years, making sweeps through the area taking thousands of acres at a time while assuring residents "that's all the land we're going to buy." A few months later they sweep through again enlarging their borders.

As a result of their disgruntlement, local citizens organized to combat the tentative Forest Service development plans. The Citizens for Southwest Virginia, which formed shortly after the Forest Service issued the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the NRA in spring 1978, was composed of citizens from the five-county area affected. They formed a Board of Directors of prominent citizens whose families had been in the area for generations. The organization claimed in 1978 that almost 10 percent of the five-county population had signed their petition of protest against further NRA development.

Largely as a result of local citizen protest, supplemented by that of environmental groups nationwide, the Forest Service modified some of its initial development plans for Mount Rogers. The proposals for a scenic highway and for a ski resort were dropped completely. Projections that reservoirs would be built between Troutdale and Damascus on the path of the supposedly defunct Scenic Highway. Citizens were still uneasy about Forest Service acquisition techniques, convinced that local landholders were sometimes intimidated through harassment and a lack of knowledge of their rights. By 1981, the Citizens for Southwest Virginia had joined the National Inholders Association, a California-based organization created in early 1979 to change Federal land acquisition policies nationwide.

The Big South Fork NRA

Another National Recreation Area in the Southern Appalachians that was still in the preliminary development stage in early 1981 was the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area in McCreary County, Ky., and Scott County, Tenn. The Big South Fork basin of the Cumberland River, although rich in coal deposits, had not been extensively mined or developed, because of the high sulfur content of the coal as well as the physical limitations imposed by the narrow shoreline, high cliffs, and generally rugged terrain of the river basin. The area was largely uninhabited, most of its acreage owned by the big Stearns Coal and Lumber Co., which had bought the land around 1900.

Since the end of World War II, the Corps of Engineers had tried unsuccessfully to win Congressional approval of an almost 500-foot dam on the Big South Fork near Devil's Jump for hydroelectric power and flood control. The dam was generally supported by local legislators and was strongly opposed by the Kentucky Senator, John Sherman Cooper; it was opposed by private power companies: the Kentucky Utilities Co., the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., as well as the Associated Industries of Kentucky.

In 1967 Howard Baker was elected Senator from Tennessee. During the 1950's and early 1960's, Baker had represented the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. in litigation and in efforts to persuade the Forest Service to allow strip mining under Stearns' reserved mineral rights. Between 1962 and 1966, he served on Stearns' Board of Directors. Shortly after his election to the Senate in 1967, the fate of the Big South Fork was decided. Baker called various government officials together to determine the best development strategy for the area; the plan to develop an NRA was an administrative and legislative compromise.

Authorized under the Water Resources Act of March 7, 1974, the NRA was to encompass approximately 123,000 acres. Of these, 3,000 belonged to the State of Tennessee, 1,000 to the Corps of Engineers, and about 16,000 lay in the Daniel Boone National Forest. All public lands were to be transferred to the National Park Service—the designated managing Federal agency—when sufficient private land had been acquired. The Federal land acquisition agency, as well as planner, designer, and construction agent of the NRA, was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Corps’ land acquisition program began in August 1979, when Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. sold 43,000 acres of surface rights, and 53,000 acres of mineral rights, in the Big South Fork area, for $16.5 million. (Although the authorizing legislation did not require that subsurface rights be acquired for the NRA, it did prohibit prospecting and mining. Thus, the Corps of Engineers felt obligated to acquire mineral rights as well as land.) During 1980 several smaller tracts were acquired, including those of over half the 38 families living in the area. By March 1981 about half the privately owned land remained to be acquired, but the timetable for that acquisition was uncertain, depending as it did upon congressional appropriation.

Local reaction to the development of the National Recreation Area was mixed. Although at first McCreary County citizens, having long supported the Corps dam, were generally opposed to the NRA, by 1978 many were beginning to regard the development favorably. There was some feeling that the area might prove a major tourist attraction, even to the point of tacky overdevelopment, characteristic of Gatlinburg.

However, in spite of the promises of local economic boom assured by NRA promoters, the former Forest Service employee of McCreary County, L. E. Perry, was scornful:

Some local leaders have been brainwashed to the point they believe the National Recreation Area . . . is holy salvation, placidly accepting the fact that not one major highway leading from Interstate 75 to anywhere near the Big South Fork is in the foreseeable future, which is further proof that the people of the region have been had.

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and the National Trails Systems Act, which also guided recreational development in the Southern Appalachians, were passed in 1968. The former established a system of rivers judged to possess “outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreation, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values” to be preserved in a free-flowing state. Rivers of the system were classified as “wild,” “scenic,” or “recreational,” depending on the degree of access, development, or impoundment they possessed; each class was to be managed according to a different set of guidelines. The Act designated 8 rivers, all west of the Mississippi, as the first components of the system, and named 27 others to be considered for wild and scenic designation. By 1980, only two Southern Appalachian rivers had been designated part of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System—the Chattooga River, forming the border between northeastern Georgia and northwestern South Carolina, and a portion of the New River near the western North Carolina-Virginia border.
**The Scenic New River Controversy**

A 26.5-mile segment of the New River in Ashe and Alleghany Counties, N.C., was designated a "scenic river" in March 1976 by the Secretary of the Interior. This designation was a deliberate obstruction to a development proposed in 1965 by the Appalachian Power Co. called the Blue Ridge Project, designed to provide peak-demand power to seven States in the Ohio River Valley. The project would have created two reservoirs—one in Grayson County, Va., the other in Ashe and Alleghany Counties, N.C.—totalling over 37,000 surface acres. The reservoirs would have dislocated nearly 1,200 people and over 400 buildings. Nevertheless, the project promoters promised the local population construction jobs and revenues from reservoir recreational visitation.

Citizens of the North Carolina counties affected by the Blue Ridge Project organized a protest against it. A National Committee for the New River, based in Winston-Salem, N.C., mounted a well-financed publicity campaign with letters, brochures, and reports. By 1973, the commissioners of Ashe and Alleghany Counties, and the two candidates for governor of North Carolina, denounced the Blue Ridge Project and endorsed the preservation of the river. In 1974, the North Carolina legislature designated 4.5 miles of the New River a State Scenic River. Public pressure was applied at the Federal level through the Federal Court of the District of Columbia, which was responsible for the Federal Power Commission license, through the Congress, and through the Department of Interior. Although the FPC license was upheld in March 1976, the Secretary of the Interior designated the 26.5-mile portion of the New River as part of the national Wild and Scenic River System 3 weeks later, in effect revoking the FPC license.

The Final Environmental Statement prepared by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, although conceding that the scenic river designation resulted in the projected loss of some 1,500 temporary construction jobs, and a certain loss in projected increased land values adjacent to the reservoirs, emphasized the benefits of the scenic designation. These were principally intangible—the preservation of a unique, free-flowing river, the preservation of wildlife and of archeological and geological assets, and the preservation of a way of life in an Appalachian river valley. The direct recreational benefits from the scenic designation to the local communities were estimated to be low. The activity areas to be established along the river were expected to accommodate annually 50,000 canoeists, hikers, and picnickers. Private entrepreneurs were anticipated to have little opportunity for riverside development, due to the existence of easements and floodway zoning.

Incorporation of the New River segment into the Wild and Scenic River System provoked little local protest. In general, the scenic designation brought only minor changes to life along the river. Nearly 5 years after the designation of the New River segment, the County Manager of Ashe County summed up its impact as "very little." The State of North Carolina, which has managed the 26.5-mile, 1,900 acre river segment, established a State park along a portion of its banks; a few canoe rental firms and river outfitters receive seasonal revenues from recreationists. Overall, however, inclusion of the New River in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System has had only a small local impact.

**The Wild Chattooga River**

The designation of the Chattooga River had larger repercussions. Public reaction was more outspoken, largely because most of the nearly 57-mile segment of the river, which included over 16,400 acres of adjacent land, was designated "wild" and was therefore slated for more restrictive management, and because the Forest Service sought to acquire lands along the river to establish a protected corridor.

The Chattooga River portion of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System was so designated by legislation of May 10, 1974. The designated river segment lay within the Nantahala National Forest and on the border between the Chattahoochee and Sumter National Forests. A corridor up to 1 mile wide was outlined for acquisition along the designated river. In 1974, 47 tracts consisting of nearly 6,200 acres had to be acquired for the river corridor. By early 1981, 85 percent of the desired corridor acreage had been acquired, mostly through exchange, and all from willing sellers.

In general, acquisition along the Chattooga River proceeded smoothly; land management of the area, however, met with considerable local protest. Because some 40 miles of the 57-mile corridor were designated "wild," river access was deliberately restricted in keeping with the guidelines established by BOR. These guidelines stipulated that administration of a wild river required restricted motorized travel, removal of homes, relocation of campgrounds, and the prohibition of structural improvements. Consequently, upon land acquisition, the Forest Service closed several of the jeep trails that had provided river access. Not all the river jeep trails were closed, just those the Forest Service judged were allowing excessive and inappropriate use of the Chattooga that was not in keeping with its wild and scenic designation.

The rationale for restricting access, however, was not strongly supported or well understood by the local population. As an Atlanta newspaper reported:

When the Forest Service attempted to keep the jeeps away from the protected Chattooga River, the mountain dwellers torched vast tracts of National Forest land; if they couldn't use the land as they wished, they wanted no one else to use it at all.
Over the years, as the Chattooga River became increasingly popular with urban recreationists for white-water canoeing, rafting, and camping, local resentment mounted. In 1980, nearly 130,000 visitor-days were spent in watercraft recreation along the 57-mile river segment; 70,000 were spent in swimming, and 60,000 in hiking. Altogether, the Chattooga Wild and Scenic River received nearly a half-million visitor-days of use in 1980. With a high frequency of visitors, it appeared to some local people that the Forest Service was catering to outsiders who came to the Chattooga to canoe, raft, and camp. Those who lived in the area often resented the restriction on using four-wheel drive vehicles. As one Clayton, Ga., resident wrote to the Forest Service in 1978:

Special interest & minority groups, plus environmentalists got the Government to close off the Chattooga River, in Rabun County. Look at the river now & it is more filthy and more trashy, from no one but people who ride the river, & if any, very few local people ride the river. Local people of Rabun County don’t destroy beauty, it’s our home. [sic]
The Appalachian Trail

Another piece of post-ORRRC recreational legislation was for the full development and protection of the Appalachian Trail. The Trail, running for over 2,000 miles from Georgia to Maine, mostly along the high ridges of the Appalachians, was actually originally cleared and built between 1925 and 1937 by the Appalachian Trail Conference, a group of Trail enthusiasts composed of outdoorsmen, parks and planning staff, foresters, and governmental officials, in cooperation with State and Federal agencies. Most of the Trail was constructed by volunteers, on private lands, whose owners gave permission. Nearly a third of the Trail was built by the Forest Service and National Park Service on their lands. Both agencies have helped promote and maintain the Trail. In the Southern Appalachian forests, 441.4 miles out of a total 592, or 75 percent, were "protected" before 1969 with an acquired right-of-way or scenic easement.

The same was not true, however, of those portions of the Trail not under Forest Service or Park Service jurisdiction. Over the years, as the Appalachian Trail received increasing public use, concern for the Trail's protection and uniform management mounted, resulting in the National Trails System Act of October 2, 1968. The Act established a national system of recreation and scenic trails, with the Pacific Coast Trail and Appalachian Trail as the major components of the system. The former was to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, the latter by the Secretary of the Interior, although specific stretches of either trail were to be managed directly by the agency whose land the trail traversed.

Specifically, the National Trails System Act charged the Secretary of the Interior with establishing the right-of-way for the Appalachian Trail, provided that, "insofar as practicable," it coincided with the right-of-way already established. The required dimensions of the right-of-way were not specified in the 1968 Act; thus, the adequacy of Trail protection at a given location was open to interpretation. Right-of-way purchases could include entire tracts, strips of tracts, or even easements, so long as the adjacent land uses were compatible with the Trail's scenic qualities.

The authority to condemn lands of an unwilling seller for the Trail right-of-way was clearly provided in Section 7(g) of the Act but was to be utilized "only in cases where . . . all reasonable efforts to acquire such lands or interests therein by negotiation have failed." Further, a limitation was placed on the amount of land that could be taken—no more than 25 acres per mile of Trail. Most condemnation cases simply involved clearing title to the land. An example of a tract that in 1980 appeared likely for such condemnation was the Blankenship tract along the Tennessee-North Carolina border, owned by more than 50 heirs. Condemnation would clear title, but all 50 owners had to be contacted before the suit could begin, and the proceedings were obviously complicated.

Until 1978, unprotected stretches of the Appalachian Trail were acquired by the various jurisdictions with acquisition authority, but generally—except for the Forest Service—at a desultory pace. The slowness was due largely to the multiplicity of agencies and States responsible for right-of-way acquisition and management. This was compounded by the fact that the two principal Federal agencies—the Park Service and Forest Service—were unable to develop a uniform approach to Trail policy, which, in part, was due to differing interpretations of the 1968 Act. The Park Service maintained that a mile-wide strip on either side of the Trail, that was free of parallel roads, which had been established in a 1938 Forest Service-Park Service agreement, was the appropriate right-of-way. The Forest Service stressed that the Trail right-of-way could not exceed 25 acres per mile.

In addition, the two agencies disagreed over the funding and timing of Trail purchases. The National Trails System Act established a $5-million fund for Trail purchases that the Forest Service felt it could draw upon. The Park Service considered this fund to be for State purchases only. Further, the Park Service imposed acquisition deadlines on the Forest Service that were impossible to meet, given the time-consuming nature of surveys, title searches, and buyer-seller negotiations. Several deadlines were established and subsequently extended. Nevertheless, between 1969 and mid-1977, 110
miles of the Appalachian Trail in the National Forests of the Southern Appalachians were acquired. Of the 61 tracts involved in this acquisition, 4 were obtained through condemnation: one in the Nantahala, 2 in the Pisgah, and one in the Cherokee.\textsuperscript{58} By mid-1981, only 14.3 miles (2.1 percent) of the 677.0 miles for which the Forest Service has responsibility in the mountains of four States were unprotected. Of the 263.5 miles delegated to the National Park Service, 42.8 miles (16.2 percent) were still unprotected.\textsuperscript{59} A summary of the status of Appalachian Trail protection in the Southern Appalachians in October 1981 is shown in table 20.

Amendments to the National Trails System Act passed in 1978 substantially improved the administration of the Trail acquisition process and clarified most of the management problems.\textsuperscript{60} Substantial additional funds were provided for acquisition, and condemnation authority was extended to allow acquisition from unwilling sellers of up to 125 acres per mile of Trail. In addition, the amendments stipulated that the acquisition program was to be "substantially complete" by the end of fiscal year 1981 (September 30).\textsuperscript{61}

Under the 1978 amendments, the acquisition process proceeded with available funding.\textsuperscript{62} By January 1981, all but 14 miles of Trail strips in the Southern Appalachian National Forests had either been acquired or were in the final stages of acquisition. Most of the remaining private tracts involved appeared to be obtainable only through condemnation. Some were held by implacable owners who simply refused to sell. John Lukacs, as resident of Florida, was one. Lukacs owned about 1,500 acres in the Cherokee National Forest, near Johnson City, Tenn., which he planned to develop someday. The Appalachian Trail cut diagonally across one small corner of his property. The Forest Service wanted to purchase a strip of land along the Trail as well as the 11.6-acre "uneconomic remnant"—the corner cut off by the Trail. Lukacs refused to sell, citing as his reason a spring in the corner remnant. In 1978 the Forest Service referred the case to the Department of Justice for prosecution.\textsuperscript{63} Late in 1981 Justice agreed to press ahead with the suit.

Table 20.—Protection status of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail in the Southern Appalachians, October 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Trail</th>
<th>USDA Forest Service Still to be Protected</th>
<th>National Park Service, USDI Still to be Protected</th>
<th>State-owned land Still to be Protected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>303.7</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>208.9</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>208.9</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>220.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>662.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Land Acquisition Field Office, Appalachian National Scenic Trail, U.S. Department of the Interior, Martinsburg, W. Va. Tennessee and North Carolina mileage is combined because much of the trail follows the State line. Virginia data includes stretches not included in the study area of this publication.
The opposition appears to have been inflamed by the RARE II proposals to designate nearly one-half of the Red River Gorge (Clifty area) as wilderness (to be discussed later); however, the concern developed out of general experience with Forest Service acquisition policies and procedures. As in the cases of Mount Rogers, Chattooga River, and the Appalachian Trail, legislative development and Forest Service management plans appeared to threaten, with little warning, the pattern of local landownership. In the Red River Gorge area many people believed that, although the Forest Service usually aired its land-management alternatives in public, it often did not adequately inform them of final land-use decisions. Because people sometimes felt uncertain of their options, the threat of Federal acquisition was not entirely removed. As long as the Federal Government was a neighbor, the mountaineer felt he could never be certain that his land would remain his own.
Private Recreation Business Is a Major Force

One conclusion of the ORRRRC report was that the "most important single force in outdoor recreation is private endeavor—individual initiative, voluntary groups . . . , and commercial enterprises." Indeed, the heightened Federal attention to outdoor recreational resources and and Federal legislation passed following the report apparently triggered a substantial private recreational development, particularly in the Southern Appalachians. The natural beauty of the region and its proximity to the population centers of the East were recognized as assets that had not been fully exploited. National corporations opened new resorts in the mountains; vacation home communities spread in clusters outside the National Forests; the number of retail establishments catering to tourists increased, and speculators bought numerous tracts of mountain land, throughout the region, hoping to turn a profit by subdividing. The impact of these actions was considerable, not only on the local population but also on the managers of Federal land.

In its first years, the Appalachian Regional Commission funded a series of studies to ascertain the potential role of the recreation industry in the region's economic development. The benefits of tourism to the local population had long been acclaimed by recreational developers seeking to gain support for their programs. Promoters of the Blue Ridge Parkway and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park had both predicted a regional tourist boom. Nevertheless, although recreational visitation and tourism in the Southern Appalachians increased dramatically over the years, by 1960 no such boom had developed.

The first ARC study in 1966 concluded that the economic impact of recreational development on local areas is "marginal" and should be justified principally because it gives open-space recreation to people living in metropolitan areas. It cautioned that recreational employment is seasonal, low-paying, and undemanding, and that the indirect benefits of tourism are small. Thus, the 1966 ARC report pointedly advised, "major public investment in non-metropolitan recreation resources would rarely be justified solely or even primarily, for the sake of the economic impact on the local area." So the recreation industry, like the timber industry, was not the solution to Appalachia's economic ills.

Nevertheless, seemingly ignoring the prudent findings of its first study, and favoring the rosy BOR report of 1967, ARC continued to encourage heavy recreational development. In 1967 the Commission began an inventory and analysis of selected multicounty sites, 23 of which were labeled of greatest potential. Twelve such sites were in the Southern Appalachians, and seven of these, all relatively undeveloped, were selected for further analysis. All seven were near, or enclosed, National Forests, National Parks, or TVA reservoirs. Thus, the large Federal landownership in the region was recognized as a major recreational asset. Private investment, it was felt, could "piggy-back" on the existing recreational attraction of public sites.

For example, the Upper Hiwassee River Interstate complex, a seven-county highland area of northern Georgia, southeastern Tennessee, and southwestern North Carolina, just south of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, was credited with enormous potential because of the Chattahoochee, Cherokee, and Nantahala National Forests and four TVA reservoir lakes. However, the area lacked road access, accommodations, and camping spaces. Although it was implied that Federal or State funds would be required for roads and other public services, ARC said private developers could profitably build hotels, motels, and second homes.

Similarly, the Boone-Linville-Roan Mountain complex in the Pisgah National Forest section of North Carolina, just east of the park, was seen to exhibit "great potential" for attracting vacationers, especially skiers. Overall, the ARC study concluded, if the 14 recreation sites were fully developed, by 1985 there would be a $1.7-billion "total economic impact." Even in the smallest counties where a lower level of expenditure could be assumed, "a sizable amount of private business development and/or expansion could be expected, and services would probably be considerably expanded." In 1960, private recreational development was not spread evenly over the Southern Appalachians; rather, it was concentrated in distinct county clusters. The principal clusters were near Great Smoky Mountains National Park—Sevier and Swain; in the Nantahala National Forest—Graham, Jackson, and Macon; the northern Georgia counties in the Chattahoochee National Forest—Towns, Union, Fannin, and principally, Rabun; and Watauga and Avery counties, in the upper Pisgah National Forest, near Boone, N.C., and the Blue Ridge Parkway. Clearly, the National Forests, parkway, and National Park of the region were integral to the development of the private tourist-recreation industry.

Nevertheless, physical recreational resources alone do not explain the locational pattern of the recreation industry. Hancock County, Tenn., for example, one of the 12 study counties we chose for more detailed analysis, located north of Knoxville near Cumberland Gap, had "a mountain environment, clean air and streams, an uncommercialized and unspoiled countryside, and a unique county culture group . . . Tourists, however, have not visited the county in large numbers." Major factors in recreational development were relative ease of access and a resort history. That is, the counties with the greatest recreational growth in this period were those that had a history of tourism and that seemed unable to attract other economic activities, because of their remoteness. Southern Appalachian counties with the most lodgings and tourist-related jobs were relatively inaccessible, lacked a diverse economic base, but had been frequented for many years by vacationers.
The Federal lands that provided the regional recreation base attracted vacationers throughout the 1960's and 1970's, most of them at an increasing rate. Statistics for the fiscal years 1972-80 reveal the general trend, as shown in figure 116. The Chattahoochee and Jefferson National Forests did not show substantial visitor growth over the 8-year period, and the Cherokee did so only in 1980, when visitation increased 150 percent over 1979. In the four North Carolina forests, it increased steadily by 240 percent over the period. In the Daniel Boone, including the Redbird unit, the peak was reached in 1976. Notably, compared to all National Forests in the United States, the Daniel Boone and North Carolina forests rose dramatically as ranked by number of recreation "visitor-days" reported. By 1980, the Daniel Boone ranked 26th out of 122 National Forest units; the North Carolina forests jointly ranked eighth.

**Private Development Varies Greatly**

The extent of private recreational development that occurred during the 1960's and 1970's varied considerably from county to county across the Southern Appalachian region. Some became the focus for heavy second-home development; others grew in commercial facilities; others, although remaining relatively important as recreational concentrations, developed very little. One area that achieved wide publicity for its heavy, uncontrolled commercial development is Gatlinburg, Sevier County, Tenn.—western entrance to Great Smoky Mountains National Park.

During the 1980's changes in landownership began to occur suddenly in the Gatlinburg area where for years land had been closely held by a few families. After 1960 "outsiders with no apparent intention of establishing residency . . . increased their holdings." Most of these "outsiders" were northern corporations, such as Rapoca Resources Coal Co. of Cincinnati, or national chains, such as Holiday Inn. A very high number of franchise or chain ownerships located there.

Investments were made not only in resort attractions (resort hotels, restaurants, and shops), but in residential land as well. Individuals and corporations bought acreage all around Gatlinburg, so that by 1972 almost half the landowners were outsiders. Many of them bought land for summer or retirement homes but some, with no intention of settling, bought for pure speculation. Although in the mid-1970's sizable tracts outside Gatlinburg were still in the hands of local inhabitants, the slightly more distant tracts, upon which higher capital gains could be realized, were largely in the hands of outsiders.

Although the town was unusual in the Southern Appalachians in that it had been an established resort area for several decades, its pattern of land development by outside investors was repeated throughout the region. Watauga and Avery Counties, N.C., were heavily developed in the 1960's, first by local entrepreneurs. For example, Hugh Morton transformed Grandfather Mountain into a recreational complex that included condominiums, a subdivision of Scottish manor houses called Invershiel, a lake, and the Grandfather Mountain Golf and Country Club, with a professional golf course. His family had owned some 16,000 acres of mountain land since the end of the 19th century; when his father died, Morton inherited the mountain as a parcel of land no one else in the family wanted. Although a movement was started to purchase Grandfather Mountain for the National Park Service, Morton finally decided to develop the land. With the aid of professionals, he built one feature after another. By 1978, Grandfather Mountain boasted, in addition to traditional resort facilities, a bear habitat, a nature museum, and a mile-high swinging bridge.

Later, corporate developments, such as Sugar Mountain and Beech Mountain, owned by Carolina-Caribbean Corp. of Miami, followed. Some Winston-Salem businessmen and the L.A. Reynolds Construction Co. built Seven Devils nearby. All included golf courses, lakes, tennis courts, and ski slopes, as well as second homes spread in subdivision fashion across the hills.

Northern Georgia has also attracted heavy recreational investment, particularly in vacation-home communities. As of 1974, approximately 210 second-home subdivisions were being

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**Figure 116.—Volume of Recreational Visitation in Southern Appalachian National Forests, 1972-80.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visitor-days—millions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>••• Chattahoochee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

**Source:** "Relative Standings of the National Forests According to Amount of Visitor-days of Use," Recreation Management Staff, Forest Service, Washington, D.C. A visitor-day is any aggregate of 12 person-hours, ranging from one person for 12 hours to 12 persons for one hour each.

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1Includes the small Croatan and Uwharrie National Forests of the Piedmont and coast.

2Includes the small Oconee National Forest of the Piedmont.

83 Most of these "outsiders" were northern corporations, such as Rapoca Resources Coal Co. of Cincinnati, or national chains, such as Holiday Inn. A very high number of franchise or chain ownerships located there.

84 His family had owned some 16,000 acres of mountain land since the end of the 19th century; when his father died, Morton inherited the mountain as a parcel of land no one else in the family wanted. Although a movement was started to purchase Grandfather Mountain for the National Park Service, Morton finally decided to develop the land. With the aid of professionals, he built one feature after another. By 1978, Grandfather Mountain boasted, in addition to traditional resort facilities, a bear habitat, a nature museum, and a mile-high swinging bridge.

85 Later, corporate developments, such as Sugar Mountain and Beech Mountain, owned by Carolina-Caribbean Corp. of Miami, followed. Some Winston-Salem businessmen and the L.A. Reynolds Construction Co. built Seven Devils nearby. All included golf courses, lakes, tennis courts, and ski slopes, as well as second homes spread in subdivision fashion across the hills.

86 Northern Georgia has also attracted heavy recreational investment, particularly in vacation-home communities. As of 1974, approximately 210 second-home subdivisions were being.
"actively developed" in 12 counties, some as large as 5,000 to 9,000 acres. On a smaller scale, the Highlands area of Macon County, N.C. became the site of many second homes whose owners had permanent residences in Atlanta, Savannah, Jacksonville, and other southern urban areas. However, recreational subdivisions per se did not become a common feature of the southwestern North Carolina landscape. In the 11-county "Southern Highlands" region of North Carolina, including Buncombe, Henderson, Graham, Macon, and Swain Counties, there were only 12 second-home development firms that controlled 30 or more homes or sites each in 1973. Macon County, had the most, with four.

The increase in second-home development throughout the Southern Appalachians was part of the general reversal of the heavy outmigration the region experienced in the two decades after World War II. As discussed in chapter VII, between 1970 and 1975 a distinct change in migration patterns occurred in all study counties; either net outmigration slowed dramatically or net immigration took place. This shift appears to have applied across the whole region, and must be seen as part of a national change. In general, over the United States as a whole, after 1970, nonmetropolitan areas attracted increasing numbers of people while Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas lost population. In particular, nonmetropolitan places of a recreation or retirement character attracted heavy numbers of immigrants. Although the Sunbelt States were the chief recipients of immigrants, parts of the Southern Appalachians previously identified as areas of recreational development were also among the migration-destination targets.

No Economic Boom Results

However, in spite of the isolated clusters of resorts, the localized proliferation of second homes, and the reversal in migration trends, recreational development in the Southern Appalachians in the 1960's and 1970's did not create an economic boom. Development was initiated largely by individual or corporate outside investors, and secondary growth was often limited. Ten years after the initial ARC recreational study of 1966, reports and statistics of actual results generally confirmed this study's conclusion that the net economic impact of recreational development on the Southern Appalachian region would be "marginal."

For example, over the 11-county area of southwestern North Carolina, almost no growth occurred in the local recreation industry between 1966 and 1972. Specifically, the North Carolina Outdoor Recreation Areas Inventory discovered an actual decline in the number of resorts offering camping and recreation/amusement facilities between 1966 and 1972. This decline was most extreme for commercial resorts, which dropped in number by 25 percent; whereas resorts on government land actually increased by 60 percent.

Employment in recreation-related businesses over the 11-county area generally increased between 1960 and 1970; however, as a percentage of total employment, recreation business employment showed little gain. Only employment in construction and in hotels, lodging places, and amusement services increased, both absolutely and relatively. Employment in eating and drinking places, gas stations, and real estate experienced relative declines. The only real recreation-related growth shown was in the actual number of firms servicing the recreation, tourist, and second-home market. This growth, however, may more accurately reflect exogenous investment than it does local capital development.

Over the Southern Appalachian region as a whole, as represented by the 12 study counties, growth from recreational development can be partially gauged from the increase in the number of, and sales from, eating and drinking places. Table 21 shows these increases over the years for which data are available:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of total retail sales from eating and drinking places

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D = Disclosure laws prohibit publication for only one or two firms.
Although the number of eating and drinking places increased in both the counties with a high proportion of National Forest land and those with little or none, the percentage increase was greater for the former group. For two-thirds of the former, the number of eating and drinking places at least doubled, an increase that suggests the rise in tourism those areas experienced. Similarly, that group of counties showed a gain in the relative importance of sales from eating and drinking places between 1967 and 1972; whereas, over the same period, the relative importance of such sales generally decreased in the latter group. This differential probably reflects the failure of the heavily national-forested counties to build as broad an economic base as those counties without much such land, as well as their increase in recreational development. 48

Pace of Recreational Development Slows

Although the recreation industry of the heavily national-forested counties experienced a period of relative growth in the 1960's and 1970's, the extent of neighboring Federal landownership was no assurance of a successful recreation investment. The pace of development has slowed. For example, the privately owned Bear Paw Resort on Lake Hiwassee in the extreme southwestern corner of the Nantahala National Forest—one of the areas identified by ARC as showing substantial recreation development potential—suffered major financial losses during most of the 1970's. 46 The resort, a 99-acre complex with 40 rental cottages, built by TVA when the Hiwassee Dam was constructed, included tennis courts, a swimming pool, an ice-skating rink, marina, stables, and restaurants. In 1979 the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development negotiated to buy the property for a State park. But, as one of the owners lamented, "the thing is a loser. There's no way for us to make money or even for the state to . . . The property isn't worth $200,000, so far as a going concern . . ." The purchase did not take place. 47

Furthermore, whatever growth may have occurred in the recreation industry in selected counties during the 1960's and 1970's, the employment in the industry was repeatedly acknowledged to be small, sporadic and low-paying. 48 In 1975, in 12 mountain counties of North Carolina, where recreational development was a feature of the landscape, only 6.6 percent of the labor force worked in the recreation industry, and then only seasonally, for low wages. 49 As Lewis Green of Asheville has written, in spite of the promises developers make for the local economy:

... all that one can see for the little man is maintenance and custodial jobs. Maids and waitresses. At the end of the season, the big money goes to Florida—to return here again to buy up some more old homeplaces. 49

Even more significant, some feel, is the fact that such employment introduces "a job orientation no longer directly associated with the land." Although in itself such orientation may not be bad, it "serves to undermine the spirit of independence so long characteristic of the mountain people, and places them in a position of almost perpetual subordination to the outside-dominated financial manipulators." 101

During the 1960's, commercial and individual private land acquisition began to alter the mountaineer's perception of his land. Land became "significant as property," and valued for financial investment. 102 On the whole, private investment in the Southern Appalachians during the 1960's and 1970's substantially inflated the price of land. In southwestern North Carolina, "hilly woodland that sold for $50 to $100 [per acre] in 1955 could have easily been sold ten years later for $450 and more." 103 Such inflation consequently raised property valuations, causing increased property taxes, and thus a higher property tax base. Whether such changes were ultimately beneficial or detrimental is open to some controversy. Edgar Bingham has described the circumstances that have led to the inflation of land values:

Buyers from . . . large corporations . . . offer prices for land which unsuspecting natives find difficult to refuse. The prices offered are in truth inflated relative to the value of the land in its traditional subsistence or semi-subsistence farm use . . . Many sell, assuming that they will buy other property within the general area, but they find that land values overall have gone up radically, so they either must give up their former way of life and become menials for the developer, or, as is often the case, they leave the community altogether. Even those who are determined to retain their land find that its value has become so inflated that it is no longer practical to use it for farming, so either they become developers themselves or they sell to the developer. 104

This process has been clearly documented in Ashe, Avery, and Watauga Counties, N.C., where the number of out-of-State landowners and the amount of land they owned increased dramatically between 1960 and 1980. 105 A study by the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group found that outside speculators increased their landownership by 164 percent in Watauga County and 47 percent in Avery County between 1970 and 1975. 106 One result of such increase is that, as land values inflated, farmers found it more and more difficult to pay taxes. By the mid-1970's, approximately half the farmers in Watauga and Avery Counties worked at least 100 days per year off their farms to supplement their incomes. The long-range predicament is that, as farmland prices escalate, a farming career ceases to be viable. 107
**Net Benefits Are Questionable**

Although second-home developments and investments in mountain land increased the property tax base of many Southern Appalachian counties, the cost of services also increased considerably. Due to a lack of substantive documentation, it is not certain whether revenues kept up with costs. The 1966 ARC study found that resorts and vacation homes generally strengthen the property tax base. Also, because the highest single item of public expenditure—education—is usually not increased as a result of recreational development, the study claimed that vacation homes and establishments do “yield a profit on the municipal balance sheet.”

However, a mid-1970’s study of the Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina State agencies responsible for recreation suggested that the cost of providing services to second-home developments can be more than the increased taxes they generate, particularly if the developments are not adjacent to existing population concentrations. Specifically, Avery and Watauga Counties, with very limited road-maintenance budgets, allowed ski roads in demand for tourist developments to be maintained, while farm roads suffered. Hospitals, fire departments, and police all were found understaffed and underfinanced to handle the temporary vacationing population. Similarly, in Sevier County, Tenn., three resort developments studied by the State Planning Office in 1977 were found to have cost the county at least $23,000 more in services than they generated in tax revenues.

In addition, many have claimed that resort and recreational home development in the Southern Appalachians has brought environmental degradation similar to that resulting from the exploitation of timber and coal resources decades earlier. Problems of erosion, inadequate water supplies, and sewage treatment facilities have been cited. Some of the degradation has been clearly visible, as the description of a Rabun County, Ga., development, named Screamer Mountain, testifies:

> Seen from a helicopter, it is as though an entire mountain had been assaulted by a road-building spider and left entangled and throttled in a network of gouges and tracks. Since this development is dense and the gradients are steep, much of the vegetation is gone; mud turning to liquid mud in the rain, is left behind. Since this development constitutes a mountain, it is visible from all sides. It is particularly worthwhile to imagine several such developments on the tops of approximately contiguous hills. These fortresses of deforestation, frowning upon each other across their several valleys, would then constitute their inhabitants’ only views . . . . It is hard to see what amenity would remain.

Such visual blight has occurred largely because most counties in the region have not had appropriate zoning or land use controls. In North Carolina, although most county governments have zoning ordinances, they are generally of poor quality, and are often set aside or lightly administered under economic pressures. In addition, development has often taken place in the unincorporated areas of a county, where land-use controls have been even more lax.

**Big Influx of Temporary Residents**

Finally, recreational development has brought to the mountains a new group of temporary residents, most of whom have a value system and attitude toward the land that are alien to the mountaineer. Writing of the suburban newcomers, Bingham has explained:

> The effect on the human population [of recreational development] over recent years has been to replace the natives with “new” mountaineers. Mountaineers without a real attachment to the land and whose demands or expectations have tended to be in conflict with rather than in harmony with the mountain habitat. His automobiles, motorcycles, and the service vehicles meeting his more elaborate demands clog the mountain roads and disturb the rural quiet with the roar of their engines. His ski slopes have cut huge slashes in the natural cover of the most attractive mountains, and the most appealing trails and associated vistas suddenly become off-limits to the people who have always lived here.

Perhaps the greatest misunderstanding between the old and new mountaineer is in the matter of trespass. The southern mountaineer has his own sense of landownership rights. Holding title to the land is but one type of possession; long residence in an area entitles one to certain rights as well—for example, free access for hunting, wood gathering, and berry picking. This attitude toward the land is based on historical precedent; in the past, each farmer had his own bottomland acreage but regarded the forested ridges as common ground.

Thus, although over 4 million acres in the region were in Federal ownership, local residents still felt free to use much of that land in the traditional way. As George Hicks has written:

> Timber is recognized as private property and one must buy trees before cutting them. Scavenging for fallen tree limbs to use as firewood, however, falls into the same category as galax: it belongs to the gatherer. The same is true for wild fruits—huckleberries, blueberries, blackberries, and so on.

Although permits were required for some activities—tree cutting, gathering evergreens, or hunting—the Forest Service at times overlooked violations. As Hicks wrote of local use of the North Carolina National Forests, “evergreen collectors take it as a game to evade the forest rangers and Federal officers, and they declare that the officials have a similar playful attitude.” A similar “game” has been observed between
local hunters and Forest Service personnel along the Appalachian Trail:

"Foot Travel Only" trails . . . [are] being (hopefully, at least) protected by Forest Service signs designed to exclude two-wheeled and four-wheeled vehicles. During hunting season, it seems that the signs are taken down and hidden; and vehicles enter. Violators profess innocence . . . claiming they saw no signs excluding vehicles. To combat this, the Forest Service erects heavy wooden posts. The posts are cut down with chain saws, and vehicles obtain entrance. The Forest Service retaliates with more wooden posts, and this time drives one-inch thick steel rods diagonally through the posts and into the ground. And so the battle goes on . . . each side thinking of new ways to outwit the other.160

Figure 117.—Prominent wilderness leaders who accompanied Forest Service officials on a 4-day "show-me" trip through National Forests in the Southern Appalachian Mountains, were here looking over the new Shining Rock Wilderness, later called Wilderne ss, from the crest of Shining Rock on the Pisgah National Forest, N.C., in September 1962, 2 years before passage of the Wilderness Act. The spot is near the "Pink Beds," "Cradle of Forestry," and Blue Ridge Parkway, southwest of Asheville and not far from Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Standing, left to right, were: North Carolina National Forests Supervisor Peter J. Hanlon; Southern Regional Forester James K. Vessey; Harvey Broome, a lawyer and co-founder in 1934 of the Wilderness Society, a leader in the Great Smoky Mountains Hiking Club; William W. Huber, Southern Regional information chief; Pisgah District Ranger Ted S. Seeley; and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, a hiking and wilderness enthusiast. Seated: Ernest M. Dickerman, then director of field services, eastern region, Wilderness Society, later also Washington representative of Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning; and (1982) vice-president of Conservation Council of Virginia; and Charles Rickerhauser. (Forest Service photo F-504012)
When the new group of vacation homeowners and resort developers came, they established the boundaries of their newly acquired property with fences and often "No Trespassing" or "No Hunting" signs. This exclusion became a source of misunderstanding and antagonism. Why, the mountaineer reasoned, was he prohibited from woodgathering or hunting on lands his family had used for years? Incidences of arson were traced to such resentment. In Macon County in 1976, an outbreak of fires struck a sawmill, several patches of woods, and a tourist attraction called Gold Mountain. A man was later quoted as saying, "The posted signs burned right off early. They didn't last no time."112

Because the mountaineers, the newcomers, and the Forest Service staff live in close proximity throughout the mountains, a triangular relationship developed in which the Forest Service was often perceived by the mountaineers to be catering to the ways of the newcomers. There was a "conflict—real or perceived—between the expectations and desires of forest users distant from the forest scene and local economic aspirations."113 The forest officers, following administrative directives from Washington, felt caught in the middle. In no case was this situation more dramatic than in the battles that were staged during the late 1970's over wilderness.

Wilderness Act Sparks Much Conflict

The Wilderness Act of September 3, 1964 gave Federal statutory recognition to wilderness designation through the establishment of a national system of wilderness areas.124 The Act was the culmination of 8 or 9 years of intensive legislative debate and lengthy testimony. The first wilderness bill had been introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey in 1956 following the opposition to and defeat of the proposed Echo Park Dam on the Green River in Dinosaur National Monument, northern Utah and Colorado. That preservation-versus-development controversy illustrated both the political power of militant conservationist groups and the substantial base of their popular support.125

Debate over the Wilderness Act focused on three issues: the amount of land to be included in the wilderness system; the addition of lands to the system; and the status of logging and mining in wilderness areas.126 Most timber, mining, petroleum, agriculture, and grazing interests opposed the legislation; the Forest Service, although a pioneer in establishing wilderness areas, also was strongly against the bill at first, largely because its administrative and land-management prerogatives would be restricted. The statement in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 that "the establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes and provisions of . . . multiple use," anticipated to some extent the wilderness legislation to come.127 Support for a separate wilderness act was strong, however, and the Forest Service ultimately acceded to the popular movement, lending its expertise to the long bill-drafting and modification process.

The Wilderness Act defined wilderness areas as places "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain." Wilderness areas were to be preserved in a roadless, forested, undeveloped condition. Specifically prohibited in the wilderness system were motor vehicles (land or water), motorized equipment, and the landing of aircraft, except where already established, as well as permanent buildings and lumbering. In general, hunting, fishing, and grazing (but not crop farming) were allowed. Where rights had been previously established, mining and prospecting could continue until January 1, 1984.

The wilderness system defined by the Act incorporated over 14 million acres of areas that were already being administered by the Forest Service as wilderness. In 1924 its Southwestern Region had established the Gila Wilderness Area in New Mexico. In 1929 the Forest Service had set aside large primitive areas in the West and upper Great Lakes region for protection under Regulation "L-20." In 1939 the "U" Regulations formally established a system of wilderness, wild, and primitive areas. (Later the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota, much of which had been pledged by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1926 to remain roadless, was added as a distinct administrative entity.) Lumbering, roads, commercial establishments, motor boats, and resorts were all prohibited in the system. Except for size, Forest Service wilderness and wild areas were the same; wilderness areas were larger than 100,000 acres, wild areas were between 5,000 and 100,000 acres. Primitive areas were tracts set aside for further study, although they were administered as wilderness. Altogether, in 1964, the system encompassed over 14,600,000 acres.128

The Wilderness Act included the Forest Service's 54 previously designated wilderness and wild areas as the sole initial components of the national wilderness system. Its 34 primitive areas, which accounted for over a third of the 14,600,000-acre system, were to be reviewed over a 10-year period for possible inclusion. Each area could be added to the system only by an act of Congress; prior to congressional action, each area had to be the subject of a public hearing where testimony from Governmental officials and private citizens would be taken.

By 1973, only three areas in the East, formerly designated wild areas, had been included in the wilderness system: Great Gulf, in the White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire, and Linville Gorge and Shining Rock, both in the Pisgah National Forest. In designating wilderness, the Forest Service had maintained a strict interpretation of its own guidelines.129 In the East, where most lands had been occupied, logged, or burned, only a few select areas of more than 5,000 acres qualified for wilderness consideration. However, the 7,655-acre Linville Gorge and 13,400-acre Shining Rock tracts were not altogether free from the imprint of man; parts of both areas had been logged and burned about 1900.130
However, the national movement for wilderness was strong. Local conservationists expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusion by definition of all but a few eastern lands from the wilderness system. Furthermore, the eastern areas that had been designated wilderness were experiencing a phenomenal increase in public visitation. Linville Gorge and Shining Rock had a recreational use of 5,300 and 5,200 visitor-days respectively in 1968; by 1974, the figures were 21,800 and 12,400 visitor-days. Recognizing the pressure for designating more areas as eastern wilderness, the Forest Service in 1972 asked conservation organizations and natural resource associations for recommendations on ways to classify and preserve wilderness in the East, taking into consideration the special problems posed by the fragmented landownership pattern, the fact that most mineral rights were privately held, and the fact that most rivers and bodies of water within National Forests were not federally owned.

Beginning in 1972, bills were introduced in Congress to establish a special wilderness system; the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 resulted. The bill did not attempt to define wilderness as such, but catalogued the value of wilderness as, “solitude, physical and mental challenge, scientific study, inspiration and primitive recreation.” Altogether, the Act designated 16 eastern National Forest areas totaling over 207,000 acres as the initial components of the system. Five of the areas were in the Southern Appalachians, as listed in table 22.

In addition, the Act named 17 study areas for consideration for inclusion in the wilderness system. They were to be administered as wilderness until a final determination on their status was made, which was to be no later than 1980. Three were in the Southern Appalachian forests: the 1,100-acre Craggymountain area in Pisgah National Forest, and Big Frog and Citico Creek in the Cherokee, totaling 18,500 acres.

The Roadless Areas Reviews (RARE)

Before the Eastern Wilderness Act was passed, efforts had been underway to expand the national wilderness system. In 1971, the Forest Service initiated a review process called RARE (Roadless Area Review and Evaluation) in which National Forest roadless areas not included in the previously named Primitive Areas were identified and rated for possible wilderness designation. The result of the RARE process was a list of 274 study areas, published in late 1973. Very few, however, lay east of the 100th meridian.

Although the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 established an eastern wilderness system, public pressure for more wilderness, and Federal dissatisfaction with the slow process of study and evaluation before public land use could be allocated, precipitated another review of potential wilderness sites. Another Roadless Area Review and Evaluation was begun in 1977, which immediately came to be known as RARE II.

RARE II was proposed as a national town meeting wherein the public would help select potential wilderness sites and then evaluate them. The RARE II process thus built upon and extended the requisite for public involvement in Forest Service planning that had been expressed in legislation since 1964. The evaluation demanded a quick decision: within a year and a half, each site was to be designated either “wilderness,” “nonwilderness,” or “needing further planning”—subject to congressional approval or modification. During the summer of 1977, workshops were held throughout the country to review a preliminary list of Forest Service-proposed wilderness sites and to suggest designation of others. On August 6, 1977, a public workshop was held in Dahlonega, Ga., to comment on wildernesses proposed in the Chattahoochee National Forest. At this meeting, the public literally drew boundaries on maps around areas they favored for wilderness.

After considering the public comments, the Forest Service selected 2,688 areas nationwide for possible wildernesses. The criteria for eastern wildernesses were different from those of western areas; for example, they could contain one-half mile of improved road for every 1,000 acres. Nevertheless, relatively few areas were named in the eastern forests, and not even 3 percent were in the forests of the Southern Appalachians.

In June 1978 the Forest Service published its Draft Environmental Statement announcing the potential wildernesses, and during the summer and early fall, solicited public response. Town meetings were held to explain the RARE II process, to outline the possible wilderness areas, to clarify wilderness management, and to receive public questions and comments. Largely through announcements in local newspapers and other media, the agency openly sought letters, written comments on pre-printed forms, and visits from the public.

The size and intensity of the public reaction surprised some in the Forest Service. Altogether, 264,093 separate responses (with 359,414 signatures) were received nationwide, “the largest number of comments the agency had ever received on a Draft Environmental Statement—or on anything else for that matter.”

### Table 22.—New areas designated in Southern Appalachia by the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilderness</th>
<th>National Forest</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beaver Creek</td>
<td>Daniel Boone (Ky.)</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock</td>
<td>Nantahala, Cherokee (N.C.-Tenn.)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellicott Rock</td>
<td>Nantahala, Sumter, Chattahoochee (N.C., S.C., Ga.)</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gee Creek</td>
<td>Cherokee (Tenn.)</td>
<td>2,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohutta</td>
<td>Chattahoochee, Cherokee (Ga., Tenn.)</td>
<td>34,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>61,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mountaineers Protest Strongly

The response of southern mountaineers, although part of the national reaction, was particularly strong, one-sided, and widespread. In one sense, the emotions expressed went beyond their typical and long-standing mistrust of government, frequently noted by Appalachian scholars; in another, they were no more than a release of pent-up frustrations and dissatisfaction with the Federal Government. From the beginning of the land acquisition program the Forest Service had filled many roles in relation to the local population: Buyer, patron, employer, persuader, educator, disciplinarian, friend. In most of these roles the agency activated some respect of the relationship and guided it toward a predefined goal. For example, from earliest days it chose to crusade against man-caused forest fires. This effort led to interactions with the local population that varied according to the personalities of the ranger and careless burner or incendiary involved. The mountaineer’s resistance, although not always passive, had been generally silent. His frustrations became increasingly pronounced during the 1960’s, however. The relationship between Forest Service managers and both the recently arrived and long-settled local populations became more and more strained by complexity and distance.

One factor that contributed to the strain was the change in the defined role of the district ranger. Because of the growing public demands on the National Forests and the increased complexity of land management, the ranger was drawn more and more into an administrative role. He was expected to be the “whole man,” handling all aspects of land management and public relations. To ensure that the ranger performed his job well, much of the time he had formerly spent training forest technicians and work crews was transferred to his district staff. As paperwork multiplied, he had to spend more time in his office and less in the forest.

During the 1960’s, throughout the region, the ranger’s office was moved from the forest into nearby towns. Such relocation was done primarily to give the town an economic boost and to enhance public access to the ranger, but it proved generally detrimental to his relationships with the people in his district. As a Chattahoochee forester explained the problem, rural folk traditionally came to town only once a week — Saturday. Thus, if the ranger was based in town and tied to his desk, people would see him at most only one day out of seven.

This distance between the ranger and the rural residents was even more pronounced in the case of the forest supervisor. The former ranger assistant, L. E. Perry of McCreary County, writes with some acidity and apparent disgruntlement on the remoteness he perceived in the Daniel Boone Forest managers:

The office of the forest supervisor he belongs to an elite group of minimibureaucrats because he holds one of about 150 such positions in the United States. On rare occasions a forest supervisor makes a brief tour of the ranger stations on the forest but keeps a discreet distance from the general public, taking great pains to shun all politicians below the office of Governor or a U.S. Congressman, and aloof from most corporation executives or professional people unless circumstances dictate otherwise.

Perry’s description of the role and attitude of the forest supervisor, if strongly biased and inaccurate, nonetheless reflects the estrangement the mountaineer sometimes felt between himself and the Forest Service.

Another factor that contributed to this estrangement was the replacement in the mid-1960’s of the fire warden system. Under this system, which had been in existence for decades in the eastern forests, a fire warden — a local man selected by the ranger for his leadership and reliability — headed a team of about 10 citizens who could be summoned immediately on notice of a fire. Fires were reported to the warden, who in turn reported to the district ranger.

Over the years, however, the type of person suitable to serve as warden had become harder to find. Increasingly, such citizens commuted to work in nearby towns or cities; they were not at home to respond to fire emergencies or to activate a fire crew.

In the 1960’s, aerial detection and special fire crews became the chief means of fire control, and the need for fire towers, crews to man them, and local labor declined. Although the new fire protection system was more efficient and helped substantially to reduce the size and number of fires, a chain of communication between the ranger and local community was broken. Gone was much of the direct contact with the local folks and their appreciation of the Forest Service attitudes, interests and personnel.

The same was true of local involvement with timber stand improvement and tree planting, as during the 1960’s much of this work was contracted out to professionals.

Thus, it is apparent that during the 1960’s and 1970’s, as the size of the Forest Service administrative staff increased, and as mountaineers were contacted less often about its activities, local resentments towards Federal land managers in the Southern Appalachians increased. At the same time, throughout the region, public land acquisition intensified: the Federal Government had pressed for recreational land even to the point of taking it by condemnation, and more and more outsiders had arrived to buy whatever was left. In the eyes of many mountaineers, its proposal to designate local land as wilderness was an intolerable last straw.
The Forest Service, however, was sensitive to local feelings. It was specifically asking the people to voice opinions on a major land-management issue. Such a request was part of a recently increased Servicewide effort to involve the public in the National Forest planning process; however, it was not only new to the mountain people, but also alien to their usual method of handling community problems:

[It] may be that the methods used by the Forest Service to elicit public input are not those that fit with the social and cultural ways of local Western North Carolina people. Natives of this area have generally been reluctant to speak in public meetings, write letters to public officials, or organize to put political pressure on national government organizations, especially if there is any division of opinion within their own communities on an issue.151

Reluctance notwithstanding, RARE II sparked an historically atypical response in the region that often surprised forest officers.

On-the-whole, the mountain people opposed more wilderness, especially in the Cherokee and Chattahoochee forests. Even in North Carolina, where out-of-State interest in RARE II was strongest, about 62 percent of respondents opposed more wilderness, 32 percent supported more.152

Opposition to wilderness was directed at the Federal Government in general. A citizen of Elizabethton, Tenn., for example, said simply, "Upper East Tennesseans do not want anyone in Congress to tell us what is Wilderness. I am opposed to it."153 More often, however, people responding to RARE II focused on specific sites. Certain areas drew particular interest—like Blood Mountain in the Chattahoochee, Clifty area of the Red River Gorge in the Daniel Boone, Southern Nantahala in the Nantahala and Chattahoochee forests, Cheoah Bald in the Nantahala, and Citico Creek in the Cherokee forest. Many people wanted some of the areas to be wilderness; other areas were almost universally favored for nonwilderness, and some drew a mixed response.154

Restrictions, Outsiders Seen as Threats

Opposition to more wilderness in the region was based on several issues: (1) the ban on logging in wilderness; (2) the threat of losing county tax revenue; (3) the exclusion of motorized vehicles from wilderness; (4) the "invasion" of the area's National Forests by "outsiders"; (5) the threat to private holdings within and adjacent to wilderness areas, and (6) the rights of the Federal Government versus those of the private citizen.

These issues were not always clearly understood or articulated. In spite of the town meetings and press releases, misinformation circulated widely, even through the local newspapers. The Watauga Democrat of Boone, N.C., stated in August 1978 that under RARE II, "There will be no hunting, fishing, or other recreational use of the [wilderness] lands."155 Two newspapers in Towns, Ga., implied that the wilderness nearby was being established for blacks and the unemployed.

(There were no blacks in Towns County.) Thus, as one pro-wilderness resident of Hiwassee, Ga., wrote, "fear and bigotry was the reason" for RARE II opposition.156

Lumbermen throughout the Southern Appalachians strongly opposed wilderness proposals. As Opel Smallwood of Frenchburg, Ky., expressed it, "There's a world of timber in there . . . just falling down and will go to waste."157 Areas where the lumber industry was predominant were particularly opposed. The Shady Valley community of Carter County, Tenn. for example, had two sawmills employing about 30 men, heavily dependent on Cherokee forest timber. The timber operators feared that designating the nearby Beaver Dam Creek area as a wilderness would force them to close their mills. The Forest Service's internal assessments concurred that one or both mills might close if Beaver Dam Creek was declared a wilderness.158

Similarly, in remote Graham County, N.C., on the southern border of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, where 75 percent of the labor force was employed in timber-related jobs, antagonism toward RARE II was strong. Six of the roadless areas under study, including Cheoah Bald, were in the county—which is 60 percent in National Forest. In 1977 the Doyle Brock Bemis Lumber Co. of Robbinsville began petitioning the forest supervisor's office in Asheville, and several citizens' groups were organized in the area.159

The timber interests expressed opposition to RARE II primarily through lobbying and newspaper campaigns. Long accustomed to supporting and protecting their interests, they were familiar with methods of political persuasion. In addition to writing letters to their district rangers, timber groups visited their city councils and congressmen, or wrote letters to local newspapers. The Appalachian Hardwood Council, which represents many of the South's largest timber companies, sent officials to Washington in the summer of 1978 to protest further wilderness in the southern mountains.160

Figure 118.—Homemade sign on plywood made by opponents of expanded wilderness areas in North Georgia during the Forest Service's second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II) hearings in the late 1970's. (Photo by Chattahoochee National Forest)
Numerous letters to district rangers expressed fear of counties losing incoming because of wilderness. RARE II gave many people the chance to express their belief that the Federal Government had been shortchanging their local governments for years. Although the Payment-In Lieu-of-Taxes Act had substantially increased payments to Southern Appalachian counties with National Forests, some either were unaware of the increase, or considered 75 cents per acre still inadequate compensation.\footnote{161}

Probably the most widely expressed opposition to the proposed wilderness in the Southern Appalachians was based on the exclusion of roads and motorized vehicles. Although hunting and fishing were to be permitted in wildernesses, access was limited to horseback or foot travel. Hunters and fishermen, accustomed to entering the woods in a pickup or 4-wheel drive vehicle, loudly attacked the restriction. Protests came from sportsmen's clubs, such as the Carter County Hunting and Fishing Club in Tennessee, as well as from individual sportsmen. As a resident of Lakemont, Ga., wrote, "I like to hunt and fish, but would like to drive within easy walking distance."\footnote{162} The letters of protest also came from mountaineers who use the woods for berrying and gathering firewood. Quite a few complained that the roadless designation was discriminatory. A Rabun County citizen wrote:

\begin{quote}
If roads are closed, only the young, hale and hearty will be able to use the inner-regions of the wilderness while the elderly, handicapped and those who are not well-in-body will have to nibble around the edges. It's not right . . . it's not American.\footnote{163}
\end{quote}

Some of the protest against wilderness designation focused on the outsiders who visit the National Forests. A Marble, N.C., man, interviewed by CBS News, wondered, "People in Raleigh and Washington, D.C., they don't have to make their living here. They don't have to heat with wood. Where we gonna' get heater wood? Where's these men gonna' work over here?"\footnote{164} Although many expressed concern about the general overuse of wildernesses, some spoke disparagingly of the type of people attracted to them. Throughout the region, the mountaineers made a clear distinction between themselves and the weekenders who hiked the Appalachian Trail, rode the Chattooga River, or backpacked near the Red River Gorge of the Daniel Boone. A Georgia resident wrote, "I used to be able to drive with my family down on the Chattooga and camp out. Now it is only open to river riding hippies."\footnote{165} Another Georgia resident wrote, "I like to be able to get out and ride Dune Buggies and 4 Wheel. I don't like these city slickers and Hippies taking over."\footnote{166}
Private Inholdings Are Protected

Emotions sparked by RARE II also ran high over the question of private inholdings within designated wildernesses. The Eastern Wilderness Act provided for acquisition of inholdings, but put no specific restrictions on the use of private land within or adjacent to wilderness. The Act authorized condemnation or exchange when the use of an inholding was incompatible with wilderness, but it did not define incompatibility. Since some of the proposed wildernesses contained several inholdings, the ambiguity created some alarm. For example, the 11,115-acre Clifty area in the Red River Gorge contained 2,145 acres in private ownership. Most was in summer-home lots and vacation cabins, but there was one permanent resident, the elderly Mrs. Ernie Tyra. Mrs. Tyra, who had optioned 115 of her 250 acres for sale to the Government, seemed less concerned about the wilderness designation than the second-home owners in the area, many of whom sent written comments to the forest supervisor. 165

Although the Clifty area was finally selected for wilderness, it was determined that the inholdings, if their present use continued, were not incompatible with wilderness, and that nothing in the area would change, "except that it [the designation] will never be changed." 166

In the Chattahoochee National Forest, the proposed Blood Mountain and Broad Camp roadless areas stirred inholders' reactions. When their perimeters were originally drawn, several summer homes in the vicinity of Lake Winfield Scott, and private lands with farms, chicken houses, and commercial enterprises were included. Clearly, some of these would be incompatible with wilderness. People asked what would become of these settlements—would their land-use options be restricted? Would the Forest Service take their land? The Forest Service, however, was unable to give a precise, definitive answer.

A public meeting was called in April 1978, in Suches, Union County, Ga., to which the Chattahoochee supervisor was called to explain the agency's intentions. Suches is a hamlet of only a few families cradled in the hills, but over 200 people were gathered in the local Woody Gap School. The crowd was visibly hostile; the supervisor was grateful to have had an assistant and two local ministers, Baptist and Methodist, acting as moderators and protectors. 169

The meeting passed without violence. Primarily as a result of the meeting, the supervisor acted to insure that the boundaries of the areas recommended for wilderness were redrawn to eliminate all private lands. He published a letter to the citizens of northern Georgia acknowledging a Forest Service error, and the validity of local concern. 170

How Much Wilderness?

Finally, some of the opposition to RARE II was based on the general issue of Federal rights and the particular issue of how much land and land-use control the Federal Government should have. "Must the Forest Service be so greedy?" a Young Harris, Ga., woman asked. 161 A Blairsville, Ga., dentist wrote, "Although I'm an avid environmentalist, I feel that the current proposed legislation imposes too much upon the citizens' rights under our Constitution." 167

Throughout the Southern Appalachians, citizens were not content simply to write protest letters to their district rangers. Many of them organized protest groups. Jack Brettler, of Franklin, N.C., started the Save America Club; Jimmy Rogers, a Baptist minister with interests in timber, organized the Stop RARE II Coalition in western North Carolina and northern Georgia. The Coalition issued "Stop RARE II" bumper stickers, which were popular on the mountain roads. 173 By far the largest and most effective local organization was SORE—Save Our Recreational Environment. SORE was formed in September 1977, in Tellico Plains, Monroe County, Tenn., and was led by the mayor, Charles Hall. SORE boasted about 2,500 members, but it sponsored many times that number of protest letters. SORE inundated the Cherokee forest office with written comments on RARE II. Indeed, Tennessee ranked fifth nationally in the number of responses received, more than half of them sponsored by SORE. 174

The intense, instant opposition to RARE II in the Tellico Plains area can be explained largely by the concern already present over the halting of the Tellico Dam and Tellico-Robbinsville Scenic Highway. Both of these projects had been stopped by environmentalist protest but were favored by the local population because they would boost the area's marginal economy. 175 The Tellico Dam, a proposed TVA project on the Little Tennessee River, was halted by a court ruling based on the threat to the snail darter, an endangered fish species. 176 The Scenic Highway, which had been approved in 1964, was opposed from the beginning by environmentalists because its path traversed a portion of the Joyce Kilmer Memorial Forest, a remote and pristine area of the Nantahala National Forest. 177 The original route was shifted, and one-third of the highway had been completed through the Cherokee National Forest on the Tennessee side when it was halted by environmental opposition.

SORE thus represented a convergence of issues. Moreover, the success of SORE was partly attributable to the ease with which local residents and vacation homeowners could work together. In contrast to the situation in northern Georgia and southwestern North Carolina, many second-home owners in the East Tennessee mountains had roots there. Although they lived in Chattanooga or Knoxville, their families had come from the mountains, and they felt at home there. They drove the same cars, and looked and talked the same, as the full-time local residents. Thus, the two groups worked easily together for a common goal: no more mountain wilderness. 178

Considering the high level of emotion, concern, and involvement generated by RARE II, it is not surprising that anti-wilderness protest threatened at times to become violent. The level of hostility at RARE II meetings was often high. In Franklin, N.C., in early August 1978, the Forest Service presented an "information meeting," which brought "a
caravan of cars and pickups, heavy log-loaders and tractor-trailer rigs’ to town. 

Citizens had previously agreed to refrain from verbal comment at the meeting. However, when one unidentified man yelled, “We don’t want no more damned wilderness,” the mayor of Franklin, claiming to be a protestor himself, led a walkout.

The most widespread threat expressed was burning the forests, should they be designated wilderness. For example, in the Chattahoochee National Forest in the summer of 1978, a plywood roadside sign was posted that read, “You put it in ‘wilderness’ and we’ll put it in ashes.” Such threats were verbal as well as written, and became a popular subject of local newspaper editorials and analyses. April 1978 was a month of unusually numerous fires across the Southeast, attributable in part to unseasonably dry weather. Some of the fires, however, were called deliberate. That month, the Asheville Citizen-Times in an editorial discussed reasons for deliberate forest burning. Acknowledging the Southern tradition of burning the woods for the purpose of clearing land and eliminating rodents, snakes, and insects, the article also cited revenge and ‘misguidance’ as motivations. “Big government,’ . . . an unresponsive society . . . foresters,” all were cited as targets of vengeful burning. (Ironically, that very month, in McCreary County, Ky., the Forest Service was embarrassed when a debris-burning fire it had set to clear a 100-acre plot flattened by a tornado spread out of control, aided by very dry brush and gusting winds, until it had covered 1,400 acres in the Daniel Boone National Forest.

However, although there were threats and hints of violence, there were almost no violent acts documented. Rangers on the Cherokee observed that, even at the height of the RARE II process and remained unresolved: mining in National Forest wilderness areas. Shortly after the Wilderness Act was passed, the Chief of the Forest Service expressed concern that this issue could cause “some of our most difficult administrative problems.” Under the Wilderness Act and Eastern Wilderness Act, mining was permitted in designated wilderness areas, according to terms of preexisting leases and permits, until December 31, 1983. (In the eastern National Forests, mineral rights under one-third of the land are not owned by the Government; either they were reserved by the seller when Federal acquisition occurred or they were already outstanding in third parties. In the Daniel Boone and Jefferson forests, where coal deposits are known to exist, even more of the subsurface mineral rights are held by private interests. For example, of 85,000 acres on the Clinch Ranger District of the Jefferson, 55,000—or 65 percent—have privately held mineral rights.)

Mining Issue Is Unresolved

A potentially more explosive issue was not addressed by the RARE II process and remained unresolved: mining in National Forest wilderness areas. Shortly after the Wilderness Act was passed, the Chief of the Forest Service expressed concern that this issue could cause “some of our most difficult administrative problems.” Under the Wilderness Act and Eastern Wilderness Act, mining was permitted in designated wilderness areas, according to terms of preexisting leases and permits, until December 31, 1983. (In the eastern National Forests, mineral rights under one-third of the land are not owned by the Government; either they were reserved by the seller when Federal acquisition occurred or they were already outstanding in third parties. In the Daniel Boone and Jefferson forests, where coal deposits are known to exist, even more of the subsurface mineral rights are held by private interests. For example, of 85,000 acres on the Clinch Ranger District of the Jefferson, 55,000—or 65 percent—have privately held mineral rights.)

Although the Forest Service has been unable to dictate the extent of mining in parts of the Southern Appalachian forests, mineral extraction prior to 1975 was limited, and most was through deep mining, which generally did not jeopardize other forest uses. However, as strip-mining of marginal lands became more economically feasible, the threat of major land-use controversies grew. In the late 1970’s, such a controversy erupted over strip-mining in the Beaver Creek wilderness of the Daniel Boone National Forest.
In 1975, the Greenwood Land and Mining Co., which operated four deep mines in the Daniel Boone forest, purchased rights to 5,000 acres of coal under the Beaver Creek wilderness in McCræary County—rights that had been reserved when the land was sold to the Government in 1937. Greenwood applied for a permit to prospect for coal at 27 sites, 22 of which were in the wilderness. The prospecting would have involved the use of motorized equipment and excavation. Ultimate recovery of the coal would require some contour stripping.196

The Forest Service denied the permit, on the basis that the prospecting was not compatible with wilderness management. Greenwood filed suit in U.S. District Court in November 1976; the court ruled in favor of Greenwood, but, commenting on an issue beyond the immediate suit, added that strip-mining could not occur on public property.197 Meanwhile, the Forest Service began planning to acquire Greenwood’s interests in the Beaver Creek area, as the mining company appealed its case. Neither initiative had been settled by early 1982.198

A similar case in the same county had a different outcome. In 1996 the Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. applied for a permit to strip-mine 15 acres of National Forest land on White Oak Creek. The Forest Service denied the application, citing the Secretary of Agriculture’s Rules and Regulations of 1911 with which Stearns’ reserved rights had to comply.199 Stearns “wholly rejected” the premises of the Forest Service denial, and took the case to court for resolution.200 In 1978, the Kentucky State Supreme Court upheld the Kentucky tradition that, in the case of a broad form deed, mining rights take precedence over surface rights, even if the surface owner is the United States Government and the surface is “public property.”

The case went to Federal court, and in early 1982 was still unsettled. The outcome of the case will have repercussions not only in McCræary County, where Greenwood Land and Mining Co. is seeking to traverse and possibly strip within the Beaver Creek wilderness, but throughout the Daniel Boone and other eastern National Forests. The most decisive recourse for the Forest Service would be acquisition of or exchanging other land for the mining rights to such land—either a very expensive solution.

By early 1982, Congress had not yet acted to establish the recommended new wilderness areas in the Southern Appalachians. In the meantime, public use of most of the areas that had been previously designated wilderness was increasing substantially. In only 3 years, between 1977 and 1980, the estimated recreational use of the eight wildernesses of the Southern Appalachians increased by over 13 percent.201 The pressures on the forests of the region, from backpackers, Federal recreation developers, and the mountaineers, seemed focused on wilderness areas. Yet the issues surrounding wilderness—particularly strip mining and the acquisition of inholdings—remained unresolved.

Reference Notes

1. 72 Stat. 238.


3. The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) was created April 2, 1962, by Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950. Foss, Conservation in the United States, p. 595. See also Fitch and Shanklin, The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. BOR was deactivated January 25, 1978 by Secretary Cecil D. Andrus, and its functions shifted to the new Heritage Recreation and Conservation Service, which was abolished February 19, 1981 by Secretary James Watt and most functions shifted to the Park Service.


7. 78 Stat. 897. See Chapter VII for discussion of LWCF acquisition in the Southern Appalachian forests.

8. LWCF Act, Section 6 (a) (1).


11. 80 Stat. 190.


14. Recreation-Use Information, computerized data on microfiche, Recreation Management Staff, USDA, Forest Service, Washington, D.C.
15. Act to Establish Mount Rogers, Section 3 (a).


17. Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture in Establishment of the Mount Rogers National Recreation Area in Virginia, 5.


25. Interview with Charles Cushman, President, National Inholders Association, Sonoma, Calif., March 6, 1981.


27. Tyler, "Why It Helps to Know Sen. Howard Baker."


32. Perry, McCready Conquest, p. 164.

33. 82 Stat. 906.

34. Some confusion over the Federal designation of a Wild River versus a State designation is apparent in the case of the Big South Fork of the Cumberland River in the Daniel Boone National Forest. L. E. Perry, in his book McCready Conquest, stated that the Big South Fork had been designated under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968; in fact, the river became a Kentucky Wild River under the Wild Rivers Act of 1972, and is administered by the Kentucky Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. "Wild Rivers of Kentucky," publication of Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Frankfort, Ky., n.d.

35. This designation was legislatively confirmed by PL 94-407, September 11, 1976.


37. A glossy folded brochure entitled, "The New River, A Heritage Endangered," with colored photographs, was distributed by the National Committee for the New River. Reports were regularly printed in Committee letterhead.


41. Interview with County Manager, Ashe County, N.C., February 19, 1981.

42. P.L. 93-279.

43. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February 1981.


45. Interview with Pat Thomas, Supervisor, Chattahoochee National Forest, Gainesville, Ga., July 11, 1979; supplemented with interview with Charles Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.


47. Recreation-Use Information, Recreation Management Staff, USDA-Forest Service, Washington, D.C.


51. 82 Stat. 919.

52. 82 Stat. 919; Section 5 (a).

53. 82 Stat. 919; Section 7 (g).


56. Fairfax, p. 137.

57. Fairfax, pp. 138, 139.

58. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February 17, 1981.


60. 92 Stat. 159.

61. 92 Stat. 159; Section 5 (a) (1).

62. In fiscal year 1980, no funds were appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund for Appalachian Trail right-of-way acquisition. However, other LWCF funds from the West were utilized for Trail purposes. Acquisition was slowed, but did not stop. Some funds also became available late in FY 1981. Information provided by Lands, Staff, USDA Forest Service, Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February and October, 1981.

63. Forest Service Lands Staff, Atlanta, Ga., February, 1981.

64. Information provided by Charles D. Huppuch, Lands Staff, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., February and October, 1981.


68. Interview with Dr. Billie DeWalt, University of Kentucky anthropologist employed by the Forest Service to study Red River Gorge community, Winchester, Ky., July 27, 1979.

69. Fitch and Shanklin, The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, p. 73. (See notes 2, 3, and 9.)


75. Walp, p. 31.

76. Walp, p. 30.


78. Neff, 30.

79. Neff, Chapter II.

80. Recreational use statistics are not comparable for the years before and after 1965; in that year the Forest Service shifted from reporting "visits" to "visitor-days." One visitor-day is equal to recreational use of national forest land or water that aggregates 12 visitor-hours. This may entail one person for 12 hours, 12 persons for one hour or any equivalent combination of use, continuous or intermittent. Recreation Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.

81. Recreation-Use data on the North Carolina forests include the Pisgah, Nantahala, Uwharrie, and Croatan National Forests; the data on the Chattahoochee include the Oconee.

82. Gatlinburg was cited in the *Response* of Citizens for Southwest Virginia as an example of what they hoped Mount Rogers would never become, pp. 40-42.


89. Shands and Healy, in *The Lands Nobody Wanted*, cited Highlands, along with Massanutten Mountain in the George Washington National Forest, as an example of the "blighting developments" that exist "in almost every eastern national forest," p. 157 (See note 13.)

90. Data on Recreation-Tourism-Second Home Development Firms, Table 1, in *Southern Highlands Mountain Resources Management Plan*, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, North Carolina Department of Administration, South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, June 1974.


92. Roseman, Table 2.

93. Roseman, Table 5.

94. Roseman, Table 3.

95. These data support for findings of Neff, "A Geographic Analysis of the Characteristics and Development Trends of the Non-Metropolitan Tourist-Recreation Industry."


103. Hicks, pp. 51, 52.

104. Hicks, p. 62.


112. The analogy between recreational development and coal and timber exploitation appears, for example, in Bingham, "The Impact of Recreational Development on Pioneer Life-Styles in Southern Appalachia;" O’Neill, "Greatest Menace Yet to the Southern Mountains;" and Parlow, "The Land Development Rag."


118. Hicks, *Appalachian Valley*, p. 52.

119. Hicks, p. 53.

120. Garvey, *Appalachian Hiker II*, p. 167. (See note 49.)


124. 78 Stat. 890.


127. 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. 529; (Section 2); Cooley and Wandesforde-Smith, *Congress and the Environment*, p. 54; *Federal Agencies and Outdoor Recreation*, ORRRC Report 13, p. 27.


131. Frome, *Battle For the Wilderness*, pp. 170-175.

132. Recreation-Use Information, on microfiche, Recreation Management Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington, D.C.


134. 88 Stat. 2096.


139. For example, the *Greenville*, Tenn., *Sun.*, on August 16, 1978, published a Forest Service invitation for groups interested in a program on RARE II proposals to contact their local ranger station for scheduling. The July 2, 1978 *Lexington, Ky., Herald Leader* presented the RARE II proposals for the Daniel Boone and explained where copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement could be obtained.


144. *Implementing the Organization Study*, p. 1-IV.


152. Margaret J. Boland and Larry N. Stern, “Public Impact and Decision-Making in the U.S. Forest Service” Community Research Center, Mars Hill College, p. 6.


156. Letter No. 08-00-002746-30546-1-1 to USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga., from resident of Hiwassee, Ga. See also Steve Oney, “The Wilderness Campaign,” p. 27 (note 46).


158. Based on analysis of questionnaires sent to district rangers as part of RARE II Individual Area Social Analysis, USDA Forest Service Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.

159. Analysis of RARE II questionnaires, Atlanta, Ga.


161. See, for example, Lee Vance, “For the Record,” *Erwin Record*, Erwin, Tenn., September 6, 1978.


163. Letter No. 08-03-01137-30525-1-1 to Forest Service, Tallulah Ranger District, Clayton, Ga., from resident of Clayton.


165. RARE II Oral Comment dated June 24, 1978. See also Boland, *Public Involvement in Forest Planning* p. 15.

166. RARE II Oral Comment dated June 30, 1978, received by Chattahoochee National Forest headquarters, Gainesville, Georgia. The aspersions cast by some mountain people on the urban recreationists were sometimes matched and exceeded by outsiders’ comments on the protestors. A man from Pocatello, Idaho, enraged by a national news story citing Georgia residents threatening to burn the wilderness, wrote to the regional forester in Atlanta, “I’d like to see those stupid mountain YA HOOS try to burn them down. The national forests belong to everyone, not just some fat-bellied and round-assed Georgia locals.” Letter 08-00-002377-8320 1-1-1.


The information on the Suches meeting is based on an interview with Pat Thomas, Supervisor of the Chattahoochee National Forest, Roger Frantz, and Steve Briggs, Gainesville, Ga., July 11, 1979. The incident described is very similar to the experience of citizens of Bristol, Vermont over the designation in 1975 of the Bristol Cliffs wilderness area in the Green Mountain National Forest. Inholders learned of the wilderness only after it had already been created; they formed the Bristol Cliffs Wilderness Area Landowners Association and eventually succeeded in having all private inholdings removed from the wilderness area. Shands and Healy, *The Land Nobody Wanted*, pp. 166, 167.


Letter to Supervisor, Chattahoochee National Forest from resident of Young Harris, Ga., August 19, 1978.

letter No. 08-03-00489-30512-1-1 to Forest Service, Brasstown District, Blairsville, Ga., from resident of Blairsville, July 31, 1978.


*Frome, Battle for the Wilderness*, p. 175. It is now a wilderness.

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